China State Commercial Banks' Non-Performing Loans: Workout and Prevention by Lou, Jianbo
China State Commercial Banks' Non-Performing 
Loans: Workout and Prevention 
JIANBO LOU 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of 
the University of London 
in satisfaction of the requirements of the Ph. D. examination 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
Queen Mary and Westfield College 
University of London 
February 2001 
Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the very significant problem of State bank non- 
performing loan (NPL) in China. NPLs undermine the stability of China's banking system 
and the efficient operation of its markets. This thesis will make recommendations for 
developing better workout procedures to deal with existing NPLs and explore the role of 
banking regulation and supervision in NPL prevention, as well as in avoiding impacts of 
NPLs on the stability of banking system, drawing on experiences at national, regional and 
international levels. 
The accumulation of NPLs in China has been caused by the dominant role of State 
banks in China's financial markets, policy loans to state owned enterprises (SOEs), 
unnecessary administrative controls on banks' lending activities, weak internal controls 
within State banks and inappropriate banking regulation and supervision. All these have 
seriously ruined the conditions of market discipline in China and resulted not only in large 
amount of NPL stock, but also the constant creation of new NPLs on State banks' balance 
sheets. 
The NPL problem in China is not limited to individual banks. It is a systemic problem 
closely connected to the SOE problem. The existing bank NPLs cannot be worked out 
without debt and enterprise restructuring. The balance sheets of banks and firms must be 
cleaned up by, first, recapitalizing banks to write off and make provision for existing NPLs, 
and, second, setting up independent asset management companies to purchase and manage 
bank NPLs. 
To prevent the increasing accumulation of new NPLs, unnecessary administrative 
controls on banks must be removed; prudential banking regulation and supervision much be 
enhanced; appropriate internal control systems must be promoted within banks, especially 
with regard to the proper risk evaluation systems and internal decision-taking structures. To 
avoid the damaging impacts of NPL problem on the stability of the banking system, ' an 
explicit limited deposit insurance system should be introduced; the central bank's lender of 
last resort facilities must be properly defined; bank insolvency resolution mechanisms must 




I am deeply grateful to Prof. Joseph J. Norton, Sir John Lubbock Professor of Banking Law 
at the CCLS, the University of London and Dr. George Walker, Lecturer at the CCLS, the 
University of London, who are both my supervisors. Without their extensive supervision and 
constant encouragement, this thesis would not have been completed. 
Thanks should also be given to Dr. Zhongfei Zhou, Sir John Lubbock Support Fund 
Fellow, CCLS; Professor Frank Lin and Dr. Jay J. Lin at the National Chenchi University of 
Taiwan; and Mr. Yangxin Wang, General Manager of International Department, the Bank of 
China, for their enlightening suggestions on my thesis. Special gratitude should be expressed 
to Mr. Douglas Amer, now Assistant Professor at the Hong Kong University Law Faculty, 
and Jorge Guira, J. Hoogmar, Heba Shams and Mamilo Yokoi at CCLS. They kindly edited 
the thesis for me. My sincere thanks are also extended to all other members of our London- 
based team who have created a very friendly environment for working together. They are 
Parmjit Badeshia, Wallace Wang and Paul, Liang. 
I also would like to thank all my friends in London for taking care of me when I was 
recovering from the road accident in 1998. Financial support from the Ministry of Education, 
the PRC and the K. C. Wong Education Foundation (Hong Kong) is greatly acknowledged. 
Last but not least, I want to thank Dean Wu, Zhipan and my other colleagues at 
Peking University Law School for their helping me and facilitating my research in China. 
Without their support, it would have been impossible for me to accomplish what I have 
achieved. 
ii 
China State Commercial Banks' Non-Performing 
Loans: Workout and Prevention 





I. BACKGROUND: THE PROBLEM STATED 
II. STRUCTURE OF THE VOLUME 
III. METHODOLOGIES 
A. GENERALIZATION VS. SPECIALIZATION 
B. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS VS. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Chapter One: 
CHIAN'S BANK NON-PERFORMING LOAN PROBLEM: SERIOUSNESS, CAUSES 
AND SOLUTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE BANK NPL PROBLEM IN CHINA 
A. THE SERIOUSNESS: LARGE AMOUNT OF EXISTING NPLS AND INCREASING NEW 
NPLS 
111 
B. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF STATE BANK NPLS 
1. Negative Effects on State Banks 
(i) The decreasing profitability of the "big four" 
(ii) The Deteriorating Creditworthiness of State Commercial 
Banks 
(iii) The Potential Failure of State Commercial Banks and the 
Entire Banking System 
2. Negative Effects on the country's Economic Reform and Its Real 
Economy Growth 
(i) Negative Effects on the Economic Reform towards a 
Market Economy 
(ii) Negative Effects on the Real Economy 
C. SUMMARY 
III. CAUSES OF BANK NPLS - THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
1. The Concept of Soft Budget Constraints and Its Application 
2. Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints 
3. Sources of Soft Budget Constraints 
B. MARKET DISCIPLINE-A MECHANISM TO CURB SOFT CREDIT 
1. General Introduction - the Theory of Market Discipline 
2. Market Discipline as a Mechanism to Curb Unsustainable Borrowing 
and Its Conditions 
C. FAILURE OF MARKET DISCIPLINE - THE ULTIMATE ROOT OF THE NPL 
PROBLEM IN CHINA 
IV. CAUSES OF BANK NPLS - EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
A. BANK-CENTRIC AND STATE-BANK-DOMINATED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
1. The Bank-Centric Finance in China 
(i) Underdeveloped Capital Markets 
(ii) The Domination of Bank Lending in Enterprise Finance 
(iii) The Domination of Bank Deposit Savings in Household 
Financial Assets 
iv 
(iv) High-Leverage Ratio in Enterprises and High-Level of 
NPLs -a Direct Consequence of the Bank-Centric 
Finance 
2. The Domination of State Commercial Banks 
(i) The "Big Four "-dominated Financial System 
(ü) State Commercial Bank-domination: Captive Finance 
Markets 
B. SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS ON SOES IN THE FORM OF POLICY LOANS 
1. General Introduction 
2. Policy Loans for Development Purpose 
3. Policy Loans to Subsidize Loss-making SOEs 
4. Failure of Market Discipline Due to Policy Loans 
C. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ON STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS 
1. Administrative Controls on State Commercial Banks as Monetary 
Policy Instruments 
2. The Credit Plan 
(i) General Introduction 
(ii) Negative Effects of the Credit Plan 
3. Interest Rate Controls 
(i) The Development of Interest Rate Controls 
(ii) The Negative Effects of Interest Rate Control 
4. Division of Business Scope among State Specialized Banks 
(i) The Development of Business Scope Division among State 
Specialized Banks 
(ii) The Negative Effects of the Business Division 
D. WEAK INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS IN STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS 
E. THE INAPPROPRIATE BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
F. SUMMARY 
V. THREE BASIC STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH BANK NPL PROBLEM 
A. BANK CLOSURE AND LIQUIDATION AT LARGE SCALE 
B. REGULATORY FORBEARANCE 
1. Regulatory Forbearance General 
V 
2. Regulatory Forbearance in China: a Failed Policy 
C. BANK RESTRUCTURING 
1. Justification for Bank Restructuring 
2. Ten Critical Points in Managing and Resolving a Systemic Bank 




NON-PERFORMING LOAN WORKOUTS: BANK RECAPTALIZATION, AMC 
PRACTICES AND NPL MANANGEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. RECAPITALIZING THE "BIG FOUR" 
A. JUSTIFICATION FOR GOVERNMENT RECAPITALIZATION OF THE "BIG FOUR" 
1. State Ownership of the "Big Four" 
2. The Low Profitability of the "Big Four" Denotes That They Cannot 
Grow out of the Problem Themselves 
3. Difficulties for the "Big Four" to Raise Capital 
B. RECAPITALIZING THE "BIG FOUR" - TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Liability Side Vs. Asset Side Recapitalization 
2. Cash Injection Vs. Bond-Bad Debt Swap 
3. Ex-ante Recapitalization Vs. Ex post Recapitalization 
4. Central Bank Vs. Treasury 
5. Summary 
C. COMMENTS ON CHINA'S BANK RECAPITALIZATION PRACTICES 
1. The Special Treasury Bond Issuance in 1998 
2. The 1999 Practice 
D. THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN RECAPITALIZATION AND MARKET DISCIPLINE 
1. Methods to Enhance Market Discipline: Asian Experience 
2. Implications for China 
III. CHINA'S AMC PROGRAM 
vi 
A. WHY ASSET MANAGEMENT COMPANIES IN CHINA? 
1. The Polish Experience: Leaving the NPLs inside the Banks 
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Specialized Agency Solution: 
the Experience of "Asian Crisis Countries" 
3. Implications for China 
B. CHINA'S AMC PROGRAM 
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S AMCS 
1. Bank-Specific AMCs 
2. State Ownership and Heavy Administrative Color 
3. Wide Business Scope and Powers 
D. PROBLEMS WITH CHINA'S AMC PROGRAM AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTION 
1. The Dilemma Faced by Chinese AMCs 
2. The Dependence of AMCs on the Respective Banks 
3. The Lack of Expertise and Experience 
4. Difficulties in Evaluating Assets 
E. IMMEDIATE LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHINA'S AMC PROGRAM AND 
RECOMMENDED SOLUTION 
1. Immediate Legal Issues Related to AMC Practices in China 
(i) The Notification Obligation under the Contract Law 
(ii) Procedural Requirements for the Transfer of Security 
Interests 
(iii) AMCs' Liabilities to Debtors 
2. Recommended Solution 
IV. TWO MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES TOWARDS NPLS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA 
A. TWO MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES TOWARD NPLS 
B. CHOOSING THE RIGHT STRATEGY: EXPERIENCE OF MALAYSIA AND SOUTH 
KOREA 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA 
V. DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS 
A. DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS IN CHINA 
1. The SETC Debt-Equity Swap Scheme 
vi' 
2. The Implementation of the Scheme 
C. POLICIES BEHIND THE SETC DEBT-EQUITY SWAP SCHEME 
1. The Debt-Equity Swap Scheme as Part of the Government Anti- 
deflation Policies 
2. The Micro-economic Effects: a Win-Win Situation for SOEs and 
Banks 
3. Justification for Converting SOEs' Debts into Equity 
D. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT DEBT-EQUITY SWAP SCHEME AND 
RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 
1. Moral Hazard Problem 
2. Lack of Workable Reorganization Plan 
E. AMCS' EXIT PROBLEM 
1. The Importance of AMCs' Timely Exit 
2. Probable Exit Routes for AMCs and Obstacles 
(i) Difficulties in Disposing Shareholdings by Selling Them to 
the Public 
(ii) Difficulties in Selling Shares to Strategic Investors 
(iii) Difficulties in Selling Back the Shares to the Debtor 
Companies or Their Parent Institutions 
F. SUMMARY 
VI. A PROPER LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DEBT DISPOAL AND 
RESTRUCTURING 
A. CREDITOR PASSIVITY OF THE BANKS IN CHINA: THE LACK OF AN EFFICIENT 
LOAN COLLECTING MECHANISM IN CHINA 
1. The Phenomena 
2. The Causes 
(i) The Disincentive Factors Within China's Banking System 
a. Soft Budget Constraints on State Commercial Banks 
b. Inadequate Loan Classification and Provisioning Rules 
c. Lack of Autonomy in Loan Write-off 
(ii) Problems With China's Bankruptcy Legislation 
a. Problems with Bankruptcy Procedures 
b. The Pro-employee Asset Distribution 
vi" 
3. Policy Recommendation 
B. THE LACK OF CONSENSUAL MECHANISMS TO FACILIATE NEGOTIATION 
BETWEEN CREDITORS AND DEBTORS 
1. The Conciliation and Reorganization Procedure Provided by the 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law Cannot Fit the Need of Debt 
Restructuring 
2. The Main Bank System in China- Should China Develop Bank-led 
Debt Restructuring? 
3. Out-of-court Procedure 
(i) Who Should Take Responsibility for Corporate Sector 
Restructuring in China? 
(ii) Collective Action Problem in Debt Restructuring 
(iii) Pro-claim debts 
a. The Economics behind the Pro-claim Debt 
b. The Closed-end Loan in China: Is it a Pro-Claim Debt? 
(ii) SUMMARY 
Chapter Three: 
NON-PERFORMING LOAN PREVENTION - ENHANCING PRUDENTIAL 
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION, PROMOTING BANK INTERNAL CONTROL 
SYSTEMS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
H. REMOVING UNNECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ON STATE 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
A. INDIRECT MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS VS. DIRECT MONETARY POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS 
B. CREDIT GUIDANCE VS. CREDIT PLAN 
1. The Removal of Credit Plan 
2. The Introduction of Credit Guidance 
3. The Implication of the Reform 
ix 
C. DECONTROL OF INTEREST RATES 
1. China's Current RMB Interest Rate Administration System under the 
1999 Interest Rate Administration Provisions 
2. Efforts towards the Liberalization of Interest Rates 
(i) Establishing and Improving the Floating Rate System 
(ii) The Reform of Loan Interest Rate Categorizing and 
Calculation Measures 
3. Prospects of Interest Rate Liberalization in China 
III. CURRENT BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN CHINA: AS 
COMPARED WITH THE BASLE COMMITTEE CORE PRINCIPLES FOR 
EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 
A. LICENSING PROCESS AND APPROVAL FOR CHANGES IN STRUCTURE 
1. The Core Principles' Requirements 
2. Licensing and Structure Change Approval in China 
3. Are China's Requirements in Conformity with the Basle Core 
Principles? 
B. ARRANGEMENTS FOR ONGOING BANKING SUPERVISION 
1. Prudential Regulations and Requirements 
2. Methods of Ongoing Banking Supervision 
(i) General Introduction 
(ii) On-site Examination and Off-site Surveillance in China 
a. From Solely Relying on On-site Examination towards 
the Combination of On-site Examination and Off-site 
Surveillance 
b. Establishing Standards for On-site Examination and 
Off-site Surveillance 
c. Establishing and Improving the Reporting System 
4 
d. Consolidating On-going Supervision 
(iii) Problems with China's Ongoing Supervision and 
Recommended Solutions 
a. Developing Clear Rules for On-site Examination 
b. Making Full Use of Independent External Auditors 
X 
c. Developing Consultations between the PBOC and Bank 
Senior Management 
d. Developing a Rating System Similar to the CAMEL 
System so as to Establish Early Warning Systems 
C. SANCTIONING: FORMAL POWERS OF SUPERVISORS 
1. China Has Developed a Set of Supervisory Measures to Bring about 
Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) 
2. Problems with China's PCAs and Improvement Recommendations 
IV. PROMOTING INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS WITHIN COMMERCIAL 
BANKS 
A. THE BASLE COMMITTEE FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS IN 
BANKING ORGANIZATION 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANK INTERNAL CONTROLS IN CHINA 
1. Bank Internal Controls before the Issuance of the PBOC Guidelines 
for Enhancing Internal Controls of Financial Institutions 
2. The 1997 PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Internal Controls of 
Financial Institutions: in Comparison with the Basle Committee 
Internal Control Paper 
(i) Definition and Objectives of Internal Controls 
(ii) Primary Elements of Internal Controls 
a. Management Oversight and the Control Culture 
b. Risk Recognition and Assessment 
c. Control Activities and Segregation of Duties 
d. Information and Communication 
e. Monitoring Activities and Correcting Deficiencies 
(iii) Evaluation of Internal Control Systems by Supervisory 
Authorities 
C. PROBLEMS WITH INTERNAL CONTROLS IN CHINA'S COMMERCIAL BANKS 
1. The Organizational Structure of State Commercial Banks 
(i) The Organizational Structure of State Commercial Banks 
(ii) Diversifying the Ownership Structure of the "Big Four": a 
Solution to Their Corporate Governance Problem? 
xi 




BANKING SAFETY NET: MECHANISMS FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION - DESIGNING A BANKING SAFETY NET 
II. DEFINING THE LENDER-OF-LAST-RESORT IN CHINA 
A. A GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1. Understanding the LOLR Properly 
2. The History and Theoretical Foundation of the LOLR 
3. Defining the LOLR in Practice 
B. DEFINING THE PBOC'S LOLR ROLE 
1. The PBOC's LOLR Role Is Not Well Defined in China 
2. Legal Definition of the LOLR: the US, UK and Japan Models 
(i) The US Model 
(ii) The UK Model 
(iii) The Japan Model 
3. Implications for China 
III. INTRODUCING A DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM INTO CHINA 
A. WHY DEPOSIT INSURANCE? 
1. A Brief Survey of Deposit Insurance Programs Worldwide 
2. Pros and Cons of Deposit Insurance 
3. Doctrine of Necessity 
4. To Replace the Implicit Government Guarantee in China with 
Explicit Deposit Insurance 
(i) China's Current Government Implicit Guarantee 
(ii) Arguments for and against Government Implicit Guarantee 
(iii) Conclusion: China Should Replace the Current 
Government Implicit Guarantee with Explicit Deposit 
Insurance 
xli 
B. ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED AND PRINCIPLES TO BE FOLLOWED IN DESIGNING 
CHINA'S DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM 
1. Issues to Be Considered 
2. Principles for Designing a Deposit Insurance System 
(i) The Explicit Deposit Insurance Should Be Established by 
Legislation 
(ii) The Deposit Insurance System Should Be Designed in as 
Incentive-compatible a May as Possible 
(iii) The Deposit Insurance System Should Be in Harmony with 
the Existing Financial System 
C. DESIGNING CHINA'S DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM 
1. Organizational Structure, Coverage and Funding of Deposit 
Insurance 
(i) The Organizational Structure 
(ii) The Scope of Deposit Insurance 
(iii) The Deposit Insurance Coverage 
(iv) Funding the Deposit Insurance 
2. Deposit Insurance Premiums 
3. Membership of the Deposit Insurance System 
4. Summary 
D. TIMING THE INTRODUCTION OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
IV. INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION 
A. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
B. CLOSURE AND LIQUIDATION (DEPOSIT PAYOFF) 
1. Out of Court Liquidation: Voluntary Closure Vs. Administrative 
Closure 
(i) Legal Infrastructure for Administrative Closure 
(ii) Closure Procedures 
(iii) Advantages and Disadvantages of the Administrative 
Closure 
2. Bankruptcy 
(i) Statutory Provisions 
(ii) Problems Raised by the GITIC Case 
xiii 
C. MERGER AND TAKE OVER (PURCHASE & ASSUMPTION) 
1. General Introduction 
2. The Chinese Practice 
D. RESCUE PACKAGE OR OPEN BANK ASSISTANCE 
1. General Introduction 
2. Application in China 
E. MANAGEMENT TAKEOVER (A VARIATION OF BRIDGE BANK) 
1. The Bridge Bank Practice 
2. Management Takeover in China 
F. PROBLEMS WITH CHINA'S BANK INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION 
1. The Uncertainty in Treating Foreign Creditors 
2. The PBOC's Autonomy in Dealing with Problem Institutions 
3. Inadequate Transparency and Disclosure 
G. BUILDING UP A SOLID LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR BANK INSOLVENCY 
RESOLUTION 
1. General Consideration: Should China Adopt Special Legislation on 
Bank Insolvency Resolution 
2. Issues that Need to Be Clarified for Bank Insolvency Resolution in 
China 
(i) The Autonomy of the PBOC in Deciding Insolvency 
Resolution and Its Limitation 
(ii) Elaborating Provisions on Administrative Closure 




CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESTORING 
MARKET DISCIPLINE IN CHINA 
xiv 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. THE FAILURE OF MARKET DISCIPLINE - THE ULTIMATE ROOT OF 
THE STATE COMMERCIAL BANK NPL PROBLEM 
A. THE CAPTIVE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
B. THE INFORMATION PROBLEM 
C. THE BAILOUT EXPECTATION 
D. THE IRRESPONSIBILITY TO MARKET SIGNALS BY BORROWERS 
III. SYSTEMATIC BANKING AND SOE RESTRUCTURING - STRATEGIES 
TOWARD THE BANK NPL PROBLEM IN CHINA 
A. THE NECESSITY OF A COMPREHENSIVE BANK AND SOE RESTRUCTURING 
B. KEY STEPS FOR BANK AND SOE RESTRUCTURING IN CHINA 
IV. RESOLVING THE STOCK OF NPL: BANK RECAPITALIZATION AND NPL 
MANAGEMENT 
A. RECAPITALIZATION OF STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS VS. MARKET DISCIPLINE 
1. Ex-ante Recapitalization Vs. Ex post Recapitalization 
2. Private Sector-based Solution & Conditioning Public Support 
B. AMC PRACTICES IN CHINA: CAN AMCS IMPOSE MARKET DISCIPLINE ON SOES? 
1. Characteristics of AMCs in China 
2. The Debt-Equity Swap Scheme in China 
3. Problems with China's AMC Practices 
(i) The Dilemma Faced by Chinese AMCs 
(ii) AMCs' Capacity and Incentive Problem 
(iii) Moral Hazards Accompanying the Debt-Equity Swap 
Scheme 
4. A Necessary Legal Framework for NPL Management in China 
(i) An AMC Law Should Be Adopted by the NPC or Its 
Standing Committee 
(ii) Updating China's Banking and Bankruptcy Legislation so 
that Banks Will Have Incentives to Be Positive Creditors 
NO Establishing An Appropriate Framework to Facilitate 
Negotiation between Creditors and Debtors 
5. Conclusion 
xv 
V. NPL PREVENTION: DEVELOPING A PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN BANKING REGULATION AND MARKET DISCIPLINE 
A. WHY A PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANKING REGULATION AND 
MARKET DISCIPLINE? 
1. Rationale of Regulation, Rationale of Market Discipline 
2. The Limitation of Regulation 
3. Conclusion 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRUDENTIAL BANKING REGULATION IN CHINA AND 
ITS COMPATIBILITY WITH MARKET DISCIPLINE 
1. Fostering Competition Should Be One of the Objectives for Banking 
Regulation and Supervision in China 
2. Removing Administrative Controls on Banks Completely 
3. Promoting Disclosure Standards and Accounting Practices 
VI. DESIGNING AN APPROPRIATE BANKING SAFETY NET TO ENHANCE 
MARKET DISCIPLINE AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION IN CHINA 
A. THE OVERALL CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE BANKING SAFETY NET AND 
MARKET DISCIPLINE 
1. The Inherent Moral Hazard Problem 
2. Understanding the Safety and Soundness Properly 
B. THE BANK SAFETY NET MUST BE WELL-DESIGNED AND OPERATED 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1.1: Profits Margin of Banks in China (percentage): 1995-1997 
Table 1.2: Table of Enterprise Finance Structure in China 
Figure 2-1: NPL Management Strategies 





ABC, the Agricultural Bank of China 
ABS, asset-backed securitization 
ADB, Asian Development Bank 
ADB, the Agricultural Development Bank (China) 
AMC(s), Assets Management Corporation(s) 
Basel Committee, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 
BCAs, bank-led conciliation agreements (Poland) 
BCCI, Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
BOC, the Bank of China (China) 
BOCOM, the Bank of Communications (China) 
BOE, the Bank of England (the UK) 
CAB, China Association of Banks 
CAMEL, Capital, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity 
CARs, Capital Adequacy Requirements 
CBI, central bank independence 
CCB, China Construction Bank 
CDRAC, the Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee (Thailand) 
CDRC, the Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (Malaysia) 
CIB, China's Investment Bank 
CIRC, China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
CITIC, China International Trust and Investment Corp. 
Core Principles, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision on Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision 
COSCO, China Ocean Shipping Company 
CPC, the Communist Party of China 
CPI, China People's Insurance Co. 
CPIC, China Pacific Insurance Co. (China) 
CRA, Corporate Restructuring Agreement (South Korea) 
CSRC, China Securities Regulatory Commission 
EBRP, the 1993 law on financial restructuring of enterprises and banks (Poland) 
EC, European Community 
xvii 
FDIC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the US) 
FDICIA, the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (the US) 
FED, Board of Federal Reserve System of the United States 
FHLBB, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the US) 
FIFI, foreign-invested financial institution (China) 
FIRREA, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (the 
US) 
FRA, Financial Sector Restructuring Agency (Thailand) 
FSA, Financial Service Authority (the UK) 
FSC, Financial Supervisory Commission (South Korea) 
FSLIC, Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (the US) 
GATT, General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 
GITIC, Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation 
GZITIC, Guangzhou International Trust and Investment Corporation 
HDB, the Hainan Development Bank (China) 
HHKMTIC, Hainan Hong Kong & Macao Trust and Investment Company (China) 
HKMA, Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
IBRA, the Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency (Indonesia) 
ICBC, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
IMF, International Monetary Fund 
INDRA, the Indonesia Debt Restructuring Agency 
KAMCO, Korea Asset Management Corp. (South Korea) 
KDIC, Korean Deposit Insurance Company (South Korea) 
LOLR, lender of last resort 
LTCB, the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan 
M&A, Merger and Acquisition 
MAS, the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
MOFTEC, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (China) 
MOU, Memorandum of Understanding 
MOUs, Memoranda of Understanding 
NEAC, the National Economic Action Council (Malaysia) 
NPC, the National People's Congress (China) 
NPL(s), non-performing loan(s) 
P&A, purchase and assumption 
xviii 
PBOC, the People's Bank of China 
PCA, prompt corrective action 
PCBC, People's Construction Bank of China (the predecessor of the CCB) 
RTC, the Resolution Trust Corporation (the US) 
SAFE, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (China) 
SDB, the State Development Bank (China) 
SETC, the State Economic and Trade Commission (China) 
SEZ(s), Special Economic Zone(s) (China) 
SOE(s), State-owned Enterprise(s) 
SOFIs, the state-owned financial institutions (China) 
SPV(s), special purpose vehicle(s) 
TB(s), transnational bank(s) 
WTO, the World Trade Organization 
xix 
INTRODUCTION 
I. BACKGROUND: THE PROBLEM STATED 
Non-performing loans (NPLs)' emerged in the People's Republic of China as early as 1958.2 
However, they were not perceived as a "problem" during the centrally-planned economy 
period (1950-1979), as the borrowers were State-operated enterprises and the lender was a 
State mono-bank. If the companies were not able to repay their debts, the State would help 
them in repaying their debts or would provide the bank with budgetary allowances to write- 
off the unpaid debts. 3 
It was not until the 1990s that NPLs became a visible and publicly discussed problem 
in China. In November 1993, the 3rd Plenum of the 14`h National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) set the future course for financial sector development in China as part 
of its "socialist market economy" strategy. 4 Accordingly, the State Council adopted 
"Resolution on Financial System Reform" in the same year, drawing a blueprint for 
overhauling China's financial system, including the commercialization of State banks. 5 It 
became recognized then that with huge amount of NPLs on their books, State banks could 
not become genuine commercial banks. 
1 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Committee) uses the term "impaired loans" in its Sound 
Practices for Loan Accounting and Disclosure (issued in July 1999). Loan "impairment", according to the Basel 
Committee, represents deterioration in the credit quality of one or more loans that it is probable that the bank 
will be unable to collect, or there is no longer reasonable assurance that the bank will collect, all amounts due 
according to the contractual terms of the loan agreement(s). Basel Committee, Sound Practices for Loan 
Accounting and Disclosure (July 1999). In this volume, this author will mainly use the term "non-performing 
loans (NPLs)"; while other terms such as "impaired loans", will only be used occasionally. 
2 Then NPLs concentrated on loans to the agricultural sector, totaled RMB4. Sbn in 1962, while NPLs to 
industrial sector were only RMB6bn. Altogether NPLs were RMB10.5bn, accounting to 15.3% of the 
outstanding loans in 1962. All these NPLs were written off in 1962. See Qing, Chi Jiang, `Bank NPL Problem 
in China' in Policy Study Office of PBOC, Issues on Bank and Enterprise Debt Restructuring, 20, at 20 
(Beijing 1995). Qing then headed the Finance Research Institute of the PBOC. 
3 In addition to the 1962 write-off, there was another overall write-off in 1979, with NPLs amounting to 
RMB5.5bn. Id. 
` See generally `Decisions on Issues Concerning the Establishment of the Socialist Market Economy System', 
Being: Xinhua Monthly 6 (November 1993). 
5 See Resolution on Financial System Reform, State Council, No. 91 (1993). 
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The real initiatives to solve the problem, however, did not begin to be implemented 
until the burst of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The severity of the Asian financial crisis6 
taught the Chinese government the importance of having a healthy financial system. There 
have been internal pressures to solve the problem as well. The collapse of several financial 
institutions in the latter part of the 1990s7 raised concerns about the health of the financial 
system. Moreover, the economic deflation8 induced the government to recognize that NPLs 
started hurting the real economy. 9 This adverse situation depleted corporate profits and 
undermined the ability of weaker companies, mainly in the State-owned sector, to service 
their debts with banks - thus, undermining further the financial position of China's major 
banks. 10 
6 The Asian financial crisis involved several mutually reinforcing events, starting with the devaluation of the 
Thai baht in July 1997, and followed by devaluations of other currencies, the attack on the Hong Kong dollar in 
October 1997, a rapid withdrawal of foreign private capital, bank runs, sovereign downgrades, and a dramatic 
decline in real economic activity. The crisis was felt particularly severe in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. 
There was a $17.2bn rescue for Thailand, and a S42bn package for Indonesia. South Korea got a whopping 
$58.4bn when it was on the verge of bankruptcy. Other countries in the region also experienced some of the 
effects of the financial turmoil, such as Malaysia and the Philippines, although they did not suffer a full-blown 
crisis. See, e. g., Philips, Michael M., 'One by One: A Look at How the Global Finance Crisis Began', Asian 
Wall St. J., S2 (May 3,1999). In this volume, these five countries (Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia 
and Philippines) will be referred to as "Asian crisis countries. " 
That is, the closures of China Rural Trust and Investment Corp. in January 1997, Hainan Development Bank 
on 21 May 1998, China New Technology Venture Capital Corp. on June 22,1998; and Pudong United Trust 
and Investment Corporation, a Shanghai-based finance company in the third quarter of 1998; and the most 
notorious, Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation in 1999. 
8 Notwithstanding the fact that China has so far kept itself relatively immune from the "contagion" bred by the 
Asian financial crisis and has managed to maintain good economic growth: China managed an 7.8% annual 
GDP growth in 1998 and 7.1% in 1999 [See, e. g., Harding James, `China: High Growth Rate "Lacks Quality"', 
Fin. Times (January 4,1999)], the deteriorating macro-economic situation in China is obvious. According to 
Wu Jinglian, a prominent Chinese economist, China began to experience deflation from mid-1997 [See Wu 
Jinglian, 'The Macroeconomic Trend in 1999 and Policy Options' in Strengthening the Banking System in 
China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,116, at 116-7 (October 1999)]. 
9 The PBOC announced on October 19,1999 that it was using monetary policy initiatives to combat deflation. 
The new deflation-fighting monetary policy initiatives include: reducing the reserve requirement ratio for 
Chinese banks, allowing commercial banks more freedom in deciding interest rates, effecting open-market 
purchases of bonds by the central bank, permitting securities firms to raise funds by issuing corporate bond, 
increasing PBOC lending to small and medium-sized financial institutions, encouraging commercial banks to 
lend to small and medium-sized enterprises, expanding loans to individuals for housing, car and education, and 
giving preference in lending to high-tech and science & technology development companies. See Chinaonline, 
`China Unveils New Weapons in War on Deflation' (October 20,1999), available' at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/C9101904. asp '. 
The efficiency of these monetary policy initiatives relies heavily on the efficiency of the banking 
system. In other words, without an efficient financial system, the deterioration in the macro-economy cannot be 
reversed efficiently. 
10 Standard & Poor, when downgrading five Chinese financial institutions on March 1,1999, reasoned that the 
rating revisions reflected Standard & Poor's expectation that the domestic operating environment for Chinese 
financial institutions would became increasingly difficult as a result of the slowed economic growth and 
corporate restructuring. Despite repeated interest rate reductions and infrastructure spending by the Chinese 
government, domestic demand remains weak and deflationary pressures are mounting. The strain will 
accentuate the existing problems of excess inventory and industrial capacity and declining profits facing state- 
owned enterprises, which are the major borrowers at the Chinese financial institutions. This negative trend, 
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On November 17-19,1997, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council 
held the National Financial Working Conference in Beijing" The conference was held 
against the backdrop of financial crises in three Asian countries - Thailand, Indonesia, and 
Korea - that had sought massive international financial assistance coordinated by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). '2 The meeting focused on similarities between the 
financial sector in China and those elsewhere in Asia13 and called to establish a financial 
system compatible with a "socialist market" economy and to strengthen the risk management 
capacity of Chinese financial institutions in about three years. 14 
In the wake of the November 1997 financial conference, the government announced 
important steps to reduce the risks that the Asian financial "contagion" would spread to 
China, including but not limited to: (1) the reorganization of the local branches of the PBOC 
along regional lines in order to reduce political interference in lending decisions at the local 
level, with the purpose of ending the common practice of provincial governors and party 
officials influencing the flow of lending in their regions (see Annex XI); (2) the injection of 
which will likely continue over the coming year 2001, has already begun to squeeze profits and boost non- 
performing assets. See Standard & Poor's CreditWire, 'Ratings Lowered on Five Chinese Financial 
Institutions; Removed from CreditWatch Negative', available at 'http: //www. ratings. 
standardpoor. com/news/newsrelease. htm '. 
l The Conference was an unusually high-level national financial working conference, addressed by President 
Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng and Vice Premier Zhu Rongji. Other participants in the Beijing meeting included 
not only central bank officials at the national and provincial level, officials from the headquarters and major 
provincial branches of China's state-owned banks, insurance companies, and many non-bank financial 
institutions, but also provincial governors and provincial-level finance officials. See Lardy, Nicholas R., 
China's Unfinished Economic Revolution, 202-3 (1998). 
12 Indeed, in an unprecedented move, China contributed US$ Ibn to the IMF-led bailout of Thailand in 1997. 
13 In terms of fundamentals, a clear lesson of the Asian crisis is that it is dangerous for a country to have weak, 
poorly regulated banks, making policy loans to inefficient, over-leveraged state enterprises -a reasonable 
description of China [See Fernald, John G. & Babson, Oliver D., `Why China Survived the Asian Crisis So 
Well? What Risks Remain? ', 1, Board of Fed. Internal Finance Discussion Papers No. 633 (February 1999)]. 
Four fundamental similarities can be identified between China and the crisis countries: First, the rate of increase 
in bank credit since reform began in China is similar to that experienced in other countries before the emergence 
of major banking crisis. In Thailand, for example, there was a five-year period in which bank lending expanded 
at an annual rate of 25%, three times the rate of real economic growth [See Sapsford, Jathon, `The Outlook: 
What Asia May Need Is Far Slower Growth', Wall Street Journal, Al (November 3,1997)]. The run-up in 
credit by financial institutions in China, more than 21% a year since 1978, has been almost as fast. Moreover, 
this expansion has been sustained for decades [See Dai Xianglong, `Improve Financial Services to Assist 
Reform and Progress of SOEs in Accordance with the Guideline of 4th Plenary of the 15th Central Committee 
of CPC', China Finance, No. 11,4, at 5 (November 1999)]. In both countries, the expansion of banking credit 
was encouraged by the government [supra note 11(Lardy), at 203 (1998)]. Second, a common feature shared by 
China's financial system and that of Asian crisis countries was that their financial systems are heavily bank 
dominated. Third, central banks are weak in China and Asian crisis countries. Their weakness seriously 
obstructs them from exercising adequate prudential supervision over commercial lending. The fourth similarity 
is the pervasiveness of NPL problem with Chinese banks and banks in the Asian crisis countries. 
14 See Historical Research Unit of the Central Committee of the CPC, 'Major Events after the Third Session of 
the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (III) (zhonggong shiyijie sanzhongquanhui 
yilei dashiji-xia)', People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 3 (December 16,1999). 
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RMB270bn in new capital to the "big four" 15 in 1998; (3) the write-off of enterprise bad 
debts; 16 (4) policies encouraging banks to take risks into account when they set interest rates 
for specific borrowers; '7 (5) the introduction of asset-to-liability ratio management and the 
removal of the credit ceiling on banks; (6) the introduction of a new loan classification and 
provisioning system more closely aligned with international standards (see Annex XII); '8 (7) 
the enhancement of controls on international borrowings; 19 (8) the establishment of four 
Asset Management Companies (AMCs) in 1999 to take over and manage NPLs of the four 
largest State commercial banks; 20 and (9) a debt-equity swap scheme to help SOEs back in 
"the black. " All these policy initiatives will be discussed in this volume, to the extent of their 
relevance to NPL workout and prevention. 
II. STRUCTURE OF THE VOLUME 
In addition to this introductory chapter, this volume comprises five chapters. Chapter One 
analyzes the seriousness and causes of the State bank NPL problem in China. On the basis of 
these analyses, a comprehensive banking restructuring strategy is recommended as a possible 
solution. Chapter Two is devoted to NPL workouts in China. The prevention mechanisms, 
namely prudential banking regulation, bank internal controls and a banking safety net, are 
discussed in Chapters Three and Four. Concluding observations are drawn in Chapter Five. 
In Chapter One, the author applies the theory of "soft budget constraints and market 
discipline"Z' and concludes that the ultimate cause of the State commercial bank NPL 
15 The "big four", for the purpose of this volume, denotes the four largest State commercial banks, i. e., the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), the Agricultural Bank of 
China (ABC) and the Bank of China (BOC). For a brief review of the history of the big four before 1995, see 
Lees, Francis A. & Liaw, K. Thomas, Foreign Participation in China's Banking and Securities Market, 24-5 
(1996). 
16 This program began in 1996 with an allocation of RMB20bn to write-off bad bank debts of enterprises that 
were being restructured. In 1997 the funds earmarked for this purpose were RMB30bn In 1998 the amount was 
increased to RMB 40bn with further increases to follow in 1999 and 2000. See Wang Lihong, 'Bad Loans Only 
5% of Bank Credits', China Daily, 3 (January 17,1998). 
17 See Sun, Shangwu, 'Financial Reform Outlined', China Daily, 1 (February 23,1998). The banks, however, 
are only allowed to adjust the interest rates within the ceilings and floors set by the PBOC. 
18 See, e. g., China Daily, 'China: Substantial Act Needed to Boost Banking Reform' (November 8,1999). 
19 Several new regulations were issued to authorize the State Administration of Exchange Control with the 
responsibility of ensuring that all international commercial borrowing by domestic institutions is approved in 
advance and that borrowed amounts do not exceed certain multiples of borrowers' net assets and foreign 
exchange earnings. 
20 See, e. g., Foo Choy Peng, 'Beijing Tackles Bad Loans-Asset Firms to Ease State Banks' Burden with Eye on 
WTO Entry', South China Morning Post 1 (April 27,1999). 




problem is the failure of market disciplines, due to the State bank-dominated/bank-centric 
finance, "soft" credits to SOEs by State banks (mainly in the form of policy loans), 
unnecessary administrative restrictions on banks (credit plan, interest rate control, etc. ), 
inappropriate banking regulation and supervision, and weak bank internal controls. The huge 
amount of NPLs not only have negative effects on the "big four" and the whole banking 
(financial) system, but also bear negative effects on the country's economic reform and its 
real economic growth. It is therefore necessary to tackle the problem immediately. China 
cannot afford to close and to liquidate its State commercial banks because of these banks' 
importance in China's financial and economic system. 
"Regulatory forbearance", 22 despite its advantages of cost-saving, is not suitable for 
China. The two pre-conditions for the success of regulatory forbearance policy - temporary 
economic difficulty and fundamental soundness of the banking system - do not exist in 
China. 
A comprehensive bank restructuring strategy is therefore recommended to solve 
China's bank NPL problem. This strategy would contain the following components: bank 
recapitalization, NPL management, enhancement of banking regulation and supervision, and 
promotion of banking internal controls (especially risk-management capacity). The core of 
these steps is that the government will need to tackle simultaneously bank and enterprise 
restructuring, and to deal decisively with the stock of NPL stock and to prevent creation of 
new NPLs, with measures to improve incentives and institutional skills. 
Chapter Two is devoted to NPL workouts. The author argues for government capital 
injection to enhance the capital of the "big four" on the basis of their state ownership, low 
profitability and difficulties in raising capital. It is suggested that the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), rather than the People's Bank of China (PBOC), China's central bank, bear the cost 
of recapitalization. China's fiscal situation decides that the government cannot afford to 
recapitalize the "big four" with current government avenues. The failure of the 1998 
RMB270bn recapitalization of the "big four" evidences the failure of ex ante recapitalization 
(i. e., with appropriate burden sharing, the government recapitalizes banks based upon an 
assessment of probable losses, and banks are left to deal with the major part of the NPLs 
themselves). China, at present, has chosen to recapitalize the "big four" in a manner between 
the ex ante recapitalization and ex post recapitalization (i. e., banks receive public funds as 
and when they provide financial relief to corporations). As mentioned above, in 1999, four 
22 A brief description of regulatory forbearance can be found in Section V, Chapter One. 
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AMCs were set up to take over NPLs from banks and to carry out corporate debt 
restructuring. In the meantime, banks are actually being recapitalized by the consideration 
paid by the AMCs for the NPL. 
The AMC approach is perceived as the optimal choice to deal with bank NPLs for 
countries facing systemic NPL problem. 23 Compared to the approach of leaving NPLs with 
the banks, the AMC approach bears both macro-economic and micro-economic advantages. 
China has chosen to have bank-specific AMCs rather than a "centric-AMC". 24 The separate 
AMCs established in 1999 were the Cinda AMC for the China Construction Bank (CCB), the 
Dongfang (Orient) AMC for the Bank of China (BOC), China Great Wall AMC for the 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and China Huarong AMC for the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). This bank-specific approach is based on the primary role 
of state-owned AMCs in guaranteeing that NPLs in each of the big four would be tackled 
without delay and allows AMCs to make good use of the bank's information about the 
debtors. 
Theoretically, there are two basic strategies for managing NPLs, i. e., NPL disposal 
and debt restructuring. The author argues that AMCs in China mainly should apply the debt- 
restructuring strategy to deal with the NPLs collected from banks, given the quantity, quality 
and type of assets collected by AMCs in China, and the market demand for such assets, and 
because most of the debtors are SOEs at the edge of bankruptcy. If AMCs apply debt 
collection widely, a massive bankruptcy of SOEs might be triggered and hence de-stabilize 
the society and the economy. AMCs in China have to dispose of some NPLs, however, 
because not all NPLs can be restructured. 
A sweeping debt-equity swap scheme has been carried out in China, proposing to 
resolve the bank and enterprise problem simultaneously. The success of the scheme, 
however, would depend on whether criteria set by the SETC on what enterprises are qualified 
for the scheme can be fully carried out, whether substantial enterprise reorganization plan 
will be implemented so that the profitability of enterprises can be really improved, and 
whether AMCs are able to dispose of the equities they have acquired from the swaps in a 
timely manner. 
2' The IMF, for example, when organized a bailout package for Indonesia, ruled that the banks' NPLs had to be 
handed over to the IBRA. See, e. g., Xinhua English Newswire, '11.5 Bln Dollars in Indonesia Bad Bank Assets 
Seized' (April 3,1999), available at '1999 WL 7931247'. 24 In some countries, such as South Korean, only one public AMC is established to take over NPL from banks. 
This is named as the centric-AMC model. 
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The success of the AMC practices in China relies on legal reform, however. At 
present, China lacks the appropriate legal infrastructure for effective NPL disposal and debt 
restructuring, resulting in creditor passivity of the banks. It is therefore necessary to reform 
China's bankruptcy regime and banking regulation so that banks will be more positive in 
collecting their loans. Moreover, an out-of-court consensual mechanism should be 
established to facilitate debt restructuring, featuring a neutral party to co-ordinate the 
negotiation between creditors and debtors, the limitation on the ability of small creditors to 
block agreements, the seniority of the interim new financing over existing debt and a 
"standstill" on creditors. 
Chapter Three reviews the development of banking regulation and bank internal 
controls in China. Prudential banking regulation and supervision has developed in line with 
the Basle Committee Core Principle for Effective Banking Supervision. 25 There is room for 
improvement, however. For example, banks are still required to set their deposit and lending 
rates within the scope set by the PBOC. 
With regard to banking supervision in China, the licensing and structure change 
approval procedures are still vague to some extent; on-going supervision need to be 
improved - clearer rules are needed for on-site examination; external independent auditors 
should play a more positive role in banking supervision; a more efficient early warning 
system needs to be established; and the sanction provisions in China should not be only ex 
post punishments: there should be incentives for banks to correct their operations. 
Chinese banks started developing their internal controls at the end of the 1980s. 
Following the adoption of the Commercial Banking Law in 1995, the PBOC issued 
Guidelines for Enhancing Internal Controls of Financial Institutions in 1997,26 in line with 
the Basle Committee's Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organization. 27 
But the real problem appears to be how well the rules set by the PBOC can be implemented 
by banks in China. Due to the sole State ownership, for example, the organizational structure 
of State commercial banks in China lacks checking and balancing among different organs 
and is not in consistent with the rules set by the PBOC. Diversifying the ownership structure 
of the "big four" might be a solution, but there are difficulties at the moment in achieving this 
25 Basle Committee, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (September 1997), available at 
'htrp: //www. bis. org/publ/bdbs30a. h tm '. 
26 Guidelines of the PBOC for Enhancing Internal Controls of Financial Institutions [zhongguo renmin yinhang 
iagiang jinrong jiguo neibu kongzhi de zhidao yuanze], issued by the PBOC on May 16,1997. 
Basle Committee, Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organizations (September 1998), 
available at 'http: //www. bis. org/publ/bcbs40. htm'. 
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objective. Information and communication is another example. Due to the poor disclosure 
and accounting practices in China, and due to the banks' lack of skills and techniques of 
assessing information, information and communication is the weakest part of bank internal 
controls in China. Efforts have been taken by the PBOC recently to help commercial banks 
obtain information about their borrowers. Banks themselves, however, must develop skills 
and expertise to analyze information appropriately. 
Chapter Four covers issues related to a banking safety net, which comprise central 
bank's lender-of-last-resort (LOLR), deposit insurance and bank insolvency resolution. It is 
argued that the PBOC's LOLR role should be defined by legislation, clarifying that the 
PBOC should only extend credit to those temporarily illiquid but not insolvent financial 
institutions when there is a threat to the soundness and stability of the financial system, and, 
the extension of the credit is necessary to avoid a serious disturbance in the economy; and 
that credit advances should be limited in maturity and extendibility and require satisfactory 
collateral. Procedures for decision-making should be provided as well, such as the authority 
of person or persons to make the decision (the PBOC Governor/PBOC Monetary Policy 
Commission) and the consultative requirements (the PBOC should consult with the MOF 
before it decides to extend emergency credit). 
With regard to deposit insurance, it is recommended that China replace the current 
government implicit guarantee with explicit deposit insurance. A Deposit Insurance 
Company should be established in China by legislation, providing deposit insurance to 
deposits in all deposit-taking institutions in China (including the "big four"). The Company 
would collect premiums from deposit-taking institutions, would manage the deposit 
insurance fund, and would pay-off depositors when a deposit-institution is closed. It is 
suggested that this Company should be affiliated to the PBOC, with the authority to inspect 
and examine the deposit-taking institutions and to deal with problem institutions. Respecting 
the coverage of deposit insurance in China, it is recommended that the deposit insurance only 
protect the individual depositors, with a "floor" and "ceiling" fixed for compensation aý to 
each individual depositor. 
Effective and timely resolution of insolvencies would reinforce systemic stability, 
would promote public confidence in the system, and would restore liquidity to the economy. 
Basic regulatory options to deal with a failed bank might include closure and liquidation, a 
rescue package (e. g., "open bank assistance"), merger and takeover (e. g., purchase and 
assumption), bridge bank (e. g., management take-over in China). To date, all these 
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mechanisms have been applied in some form in China, although the 1995 Commercial 
Banking Law only provides for the management take-over and liquidation (including 
bankruptcy) of commercial banks. 
There are fundamental problems with China's current insolvency resolution practices, 
such as the unfair treatment of creditors, the local governments' intervention in the PBOC's 
discretion in deciding insolvency resolution mechanisms, and inadequate transparency and 
disclosure. It is recommended that clearer rules be set out in China's Commercial Banking 
Law concerning bank insolvency resolution in China. 
Chapter Five draws some concluding observations. It is concluded that the ultimate 
cause of state commercial bank NPL problem is the failure of "market discipline" in China. It 
is therefore necessary to implement a comprehensive banking restructuring to restore market 
discipline in China. Market discipline cannot be restored without a solid legal framework, 
including laws respecting AMC practices in China, legislation on prudential banking 
regulation, and legislation on a banking "safety net. " 
III. METHODOLOGIES 
A. GENERALIZATION VS. SPECIALIZATION 
The methodology of "generalization vs. specialization" is carried out through this whole 
study. 28 In analyzing the causes of China's bank NPL problem, the author identifies the direct 
causes of bank NPL problem - i. e. - the State bank-dominated, bank-centric finance, the 
policy loans to SOEs, administrative controls on banking activities, inappropriate banking 
regulation and poor bank internal controls - within the broad background of China's overall 
economic reforms. Instead of trying to provide some broad policy suggestion, the author 
recommends a solution directly targeting these problems. 
This study, however, is not limited to the "big four" state commercial banks. Other 
financial institutions, including the three policy banks, 29 joint stock commercial banks, city 
commercial banks, urban and rural credit cooperatives, foreign banks, etc., are also tackled to 
28 "To generalize" means to study a issue against its broad background; "to specialize" means to impose 
limitations to qualify the study. 




the extent of their relevance. Further, this study is not limited to the banking industry: the 
whole financial industry and even the corporate sector are touched upon in this manuscript. 
The methodology is also carried out in terms of international and comparative 
studies. For example, the author focuses mainly on the experiences and lessons from recent 
Asian crisis countries, because of similarities between China and these countries, and 
because of the availability of materials. Experiences in other countries such as the US, the 
UK, Japan, and the Eastern and Central European countries are studied as well. With regard 
to banking regulation and supervision, the author mainly refers to the documents issued by 
the Basle Committee, although regional practices such as the European Community banking 
policies and national experiences in selected countries are referred to sometimes. 
B. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS VS. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The author provides a joint substantial consideration (legal and economic) of issues related to 
bank NPLs. 30 Macro-economic analyses are employed in studying the causes of bank NPLs 
and their solution. The legal analyses, however, is used to support the main themes of this 
volume, by grounding proposals on economic analyses articulated by legal analyses and 
legislative proposals. 31 
30 See, e. g., Lastra, Rosa Maria, Central Banking and Banking Regulation (1996). Dr. Lastra names this method 
"macro-economic analysis of law" and distinguished it from the traditional "economic analysis of law". Id., at 
6-7. 
'1 E. g., the study in this volume focuses on, but not limit to, legislation on the banking regime. In addition to 
financial legislation, property law, contract law, company law and bankruptcy law are also discussed to the 
extent of their relevance. 
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Chapter One CHINA'S BANK NON-PERFORMING LOAN PROBLEM: 
SERIOUSNESS, CAUSES AND SOLUTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A clear diagnosis is one of the basic principles for successful bank restructuring -a clear 
diagnosis helps "identifying the underlying causes of the banking problem and designing a 
strategy aiming at addressing each of them, and not just their symptoms in the banks' balance 
sheets. "' This chapter first examines the seriousness of the bank NPL problem in China, 
followed by analyses on the causes of the bank NPL. Afterwards, possible strategies towards the 
bank NPL problem are explored, with a comprehensive bank restructuring strategy recommended 
as a possible solution. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section II refers to different estimates of 
China's bank NPLs and describes their negative effects on State banks, the entire banking 
system, the country's economic reform, and its real economic growth. Sections III, IV analyze 
the causes to China's bank NPL problem. A theoretical framework is established in Section III 
- that soft budget constraints and the deterioration of market discipline are the ultimate cause of 
the bank NPL problem, followed by empirical analyses in Section IV. In Section V, after 
comparison between the three main strategies (bank closure and liquidation in large scale, 
regulatory forbearance, and comprehensive bank restructuring) towards the bank NPL problem, a 
comprehensive bank restructuring strategy is recommended to solve China's bank NPL problem. 
The Chapter finishes with some concluding observations in Section VI. 
II. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE BANK NPL PROBLEM IN CHINA 
' See Dornbusch, Rudi & Giavazzi, Francesco, 'Heading off China's Financial Crisis' in Strengthening the Banking 
System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,40, at 46 (October 1999). Cf. Andrew, Sheng, 
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A. THE SERIOUSNESS: LARGE AMOUNT OF EXISTING NPLS AND INCREASING NEW 
NPLS 
The seriousness of the State commercial bank NPL problem can hardly be overweighed. Chinese 
Scholars' estimates of the proportion of NPLs to bank assets have varied from 10 % to 40 %. 2 
"Two reasons contribute to the variety: one is that different asset classification standards have 
been applied; the other is that most estimation was based on samples rather than on 
comprehensive surveys. What can be said without doubt is that the huge amount of NPLs 
accumulated on [State] banks' balance sheets may have very serious consequences and must be 
paid attention to. "' 
There is no official disclosure of the NPL amount. The best data available to outsiders are 
that of the "big four" released by the PBOC governor Dai Xianglong and other high ranking 
banking officials. It was stated that NPLs of the "big four", as a share of their total outstanding 
loans, increased from 20% at year-end 1994 to 22% at year-end 1995, and then to 25% at year- 
end 1997. ° Some foreign observers believe, however, the ratios are much higher. Goldman 
Sachs, for example, asserted that a more stringent and internationally accepted classification 
would show that the mainland's banking sector had one of the highest NPL levels in Asia, 
ranging from 30 to 60 percent of outstanding bank loans. ' 
'The Framework for Financial Supervision: Macro and Micro Issues' in Strengthening the Banking System in 
China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,154, at 155-6 (October 1999). 
2 Different estimates of the proportion of NPLs to the total State commercial banks' asset can be found in the 
following publications - 10%: Pan, Yue (ed. ), Policies and Procedures for Asset Restructuring, 31 (Beijing: 1997); 
20%: Policy Study Office of the PBOC, Issues on Bank and Enterprise Debt Restructuring (Beijing 1995); 22.3%: 
Yi, Gang, `The Asset Structure of China's Financial Institutions and Its Policy Implication', Jingji Yanjiu No. 12 
(1996); 20-30%: Huang, Yuncheng, 'Bank Reform and Debt Restructuring', Beijing: Guanli Shyie No. 6 (1996); 
30%: Xv, Jingyong, 'Causes of the Deterioration of the Asset Quality of State Specialized Banks', Dangdai Jingji 
Yanjiu No. 1 (1996); 25-40%: Lu, Xianxiang, 'Problems with the Three Lending Models of China's Commercial 
Banks', Guoji Jingrong Yanjiu No. 12 (1996). 
' See Qing, Chi-jiang, 'Bank NPL Problem in China' in Policy Study Office of the PBOC, Issues on Bank and 
Enterprise Debt Restructuring, 20, at 21 (Beijing 1995). Qing headed of the Policy Study Office of the PBOC then. 
The total figure for NPLs include those that were overdue for less than one year and might be recovered, there is 
also a core of bad and doubtful loans that would have to be written off. These amounted to between 7 and 10 per 
cent of total lending. See, e. g., Montagnon, Peter & Harding, James, 'China: Bank Cut Non-performing Loans', Fin. 
Times (September 13,1999); Faison, S., `Inflation Curbed but Not Growth, China Asserts', New York Times (July 
16,1996); and Lardy, Nicholas R., 'The Challenge of Bank Restructuring in China' in Strengthening the Banking 
System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,26 (October 1999). 
' The outstanding loans amounted to RMB9.6 trillion at March 31,1999,110% of the GDP that year. See Wang, 
Xiangwei, 'Goldman Puts Loan Clean-up Bill at US$272bn', South China Morning Post, 4 (September 24,1999). 
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Making matters worse, despite large write-offs in recent years, " NPL levels have been 
rising steadily in China. 7 An article based on an interview with Dai Xianglong, then vice- 
governor of the PBOC, states that the proportion of NPLs to total outstanding loans of China's 
State-owned banks "has been rising by 2 percentage points per annum in recent years. "' The 
PBOC Governor admitted in his speech at the annual Session of the NPC on March 11,1999 
that, "owing to the unsatisfactory performance of state-owned enterprises, the trend of increasing 
non-performing loans has yet to be checked". 9 
B. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF STATE BANK NPLS 
1. Negative Effects on State Banks 
The NPL problem has been a major obstacle preventing the "big four" from becoming genuine 
commercial banks. Huge amounts of bad assets are damaging their profitability and competitive 
ability, and impeding them from improving their economic efficiency. If the creation of NPLs 
cannot be curbed effectively, the NPL problem will eventually lead to the collapse of the "big 
four" and eventually the entire banking system. 
(i) The decreasing profitability of the "big four" 
NPLs have direct decreasing effects on bank profits: Banks have to write off and provision for 
NPLs. This decreases their profits substantially. '° As shown in Table 1.1, the average profit 
6 It is reported that China wrote off RMB 30bn (US $ 3.62bn) in bad debts in 1997 and RMB40bn (US $ 4.83bn) in 
1998. See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'China Wrote Off US $ 3.62 Billion in Bad Debts in 1997, US $ 4.83 Billion in 1998', 
available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/top_storieslbreakingnews_c9022405. html'. These two years writing off 
was on the basis of a RMB 23.8bn writing off in 1996. See the PBOC, China Financial Outlook 1998,20 (Beijing: 
1998). 
' China's banking sector has been increasing loans to inefficient SOEs at a rate that outstrips the output growth, 
thereby heaping new NPLs on old-ones. See, e. g., Harding, James, 'China: Market Differences Emphasized', Fin. 
Times (January 28,1999). 
See Zhao Yining, 'The Financial Situation and Financial Reform', Liangwang (Outlook), 12-3 (May 15,1995). 
See Harding, James, 'China: Banks to Be Allowed to Price Risks', Fin. Times (March 12,1999). 
The CCB, for example, generated book profits of RMB 2.2bn (US $ 266 m) in 1998. The actual profits, 
however, were only RMB 850 in (US $ 102.7 m), 44% down from the RMB 1.51bn in 1997. Zhou Xiaochuan, then 
the CCB governor, said the bank experienced an increase in expenditures and a decrease in profits. In addition to the 
government's cut in interest rates, adjustments made to the bank's interest receivables, and the summer floods, he 
attributed decreased profits to the increase in provisions for the NPLs. Provisions for NPLs rose by RMB 7.9bn (US 
$ 954 m) year on year. See, e. g., 'China's Top Five Commercial Banks Report 1998 Account Balances', available 
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margin of the "big four" from 1995 to 1997 was only 0.26% and showed a decreasing tendency, 
while the profitability of the ten new commercial banks" during the same period was 1.70% and 
showed an increasing tendency. One of the reasons that these newly emerged banks over- 
performed the "big four" is that they had a very low NPL level. '2 
Table 1.1: Profits Margin of Banks in China (percentage): 1995-1997 
1995 1996 1997 Period Average 
The big four 0.35 0.32 0.12 0.26 
Ten New Commercial Banks 1.68 1.60 1.82 1.70 
City Commercial Banks n. a. 2.00 0.91 1.46 
Foreign Banks in China 0.73 0.61 0.67 0.67 
Source: Table 5 in Yu, Liangchun & Jv, Yuan, `Monopoly and Competition: Banking Monopoly and Competition 
in China [rongduan yu jingzheng: zhongguo yinghang ye de gaige yu fanzhan], Economic Research Journal No. 8, 
48, at 53(1999). 
(ii) The Deteriorating Creditworthiness of State Commercial Banks 
The accumulation of NPLs has seriously degraded State banks' credit standing, as evidenced by 
the downgrading of five Chinese financial institutions by Standards and Poor on March 1,1999.13 
at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/top_stories/today_b9012040. html ; and Harding, James, `China: Profits Under 
Pressure', Fin. Times (January 22,1999). 
" They are: BOCOM, CITIC Industrial Bank, China Everbright Bank, Huaxia Bank, China Minsheng Banking, 
Guangdong Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, Merchant Bank, Fujian Industrial Bank and 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank. 
12 It is estimated that NPLs only account for 2.36% of the outstanding loans of the emerging commercial banks. See, 
e. g., Yu, Liangchun & Jv, Yuan, `Monopoly and Competition: Banking Monopoly and Competition in China 
[rongduan yu jingzheng: zhongguo yinghang ye de gaige yu fanzhan], Economic Research Journal No. 8,48, at 55 
(1999). 
" See, e. g., Harding, James, 'China: Financial Institution Downgraded', Fin. Times (March 2,1999). Standard & 
Poor lowered the foreign currency counterpart credit, certificate of deposit, and debt ratings on five Chinese 
financial institutions: the ICBC, the CCB, the BOC, the Bank of Communications (BOCOM), and China 
International Trust & Investment Corp. (CITIC). 
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According to Standard & Poor Credit-Wire, 14 in addition to the adverse macro-economic 
environment, poor asset quality and increased write-offs have limited each institution's ability to 
improve its credit standing. 
Moody's rated China's average bank financial strength at "D", i. e., very weak, in July 
1999. That was worse than all other countries being rated except Korea, Pakistan, Thailand, 
Indonesia and Russia. 'S 
(iii) The Potential Failure of State Commercial Banks and the Entire Banking System 
The accumulation of NPLs has historically been one of the direct causes of bank failures. In the 
US, loan losses dominated the major bank failures from 1934 to 1983.16 
The huge amount of NPLs has already made the "big four" technically insolvent. " They 
are running mainly on government support and the public's confidence in them. 18 Or, in 
Nicholas Lardy's words, "the `big four' are insolvent, but not illiquid". "' 
Given the weightiness of the "big four" in the entire banking system, 2° it would not be 
exaggerating to assert that if the creation of new NPLs cannot be effectively curbed, the 
" See Standard & Poor's CreditWire, 'Ratings Lowered on Five Chinese Financial Institutions; Removed from 
CreditWatch Negative', available at `http: //www. ratings. standardpoor. com/news/newsrelease. htm'. 
" See Moody's Investors Service, `Average Bank Financial Strength Rating by Country' in Banking System 
Outlook: Singapore, 5. 
16 See Table 9.2 of Nagle, Reid & Petersen, Bruce, `Capitalization Problems in Perspective', in Aspinwall, Richard 
C. & Eisenbeis Robert A (eds. ), Handbook for Banking Strategy (1985). 
" As of 1995, for example, it was revealed that then overdue loans, dead loans and irrecoverable loans constituted 
12%, 8% and 2% respectively of the combined value of the loan portfolios of the "big four". See, e. g., Tang Xiong, 
`How to Calculate the Bank's Non-Performing Assets', Jinrong Shibao (Financial Times), 5 (April 21,1996). 
Since the loans outstanding of these four institutions at year-end 1995 stood at RMB3.9bn, classified loans 
can be estimated at RMB860bn. Of these RMB469bn were overdue, RMB313 were dead loans, and RMB78bn were 
irrecoverable. The total net worth of these banks at year-end 1995, including paid-in capital, surpluses, and retained 
profits, stood at only RMB269bn. Deducting the value of irrecoverable loans, the net worth of these institutions 
would be only RMB 191bn. If the ultimate recovery rate on the remaining classified loans were less than 3/4, the 
magnitude of loans to be written off would exceed the remaining net worth of these banks. See Lardy, Nicholas R., 
China's Unfinished Economic Revolution, 119 (1998). 
See also Li Xinxin, 'Looking at China's Hidden Financial Danger from the Perspective of the East Asian 
Financial Crisis: An Analysis of the Utilization and Management of Assets by China's State-Owned Commercial 
Banks', Gaige (Being) No. 3,32 (1998). Li Xinxin is one of the few Chinese authors who have explicitly 
acknowledged that the liabilities of the "big four" exceeded their assets. 
IS A survey conducted by the Task Team of the Huaihua PBOC Branch in 1998 shows the public confidence in 
State owned commercial banks. See The Task Team of the Huaihua PBOC Branch, `Depositors' Consciousness of 
Financial Risks and the Bank Exit System [chunkuanren de fengxian yishi yu yinghangye de tuichu zhidu], Jinrong 
Jingji (Changsha) No. 9,3-6 (1998). 
19 See Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 4, at 31. 
20 See infra note 83 and the accompanying text. 
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accumulating NPLs will eventually pull down the "big four" and even the entire banking system 
in China. " 
2. Negative Effects on the country's Economic Reform and Its Real Economy Growth 
(i) Negative Effects on the Economic Reform towards a Market Economy 
The building of a market economy requires the creation of markets, market-oriented enterprises, 
and a wide range of institutions and business practices to support them. For markets to function 
well there must be a robust entry in and disciplined exit from markets to ensure that the most 
efficient and innovative producers are those that operate in the markets. 22 
The presence of NPLs on banks' balance sheets distorts the incentives for both banks and 
SOEs. It has been proven that large amounts of NPLs frequently lead to the adverse selection of 
bank and firm managers. 23 Lenders are forced to consider a workout loan when borrowers lose 
access to financial markets and must seek new loans from existing creditors to continue servicing 
outstanding debt. 24 The distortion of the lending decision is most extreme if the bank is so 
heavily exposed to a borrower that the bank would fail if the workout loan were not made. In this 
case, the bank will be willing to make the loan so long as there is some chance - however 
negligible - the workout loan will succeed. " Firms' managers, on the other hand, are under no 
pressure to scrutinize their projects, because they know that banks have no alternatives but to 
keep lending. In China, the adverse selection is not limited to banks and SOEs. Most adverse 
selections are under the explicit or implicit instruction of the government. Z" 
The banks' passivity in enforcing loan contracts and willingness to grant new loans to 
loss-making SOEs has fostered the reliance of SOEs on State banks and reduced their willingness 
Z' See, e. g., Jiang, Chun, 'On the Essence of Finance and Institutional Prerequisites [lun jinrong de shizhi ji zhidu 
qianti]', Economic Research Journal No. 7,33, at 35 (July 1999). 
Z2 See, e. g., European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998: Financial Sector in 
Transition, iv (1998). 
23 See e. g., Herring, Richard, J. 'The Economics of Workout Lending', 21 Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 
No. 1,1 at 5 (Feb. 1989). 
21 Id., at 1. 
23 In other words, additional lending to allow bankrupt firms to service the old loans becomes rational, as it enables 
banks to report the loans as formally performing, thus delayed the day of reckoning. 
26 See Yuan, Gangming, `Empirical Analyses on China SOEs' Bad Debts [zhongguo guoyu qiye buliang fuzhai de 
shizheng fengxi]', Economic Research Journal No. 12,12, at 15 (2000). 
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and ability to adjust their production to changing demands and respond to market signals 27 More 
seriously, adjusting to "soft" loans from state banks, some enterprises cling to the idea that they 
do not have a legal obligation to repay loans, " while an acute sense of trust in day-to-day 
dealings is essential to a market-oriented economy. 
(ii) Negative Effects on the Real Economy 
It is now well accepted29 that the performance of the financial sector has a major influence on the 
performance of the overall economy, by mobilizing domestic and foreign savings and efficiently 
allocating these funds to investment opportunities in the real economy. A sound financial sector 
is also a source of stability, providing a mechanism for allocating risks and spreading financial 
losses that inevitably arise from economic activities. The financial crises in emerging markets 
demonstrate fully how weak banking systems could damage the economy as a whole 3° As banks 
are the key providers of funds to the industry and commerce in China, their fragility certainly has 
a negative impact on the real economy. 
Failures in the financial sector hurt other business and eventually the whole economy. 3' 
This has been fully shown in the failure of the Guangdong International Trust and Investment 
Z' It is reported that 66.7% per cent of 605 key manufactured products in China were in oversupply. That is to some 
extent due to the weak market responsiveness of SOEs. See, e. g., Kynge, James, 'China: Products in 'Oversupply", 
Fin. Times (February 5,1999). 
28 In 1999, the PBOC and the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) issued jointly the Report on 
Collecting Bank Interest Arrears According to Law, which reveled that among all the interest arrears, 20% were 
owed by the debtors who had the capacity to repay the interests. See Circular of the General Office of the State 
Council on Issuing the Report of the PBOC and the SETC on Collecting Bank Interest Arrears According to Law, 
issued on January 21,1999. 
Z9 There is a large literature demonstrating a significant correlation between the financial development and 
economic growth. See, e. g., King, Robert G. & Levine, Ross, `Finance and Growth: Schempeter Might Be Right', 
53 Quarterly Journal of Economics 715-37 (August 1993); Pagano, Marco, 'Financial Market and Growth: An 
Overview', 37 European Economic Review 613-22 (April 1993); and also Stiglitz, Joseph E., 'Financial Market and 
Development', 5 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 61 (Winter 1989). 
The positive correlation between financial development and economic growth exits in China as well. See 
Tan, Ruyong, 'An Empirical Study of the Relationship between China's Financial Development and Economic 
Growth [zhongguo jinrong fanzhang he jingji zhengzhang guanxi de shizheng yanjiu]', Economic Research journal 
[fingji yanjiuJ, No. 10,53 (October 1999). 
30 See Dornbusch, Rudi & Giavazzi, Francesco, supra note 1, at 40. 
3' For an economic analysis, see, e. g., Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Moore, John, 'Credit Cycles', 105 Journal of Political 
Economy No. 2,211 (1997). 
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Corporation (GITIC), which led to the liquidity crisis spreading across China's financial sector 
- caused by the retreat of international lenders. 32 
Even without obvious failure, large amounts of NPLs have negative impacts on the real 
economy. 33 The banking sector stress contributed to the 1998 economic slowdown in China. It is 
pointed out that the huge amount of NPLs, combined with the Asian financial crisis, caused 
tensions in the Chinese government and the banking sector - banks became cautious about 
increasing lending, and many projects with uncertain returns were rejected. 34 There were 
companies complaining that many banks avoided giving out loans because of rising NPL levels. " 
C. SUMMARY 
Although there are disagreements on the exact amount of NPLs accumulated on the State banks' 
balance sheets, it is widely accepted that NPLs have accumulated to such an extent that they are 
large enough to threaten the safety and soundness of China's State banks and consequently the 
entire banking system. Banks are now running on the government support and the public's 
confidence. 
The existence of a sky-high amount of NPLs not only impairs the health of the banking 
system. More importantly, it impedes banks from granting new loans to the real economy, and 
impedes the establishment of a market economy in China. Efforts must be made to work out 
bank NPLs, and to prevent the increasing creation of NPLs on banks' balance sheets. 
III. CAUSES OF BANK NPLS - THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
'Z See, e. g., Harding, James, `China: Foreign Banks Get Tough', Fin. Time (February 8,1999); 'China: Foreign 
Banks Look to Reduced Role', Fin. Times (January 27,1999); `China: GITIC Failure Starts to Hurt other 
Businesses', Fin. Times (January 22,1999); and Lucas, Louise & Harding, James, `China: Confidence Sinks with 
Full GITIC Debt', Fin. Times (January 11,1999). 
" The massive overhang of bad debt stifles new, higher-quality lending by banks and acted as a drag on new 
economic growth. Banks have to make provisions for these loans. High provisioning needs are pushing banks to put 
available cash aside for potential losses instead of making the new loans needed for the economy. This consequence 
has already been seen in countries such as Japan and Thailand. See, e. g., Business Week, 'Why Japan is Stuck', 
available at '1999 WL 8226852'; and Bardacke, Ted, 'Thailand: Debt Makes up 44% of Lending', Fin. Times 
(March 3,1999). 
See generally Wu, Renhong, China's Economic Outlook, Chinaonline (1999). 
's These complaints were dismissed by the PBOC. According to a PBOC survey, large- and mid-sized companies 
with healthy profits were still getting needed loans, although credit controls were more stringent and companies 
were being forced to look for needed capital through other channels. The survey found out that enterprises had been 
turned down largely because of their poor credit record. See Xinhua English Newswire, `China's Bank Loans on 
Target' (April 5,1999), available at '1999 WL 7931582'. 
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Before we start to investigate the causes of bank NPLs in China, it is important to recognize that, 
unlike in Eastern and Central European countries, 36 most NPLs of Chinese banks are not 
inherited from the pre-reform era. Instead, they are mainly created after reform began. " Dai 
Xianglong stated that the NPL problem in China resulted from the "transformation of the 
country's economic system" 38 . 
China's economic reform is in transition from a planned economy to a market economy. 39 
The main idea is for market mechanisms to become the main integrators of the economy - this 
embraces far-reaching decentralization, a high degree of autonomy to the firm, and the 
liberalization of prices, with the predominance of State-ownership and a pervasive role of State 
control. 4° In this sense, China's reform is no different than the socialist market reform defined by 
Janos Kornai4' and bears the exact problems he pointed out - the bureaucratic coordination of 
the command economy is lifted without true market discipline being applied. "' In the rest of this 
section, the author will argue that it is the failure of market discipline that has resulted in the 
huge amounts of NPLs on the balance sheets of Chinese State banks. 
A. SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
1. The Concept of Soft Budget Constraints and Its Application 
36 In Hungarian, for example, during the period from 1987 to 1991, more than 51% of the bad debts outstanding 
were concentrated on big banks. They inherited the bad debts of the big companies granted by the National Bank of 
Hungary in the one-tier banking system. See, e. g., Ligeti, Sandor, Problem Loans, 7, IEF Research Papers in 
Banking and Finance 93/13 (1993). 
37 See Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 17, at 220. 
38 See, e. g., Xinhua English Newswire, 'China Will Not Suffer A Financial Crisis: Official', (April 3,1999), 
available at '1999 WL 7931322'. 
39 See China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century, the World Bank China 2020 Series (September 
1997), Box 2.1. For a detailed discussion about the evolution of the aims for China's economic reform, see Li, 
Tianying, 'The Foundation of Socialist Market Economic Theory and A Significant Breakthrough - in 
Commemoration of the 20' Anniversary of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11' Central Committee of CPC [shehui 
zhuyi shichang jingji lilun de xingcheng he zhongda tupo- jinian zhongguo gongchandang di shiyijie sanzhong 
quanhui ershi zhounian]', Economic Research Journal No. 3,3 (March 1999). 
`° See 'Accelerate the Reform and Openness, Promote the Modernization Drive, Striving for New Victories in the 
Way of the Socialism with Chinese Characteristics' - Jiang Zemin's address at the 14th National Congress of the 
CPC, People's Daily, 2 (October 13,1992). 
" Janos Kornai characterizes the reform socialism with (1) the ruling role of the Communist party with somewhat 
mitigating the repression and allowing a degree of freedom for alternative views; (2) the pervasive role of state 
control and the subordination of the economy to the bureaucracy; (3) the predominance of state-ownership; (4) the 
development of market coordination as the main integrators of the economy; and (5) the development of the private 
sector confined with some limits. See Kornai, Janos, Highway and Byways, 59 (1995). 
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The concept of soft budget constraint was first introduced by Janos Kornai in 1980. °3 Kornai 
defines the budget constraint as a rational planning postulate with two important properties: first, 
the budget constraint refers to a behavioral characteristic of the decision-maker (he adjusts his 
expenditures to his financial resources); second, the budget constraint is a constraint on ex ante 
variables and most of all on demand (it is based on expectations concerning his future financial 
situation when the actual expenditure will occur). The "softening" of budget constraints appears 
when the strict relationships between expenditures and earnings are relaxed, i. e., when excess 
expenditures over earnings will be paid by some other institutions, typically the State. A further 
condition of "softening" is that the decision-maker expects such external financial assistance 
with high probability and this probability is firmly built into his behaviors. 
Kornai's conceptual framework is most widely used in discussing the economies of 
Eastern Europe, ' although it has been more recently applied to China by Kornai himself 5 and 
other western scholars, " as well as Chinese scholars. 47 These applications, however, mainly test 
the concept with evidences in China. 
2. Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints 
The soft budget constraints on firms have many interrelated consequences. 48 As for its impact 
on a firm's conducts, three consequences can be identified: weak price responsiveness, low 
'Z Id., at 44-45; and Kornai, Janos, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, 497-498 (1992). 
43 See Kornai, Janos, Economics of Shortage (1980). For a more detailed explanation of the concept, see Kornai, 
Janos, ̀The Soft Budget Constraint', 39 Kyklos 1,3 (1986). 
44 See, e. g., Kornai, Janos, `The Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, Hopes and Reality', 24 Journal of Economic 
Literature No. 4 (1986). 
°S See, e. g., Kornai, Janos, Vision and Reality, Market and State, 35-36,192-193 (1990); and also 'The Soft Budget 
Constraint', 39 Kyklos 1 (1986). 
" See, e. g., Blejer, Mario I. & Gyorgy Szapary, `The Evolving Role of Tax Policy in China', 14 Journal of 
Comparative Economics No. 3,452 (September 1990); Bowles, Paul & Gordon White, `Contradictions in China's 
Financial Reforms: The relationship between Banks and Enterprises', 13 Cambridge Journal of Economics No. 4, 
481 (December 1989); and Wong, Christine P. W., `The Economics of Shortage and Problems of Reform in 
Chinese Industry', 10 Journal of Comparative Economics No. 4 363 (December 1986). 
" See, e. g., Jiang, Sidong et al., `Financial Reform, the Two-track System: Strengthen Credit Restraint, Open up a 
Capital Market among the People, ' Chinese Economic Structural Reform Research Institute (Being): Research 
Reports No. 25 (November 29,1985). 
48 For a detailed discussion of all those consequences, see generally Kornai, Janos, Contradictions and Dilemmas 
42-44 (1986). 
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efficiency, and excess demand. "' The softness of budget constraints diminishes the firm's 
sensitivity towards price fluctuation and, thereafter, invalidates the banks' efforts to curb 
unsustainable borrowing by charging higher interest rates. Weak price responsiveness can lead to 
low efficiency of firms: allocation efficiency cannot be achieved when input-output 
combinations do not adjust to price signals. Under soft budget constraints, there is not a 
sufficiently strong stimulus for a firm to maximize its profits. More seriously, when the external 
circumstances are unfavorable, the firm is not forced to adjust to changed situation; instead, it is 
likely to seek external assistance. A third syndrome of soft budget constraints is the formation of 
excess demand. Whatever goals the firm managers have (maximizing short- or long-term profits, 
sales, the size of the firm, and the discretion and power), these objectives, or any combination of 
them will be associated with expansion - termed by Jonas Kornai as `investment hunger 
syndrome'. 'o 
3. Sources of Soft Budget Constraints 
The soft budget constraints have a number of sources. Kornai points to soft subsidies granted by 
national or local government, soft taxation (under this firms in difficulties are granted tax 
concession or allowed to postpone payment of their taxes), soft credits, and soft administrative 
prices. " Among them, soft credits contribute directly to NPLs. 
B. MARKET DISCIPLINE -A MECHANISM TO CURB SOFT CREDIT 
Market discipline is by no means a new concept to the financial world. Whenever there are 
doubts about the efficiency and effectiveness of financial regulation, people turn to concepts such 
as market forces, market place or market discipline in the hope that the market can solve 
49 The discussion in this paragraph draws heavily from Kornai, Janos, ̀The Soft Budget Constraint', 39 Kyklos 1,3 
(1986). 
so See Kornai, Janos, supra note 41, at 189. Over-investment had been a chronic problem during China's classical 
socialist period. For a detailed discussion, see Chang, Hsin, `The 1982-83 Over-investment Crisis in China', 24 
Asian Survey No. 12,1277 (December 1984). The investment hunger syndrome survived the economic reform 
started in 1978 with two new characteristics. One is a rise in the proportion of a firm's profits that it needs not hand 
over to the State budget and can use to finance investment of its own. The other is a reduction within the entirety of 
the outside resources for investment in subsidies from the State budget that need not be repaid and increase in bank 
credits that have to be repaid with interests. Id. 
S' See Kornai, Janos, supra note 42, at 140-42 & 489; The Economics of Shortage, supra note 43, Ch. 13. 
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problems better than the government. William McDonough, president of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York and Chairman of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, when talking 
about the reform for the 1988 Basle Accord, " insisted on the need for reliance on market 
discipline and said that "the new framework was supposed to include as great as possible a 
reliance on market discipline, with emphasis on transparency and disclosure". " 
1. General Introduction - the Theory of Market Discipline 
Timothy Lane developed the theory of market discipline by studying the experience of federal 
unions, ranging from tight central control of borrowing by lower levels of government to 
virtually complete reliance on market forces; evidences regarding sovereign debt; the relationship 
between market discipline and financial regulation; and soft budget constraints in socialist 
countries. 54 He discovered that in the diverse cases examined, the conditions required for market 
discipline are essentially the same - competitiveness of capital markets; availability of 
information on the borrower's outstanding liabilities; no expectation for bailout; and the 
borrower's capability and willingness to respond to market signals provided by interest rate 
spreads. Because these conditions, especially the "no-bailout" condition cannot always be 
satisfied, Lane recommended reinforcing market discipline by some kind of direct controls or 
rules, stressing the importance of implementing measures to strengthen market discipline itself. 
Jonas Kornai, who has done thorough studies on post-socialist economies, used the term 
"financial discipline" synonymously with market discipline. He defined financial discipline as 
the enforcement of four simple rules, namely: buyers pay for the goods they buy; debtors abide 
by the loan contract and pay back debt; taxpayers pay their taxes; enterprises cover their costs out 
of their revenues. Although these rules were self-evident in a market economy, Kornai 
acknowledged they were far from obvious in a socialist command economy - characterized 
with soft budget constraints. After analyzing Hungary's experiences in introducing these new 
rules, he made two conclusions: first, a range of prior conditions must be satisfied before the 
SZ Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards (July 1988). 
s' See, e. g., International Banker, 'Basle To Keep Partial Modeling', available at '1999 WL 5992038'. 
' See generally Lane, Timothy D., Market Discipline, the IMF working paper WP/92/42 (June 1992). 
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financial discipline can be firmly imposed; and second, a quite long period must pass before the 
actors in the economy believe that financial discipline is being imposed. " 
2. Market Discipline as a Mechanism to Curb Unsustainable Borrowing and Its Conditions 
Unsustainable borrowing, i. e., borrowing without the means or even the intention of repaying, 
directly leads to NPLs. Market discipline is one force that may limit such abuse of financial 
markets: market discipline implies that lenders penalize excessive borrowing, first, by requiring a 
higher interest rate spread and, ultimately, by excluding the borrower from the market. " Lardy 
expands the lender's discipline function to the time after the funds are lent: Once funds are lent, 
the lender monitors the borrower to ensure that the use of funds is consistent with the loan 
contract. Most importantly, he can force the defaulted borrower either to restructure in order to 
survive or to exits' If market discipline works effectively, credit will be hardened and hence 
unsustainable borrowing can be efficiently curbed. 
Market discipline will not work for itself, however. As mentioned above, there are four 
conditions for market discipline to work effectively. Failure of any of these conditions will lead 
to the failure of market discipline. " 
Competitive Capital Markets This is required so that unsustainable borrowing will face 
the borrower with increased interest rates or exclusion from the market. In the case of financial 
institutions, if there are legal restrictions that limit competition for deposits, such as geographic 
scope of activities, or if there are activities permitted to particular categories of institutions that 
gives them a degree of market power, the market's ability to discriminate between prudent and 
imprudent financial intermediaries will be reduced and thereby market discipline will be render 
ineffective. In the case of SOEs in reforming socialist economies such as China, if financial 
institutions are directed by the authorities to lend to particular enterprises regardless of their 
credit-worthiness, financial discipline will be nullified. 
Information A second requirement for effective market discipline is to allow lenders to 
obtain relevant information about the borrower's outstanding debts. The information problem has 
ss See, e. g., Kornai, Janos, supra note 41, at, 141-60. 
See Lane, Timothy D., supra note 54. 
See Lardy, Nicolas R., supra note 17, at 59-60. 
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been studied extensively after the burst of the Asian financial crisis. The IMF, in a report about 
the Asian financial crisis, concluded that the weakness in disclosure practices in the "Asian crisis 
countries" allowed excessive risk-taking. 59 Andrew Sheng, the Chairman of Hong Kong 
Securities and Future Commission summarized the information problem as "Bad accounting = 
bad information = poor decision-making = bad risk management = financial crisis". 60 In the case 
of SOEs in socialist economies, the need for timely information to assess enterprises' credit- 
worthiness is always frustrated by the unavailability of necessary information and the 
incapability of bank loan officers to find and process the relevant information. 
No Bailout For market discipline to be effective, it is necessary that there is no 
anticipation of a bailout in the case of (actual or impending) default. This condition is the most 
crucial and its failure is probably the most important reason for the failure of market discipline. 
In formerly planned economies, even as reforms proceed, banks are often content to continue 
lending to insolvent enterprises in the belief that the government will make good on the loans. To 
be worse, even if the government would like to promote efficiency by committing itself not to 
bail out insolvent enterprises, such a commitment may not be credible. Once a large enterprise's 
failure is impending, the government's best response, in view of the possible losses of output and 
employment, may be to bail out the enterprise. " 
Borrower's Response Market discipline takes two forms: initially, the borrower faces a 
rising interest rate spread and eventually access to further credit is denied. Because the second 
stage is often associated with a financial crisis, it is not a normal form of market discipline. Thus, 
a condition for the smooth operation of market discipline is that borrowers respond to market 
signals in time to avoid a crisis. 
Borrowers who believe that there is a high probability of insolvency, however, will not 
respond to market signals or to anticipate them: they have nothing to lose by borrowing, even at 
a high interest rate. 62 In other words, market discipline does not work through interest rate spread 
S8 See Bishop, Graham, Dirk Damrau, and Michelle Miller, /992 and Beyond: Market Discipline CAN Work in the 
EC Monetary Union (1992); and Frenkel, Jacob A., & Goldstein, Morris, 'Monetary Policy in an Emerging 
European Economic and Monetary Union', 38 IMF Staff Papers No. 2,356 (June 1991). 
S9 See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring Lessons from Asia, 21 
(the IMF, September 1999). 
60 See Andrew, Sheng, supra note 1, at 161-2. 
61 See Schaffer, Mark E., 'The Credible-Commitment Problem in the Center-Enterprise Relationship', 13 Journal of 
Comparative Economics No. 3,359 (September 1989); and also Hardy, Daniel, Soft Budget Constraints, Firm 
Commitments, and the Social Safety Net, IMF Working Paper WP/91/98 (October 1991). 
62 This is the problem of adverse selection, which has been used as a basis of an explanation of credit rationing in 
private credit markets. See Stiglitz, Joseph & Weiss, Andrew, `Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
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if borrowers are already near insolvency, it can only work by excluding insolvency borrowers 
from the market. 
C. FAILURE OF MARKET DISCIPLINE - THE ULTIMATE ROOT OF THE NPL 
PROBLEM IN CHINA 
Applying the theory of soft budget constraints and market discipline to China, if budget 
constraints were hardened, and market discipline were working effectively, State banks would 
not lend to SOEs unless they are ensured that borrowers are willing to and capable of repaying 
loan interest and principle. On the other hand, hard budget constraints and market discipline on 
SOEs would prevent them from borrowing to finance loss-making productive activities that are 
never expected to turn profitable. A well functioning market discipline could thus prevent the 
creation of NPLs, or at least reduce the amount of NPLs to an acceptable level. The huge amount 
of NPLs with State banks, therefore, provide evidence that market discipline is not working 
effectively in China, and soft budget constraints still apply to SOEs. The veracity of this 
assumption will be tested in the next section. 
IV. CAUSES OF BANK NPLS - EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
A. BANK-CENTRIC AND STATE-BANK-DOMINATED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
1. The Bank-Centric Finance in China 
China is still in the stage of bank-centric finance. b' Bank lending - often directed by 
government policy - dominates enterprise finance, and bank deposits dominate household 
investment. 
Various reasons can be attributed to the bank-centric finance in China. 64 The most 
important one is that the bank-centric finance, because it can be instituted and controlled from 
Information', 73 American Economic Review No. 3,393 (June 1981). The restrictions on large exposure can be 
reasoned on this ground as well. 
63 For definitions and description of bank-centric finance and market-centric finance, see, e. g., Mellyn & Saal, 'A 
Perspective on the Risk and Regulatory Implications of Market-Centric Financial Systems', the First Price Essay of 
the 1998 Essay Competition of the HF. 
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above, fits the need of the Chinese government to direct savings from the household sector into 
the financing of industrial development and infrastructure. " The relatively small role of capital 
markets is not purely a product of market forces; it is also a product of administrative decree. The 
authorities, fearing that unrestrained capital market development would drain resources from 
State commercial banks, used credit plans to set quotas on how much equity and securitized 
debts can be issued in a given year. " 
(i) Underdeveloped Capital Markets 
It was not until 1981 that China's Central Government restarted selling treasury bills and other 
types of government bonds. SOEs, investment companies, and State-owned financial institutions 
were authorized to sell bonds beginning in 1986. But markets for these debt instruments 
developed extremely slowly. From 1987 to 1995, the value of all bond issues in a year had never 
exceeded 20% of the total value of investment by State-owned units. 67 Enterprise bond issues 
have been especially small. " Between 1995 and 1997, the annual value of enterprise bond issues 
accounted for less than 3% of the total enterprise finance (see Table 1.2). 
The stock markets were created in the 1980s when provincial legislatures began to 
experiment with company regulations, and locally chartered companies began to issue shares to 
sell to the public. 69 Two stock exchanges - Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange opened in 1990 and 1991 respectively. In 1998, the issuance of stock accounted for 
15% of the country's total amount of financing raised annually. 7° According to the latest 
60 For a detailed discussion about the reasons, see generally Statistics Department of the PBOC, 'An Analysis of the 
Direct Finance of Chinese Enterprises', China Finance (Being) No. 9,24 (1998). 
65 China has aimed at establishing a bank-centric financial system since the economic reform. See generally Liu, 
Hongru, `Developments in the Reform of China's Banking and Financial System', 2 J. Chinese L. 323 (Fall, 1988). 
" See, e. g., China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century, supra note 39, at 33. In 1997, for example, 
the quota for enterprise convertible bonds was RMB4bn. 
It was not until 2000 that the quota assignment for stock issuance was removed. On March 16,2000, the 
State Council approved the Procedures of China Securities Regulatory Commission for Examining and Approving 
Stock Issuance [zhongguo zhengjianhui gupiao faxing hezhun chengxv, approved by the State Council on March 
16,2000]. The new procedures eliminated quota assignment and administrative recommendations. 
67 Id. Figure 3.8. 
6' Enterprises in China have been allowed to issue bonds only since the latter part of the 1980s. 
69 See Neoh, Anthony, 'China's Domestic Capital Markets in the New Millennium' (August 21,2000), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/commentary_an... onomics/currentnews/secure/c00082143. asp'. 
70 See Chinaonline, `Some Investors Still Bullish On China's Listed Companies', available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. con/top_stories/today_b2_99011818. html '. 
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statistics, there were 1,063 listed companies, and the amount of registered investors numbered 
more than 55 million at the end of 2000. " 
At the end of November 2000, the total market value of China's securities market 
exceeded RMB4.6 trillion, accounting for 50% of China's GDP; 72 while in G-10 countries, the 
market capitalization of their stock markets represent well over 100% of their GDP. " It is 
estimated by the World Bank that even if capital markets grow at more than twice the rate of 
projected GDP growth (in real terms) in China, by 2020 the value of stocks and bonds relative to 
China's economy would only approach that in India's capital market today (74% of GDP). 74 
Table 1.2: Table of Enterprise Finance Structure in China 
1995 1996 1997 
Amount Percentage to Amount Percentage to the Amount Percentage to the 
(RMBbn) the Enterprise (RMBbn) Enterprise Finance (RMBbn) Enterprise 
Finance in the in the Aggregate Finance in the 
Aggregate Aggregate 




Bank 1014 88.4 1114 82.8 1140 77 
Borrowing 
Share Issues 10.3 0.9 42.5 3.2 127.5 8.7 
Bond Issues 21.6 1.9 26.8 2 25 1.7 
Commercial 101.2 8.8 162.5 12 186 12.6 
Papers 
Sources: Statistics Department of the PBOC, 'An Analysis of the Direct Finance of Chinese Enterprises', China 
Finance (Being) No. 9,24 (1998). 
" See Chinaonline, `China's Securities Market Valued at US$556.44B' (December 15,2000), available at 
'http: //www. ch inaonline. conr/topstories/00121 S/1IB200121318. asp '. 
72 Id. 
73 See Neoh, Anthony, supra note 69. 
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(ii) The Domination of Bank Lending in Enterprise Finance 
In contrast to the underdeveloped capital markets is the dominating role of bank lending in 
enterprise finance. Bank lending accounted for about 90% of the whole finance in China in 
1998.75 With regard to enterprise finance, the proportion of bank borrowings accounted for over 
80% from 1995 to 1997 (see Table 1.2). 
(iii) The Domination of Bank Deposit Savings in Household Financial Assets 
The bank-centric finance in China is also reflected in the structure of household financial assets. 
The household financial assets in China, although diversified in recent years, are still dominated 
with bank deposit savings. In 1997, bank deposit savings accounted for more than 80% of all 
household financial assets, with securities only accounting for approximately 10%, and cash and 
other assets less than 10%. 76 
(iv) High-Leverage Ratio in Enterprises and High-Level of NPLs -a Direct 
Consequence of the Bank-Centric Finance 
The bank-centric finance often leads to high-leverage ratio in enterprises, especially when it is 
combined with over-saving. The average debt-asset ratio is currently 65% and 71% respectively 
for SOEs and collective enterprises. " This means that banks and enterprises are so interwoven 
that industrial collapse would pull down individual banks and even the entire banking system. 
Moreover, a bank-centric finance system easily creates NPLs within its banking sector. 
Because people leave most of their financial resources in the banks to earn a risk-free return, 
banks have to lend the money out to make profits. When easy money is flooding to companies 
and projects such as real estate development, bubbles will be created in the property sector and 
the stock market, as well as huge over-capacity in the manufacturing sector. Later, when the 
economy slows down, the bubbles burst, companies are left with large amounts of unsold goods, 
See China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century, supra note 39, at 34. 
75 See, e. g., Jiang, Xuejun & Liu, Yan, 'China's Financial Structures', China Finance (Beijing) No. 6,43 (1998). 
76 See Statistics Department of the PBOC, supra note 64. 
" See Wu, Renhong, supra note 34. Even the listed companies have very higher debt-asset ratio. The 1997 average 
debt-asset ratio of Chinese listed industrial companies was 47.7%. See Chinaonlne, supra note 70. 
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and banks end up with massive amounts of NPLs. 78 This argument is supported by international 
experiences that the ratio of NPLs to GDP in bank-centric finance economies are usually higher 
than that in other countries suffering from a financial crisis. 79 
2. The Domination of State Commercial Banks 
(i) The "Big Four "-dominated Financial System 
The bank-centric finance in China is closely connected to a bank-dominated financial system. In 
China, the banks' share of financial intermediation is almost nine-tenths, a ratio exceeding that 
found in almost all other Asian countries. 80 Further, because virtually all banks in China are state 
owned, the bank domination in China is reflected in the State bank-domination. 
China appears to be an extreme example of the Asian pattern where a few banks loom 
very large on the financial landscape and competition is thus somewhat very limited. " Although 
a variety of institutions are populating China's financial sector, and there is now a nucleus of 
potential competition between commercial banks, State commercial banks, especially the "big 
four", are still dominating the banking sector (see Annex I). The profits of the "big four" 
accounted for 50% of the profits in China's banking system in 1998. $2 They hold 68% of the 
nation's deposits, 77% of all loans, 75% of the country's total assets, and employs 66% of those 
working in the banking sector. 83 
At year-end 1996, the assets of China's largest bank, the ICBC were RMB3.6trillion, an 
amount equivalent to just over half of China's GDP that year. The assets of the CCB, the second 
largest, were RMB2. ltrillion, 30% of GDP. Even by the standard of Asia's bank-dominated 
78 See, e. g., Pu, Yonghao, 'How to Save China from Oversaving', Chinaonline (June 28,1999), available at 
ysis/ca_c906252l. h tml '. 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/Commentary -anal 79 See the World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2000 Report, 73 (December 1999). That ratio has been 27% in 
South Korea, 30% in Malaysia, 60% in Thailand, and 25% in Indonesia. In contrast, NPLs in other major emerging 
market crises (Chile in the early 1980s and Mexico in 1995) were less than 20% of GDP. In the Scandinavian 
banking crises, NPLs amounted to approximately 5% of GDP. The East Asia's heavy reliance on bank-based 
financial systems and the high debt-equity ratios of corporations have made the economic distress especially acute. 
Id. 
80 See Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 17, at 16. 
81 In all "Asian crisis countries", commercial banks dominate the financial system. See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch 
Charles et al., supra note 59, 'Box 1. Structure of the Financial System at End-1996' at 19. 
$2 See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'S &P Downgrades Hit China's Big Banks When They Can Least Afford It', available at 
'http: //www. chinaoline. com/top_stories/top_news_story. html '. 
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financial systems, these two banks accounted for an unusually high share of credit creation. 
Malaysia's biggest lender, Malayan Banking had assets of less than 40% of GDP in 1997. The 
ratio for the biggest Thai bank, Bangkok Bank, was 25%. In contrast, the biggest bank in the 
U. S., Chase Manhattan, controls assets equal to only 4% of GDP. 84 
(ii) State Commercial Bank-domination: Captive Finance Markets 
As mentioned above, competitive capital markets are one of the conditions for the well 
functioning of market discipline. This is required so that unsustainable borrowing will face the 
borrower with increased interest rates. A bank-dominated financial system is a captive market 
where households and enterprises are left with very few choices but to deposit their money with 
banks, no matter how high or low the interest rate is. 85 In a State bank-dominated financial 
system, it is hard to expect State banks to operate as genuine commercial banks because they do 
not face substantial competition. 
B. SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS ON SOES IN THE FORM OF POLICY LOANS 
All four forms of soft budget existed in China before the economic reform, and to some extent 
exist today. With the deepening of the economic reform, however, soft credits (mainly in the 
form of policy loans) are gradually taking the place of other forms. 86 
1. General Introduction 
The negative effects of government-directed loans have been recognized worldwide. " It is 
frequently argued that China's bank NPL problem result from years of bad lending practices, and 
83 See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'A Look at Bank Reform in China' (April 14,1999), available at 
'http: //www. ch inaonline. com/top_stories/breakingnews_b2-99030914-2. h tml '. 
84 See Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 17, at, 165-66. 
gs Anecdotal evidences show that countries with bank-dominated financial systems, such as Japan and China, have 
been able to sustain high household savings rates, even when real interest rates paid on savings are not very 
attractive. However, the absence of significant competition from capital markets in such systems typically has led to 
inefficiency in the allocation of funds and a low rate of return on bank capital. Id., at 10-11. 
16 See, e. g., Fang, Gang, 'On "Comprehensive State Liabilities": How to Deal with Bank's Bad Assets [lun "guojia 
zhonghe fuzhai", jianlun ruhe chuli yinghang buliang zhichan]', Economic Research Journal No. 5,11, at 11-2 
(May 1999). 
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is exacerbated by political influences on bank lending or actual policy lending to inefficient, 
over-leveraged SOEs. 88 The World Bank, for example, has noted with concern that "state banks 
are not yet completely free to lend according to commercial criteria", as "about a third of their 
investment lending is allocated to projects selected by the State Planning Commission, and the 
rest is subject to considerable informal government influence, particularly in the provinces"; and 
"as a result the creditworthiness of borrowers and the commercial viability of projects are often 
not important considerations in lending decisions. "" 
Lardy defines policy loans in China as loans extended at the behest of the governmental 
authorities at the central or local levels rather than as a result of normal commercial bank 
decision-making. " There are two forms of policy loans in China: policy loans for development 
purpose, and policy loans to subsidize loss-making SOEs. 9' 
2. Policy Loans for Development Purpose 
Policy loans for development purpose are often referred to as re-lending in China. The PBOC 
lends to financial institutions, primarily the "big four". These funds are earmarked to finance 
specific projects identified by the State Planning Commission. 92 Granting policy loans for 
development purpose has been legalized as the obligation of State commercial banks' since the 
very beginning of their establishment as specialized State banks. The 1986 Interim Regulations 
on Bank Administration provide that State specialized banks should lend to enterprises according 
to State policies and plans. "' 
g' Government directed loans are claimed causes to the financial crisis in Korean and Indonesia. See, e. g., Phillips, 
Michael M., `One by One: A Look at How the Global Finance Crisis Began', Wall. St. J. Eur. 12 (April 29,1999); 
Balino, Tomas J. T. & Ubide, Angel, The Korean Financial Crisis of 1997 -A Strategy of Financial Sector 
Reform, IMF working paper WP/99/28 (March 1999); Borenztein, Eduardo & Lee, Jong-Wha, Credit Allocation 
and Financial Crisis in Korea, IMF working paper WP/99/20 (February 1999); and Ehrilich, Craid P. & Lee, Jay 
K., `Governance of Korea's Chaebols: Role in Crisis, Coming Changes', East Asian Executive Reports 9 (March 15, 
1998). 
88 See Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 17, at 91-2; China Business Information Network, 'China: ADB: Chinese 
Banks Need 5-Year Reprieve Before Liberalization' (April 22,1999), available at '1999 WL 5618989'; and 
Atkinson, Dan, 'China Plans Bank Clean-up As Yuan Slides', The Guardian (London) 17 (April 6,1999). 
89 See, e. g., China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century, supra note 39, at 31. 
90 See Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 17, at 83. 
91 This division has been used before by other authors. See, e. g., Qian, Yingyi, 'Financial System Reform in China: 
Lessons from Japan's Main Bank System', in Aoki, Masahiko & Huge Patrick, The Japanese Main Bank System: It 
Relevance for Developing and Transforming Economies (1994). 
92 Now the State Development and Planning Commission. 
97 Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Bank Administration, issued by the State Council on 
January 7,1986 (hereinafter referred to as "Interim Regulations on Bank Administration"), art. 14. 
31 
CHAPTER ONE: CHINAS BANK NON-PERFORMING LOAN PROBLEM 
Policy loans for development purpose have developed with the decentralization of 
financial resources in China. Under the old system of enterprise finance before the economic 
reform - known as "uniform collection and unified expenditure', SOEs returned almost all their 
profits to the MOF and received investment funds plus a minimum amount of quote working 
capital in the form of grants from the State-budget. "' The PBOC, the mono-bank in China before 
the reform, 95 only provided SOEs with credits to finance above-quote working capital. "' Soft 
budgets to SOEs then seldom took the form of bank soft credits. 
The economic reform initiated in 1978, however, changed the picture completely. 
Accompanying the decentralization of decision-making power through the reform, 97 an increased 
proportion of the national financial resources started to be held by decentralized units - 
households, enterprises, and local governments. For example, by 1991 the share of households in 
total national savings reached 46%. The decentralization of financial resources led to a greater 
separation of the saver from the investor. As a result, there arose a need for financial 
intermediaries. " After the 1979-84 banking system reconstruction, a two-tier banking system 
evolved in China: with the PBOC as the central bank, and four specialized state banks as the 
second tier. 99 
With more and more financial resources being held by decentralized units, the share of 
central government revenues of GDP has been decreasing annually. 10° In 1998, the central 
government revenues were only 12% of GDP - well below the developing country average of 
See Bowles, Paul & Gordon White, supra note 46. 
95 Prior to the reforms financial resources in China were highly centralized. The mobilization and allocation of 
financial resources was done mainly through the state budget in conjunction with the state plan. Household 
savings accounted for only 3% whereas the state budget accounted for 46% of total national savings on the eve of 
the reforms in 1978. Since the government was the main saver and investor, financial intermediaries were neither 
necessary nor allowed. Hence, financial markets were closed, financial instruments were prohibited, and all 
financial institutions had been either confiscated or nationalized and were merged with the PBOC. See, e. g., Jao, Y. 
C., `Financial Reform in China and Hong Kong 1987-1988: A Comparative Overview', Paper presented to the 
Inaugural International Conference on Asian Pacific Financial Markets (Singapore: 16-18 Nov. 1989). 
% See, e. g., Luc, De Wulf, 'Financial Reform in China', Financial & Development 19 (December 1985). 
97 For a general discussion of the decentralization in China's industrial system, see, e. g., Chai, Joseph C. H., China: 
Transition to A Market Economy, Chapters 3&4. (1997). 
98 See generally the World Bank, World Development Report, 28-9 (1989). 
See generally Luc, De Wulf, supra note 96. For China's financial system at the end of 1985, see Zhou, 
Xiaochuan & Zhu, Li, 'China's Banking System: Current Status, Perspective on Reform', Journal of Comparative 
Economics No. 11,399, Fig. 1: The Structure of China's Banking System (1987). 
10° Between 1978 and 1995 budgetary revenues tumbled from 35% of GDP to 11%. See China 2020: Development 
Challenges in the New Century, supra note 39, at 24. 
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approximately 32%, making it one of the lowest levels in the world. "' The decline in revenue, 
combined with the government's desire to keep the budget deficit modest, has brought a similar 
decline in government expenditures as a share of GDP. Investment suffered the most, falling 
from 16% of GDP in 1978 to less than 3% in 1995.102 Starting in 1983, budget financing of 
working capital for SOEs was drastically curtailed, and in late 1984 the government announced 
that the budget would no longer provide financing for fixed-asset investments. 103 Consequently, 
the expansion of the economy relies heavily on the banking system. In 1995, bank loans 
accounted for 39% of the government-controlled investment. '04 
To free State commercial banks from policy loans for development purpose, three policy 
banks have been established since January 1994: the State Development Bank (SDB), whose 
general responsibility is infrastructure lending; ` the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB), 
who is responsible for funding agricultural procurement and agricultural infrastructure; 106 and 
China Export-Import Bank, whose responsibility is to handle export-import financing for key 
sectors. 107 The establishment of policy banks has to some extent released the "big four" of their 
policy-lending obligation, as reflected in changes in the magnitude of central bank loans to the 
"big four". Central bank lending to the "big four" grew from RMB268.2bn in 1985 to over 
RMB960bn by 1993 and then fell to RMB680bn at year-end 1995 as policy lending began to be 
channeled through newly-created policy banks in 1994.108 
The policy banks, however, generally lack secure funding sources. For example, most of 
the SDB's funding has come from low-interest bonds placed with State commercial banks by the 
1' More seriously, 60% of the RMB 548.3bn in total central government revenues of 1998 came not from tax 
collection but from the issuance of debt. Of the debt raised, 70.9% went on servicing and financing redemption of 
other debts. This seriously impairs the central government's ability to conduct macro-economic policy and pursue a 
fiscal stimulus policy. See, e. g., Kynge, James, 'China: Poor Revenues Hit Growth Hopes', Fin. Times (April 6, 
1999). 
102 See China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century, supra note 39, Figure 3.1. 
103 See generally Circular of the State Council Approving and Promulgating the Report of the People's Bank of 
China on the PBOC's Unified-Management of State-Operated Enterprises' Working Capital, issued by the State 
Council on June 25,1983; and Interim Provisions Converting All State Budgetary Capital Construction Investment 
from Appropriations to Loans, adopted by the MOF on December 14,1984. 
'°° See, e. g., China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century, supra note 39, Figure 3.2. 
105 See Circular of the State Council on Establishing the State Development Bank, No. 22,1994. 
106 See Circular of the State Council on Establishing China Agricultural Development Bank, No. 25,1994. 
107 The Export-Import Bank of China was formally established on April 26,1994, and started operations on July 1, 
1994. The bank's financial business is subject to the direction and supervision of the MOF, the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and the PBOC. See Wan, Timothy Haosen, Development of Banking 
Law in the Great China Area: PRC and Taiwan, 181-2 (1999). 
Boa See Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 17, at 85. 
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PBOC fiat, while the ADB relies on the PBOC re-lending for 90% of its needs. 109 Furthermore, 
policy banks, because of their mandates to lend to state projects for the implementation of state 
policies, are accumulating NPLs themselves. The ADB, for example, had accumulated 
RMB214bn NPLs from its establishment to November 1999.10 These institutional weaknesses 
of young policy banks indicate that it may take a while before they have the resources to 
shoulder all policy lending. As a result, State commercial banks are still required to conduct their 
loan business in accordance with the need for the development of the national economy and 
social progress under the guidance of the State industrial policy. "' 
3. Policy Loans to Subsidize Loss-making SOEs 
The situation of policy loans to subsidize loss-making enterprises is more complicated than that 
of policy loans for development purpose. China's SOEs, while acquiring increased autonomy 
over their operations since 1980,12 are increasingly under pressures from competition created by 
trade liberalization and the proliferation of non-state enterprises, and consequently suffer huge 
losses every year. 13 Their rate of return on assets (measured by pre-tax profits divided by the 
sum of the depreciated value of fixed assets plus working capital) has been declining during the 
economic reform, which averaged 24-25% in the early years of reform, and has declined 
continuously since 1985 while standing at only 6% in 1997.11 As a result, the SOEs' 
dependence on public subsidies began to increase. "S The decentralized financial resources, 
109 See generally Holmes, William D., 'China's Financial Reforms in the Global Market', 28 Law & Pol y Int'l Bus. 
715. 
10 See, e. g., Reuters English News Service, 'China: China's WTO Deal Heralds Radical Banking Reform' 
(November 16,1999). The ADB funds state grain purchases from farmers at abovc-market prices. It was estimated 
that the amount would rise dramatically as cheaper and better foreign agricultural imports flooded the market. Id. 
"' The Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks, adopted at the 13th Session of the Standing 
Committee of the 8th National People's Congress on May 10,1995, and effective as of July 1,1995 (hereinafter 
referred to as "the Commercial Banking Law"), art. 34. 
"Z For a detailed discussion of the SOEs' increasing autonomy through the economic reform, see Chai, Joseph C. 
H., supra note 97, Ch. 4. 
"' Compared to non-state sector enterprises, SOEs have lagged in output, employment, and productivity growth. 
Their return on assets is estimated at just 6.0%, compared with 8.4% in collectives and 9.9% in joint ventures. Their 
share of loss-makers was 26% in 1992 and increased to 50% in 1996. See China 2020: Development Challenges in 
the New Century, supra note 39, at 28. 
14 See, e. g., Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 4, at 17-18. 
"S Since the late 1980s, direct fiscal subsidies and indirect subsidies (policy loans) together absorbed 10% or more 
of GDP every year. See Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 17, at 4. 
34 
CHAPTER ONE: CHINAS BANK NON-PERFORMING LOAN PROBLEM 
however, made the government unable and unwilling to subsidize these enterprises by budget . 
16 
Thus, the banking system became the SOEs' main source of financial support. "' In 1994, for 
example, banks were ordered to lend to subsidize loss-making enterprises so as to maintain the 
life of those SOEs' employees and the stability of the society. "8 
Some of the subsidizing policy loans are actually subsidies to enterprises that are 
suffering losses because of government policies and the cost of their social security benefits. 1' 
To contract the scope of subsidies, at the 14' Session of the 8' NPC in March 1996, the 
government announced its intention to concentrate on the reform and development of 1,000 large 
SOEs and state-owned enterprises groups that would form the core of China's modem enterprise 
system. 12° The central government also determined that continued policy loans, tax relief, 
additional credit, and sales support would be used to support these 1,000 core enterprises and 
enterprise groups, while the rest of the SOEs would be left for restructuring, mergers, leasing, 
sale to non-state enterprises, or bankruptcy. 'Z' Consequently, the State commercial banks' 
lending mission was narrowed to a small population of eligible SOEs by the adoption of the main 
bank system. Adopting the Japanese model, each borrower is paired with a main bank lender - 
actually a designated bank branch - with which it keeps its basic account and from which it 
receives all of its loans (unless the main bank is unable to meet its demand). Three hundred large 
and medium-sized SOEs were paired with main banks as the first step to adopting the main bank 
system. 'ZZ As a result, 80% of new loans went to these 300 SOEs in the first half of 1996. '2' 
In addition to policy loans subsidizing enterprises suffering losses because of government 
policy, there are also loans made under informal government intervention. Local governments at 
various levels, especially provincial governments, fearing large lay-offs from the failure of loss- 
making enterprises, have pressured state banks to keep lending to loss-making enterprises. And 
116 E. g., budgetary subsidies fell from 7.5% of GDP in 1992 to 2.3% in 1994. See the World Bank, The Chinese 
Economy: Fighting Inflation, Deepening Reforms, 17, a World Bank Country Survey (1996). 
117 Despite recent attempts of reform, China's banks are still the dispensers of disguised subsidies, in the form of 
loans, to unprofitable SOEs. In 1994, for example, implicit financial subsidies in the form of low interest rate loans 
and unpaid principal and interest came to 1.7% of GDP. Id. 
"$ The Urgent Circular on Making Working Capital Loans to SOEs, PBOC No. 34 (1994). 
19 For example, in 1994, a survey of 156 SOEs showed that the budgetary and financial subsidies received equaled 
the costs to enterprises arising from government price policies, social securities benefits, and wages for redundant 
workers. See the World Bank, supra note 116. 
120 Id., and China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century, supra note 39, at 29-30. 
See, e. g., Miller, Sheryl, 'Institutional Impediments to the Enforcement of China's Bankruptcy Laws', 8 Int'l 
Legal Persp. 187. 
'u This system is set out in the Provisional Measures for Main Bank Management, issued by the PBOC on June 29, 
1996, effective as of July 1,1996. 
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they were well-positioned to make interventions, because the PBOC and the "big four" had 
thousands of regional and local branch offices that were under dual administration by their 
headquarters and the regional or local governments. 124 Under such an administrative structure, 
even if the Commercial Banking Law grants banking institutions autonomy to make lending 
decisions and prohibits any individual or entity from forcing the bank to make lending or provide 
a guarantee, "' the banks' autonomy cannot be guaranteed. 12" According to Moody, in the first 
half of 1999,89% of State bank lending was to state-sector companies in spite of their poor 
performance. 'Z' 
4. Failure of Market Discipline Due to Policy Loans 
As a kind of soft budget constraints to SOEs, policy loans result in SOEs' irresponsiveness to 
market signals"' and lack of dynamic capacity. The pervasiveness of policy loans also deepened 
the captivity of China's financial markets. Making matters worse, because banks are subject to 
government mandate and intervention in their lending activities, the need for the development of 
the micro-credit analysis structure in the banking industry has been delayed and masked - 
resulting in weak internal controls, especially weak risk-control systems. All these lead to the 
failure of market discipline in preventing unsustainable borrowing in China and consequently 
result in the accumulation of NPLs on State commercial banks' books. 
123 See Holmes, William D., supra note 109. 
124 China's Central Bank was an immense institution with branches in every provincial level administrative unit and 
offices in all larger cities as well as most counties before the 1998 structural reshuffle. By mid-1993, the provincial 
branches of the PBOC responded primarily to provincial-level political leaders rather than the PBOC headquarters 
in Beijing. This was not surprising since the control of appointments of the top officials in each provincial branch of 
the central bank was largely in the hands of provincial party officials rather than in the hands of the central bank 
headquarters in Beijing. In turn, the provincial branches of the four specialized banks, as to a lesser degree than 
other banks, were responsive primarily to the policies emanating from the provincial branches of the central bank 
rather than their own head offices in Beijing. This structure maximized the possibility that loan decisions within 
each province would be response to local political pressure and even corruption. See Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 
17, at 90-1. 
'ZS The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 111, art. 41; and also General Lending Rules, issued by the PBOC in 
1995 and effective as of August 1,1996, art. 22, which provides lender's right. 
116 This is indicated in one signed article by a CCB official published on Zhongguo Jingrong (China Finance), a 
monthly Journal of the PBOC, where the author suggests that regional and local branch should avoid and resist 
making policy loans imposed by local governments with flexible strategy and tactics and try to win over their 
understanding and support. See Song, Bo, 'Proposals on the Commercial Bank's NPL Workout', China Finance 
(Being) No. 1,23 (1998). 
'Z' See, e. g., Kynge, James, 'Beijing: China Bank Reform "Yet to Tackle All Faults"', Fin. Times (August 18, 
1999). 
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Given China's desperate need to keep its economic growth, 12' it is predictable that policy 
loans cannot be ended abruptly. Dai Xianglong announced at the World Economic Forum in 
Beijing in April 1999 that the "big four" would end policy loans to bail out government 
businesses within two years. 13° This might be a realistic commitment. 
C. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ON STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS 
1. Administrative Controls on State Commercial Banks as Monetary Policy Instruments 
China's bank-centric finance has determined that banks must play an important role in 
accumulating and distributing funds. This, together with the central bank's inability to use 
indirect monetary policy instruments, results in administrative controls on commercial banks 
such as credit plans and interest rate controls, "' although these direct instruments have not 
always proven very effective. "' 
The PBOC's over-reliance on direct monetary policy instruments evolved from the pre- 
reform period. From 1953 to 1978, the State controlled the supply of credit and cash through a 
credit and cash plan. 133 The credit plan was to provide working capital for industry and 
commerce, while the cash plan was designed to control demand and to facilitate transactions in 
consumer goods markets. 134 The PBOC followed cash and credit plans from the State Planning 
Commission, and its branches provided financial resources to enterprises according to the plan. 
'2a According to a survey in 1992, enterprises' demands for bank loans were not very responsive to changes in 
interest rates. See Chai, Joseph C. H., supra note 97, Table 5.3. 
'Z' It is predicted that serious socio-economic problems will result if China's growth rate falls below 7%. See 
generally Chinaonline, 'China Should Set Economic Growth Rate Floor at 7%, Economist Says' (May 7,1999), 
available at `http: //www. chinaonline. comltop_stories/breakingnews_b2-99050518'. 
110 Quoted in Callick, Rowan, 'China Draws Near to WTO Membership', Australia Financial Review 15 (April 28, 
1999). 
"' Zhao, Ziyang, China's former premier minister, stated in his report to the 13' National Congress of the CPC that 
the government should intensify the reform of China's monetary system, strengthen the status of banks and their 
role in the system of macro-economic control, and exercise proper control over the volume of credit funds supplied 
in accordance with sound policies relating to currency circulation. See Liu, Hongru, supra note 65. 
132 For example, broad money maintained its rapid expansion in 1995 on the strength of rising foreign reserves and 
higher-than expected growth in domestic credit, as State commercial banks found new ways to circumvent the credit 
plan. See the World Bank, supra note 116. 
133 Before 1953, cash management was the centerpiece of monetary policy. See generally Dai Genyou, 'A Review 
of PBOC's Monetary and Credit Policy', China Finance (Beijing) No. 12,27 (1999). 
134 See, e. g., Fernando, Montes-Negret, 'China's Credit Plan: An Overview', 11 Oxford Rev. of Econ. Poly No. 4, 
25 (Winter, 1995). 
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In 1978, the PBOC was separated from the MOF and granted ministerial rank. 15 Five 
years later, in 1983, the State Council granted the PBOC the authority of a central bank and the 
PBOC subsequently transferred its commercial banking operations to four specialized banks. '36 
The PBOC was authorized to take the responsibility for making and implementing monetary 
policy via credit plans and interest rate controls, among other means. 13 " This responsibility was 
confirmed in the 1986 Interim Regulations on Bank Administration. "' 
2. The Credit Plan 
(i) General Introduction. 
The financial system in China had implemented the "credit plan" format until 1998 - the central 
bank regulated supply and allocation of credit through an annual credit plan. "' The credit plan 
governed each bank's credit volume directly (in the aggregate, by different types of lending, and 
sometimes by different sectors, sub-sectors, and even individual borrowers140) and translated the 
government's investment plans into reality. "" 
The PBOC implemented the credit plan by imposing individual credit ceilings on the 
State specialized banks, and later on other commercial banks and non-bank financial 
institutions. "' After formulating an annual credit plan, the PBOC allocated credit ceilings to 
"S See Gang, Yi, Money, Banking, and Financial Markets In China, 27 (Beijing: 1994). 
136 See Decisions of the State Council on the PBOC's Exclusive Role as Central Bank, issued by the State Council 
on September 17,1983 (hereinafter referred to as "the Decisions on the PBOC's Exclusive Role as Central Bank"). 
Id. art. 1 
"$ Interim Regulations on Bank Administration, supra note 93, art. 5. 
See, e. g., Chai, J. C. H., 'Domestic Money and Banking Reform in China', Hong Kong Economic Papers, No. 
14,37 (1981). 
10 Separate credit ceilings were set for different categories of bank credits. There were three categories of bank 
loans: working capital credits (up to 1 year), technical renovation or transformation credits (1-5 years), and fixed 
capital construction loans (between 5-10 years). Each maturity category was further broken down into activities, 
sub-sectors, and major projects. Working capital loans, for example, were subcategorized as loans for the 
construction industry, industry and commerce, technological development, local suppliers of equipment and inputs, 
special purposes, housing, bridges, and capital construction reserve fund. Some flexibility was allowed: the 
specialized banks could reallocate their "quota" from fixed asset lending to working capital loans, for example, but 
could not do the reverse. See Fernando, Montes-Negret, supra note 134. 
"' See the World Bank, supra note 116, at 28. For a detailed description of the process to formulate an annual credit 
plan, see the World Bank, infra note 142, at 37-8; and Fernando, Montes-Negret, supra note 134. 
"Z Since its creation, the credit plan had been expanding its application in an intention to counter credit plan 
leakage. The plan originally did not applied to non-bank financial institutions. In 1988, there were great leakages 
from the credit plan, primarily through a rapid expansion of loans by non-bank financial intermediaries. As a result, 
inflation began to accelerate in 1988. The PBOC had to institute a broader credit plan beginning in March 1989. 
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each state bank's head office and to the PBOC branches in Shanghai and Shenzhen. In turn, the 
banks allocated credit ceilings to their branches, with the exception of the branches in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen, which received their credit ceilings from the local PBOC branch. These ceilings 
were afterwards monitored by the local PBOC branches and were binding on the overall 
operations of each bank and on their respective branch offices. Swapping of credit ceilings 
between branches whose loan demands were below the ceilings and those whose loan demands 
exceeded the ceilings was not permitted. 143 
(ii) Negative Effects of the Credit Plan 
Under the credit plan, banks were actually facing a captive market, where they had no choice but 
to lend to designated borrowers. For example, under the credit ceilings set in the early 1990s for 
the largest specialized bank, the ICBC, about a third of lending was mandatory loans for key 
economic sectors, another third was fixed asset loans, and another 10% was committed to 
specific projects of local governments. Thus, less than 20% of the bank's lending was decided 
"autonomously". 
Moreover, banks under the credit plan acted largely as passive channels, allocating credit 
to priority sectors, sub-sectors, and projects selected by national or local governments. As 
passive financial agencies of the government, they did not need to manage their risks. '" This 
resulted in their weak internal controls (especially risk-management ability). The lack of risk- 
management ability was evident in the sharp reduction in new loans in the first quarter of 1998. 
When the credit ceilings on banks were removed in 1998, banks were forced to cut their lending 
because they could not evaluate the risk of some projects properly. "" 
3. Interest Rate Controls 
Under the credit plan in the broader sense, all lending institutions, including credit cooperatives, trust and 
investment companies, and other non-bank financial intermediaries were subject to credit ceilings. See the World 
Bank, China: Financial Sector Policies and Institutional Development, 31-2, a World Bank Country Study (1990). 
143 Id., at 38. 
'« E. g., in South Korea, beginning in the early 1980s, the government involvement in bank lending decisions was 
gradually reduced. But banks developed few skills in credit analysis or risk management, lending decisions were 
still largely based on the availability of collateral rather than on an assessment of risk and future repayment 
capacity. See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 59, at 20. 
gas See, e. g., Liu, Bin (Statistics Department of the PBOC), 'A Survey on the Loan Extending Behavior of Chinese 
Commercial Banks', China Finance (Being) No. 9,27 (1998). 
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(i) The Development of Interest Rate Controls 
Interest rate controls have been a dominant feature of China's financial system. Before the 
economic reform, bank interest rates in China remained at low levels with very few brackets and 
were always fixed for long periods of time. "' Since the reform began, the interest rate policy has 
gone through adjustments that have enabled interest rates to function as a lever in regulating the 
supply and demand for funds. 14' Interest rates continued to be set administratively by the PBOC, 
however, subject to the approval of the State Council. The 1986 Interim Regulations on Bank 
Administration provided that, except for inter-bank lending interest rates, 148 interest rates should 
be set by the PBOC headquarters. 149 In December 1990, the PBOC promulgated Interim 
Provisions on Interest Rate Administration, providing procedures for the PBOC to fix and 
administer RMB interest rates. 'so 
The 1995 Commercial Banking Law, while providing that commercial banks shall 
operate and assume civil responsibilities independently, "' reiterates that they shall fix their 
interest rates for deposit and loans pursuant to the ceiling and floor interest rates defined by the 
PBOC. 152 On March 2,1999, the PBOC issued its new Provisions on RMB Interest Rate 
Administration. 's' These Provisions grant financial institutions a little bit more freedom in 
deciding interest rates, but banks are still required to fix their deposit and loan interest rates 
pursuant to the ceiling and floor interest rates set by the PBOC. 154 
(ii) The Negative Effects of Interest Rate Control 
146 See Liu, Hongru, supra note 65. 
147 Id. 
148 Interim Regulations on Bank Administration, supra note 93, art. 45. This article authorizes State specialized 
banks to decide the inter-bank lending interest rates. 
149 Id. art. 42. 
1S0 Interim Provisions on Interest Rate Administration [ lily guanli zhanxing guiding], issued by the PBOC in 
December 1990. 
's' The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 111, art. 4. 
152 Id. arts. 31 & 38. 
` s' Provisions on RMB Interest Rate Administration [renminbi lily guanli guiding], promulgated by the PBOC on 
March 2,1999, effective as of April 1,1999. 
' S4 Id. arts. 5&6. 
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Among all administrative restrictions, interest rate controls do the greatest harm to the well 
functioning of market discipline. With interest rates being set administratively by the PBOC, 
sometimes at a very low level to subsidize the development of certain priority industries or loss- 
making enterprises, "' commercial banks have no way to discipline unsustainable borrowers by 
charging higher lending rates. Actually, even under the floating rate system, banks are not 
allowed to raise their lending rates when they lend to large SOEs. In the September 1999 
widening of rate floating for lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises, the PBOC clearly 
stated that lending rates for loans to the 512 key SOEs could not be floated upward. 'sa 
Making matters worse, because of the administrative control, bank interest rates 
sometimes give distorted signals to the market. According to a 1996 World Bank report, China's 
interest rate policy "fulfills a complex set of objectives, reflecting the authorities' `revealed 
preferences' with respect to distribution of subsidies to various productive activities, groups and 
regions; policies for industrial and agricultural development; and resource transfer from 
depositors to the state or other borrowers. ""' 
Further, because of the government's intention to use higher interest rates to mobilize 
savings while at the same time providing cheap credit to enterprises, the interest margin received 
by China's commercial banks is narrow and sometimes even negative. "' Over time, the result 
has been a steady de-capitalization of the banks. 'S' Making matters worse, there is no sign that 
the government will discontinue its policy to sacrifice the banks for economic growth. For 
example, to stimulate the economic growth, interest rates were cut consecutively seven times 
from May 1996 to July 1999 (see Annex II), reducing interest rate margins of Chinese banks by 
0.9 percentage points. 16° 
4. Division of Business Scope among State Specialized Banks 
iss There were more than 30 preferential rates around 1995. See, e. g., Mehran, Hassanali, Laurens, Bernard & 
Quintyn Marc (eds. ), Interest Rate Liberalization and Money Market Development, 19 (1996). 
" See Zhou Rongfan, Chao Deyun, 'The Reform and Development of China's Floating Interest Rate System' 
[woguo fudong lily zhidu de gaige he fazhan]', China Finance No. 10,23, at 24 (1998). The PBOC also prohibited 
individual housing loans, preferential loans and loans from policy banks from floating. 
See the World Bank, supra note 142, at 24. 
's$ See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'China's Central Banker Talks up Bank, Interest Rate Reform' (October 12,1999), 
available at 'http: //Www. chinaonline. com/topstoriesIC9101109. asp'. 
159 See, e. g., China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century, supra note 39. 
160 See Dai Xianglong, 'Improve Financial Services to Assist Reform and Progress of SOEs in Accordance with the 
Guideline of the 4th Plenary of the 15th Central Committee of CPC', China Finance, No. 11,4, at 5 (November 
1999). 
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(i) The Development of Business Scope Division among State Specialized Banks 
Each of the "big four" was authorized to operate in certain specific sectors of the economy when 
it was established or reestablished. When the ABC was re-established in 1979, it operated mainly 
in the rural sectors with responsibility for rural financial affairs. 16' The ICBC was established in 
1984 and handled mainly the domestic currency business of state enterprises in the urban 
industrial and commercial sectors. 162 The BOC acquired its independent status in 1979 and was 
mainly responsible for foreign exchange business. 163 The CCB also became part of the 
specialized banking system in 1979'" and was mainly responsible for the disbursing and control 
of funds budgeted for basic construction and modernization investment., 6' In 1983, the State 
Council promulgated Decisions on the PBOC's Exclusive Role as Central Bank, authorizing the 
PBOC to further specify and adjust the business scope division among specialized banks. 166 In 
1984, the State Council approved the PBOC's report dividing the business scope among 
specialized banks regarding fixed-asset loans. 167 
The division of business scope among specialized banks did not last long. Although the 
1986 Interim Regulations on Bank Administration confirmed this business scope division by 
providing that state specialized banks must apply for the approval of the PBOC for activities 
16' See, e. g., He, Linxiang (Governor of the ABC), 'ABC Pressing Forward in China's Reform and Opening up', 
China Finance (Being) No. 8,4 (1998). 
162 See, e. g., Liu, Tinghuan (Governor of the ICBC), 'ICBC's 20 Years of Reform and Development', China Finance 
(Being) No. 7,7 (1998). 
16' See Reply of the State Council to the PBOC's Proposal Concerning the Amendments to the BOC's Articles of 
Association. Issued by the State Council on September 22,1980. 
164 The predecessor of the CCB is the People's Construction Bank of China (PCBC), which was first established in 
1954 under the Decision of the State Council on Establishing the People's Construction Bank of China, as a 
specialized bank subject to the Ministry of Finance to supervise the use of public money for capital construction. In 
1979, the PCBC became subject directly to the State Council and began to involve itself in banking business. The 
PCBC started to take deposits from enterprises and use them to extend long-term credits to finance both basic 
construction and modernization investment in 1980; started its cash booking business and working capital loans 
business in 1984; and started to take household deposit and savings in 1985. The PCBC has been renamed as CCB 
since March 26,1996. See CCB, 'CCB Is Enjoying A Rapid Development And Undertaking A Strategic Reform', 
China Finance (Being) No. 8,9 (1998). 
165 In 1983, the State Council promulgated Decisions on the PBOC's Exclusive Role as Central Bank. The 
Decisions provide that CCB should concentrate on issuing grants and loans for capital construction and loans for 
large-sized technical updating and transformation projects. The PBOC should transfer its business of loans for 
capital construction to CCB, while CCB should transfer its business of loans for medium and small-sized technical 
updating and transformation to the ICBC. The Decisions on the PBOC's Exclusive Role as Central Bank, supra note 
136. 
" Id. art. 3. 
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beyond their authorized business scope, "' since 1985, all four specialized banks have been 
allowed to undertake general banking business irrespective of their sector, and compete for 
deposits and loans in their previously monopolized markets. 16' The 1993 Resolution of State 
Council on Financial Reform provided that there should be overlap between State commercial 
banks' business, and competition between State commercial banks should be encouraged. 1' The 
division was formally removed by the 1995 Commercial Banking Law. "' 
(ii) The Negative Effects of the Business Division 
The administrative division of business scope between the four state specialized banks had 
seriously impeded competition between banks. Under the division, specialized banks' clientele 
was limited to certain geographic areas and/or industries, facing them with captive markets. 
Although the division only existed shortly, its influence still exists. Given the structure of the 
banks' preexisting branch networks and the informal limitations on competition that continue to 
prevail, full overlap has yet to take place. 
D. WEAK INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS IN STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS 
Banks under heavy administrative controls often do not have the opportunity to develop their 
risk-management capacity. In Japan, for example, tight controls of bank behavior by regulators 
had long been a substitute for risk management by banks and for monitoring by shareholders and 
depositors. When the controls were successively relaxed in the 1970s and 1980s, a vacuum 
emerged in bank risk management. 12 This might have been a factor behind massive lending into 
real estate-related activities of Japanese banks in the 1980s, where credit analysis was just a 
167 See Report of the PBOC Concerning the Division of Business Scope in Fixed Asset Loans among Specialized 
Banks, approved by the State Council on May 13,1984. 
168 Interim Regulations on Bank Administration, supra note 93, art. 16. 
169 See Qian, Yingyi, supra note 91. 
10 Section 3, Resolution on Financial Reform, State Council, No. 91 (1993). 
"" The Commercial Banking Law, not like the 1986 Interim Regulations on Bank Administration, has no special 
provisions for the former "big four" state specialized banks, they are treated equally in the law with other 
commercial banks. 
"= Even as of 1996, banks were reluctant to go ahead with self-assessment of their loan portfolio, because, in their 
view, this would involve much preparation on their part. See Ueda, Kazuo, 'The Japanese Banking Crisis in the 
1990s' in Strengthening the Banking System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,251, at 259 
and note 7 (October 1999). 
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matter of estimating the future path of real estate prices. "' This is exactly the case for Chinese 
banks (especially State commercial banks). After decades of extending loans largely at the behest 
of political leaders, the banks have not accumulated sufficient experience in real commercial 
banking. 174 
According to a 1996 World Bank report about China, 175 China's State commercial banks 
are handicapped by such operational deficiencies as the absence of key management processes 
(planning, budgeting, reporting); lack of familiarity with asset and liability management 
techniques; inadequate accounting standards that render performance and risk assessment 
difficulties; substandard information systems; inappropriate internal incentives systems for staff; 
and poorly articulated institutional structures and legal frameworks. These are needed to 
underpin a sound system of corporate governance, eliminate interference and conflicts of interest, 
increase management autonomy, and protect the interests of owners and depositors. 
These weak internal controls led to the accumulation of NPLs. 16 A survey conducted at 
the end of 1998 divided the loan assets in one of the "big four" into loans under credit plans or 
government instruction, and loans granted at the full discretion of the bank. It discovered that 
more NPLs were created via lending at the full discretion of the bank, both in absolute amount 
and in proportion, than were created via lending under credit plans or government instructions. "' 
The PBOC launched an inspection at the end of 1998 into 50 branches of state banks where there 
had been sharp increases in bad debts and found serious problems including "chaotic" internal 
management, "blind lending", falsifying NPL data, severe dereliction of duty and "fraud for self- 
interest". "" More seriously, weak internal controls have led to numerous instances of corruption 
and fraud by bank officials, '" as well as misdemeanors by bank managers. 18° 
173 Id., at 256. 
14 A senior partner in Price Waterhouse was reported saying "China's bankers are still ill-equipped to evaluate the 
quality of new loans". See 'Long and Slow Road Ahead for Banking System Reform', Hong Kong Standard 
(January 31,1997). 
15 See the World Bank, supra note 116, at 34-35. 
176 See, e. g., Wang, Zhaoxing, 'Financial Supervision: Opportunities and Challenge [jinrong jianguan: fanzhang yu 
tiaozhan]', China Finance No. 12,16, at 18 (December 1999); and also Kang, Shusheng, Commercial Banks' 
Internal Controls: Borrowing and innovation [shangye yinhang neikong zhidu: jiejian yu chuangxing], 3 (1999). 
"' See, e. g., Zhang, Haining & Ouyan, Haijie, 'How Can State Commercial Banks Prevent Credit Risks [guoyou 
shangye yinhang fangfan xingdai fenxiang de chuly zai nali]? ', China Finance (Being) No. 10,34, at 34 (1999). 
18 See, e. g., Dow Jones International News, 'China Pledges Tough Measures to Combat NPLs - Report' (March 19, 
1999); and also Harding, James, 'China Banks Sack Managers', Fin. Times (March 20,1999). 
19 See, e. g., Harding, James, 'Official Arrested over Chinese Fraud', and 'China: Corruption May Threaten State', 
Fin. Times (March 5,1999). 
180 See Kynge, James, 'China: Report Reveals Banking Abuses', Fin. Times (December 17,1999); and also Dow 
Jones International News, 'China Auditor Uncovers Irregularities at Two State Banks' (December 16,1999). 
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E. THE INAPPROPRIATE BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
External regulation, especially prudential regulation and supervision is critical to ensure the 
safety and soundness of individual banks and the entire banking system. The failure of the PBOC 
to develop a prudential supervisory regime has been widely recognized as one of the causes of 
State commercial banks' NPL problem. "' 
The PBOC, having engaging in formulating and enforcing the credit plans for such a long 
time, shifted to the prudential regime just few years ago. 182 Besides, the government's 
interference in credit allocation not only circumvented the need for thorough risk assessment by 
the banks, made the government co-responsible for the quality of banks' assets, and provided an 
implicit government guarantee on banks' liabilities, but also constrained the supervisors in their 
ability to penalize banks for bad lending decisions. Thus, although bank supervision activities in 
China dated from May 1985 when the PBOC established its department of bank supervision and 
examination, "' the PBOC had failed to develop prudential supervision on banks until the mid- 
1990s. 184 
F. SUMMARY 
To sum up, the empirical analyses support the assumption in the theoretical framework section, 
i. e., the failure of market discipline is the ultimate cause of the bank NPL problem in China. The 
state bank-dominated/bank-centric finance, policy loans, administrative controls on banks, weak 
bank internal controls, and inappropriate banking regulation/supervision have all led to the 
failure of market discipline. As a result, market discipline do not really work on banks 
... See Wang, Zhaoxing, supra note 176, at 18. 
'82 As recognized by many Chinese commentators, the prudential regime and the credit plan conflict with each other 
both in theory and practice. See, e. g., Jin, Weihong, `An Empirical Study of Debt-Capital Ratio Management as 
Introduced by China's Specialized Banks', Guanli Shijie No. 3,44,1996; and Chen Yuan (ed. ), Chinese Financial 
System Reform, 31-38 (1994). 
1e' This Department, known as the Examination and Supervision Department, had more than 4,700 personnel by the 
end of 1988. Among them, however, only about 200 were at the level of senior economist or senior accountant with 
slightly more than 1,200 in the middle grades. See the World Bank, supra note 142, at 33. 
184 Prior to 1995, the PBOC mainly focused on market-entry regulation and supervision. See Wang Zhaoxing, supra 
note 176, at 16. 
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(especially State commercial banks) and SOEs, budget constraints no longer bite, leading to 
unsustainable borrowing by SOEs and continuous creation of NPLs on banks' books. 
V. THREE BASIC STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH BANK NPL PROBLEM 
In countries where banks are burdened with NPLs, bankers and government officials are 
grappling with a common problem: how to deal with the vast amount of NPLs so as to produce a 
healthy banking sector able to survive without State support and contribute to the country's 
economic recovery. The IMF has examined economic cycles in a range of countries experiencing 
financial system crises and noted, "turnaround did not occur until decisive actions were taken to 
deal with the bad loans of the banking system and to wind up insolvent institutions. ""' 
From the government's point of view, there are three basic policies to deal with banks 
trapped with NPLs: (1) bank closure and liquidation at large scale, (2) regulatory forbearance, 
and/or (3) bank restructuring. These policy options are not mutually incompatible and in practice 
strategies can entail various combinations of each policy. As a matter of fact, in many countries, 
policy responses to banking problems have often been implemented through a piecemeal process 
- restructuring part of the banking sector, closing some small banks and postponing the 
resolution of some troubled banks. 'ab In the rest of this section, the advantages and disadvantages 
of each strategy will be explored so as to discover a suitable policy combination for China. 
A. BANK CLOSURE AND LIQUIDATION AT LARGE SCALE 
Part of the normal competitive process in any industry is that individual firms should be allowed 
to fail. Allowing the weakest to fail increases the overall efficiency of the industry; conversely, 
maintaining overcapacity creates a more difficult environment for the stronger firms. This 
rationale applies to the banking industry as well. "' The banking crisis in Russia in the summer 
iss Cited by Richard Jerram in `Half Measures Hobble Japan's Recovery', Asian Wall St. J., 10 (May 11,1999). 
'sb In Indonesia, for example, there were four major sets of bank closures between November 1997 and March 
1999, and several sets of open bank resolution through bank takeovers; the authorities have also sought to address 
bank insolvency in some cases through recapitalization. To some extent these approaches are complementary, but to 
some extent also substitutes. See, e. g., Enoch, Charles, Interventions in Banks During Banking Crises: The 
Experience of Indonesia, IMF Policy Discussion Paper (March 2000). 
'$' Closure may be cost effective than recapitalization or purchase of problem assets. Moreover, a closure strategy 
mitigates the moral hazard problems that would arise with any "bail out" of the bank; it may bring about necessary 
reduction in banking sector capacity, thus improving the viability of the remaining banks; it may enable the 
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of 1995 illustrates how liquidation of a large number of small institutions can, under certain 
circumstances, be beneficial to the restoration of confidence in the system. 18' 
Closure and liquidation at a large scale, however, "is seldom considered a viable option, 
because of its detrimental effects on the workings of a market economy, because of a potential 
"domino" effect on other [sound] financial institutions18' (the very malaise the government is try 
to avoid), and because of difficulties in judging whether the problems are permanent or merely 
cyclical or temporary. "190 Moreover, closure and liquidation may disrupt credit relationships 
between a bank and specific borrowers'9' and bear the danger of "credit crunch". '92 In practice, 
medium-sized or large-sized banks are rarely closed. 193 In "Asian crisis countries", for example, 
what the authorities closed were usually small bank-s, '9' while banks bearing systemic 
government to share the costs to the public deriving from banks' insolvency, even in the situation where depositors 
are protected, by inflicting losses on the banks' shareholders and subordinated debt holders; and it may demonstrate 
that the government is serious about addressing the banking system's problems. Id. 
Isa See, e. g., Aslund, Anders, 'When a Banking Crisis Is a Good Thing', Fin. Times (13 September 1995). 
'e9 A bank failure may infect other healthy banks and financial markets more generally. There are several 
mechanisms of infection. One is through the payments system, where one failure may provoke a chain reaction of 
non-payment by other participants. Another mechanism of infection is through inter-bank loans. A final mechanism 
of infection works through the bank deposit market. The danger is that one failure may undermine the public's 
confidence in banks generally, provoking a generalized bank run. See Hawkins, John & Turner Philip, 'Bank 
Restructuring in Practice: An Overview' in Bank Restructuring in Practice, 6, at 37, BIS Policy Papers No. 6 
(August 1999). 
190 See, e. g., Lastra, Rosa Maria, Central Banking and Banking Regulation, 141 (1996). Bank closure may be risky: 
Where the extent of a crisis may not have been fully recognized by the public, the impact of the closures may lead 
to concerns about the remaining banks, and thus provoke banks runs; closures may disrupt credit or payment flows; 
and may inflict losses on vulnerable or, conversely, on powerful members of community. See Enoch, Charles, supra 
note 186, at 2. 
191 As Lawrence Summers writes: "because of the relationship-specific capital each [lender] has accumulated, 
reserves at one bank are an imperfect substitute for reserves at another". See Summers, Lawrence, 'Macroeconomic 
Consequences of Financial Crisis" in Feldstein Martin (ed. ), The Risk of Economic Crisis (1991). 
192 See Hawkins, John & Turner Philip, supra note 189, at 36. 
193 id. 
194 One of the common strategies shared by "Asian crisis countries" is the immediate closing of insolvent or nearly 
insolvent financial institutions. This was needed to stem accumulating losses and rapidly growing liquidity support 
and to give markets a signal that there was a break from the past practice of extensive forbearance. See Balino, 
Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 59, 'Box 5. Considerations Regarding the Immediate Closure of Banks 
in a Systemic Crisis' at 31. 
The closed banks or non-bank financial institutions were mainly small ones. In Thailand, for example, the 
57 finance companies closed only accounted for 11% of the country's financial asset. See the World Bank, supra 
note 79, ̀ Table 3.5 Structural Changes in the Financial System' at 85. 
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importance are often kept afloat. 19' Indeed, many countries follow a more-or-less explicit policy 
of not letting any bank go bankrupt. "" 
According to Lardy, banking reform in all transition economies must be based on the 
rehabilitation of existing banks, entry of new banks, or some combination thereof . 
197 While 
relying primarily on new institutions is a viable strategy in Russia and the other newly 
independent states, where high inflation so reduced the value of savings deposits that the ratio of 
deposits to GDP in 1994 was only one-sixth of that in China; ` relying largely on new 
institutions in China would inevitably mean the collapse of existing banks, wiping out most of 
the value of household savings deposits, given China's unusually high ratio of bank deposits to 
GDP. 199 The importance of State commercial banks in China's financial and economic system 
means that their closure would imply the disappearance of most intermediation systems. 200 
B. REGULATORY FORBEARANCE 
1. Regulatory Forbearance General 
Regulatory forbearance has been applied to deal with banks trapped with NPLs. Regulatory 
forbearance can be transparent (i. e., an open relaxation of normal regulatory standards) or 
disguised (i. e., official collusion with banks to conceal the magnitude of the problem). 20' It may 
result in lower capital adequacy requirements, more lenient tax treatments, tax breaks, loan loss 
'9S In South Korea, for example, the government took over two large commercial banks, Korea First Bank and 
Seoul Bank, which were technically insolvent in December 1997. Given their systemic importance, the government 
and the KDIC injected capital, acquiring a stake of about 94% in each bank. See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles 
et al., supra note 59, at 121. 
196 A survey of 120 banks in 24 developed countries in the 1980s and 1990s found that two-thirds of failed banks 
were bailed out, directly or indirectly, by the government. See Goodhart, Charles A, The Central Bank and the 
Financial System (1995). 
197 See Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 17, at 143. 
198 See the World Bank, From Plan to Market, 101 (1996). 
In 1996, for example, household savings deposits was equivalent to well over one-half of the GDP. 
20° See Li, Junjie, 'The Dispatch of Bank NPLs and The Operation of AMCs [yinhang buliang zichan boll he zichan 
guanli gongshi de yunzhou]', Modern Commercial Banking [xiandai shangye yinhang] No. 9,8, at 8 (September 
1999). 
201 See Hawkins, John & Turner Philip, supra note 189, at 19. But Cf. Claessens, Stijin, 'Experiences of Resolution 
of Banking Crises' in Strengthening the Banking System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7, 
275, 'Box 2 Forbearance: Never? If ever, when? And how? ' at 283 (October 1999). Where that author divides 
forbearance into regulatory forbearance (where existing supervisory regulations and standards are waived for an 
institution), accounting forbearance (where an institution is exempted from following standard accounting practice), 
and tax forbearance that exempt a class of institutions from paying their full taxes. Id. in this volume, all these three 
kinds of regulatory forbearance is discussed. 
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reserves and provisioning requirements that are lower than expected losses, and lenient 
accounting standards and practices. "' 
Regulatory forbearance as a tactic to deal with problem banks is based on the assumption 
that banks would be able to gradually recapitalize themselves through reinvestment of their 
profits. An obvious advantage of regulatory forbearance as compared with the government 
recapitalization is that it can save taxpayers' money. The World Bank's 1996 World 
Development Report, focusing on the problems of transition economies, favors forbearance 
polices that "promote self-help for banks to encourage them to build up their capital base, " 
allowing banks to "grow out of their bad debt problems. ""' 
Transparent regulatory forbearance has been widely applied to deal with bank NPL 
problem. In all "Asian crisis countries", the bank restructuring strategies include tightening of 
rules for loan provisioning and observance of minimum capital requirements. The tightening of 
regulations, however, was gradual - but transparent - to give banks times to restructure and 
mobilize new capital, and to avoid aggravating credit supply problems. 204 Regulatory 
forbearance is not just an issue for developing countries. It has been applied in developed 
countries as well. During the 1930s depression in the US, banks were allowed to operate even 
though many were technically insolvent. 20' Another example was the lenient regulatory 
treatment of a number of major money center banks whose loans to heavily indebted countries 
exceeded their capital in the early 1980s. 206 
Regulatory forbearance does not always work, however. There are two prerequisites for 
the successful application of regulatory forbearance. First, the difficulties of banks are due to 
extreme macroeconomic misalignments or shocks that are likely to be temporary - 
"Forbearance may be appropriate when an otherwise healthy financial system is subject to an 
exogenous shock that causes a rapid and unexpected deterioration in the financial condition of its 
borrowers. ""' Second, the banks must be fundamentally sound. Regulatory forbearance may be 
highly risky when it is applied to institutions that are poorly managed, lack a credit culture, And 
202 See Claessens, Stijin, supra note 201, ̀ Box 2, `Forbearance: Never? If Ever, When? And How? ' at 283. 
203 See the World Bank, supra note 198, at 103. This view was based in part on the early Hungarian transition 
experience where "some banks have been recapitalized as many as five times. " Id., at 101. 
204 See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 59, at 49. 
205 See Hawkins, John & Turner Philip, supra note 189, at 19. In the debt crisis of the 1980s, some international 
banks were allowed to build up gradually their loan loss provisions against impaired sovereign claims to avoid a 
severe write-down of their capital. 
206 Id. 
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are engaged in high-risk lending practices. 208 Misapplications of regulatory forbearance often 
result in more expensive bailout later. The experience in the US and Japan shows how harmful 
the wrongly applied regulatory forbearance could be (see Annex III). 
2. Regulatory Forbearance in China: a Failed Policy 
Regulatory forbearance has been applied in China as well. The 1995 Commercial Banking Law 
requires that commercial banks abide by the regulations on asset-liability ratios in their loan 
businesses, including the 8% CAR requirement. 209 The same article of the law, however, 
provides that a commercial bank established prior to the promulgation of the Commercial 
Banking Law can take time to conform to the stipulations. "' Although the law does require these 
commercial banks to conform to the ratios within a designated time, the law does not provide the 
time explicitly but leave that to the State Council. "' These provisions are in essence disguised 
regulatory forbearance"' and led to worse financial situation of the "big four". With regard to 
the percentage of the paid-in capital to the total asset of the "big four", it was 2.6%, 2.5%, 2.2% 
and 2.2% in 1994,1995,1996, and 1997 respectively, 21 showing a clear tendency of 
deterioration. 
The Chinese government recognized the failure of regulatory forbearance. In March 
1998, a special treasury bond amounting to RMB270bn was issued to strengthen the capital bases 
of the "big four". In 1999, four AMCs were established to take over NPLs from the "big four". In 
other words, China turned to bank restructuring strategies. 
C. BANK RESTRUCTURING 
1. Justification for Bank Restructuring 
0 
208 Id. 
'09 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 111, art. 39. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 China's approach is different from the gradualism of "Asian crisis countries". The gradualism of "Asian crisis 
countries", as discussed above, are transparent, while in China's case, the authorities provide ad hoc exemptions and 
waivers from prudential norms for individual financial institutions in a nontransparent way. 
21 See Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 17, Table 3-4 at 93; and Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 4, Diagram 4 at 17- 
18. 
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Bank restructuring is justified by the theory of low-level equilibrium in economics. 
Theoretically, given sufficient time, financial institutions and corporations can overcome their 
distress as stakeholders resolve their claims on assets, even in the absence of formal bankruptcy 
procedures, and as restructuring is induced by market pressure. Without additional shocks, the 
economies would then return to their new long-term sustainable growth path, which could be 
lower than the pre-crisis time. "' This natural recovery, however, takes time and bears at least 
two risks. First, the continued distress lowers investment, which lowers growth, and in turn 
further contributes to NPLs and reduces investment and growth prospects. This will happen more 
probably in a country with a bank-centric financial system. Second, strong incentives exist for all 
parties to wait rather than to resolve their problems. "' International experience suggests that 
delaying restructuring is costly. "' 
In dealing with the Asian financial crisis, questions have been raised as to whether the 
economic programs adopted at the time of the crisis should have focused exclusively on 
macroeconomic policies, leaving the structural reform for a later time, or whether the structural 
reforms should have been made at a slower pace. Several considerations regarding the financial 
sector argue against delay: (1) A banking system saddled with large amounts of NPLs would 
have maintained an excessively cautious lending policy, which would have caused an uneven 
greater credit slowdown and further delayed the restoration of normal credit flows. (2) In cases 
where banks (and companies) were insolvent, allowing them to continue operating without 
restructuring would have allowed market distortions and moral hazards to build. (3) Bank and 
corporate restructuring was necessary to facilitate the rollover of maturing foreign loans and new 
private investment that were crucial to ensure the necessary financing of economies. (4) Keeping 
insolvent banks (and companies) in operation could have entailed higher fiscal costs and a further 
complicated monetary management. 217 
Interestingly, the same questions have been raised in China as well. According to some 
observers, restructuring Chinese banks before the underlying causes of the accumulation of bad 
loans are removed would be useless. In their view, restructuring SOEs - that is, reforming these 
firms and imposing upon them hard budget constraints - should be the first step. This, in turn, 
216 See the World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 1998/1999: Beyond Financial 
Crises (1999). 
See the World Bank, supra note 79, 'Box 3.1 Why Distress Can Persist' at 80. 
x" Id., at 84. 
See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 59, at 25. 
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would require discharging SOEs from the responsibility for providing a broad range of social 
services, shifting such costs directly to the budget: the accompanying increase in public 
expenditure should be matched by a corresponding increase in tax revenues. At the present time, 
when the growth of the Chinese economy has slowed and public confidence in the economy, for 
a variety of reasons, is low, it is definitely not the right time for hastening real reform of the 
SOEs, and hence there should be no rush to undertake a radical reform of the Chinese financial 
sector. 21' While obviously "correct", this should not be used as an excuse for doing nothing until 
an unlikely `big bang' turns the Chinese economy around. 
2. Ten Critical Points in Managing and Resolving a Systemic Bank Crisis and Their Implication 
for China 
The IMF summarized ten critical steps in managing and resolving a systemic bank crisis. "' 
According to the IMF, although specific actions may differ among countries based on the depth 
of the crisis, the composition of the financial sector before the crisis, local circumstances and 
preferences, the contents and sequence of the basic building blocs and strategies should be 
similar across countries. 22' The 10 steps are divided in three phases as follows. 
Steps 1-4 -The Acute Crisis Phase. In this phase, measures should be taken to stop the 
panic and stabilize the system. This phase comprises four steps: (1) The crisis usually begins 
because, in one form or another, there is excessive leverage in the economy. In the early stages 
there may also be a degree of denial on the part of banks and the government. (2) Bank runs by 
creditors and depositors start and intensify. The central bank responds by providing liquidity 
supports to the affected banks. (3) When central bank liquidity is unable to stop the runs, the 
government announces a blanket guarantee for depositors and creditors. Such a measure is 
intended to reduce uncertainty and allow time for the government to begin an orderly 
218 See Lau, Lawrance J., 'The Macroeconomy and Reform of the Banking Sector in China' in Strengthening the 
Banking System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,59, at 84 (October 1999). 
That author, after analyzing the fiscal situation of China, concluded that the Chinese economy is not in 
imminent danger of financial collapse, despite the existence of a significant stock of NPLs. The system is 
sustainable for at least another decade or longer. Id., at 80-85. 
Z'9 See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 59, at 10. The sequence is based on the assumption that 
a country's financial sector has public good aspect, and, hence, that solving such a crisis warrants substantial public 
sector involvement. Id. 
220 Id. 
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restructuring process. (4) All along, the central bank tries to sterilize its liquidity support to avoid 
a loss of monetary control. 
Steps 5-8 - The Stabilization Phase. In this phase, measures should be taken to 
restructure the system. This phase usually consists of the following four steps: (5) The authorities 
design the tools needed for a comprehensive restructuring, including the required legal, financial 
and institutional framework. (6) Losses in individual institutions are recognized. The authorities 
shift the focus from liquidity support to solvency support. (7) The authorities design a financial 
sector restructuring strategy, based on a vision for the post-crisis structure of the sector. (8) 
Viable banks are re-capitalized, bad assets are dealt with, and prudential supervision and 
regulations are tightened. 
Steps 9-10 - The Recovery Phase. In this phase, measures are taken to normalize the 
system. This phase consists of two steps: (9) Nationalized banks are re-privatized, corporate debt 
is restructured, and bad assets are sold. (10) The blanket guarantee is revoked which, if properly 
handled, is a nonevent because the banking system has been re-capitalized and is healthy again. 
What stays in the core of these ten steps is that for a country facing systemic bank 
problem - evidenced by a banking system burdened with NPLs and an inefficient corporate 
sector, the authority must tackle simultaneously bank and enterprise restructuring and dealt 
decisively with the NPL stock22' and flow... problem, with measures to improve incentives and 
institutional skills - i. e., to promote better internal controls in banks and to enhance banking 
regulation and supervision... ' In other words, a comprehensive bank restructuring contains at 
least the following components: (1) bank recapitalization, (2) NPL management, (3) 
enhancement of banking regulation and supervision, (4) promotion of banking internal controls 
(especially risk-management capacity). 
D. SUMMARY 
22' To deal with the "stock" problem is to deal with the banks' current balance sheets, raising capital and removing 
NPLs. 
222 To deal with the "flow" problem is to improve the quality of banks' earnings so banks' balance sheets do not 
quickly deteriorate again. 
21' This strategy is recommended by Chinese Scholars as well. See, e. g., Task Team of Xiamen University, 'Credit 
Assets, Risk of State-Owned Commercial Bank: The Prevention of Their Increasement and the Dissolution of Their 
Stock [guoyou shangye yinghang xingdai zichan fengxian: Zhenliang fangfan yu chunliang huajie]', Economic 
Research Journal No. 5,18 (May 1999). 
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To sum up, the accumulation of NPLs is not a problem unique to China. Governments all over 
the world have been tackling this problem. In this course, three strategies have been developed, 
namely, bank closure and liquidation at large scale, regulatory forbearance, and bank 
restructuring. While these policy options are not mutually incompatible and in practice strategies 
can entail various combinations of each policy, each government will have to make its choice 
when it is faced with bank NPL problem. 
China cannot afford to close and liquidate its State commercial banks. Given their 
importance in China's financial and economic system, their closure would imply the 
disappearance of most intermediation systems and damage the economic growth. Regulatory 
forbearance, despite its advantages of cost-saving (the American and Japanese experience shows 
that regulatory forbearance usually results in more fiscal burdens to solve the problem 
eventually), is not suitable for China, too. The two pre-conditions for the successful application 
of regulatory forbearance - temporary economic difficulty, fundamental soundness of the 
banking system - do not exist in China. A comprehensive bank restructuring seems a possible 
solution to the NPL problem in China. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
China's bank NPL problem is not limited to individual banks; rather, it is pervasive in all State 
commercial banks. NPLs not only have negative effects on State commercial banks, but also on 
the country's economic reform and its real economic growth. And, because the amount of NPLs 
is so huge, the "big four" have been technically insolvent for several years. Given their 
weightiness in the whole financial system, the NPL problem with State commercial banks is 
threatening the stability of the whole financial system, and even the whole economy. It is 
therefore necessary to tackle the problem immediately. 
The causes of NPL problem are systemic. The state bank-dominated financial system, the 
bank-centric finance, the soft credit to SOEs in the form of policy loans, the administrative 
controls on banks, and weak internal controls in banks and inappropriate prudential supervision 
on banks have led to the deterioration of market discipline in China and consequently result in 
the accumulation of NPLs on State commercial banks' books. In other words, China's bank NPL 
54 
CHAPTER ONE: CHINA'S BANK NON-PERFORMING LOAN PROBLEM 
problem is actually a reflection of weakness in its financial and corporate sector and need a 
systematic solution. 
Several points can be made here. First, problems with banks and SOEs are so interwoven 
that they can only be solved together. Second, the seriousness of NPL problem with state banks 
is not limited to the massive existing NPLs on the banks' books, but also the creation of new 
NPLs. Endeavors therefore must be taken to control the creation of new NPLs. To achieve this, 
State commercial banks must be freed from making policy loans, unnecessary administrative 
controls on State banks must be removed, prudential regulation and supervision must be 
strengthened, and efforts must be made to promote bank internal controls in China. Last but not 
least, the lack of market discipline underpins the macro and micro reasons for the accumulation 
of, and the increase in bank NPLs in China. Without the restoration of market discipline, the 
NPL problem cannot be really solved. It is therefore important to design the NPL workout and 












The bank NPL problem must be solved immediately in China. To achieve this, China will 
have to implement a comprehensive bank restructuring - to carry out simultaneously bank 
and enterprise restructuring and deal decisively with the NPL stock' and flow2 problem, with 
measures to improve incentives and institutional skills. This chapter will cover issues related 
to NPL workouts, namely, bank recapitalization, setting up AMCs to take over NPLs from 
the "big four", and NPL management (mainly debt-equity swaps). 
The rest of the chapter comprises six sections. Issues related to bank recapitalization 
are discussed in Section II. Section III focus on AMC theories and practices. Two basic NPL 
management strategies - asset management strategy and loan management strategy - are to 
be discussed in Section IV, with a loan management strategy recommended for AMCs in 
China. Section V focuses on the on-going debt-equity swaps in China. A legal infrastructure 
for debt disposal and restructuring is explored in Section VI. Section VII summarizes the 
discussion in this Chapter. 
II. RECAPITALIZING THE "BIG FOUR" 
' To deal with the "stock" problem is to deal with the banks' current balance sheets, raising capital and 
removing NPLs. 
2 To deal with the "flow" problem is to improve the quality of banks' earnings so that banks' balance sheets do 
not quickly deteriorate again. 
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The erosion in bank capital is the logical development of the accumulation of NPLs. ' This is 
exactly the case in China, where banks' capital base has been deteriorating sharply in the 
reform era. " 
Recapitalization is the core of any bank rehabilitation strategy. Banks must have 
sufficient capital before they can provision for and write off NPLs. Furthermore, bank 
recapitalization is essential to the economic recovery, as evidenced in the Asian financial 
crisis. ' 
A. JUSTIFICATION FOR GOVERNMENT RECAPITALIZATION OF THE "BIG FOUR" 
1. State Ownership of the "Big Four" 
Andrew Sheng, when conducting studies on bank restructuring in the 1980s, argued that in 
general the burden of recapitalizing banks should be borne, in descending order, by 
borrowers, private bank shareholders, bank employees, the government, and depositors; and 
that depositors should be protected against losses due to bank failures-6 In China, because the 
"big four" are entirely State-owned and most of their borrowers are SOEs owned by the 
government, to have the borrowers or the shareholders bear the losses is the same as to have 
the government bear the losses. Selling shares of the "big four" to the public, assuming it 
were a practical option, results in the dilution of government ownership and allocates the 
losses to the government indirectly. Since the losses would have to be borne by the 
government, a direct government capital injection might be a rational choice. 
E. g., in South Korea, after the sharp increase between December 1996 and September 1997 of the share of 
NPLs in total assets of commercial banks, the net worth of many financial institutions fell perilously low, and a 
significant shortfall in capital adequacy emerged. Of the 26 commercial banks, 14 had CARS below 8%, of 
which two were deemed to be technically insolvent (with zero or negative capital). In addition, 28 of the 30 
merchant banks had CARS below 8% and 12 were deemed technically insolvent. See Balino, Tomas J. T., 
Enoch Charles et al., Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring Lessons from Asia, 116-7 (the IMF, Septehber 
1999). 
See Lardy, Nicholas R., infra note 28, table 3-4 at 93; and Lardy, Nicholas R., infra note 48, Diagram 4 at 17- 
18. As reflected in the table and the diagram, relative to their assets, the paid-in capital of the "big four" fell by 
five-sixths, from 12.1% in 1985 to 2.2% at year-end 1997. 
s From the point of view of the economic health of a country, it is essential that those potentially viable 
businesses are re-financed and that the banks are able to start lending again. During the Asian financial crisis, 
however, because banks saddled with massive NPLs were unable to extend credit, although there were still a 
large number of potentially viable export-focused businesses throughout Asia, they were constrained by a lack 
of cash flow and trade finance. See Earnest & Young International, Asia Pacific Economic Outlook: 1999-2009, 
9(1999). 
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2. The Low Profitability of the "Big Four" Denotes That They Cannot Grow out of the 
Problem Themselves 
As part of the strategy formally adopted by the State Council in 1993 of converting 
specialized banks to commercial banks, the PBOC in 1994 notified banks that they would 
have to comply with the capital adequacy standards set by the Basle Capital Accord. ' This 
commitment was reaffirmed in the 1995 Commercial Banking Law. 8 Initially, the 
government wished that the "big four" could come into compliance with the 8% capital 
adequacy standard by the end of 1996, largely through the growth of retained earnings and 
increasing provisions for NPLs. 9 This proved an unrealistic goal. The low profitability of the 
"big four" denotes that they cannot grow out of the problem themselves. 
The profitability of the "big four" declined sharply in the early 1990s and shows no 
indication of reversing. From 1994 to 1996, the return on assets of the "big four" stood at 
only 0.3%. 1° This simply reflects the fact that while loans (the principal asset of banks) 
expanded rapidly, profits grew much more slowly. The declining profitability indicates that 
banks will not be able to climb to the 8% capital adequacy standard merely through the 
growth of retained earnings and increased provisions for NPLs. " 
3. Difficulties for the "Big Four" to Raise Capital 
As an established policy in "Asian crisis countries", banks must raise private capital 
themselves before they would be qualified for government capital injection. In Indonesia, for 
example, bank owners had to provide 20% of the capital shortfall before they could turn to 
the government for the remaining 80%. In South Korea, after June 30,1998, public resources 
6 See, e. g., Sheng, Andrew, Bank Restructuring: Lessons from the 1980s, 32 (1996). 
'See Provisional Measures On Commercial Banks' Asset: Liability Ratio Management, issued by the PBOC on 
February 18,1994. 
' The Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks, adopted at the 13th Session of the 
Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress on May 10,1995, and effective as of July 1,1995 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Commercial Banking Law"), art. 39. 
° See Jiang, Zuqi, `The Progress and Future of China's State Specialized Banks' Commercialization Reform', 
Guoji Jinrong Yan Jiu No. 1,8 (January 1996). 
1° See Lardy, Nicholas R., infra note 28, table 3-8 at 100; and Lardy, Nicholas R., infra note 48, at 23. 
Theoretically, there is a way to achieve this, i. e., the banks cut their lending to the real economy. This will 
lead to credit crunch on enterprises and sacrifice the economic growth. 
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- through subscription of capital instruments and NPL purchases - could only be 
committed on the condition that adequate contributions be made by shareholders and other 
stakeholders. 12 The Thai government only matched the amount of capital injected by private 
investors under its tier-1 capital support scheme. " The idea behind the policy is to minimize 
the moral hazards accompanying the public capital injection. 
Should China follow this model? There have been strong arguments for diversifying 
the ownership structure of the "big four". " The current author, however, doubts whether it is 
the right time for the Chinese government to sell stakes in the "big four". Private investment 
in State banks cannot be taken as granted. Government guarantees are behind almost all the 
deals in "Asian crisis countries". " The Chinese government must improve the asset quality of 
the "big four" before diversifying their ownership. 16 
B. RECAPITALIZING THE "BIG FOUR'- TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Liability Side Vs. Asset Side Recapitalization 
Technically, there are different ways of helping banks in distress (see Annex IV). Bank 
recapitalization can affect both the asset and liability side of a bank's balance sheet. 
See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 3, at 118. 
Id., `Box 5. Thailand: Capital Support Facilities' at 164. 
14 See Zhao, Haikuan, `The State Commercial Banks Should Be Converted into Joint Stock Banks [guoyou 
shangye yinhang yiyu shixing gufengzhi]', China Finance (Being) No. 11,26, at 26 (November 1999). 
's This was fully evidenced in two of the deals carried out by the Bank of Thailand. In the Nakornthon deal, 
Bt36bn in bad loans, accounting for approximately 65% of the Nakornthon's total lending, was 100% 
guaranteed by the Thai government. The government had also provided a guarantee for 85% of the eventual 
losses on the remaining portion of the NPLs, and similar protection for 15% of the performing loans as well. 
The government was also obliged to pay Standard Chartered twice a year for the cost of carrying the NPLs, 
under a yield maintenance scheme. Standard Charted would also not be required to make provisions for the bad 
debt that is guaranteed by the government, which should avoid the need for an additional capital injection over 
the next few years. See generally Bardacke, 'Nakornthon: Standard Chartered Gets Free Reign', Fin. Times 
(September 14,1999). 
The structure of the Randanasin deal was similar to that of the Nokomthon. The principal difference is 
that while the Bank of Thailand offered similar guarantees on NPL losses, in the Randanasin case they were 
placed in an AMC. The bank's high proportion of problem loans - about S Ibn or 80% of the book - were to be 
injected into an asset-management corporation to be owned by the Bank of Thailand but run by UOB. The 
central bank made a preliminary agreement to cover 85% of the AMC's losses and take 95% of whatever 
profits would be squeezed out of it. See Barriers, William, 'UBO: Thai Bank Taken on Despite Bad Debts', Fin. 
Times (October 7,1999). 
16 This has been realized by Chinese policy-makers. Dai, Xianglong set out a roadmap for reforming the "big 
four" at a PBOC press conference on January 19,2000. He said that the State banks had to slash their payrolls, 
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On the asset side the main solution entails a transfer of government securities. This 
can be un-required, but more often securities are swapped for NPLs. 
Un-required injections of cash or bonds (negotiable or non-negotiable) will 
immediately increase a bank's net worth, improve its capital ratios, liquidity, and potential 
profitability. " The main drawback of un-required cash or bond injection is, of course, that the 
government does not have any increased ownership or control rights. '8 
Swapping impaired assets for cash of bond will usually be at market prices (less, 
possibly substantially less, than book value). Even so, these swaps will improve the bank's 
capital adequacy, liquidity, the ability to make loans, and can reduce funding costs. Risk- 
weighted capital ratios improve because the swap, generally, replaces risky loans with low- 
risk investments, such as government bonds or cash. 19 
On the liabilities side recapitalization can occur through the purchase of new bank 
shares, the granting of long-term subordinated loans, or the assumption of bank liabilities. 
Equity purchase or subordinated loan granting by the government can immediately increase a 
bank's net worth, improve its capital ratios, liquidity, and potential profitability. Liability 
assumption by the government facilitates banks to re-negotiate their debts and obtain 
breathing space. Debt renegotiation can sometimes even result in banks' liability reduction, 
which improves banks' capital adequacy and potential profitability. 20 
Authorities in China must find a suitable way to recapitalize the "big four". Given the 
high NPL level of the banks, swapping impaired assets for cash or bond might be a good 
choice. 
2. Cash Injection Vs. Bond-Bad Debt Swap 
Issuing bonds to banks is a common practice for countries whose financial resources do not 
allow them to recapitalize their banks in cash. According to the IMF, bonds issued by the 
governments of Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand are the main instruments for financing the 
clear out bad loans and exercise strict "credit discipline" before they could be transformed into "shareholding" 
companies. See Kynge, James, ̀China to Speed up Financial Reforms', Fin. Times (January 21,2000). 
" See Claessens, Stijin, `Experiences of Resolution of Banking Crises' in Strengthening the Banking System in 
China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,275, 'Box 4 Different Kinds of Support to Banks' at 
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governments' contribution to the restructuring costs. 21 In Poland, the 1993 recapitalization of 
the seven State banks was carried out by providing the seven banks with PZLlltrillion in 
fifteen-year treasury bonds. 22 
Given China's fiscal situation, it is clear that the government will not be able to 
finance the recapitalization of banks from its current tax revenues. The real GDP growth rate 
of China has been declining yearly since 1995.23 Making matters worse, government 
revenues as a share of GDP fell from 35% in 1978 to 11% in 1996, and the tax revenues from 
14% to 10%. 24 These revenue levels are much lower than those of other countries. 25 Total 
government debt at the end of 1998 was about RMB1,688bn, or 20.5% of GDP. 26 This was 
almost five times the level of five years before. 27 It will be unrealistic to expect a government 
in such a difficult fiscal situation to finance the bank recapitalization with current revenues. 
Therefore, China's best option is probably to follow the course pursued by the Eastern 
European and Asian countries, injecting government bonds in an amount equal to the value 
of the NPLs being written off, i. e., a bond-bad debt swap. Since the bonds would pay interest, 
an injection of bonds would provide the banks with income-earning assets. Moreover, over a 
period of time the bonds could be sold on the secondary market, making the value of the 
injection quite transparent. Thus the injection of bonds would give the banks a measurable 
asset and an obvious source of income that could be used to pay interest to household savers. 
As a result the likelihood of a loss of public confidence and resulting run on the banks would 
20 Id. 
21 In Indonesia, variable and fixed coupon bonds are issued to banks in exchange of equity, variable and 
tradable bonds are issued to banks in exchange for NPLs, and index-linked tradable bonds are issued for debt- 
to-equity conversions. In South Korea, tradable variable coupon bonds are issued to banks in exchange for 
equity or preferred shares. In Thailand, tradable fixed-coupon bonds are issued to banks for equity in banks, 
non-tradable fixed-coupon bonds are issued to banks in exchange for subordinated debt. See Balino, Tomas J. 
T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 3, 'Table 12. Instruments Used to Recapitalize and Purchase NPLs' at 61. 
'Z See Gray, Cheryl W. & Holle, Arnold, Bank-Led Restructuring in Poland (1): An Empirical Look at the Bank 
Conciliation Process, 5& note 20 (the World Bank, September 1996). 
"The real GDP growth rate was 10.5%, 9.6%, 8.8%, and 7.8% for 1995,1996,1997 and 1998 respectively.. 
24 See Stiglitz, Joseph E., 'Second-Generation Strategies for Reform for China (zhongguo dierbu gaige 
zhanlue)', People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 2&3 (November 13,1998). 
u The average for all developing countries was 31.7%. See the World Bank, The Chinese Economy: Fighting 
Inflation, Deepening Reform, 39, A World Bank Country Study (1996). 
2° China's total debt issued and annual interest payments plus repayment of principle reached 34% and 24% of 
the fiscal revenue, respectively in 1997 and 1998. See Choy, Gilbert C., 'Keynes Fails in China ... 
', Asian Wall 
St. J., 10 (December 16,1999). 
=' See Kynge, James, 'China: A Fraught Fiscal Future', Fin. Times (January 11,2000). This sum is thought to 
have included RMB803bn in Treasury debt; an issue of RMB270bn for a partial recapitalization of the "big 
four"; interest payments on the RMB803bn of Treasury bonds; and RMB532.2bn of bonds issued by the State 
Development Bank. Id. 
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be reduced significantly. 28 Moreover, tradable bonds help the banks manage their liquidity, as 
they can sell the bonds if liquidity is needed. 
3. Ex-ante Recapitalization Vs. Ex post Recapitalization29 
Ex ante recapitalization and ex post recapitalization denotes whether to recapitalize banks 
before, or after corporate restructuring. Under an ex ante recapitalization, with appropriate 
burden sharing, the government recapitalizes banks based upon an assessment of probable 
losses (determined by outside audits and independent portfolio reviews). Some loans may be 
transferred, at the time of recapitalization or afterwards, to AMCs. The banks are left to deal 
with the major part of the NPLs themselves. Poland carried out this ex ante recapitalization, 
with a one-time recapitalization of the banks, designed to be large enough to ensure adequate 
capital and make credible the "one-time-only" promise. The amount of each bank's 
recapitalization was based on the value of its portfolio of bad debts at year-end 1991, as 
identified in audits conducted in 1992 by international accounting firms. 3° After the 
recapitalization, a bank-led debt restructuring was carried out in Poland. " 
Ex ante recapitalization can be fast and signal to the market that problems are being 
resolved. It also formalizes government guarantees of bank liabilities. And, provided that it is 
accompanied by substantive improvements in corporate governance and bank operations and 
well monitored, it can be an up-front investment that leads to lower ultimate costs. But ex 
ante recapitalization has also carried great risks. First, it will be hard to assess probable losses 
in countries lacking accounting practices, while it is important for the government to inject 
sufficient money into banks to avoid further bailout. Second, in most cases, governments 
routinely respond to such systemic bank solvency problems by injecting capital into insolvent 
banks, without change in bank governance and operations, resulting in the waste of the 
recapitalization. Third, although banks will definitely have better capacity to work out loans 
and take losses when recapitalized, they may still delay restructuring and roll over NPLs 
2B See Lardy, Nicholas R., China's Unfinished Economic Revolution, 157 (1998). 
Z9 The discussion in this part relies heavily on Claessens, Stijin, supra note 17, at 293-4. 
The first set of audits by international auditing firms were carried out for all nine State banks in the summer 
of 1991. The audits were repeated in mid-summer 1992 and (for the seven banks still in the State hands) again 
in 1994. The recapitalization was based on the status of loan portfolio as of end-1991, as measured in the 1992 
audit. See Gray, Cheryl W. & Holle, Arnold, supra note 22. 
31 See Annex VI. 
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since they are able to attract new funds anyhow. '' And, likewise, corporations may have little 
incentive to undertake necessary operational restructuring, if they have access to new funds 
anyway. 
These risks are very real for a country like China without advanced accounting rules 
and lacking an appropriate legal infrastructure for debt disposal and restructuring. Besides, 
banks in China do not have sufficient skills and techniques to restructure their corporate 
borrowers. The failed RMB270bn recapitalization of the "big four" in 1998 evidences the 
failure of ex ante recapitalization in China. 
In contrast to ex ante recapitalization, ex post recapitalization denotes that banks 
receive public funds as, and when they provide financial relief to corporations. This model 
provides more time to undertake the necessary fundamental reforms and maintains pressures 
on banks and corporations to agree quickly on realistic financial and operational 
restructuring. The main drawback is uncertainty, as depositors and other creditors can be 
uncertain about the quality of their claims. 
In between ex ante and ex post recapitalization, the government may choose to set up 
AMCs to take over NPLs from banks, so that banks are recapitalized by the consideration 
paid by the AMCs for the NPLs. The AMCs, rather than the banks will be in charge of 
corporate debt restructuring. As will be shown below, China actually is carrying on this in- 
between model to recapitalize the "big four". 
4. Central Bank Vs. Treasury 
Theoretically, the cost of bank recapitalization could be borne by either the central bank" or 
the treasury. This author, however, would argue that the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in China 
should bear the cost of recapitalizing the "big four", based on the following two reasons. 
First, as indicated in Chapter One, the "big four" are insolvent, but not illiquid. 
International experience shows that bank insolvency cannot be solved by protracted liquidity 
" Banks in Japan, for example, have shown no inclination to undertake corporate restructuring, as they can 
continue to carry NPLs at low costs. See Claessens, Stijin, supra note 17, at 294. 
" Examples include the National Bank of Poland's purchase of shares and low-yield long-term bank bonds 
from polish banks. In Indonesia, some central bank liquidity support is at present being converted into 
government equity in the recipient banks. See, e. g., Hawkins, John & Turner Philip, 'Bank Restructuring in 
Practice: An Overview' in Bank Restructuring in Practice, 6, at 53, BIS Policy Papers No. 6 (August 1999). 
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support from the central bank. "At the root of a successful program lies the recognition that 
systemic banking crises are a fiscal, not a monetary problem. "" 
Second, to recapitalize a commercial banking system by a reduction in the net worth 
of the central bank is only possible when a country's central bank has high levels of capital, 
primarily non-interest-bearing monetary liabilities, and significant foreign exchange reserves. 
When this is not the case, the cost of injecting fresh capital into the banking system must be 
borne by the treasury. " 
The ability of the PBOC to absorb the losses of the "big four" is limited by its own 
financial weakness, as reflected in both the asset and liability sides of its balance sheet. 
Unlike most central banks in the world, " the principal assets of the PBOC are not 
government bonds, but loans to financial institutions (including the "big four"). From the 
mid-1980s through 1993 these loans on average constituted more than three-quarters of the 
PBOC's assets. At year-end 1996, the central bank's loans to financial institutions stood at 
RMBI. 5 trillion, which was equal to just over half of its assets. " Since the ultimate 
borrowers of the PBOC loans to other financial institutions are loss-making SOEs, which too 
frequently are unable to repay the loans, there are risks that the PBOC will have to write off a 
substantial part of its loans to financial institutions. 
The liability side of the PBOC balance sheet also compares unfavorably with most 
other central banks. The largest liability of central banks traditionally is currency issued. 
Holders of currency receive no interest, making this an ideal liability for central banks. But 
the single largest liability of the PBOC, accounting for over one-half of total liabilities, is the 
required and excess reserves placed by banks with the central bank. The PBOC pays interest 
on all of these reserves. 38 
34 See Dornbusch, Rudi & Giavazzi, Francesco, 'Heading off China's Financial Crisis' in Strengthening the 
Banking System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,40, at 47 (October 1999). 
13 See Sheng, Andrew, supra note 6, at 34. 
J6 The principal asset of most central banks is government bond. These pay a fixed rate of interest and are 
backed by the full faith and credit of the central government. 
" See the PBOC, China Financial Outlook'97,95 (1997). 
" The reserve requirement was first introduced in 1984, with the reserve ratio ranging from 20-40% for 
different types of deposits. In 1985, this range was replaced by a uniform ratio of 10%, which was raised to 
12% in 1987 in order to curb inflation. Since 1988, it has been fixed at 13%. An overhaul of the deposit 
reserve system was conducted in March 1998. Different reserve and deposit requirements were unified by a 
single reserve requirement, with the ratio reduced to 8%. It was further lowered to 6% from November 21,1999 
on in a move to spur economic growth through increased bank lending. The required reserve was interest 
bearing. See Chai, Joseph C. If., China: Transition to A Market Economy, 131 (1997); Dai, Gengyou, 'A 
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The financial weakness of the PBOC determines that the cost of injecting fresh capital 
into the large banks should be bom by the MOF rather than the PBOC. 
5. Summary 
Issues related to the recapitalization of the "big four" are considered in this section. It is 
suggested that the "big four" be recapitalized by swapping impaired assets for bonds. Bond- 
bad debt swap is recommended because of China's poor fiscal situation. The timing of the 
recapitalization is also considered. It is argued that China should not choose to recapitalize 
the "big four" once-for-all - ex ante recapitalization. The last issue considered is who 
should bear the cost of recapitalizing the "big four". It is argued that the MOF rather than the 
PBOC should bear the recapitalization cost. 
C. COMMENTS ON CHINA'S BANK RECAPITALIZATION PRACTICES 
1. The Special Treasury Bond Issuance in 1998 
In March 1998, the 9`h NPC examined and passed a resolution allowing the MOF to issue 
special bonds totaling RMB270bn to replenish the capital of the "big four". " This 
recapitalization was implemented in three steps in conjunction with the reduction in the 
deposit reserve requirement: (1) The PBOC lowered the legal reserve requirement from 13% 
to 8%, 4° freeing up about Rmb377bn of bank liquidity. "' (2) In August 1998, the MOF issued 
RMB270bn 30-year bonds to the "big four", with an annual coupon rate of 7.2%. 42 The "big 
Review of PBOC's Monetary and Credit Policy', China Finance (Being) No. 12,27 (1998); and also 
Chinaonline, `China Central Bank Cuts Reserve Ratio to Spur Growth' (November 19,1999). 
"See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'China's Central Bank Governor on Financial Situation' (March 7,1998), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/industry/fina... l/News Archive/Secure/1998/May/fn_002. asp'. The NPC 
authorized the MOF to decide the term and interest rate of the bonds. Id. 
10 See, e. g., Xie, Ping, `Bank Restructuring in China' in Bank Restructuring in Practices, 124, at 124-5, BIS 
Policy Papers No. 6 (August 1999). 
" Roughly RMB270bn from the State-owned banks and RMB107bn from other financial institutions. The 
PBOC recalled part of its loans to the State-owned banks to offset the inflationary impact of the reduction in the 
reserve requirements. See, e. g., Mo YK, 'A Review of Recent Banking Reforms in China' in Strengthening the 
Banking System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,90, at 93 (October 1999). 
02 See, e. g., Lau, Lawrance J., 'The Macroeconomy and Reform of the Banking Sector in China' in 
Strengthening the Banking System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,59, at 73 
(October 1999). 
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four" purchased the bonds with funds freed up by the lowering of the required reserve ratio. 
(3) The MOF injected the entire proceeds into the State-owned banks to strengthen their 
equity capital. 43 
The recapitalization plan raised the capital of the "big four" to RMB478bn from 
RMB208bn. After the capital injection, the size of the aggregate balance sheet of the State- 
owned banks remained unchanged. The balance sheet of the PBOC contracted but this was 
offset by a similar expansion in the balance sheet of the MOF. " The recapitalization plan not 
only strengthened the capital of the "big four" but also had positive implications for their 
future income streams: "' First, the "big four" could benefit from the yields arising from 
investment in the bonds. This amounted to RMB 19.4bn a year before additional dividend 
payments to the MOF because of the government's increase in equity holdings. Second, in 
paying off some central bank credits, the "big four" could also reduce their interest costs. 46 
It was expected then that after the RMB270bn injection, the risk-weighted capital 
adequacy of the "big four" could have reached the 8% standard set by the Basle Capital 
Accord and the Commercial Banking Law. 47 The expectation proved unrealistic, however. 
According to Lardy, this recapitalization scheme was neither well timed nor in the right 
size. 48 
With regard to the timing, Lardy's main criticism is that the recapitalization was 
timed such that it fostered the expectation that having bailed out troubled banks once, the 
government would do so again: Although there was some evidence, particularly after mid- 
1993, that banks were beginning to curtail the flow of new lending to money-losing SOEs, a9 
See, e. g., Mo YK, supra note 41, at 93. 
For details of the changes in the aggregate balance sheet of the State-owned banks, the balance sheet of the 
PBOC, see Mo YK, supra note 41, at 106-108. 
`s Id., at 94. 
16 YK MO of the BIS Hong Kong Office did a calculation and estimated that the reduction in interest cost could 
amount to RMB4-5bn a year. This, totaled with the yields from the bonds, would means RMB23-24bn increase 
in the big four's profits annually, almost as much as their aggregate profits in 1997. Id. f 
" See Xinhua News Agency, 'The Ministry of Finance is to Issue Special Treasury Bonds Worth RMB270 to 
Enhance the Capital of State Owned Commercial Banks (Buchong Guoyou duzi Shangye Yinghang Zibenjing, 
Caizhengbu Faxing 2700yi Tebie Guozhai)', People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 1 (March 2,1998). 
In June 1997, the CAR of the big four was 5.86%. After deduction of NPLs, the rate was as low as 
3.5%. That urged the RMB270bn capital injection. See Chinaonline, 'State-Owned Commercial Banks to Offer 
Long-term Financial Bonds' (March 14,2001), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/0l0314/1/C0l031302. asp '. 
4e See Lardy, Nicholas R., `The Challenge of Bank Restructuring in China' in Strengthening the Banking System 
in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,32-3 (October 1999). 
49 This policy was reinforced in the spring of 1998 when the NPC endorsed the goal of encouraging commercial 
behavior on the part of State-owned banks. 
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by mid-1998 this policy appeared to have been significantly modified when the PBOC 
directed these banks to continue to extend additional loans to money-losing SOEs. 5° Shortly 
thereafter, the government completed the RMB270bn injection of capital into the "big four". 
Requiring banks to lend additional funds to firms that have only limited prospects of 
amortizing their loans created the expectation on the part of banks that additional 
recapitalization funds would inevitably be forthcoming. That expectation seriously 
undermined the prospect for a fundamental change in bank lending behavior. 
Compared to huge amount of NPLs accumulated on the four banks' balance sheets, 
estimated to be RMBltrillion, s' the RMB270bn recapitalization of the "big four" undertaken 
in August 1998 fell far short of the recapitalization amount that they would ultimately 
require. 52 
To guarantee a successful ex ante recapitalization, China would have had to follow 
the Polish approach and to have internationally recognized accounting firms audit the 
financial situation of the "big four" before deciding the size of the recapitalization. This 
proves unrealistic at least at this moment, however, because China cannot afford the risk of 
losing the public confidence in the "big four". 53 Besides, even if an exact amount of 
recapitalization can be determined, whether the government can afford it once-for-all remains 
doubtful. 
so Notice Concerning Further supporting State-Owned Industrial Enterprises that Are Losing Money which 
Have Salable and Efficiently Produced Products [guanyu jingyibu zhichi guoyou kuisun gongye qiye 
youxiaolu, youxiaoyi chanpin shengchan de tongzhi], issued jointly by the PBOC, the SETC, and the State 
Bureau of Taxation in June 1998. 
" See Chinaonline, 'China's Bank Clean-up to Take Three Years- Official" (October 25,1999), available at 
'http: //www. ch inaonline. com/topstories/C9102114. asp '. 
52 YK Mo of the BIS Hong Kong Office conducted a sensitivity test on the provisions required by the "big four" 
against their classified loans. The test was conducted on the assumption that the NPLs were 20% of total loans 
extended by the "big four", of which 6% were irrecoverable loans and the remaining 14% and doubtful and 
substandard loans. The following provision requirements applied in the analysis: 100% for irrecoverable loans, 
75% for doubtful loans and 15% for substandard loans. The results showed that the required amount of 
provision was RMB480-979bn as of end-1997. Taking the 25th and 75th percentiles, a reasonable amount 
would be RMB600-850bn, roughly 1.3-1.8 times the entire amount of the post-injection aggregate paid-in 
equity capital of the "big four". The "big four" would probably need such amounts of additional fund injection 
to recapitalize in order to maintain an 8% capital adequacy ratio. See Mo YK, supra note 41, `Annex Sensitivity 
analysis on provisions for classified loans in the four state-owned banks' , at 
109. 
" Xie, Ping, a senior official of the PBOC, for example, when talking about the feasibility of the establishment 
of mandatory requirements on disclosure for financial institutions, cautioned that such requirements would 
jeopardize public confidence since all financial institutions have serious problems and wondered how long it 
would take to get ready to be able to implement disclosure requirements. See Strengthening the Banking System 
in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,331 (October 1999). 
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2. The 1999 Practice 
In 1999, four State-owned AMCs were established to take over NPLs from the "big four". 
The AMCs issues bonds guaranteed by the MOF to their respective banks in exchange for 
NPLs at their paper value. 54 Because the bonds issued in exchange of the NPLs are Treasury- 
backed bonds, this transaction is virtually an injection of capital into the "big four". 
Compared to the special treasury bond injection in 1998, setting up AMCs to take 
over NPLs from the "big four" can avoid the potential costs of succumbing to the natural 
tendency of reducing the cost of bank recapitalization by underestimating the magnitude of 
NPLs or by overestimating the amount that ultimately can be recovered from borrowers. " 
Given the current quality of loan classification and poor disclosure practices in China, it is 
hard to make a proper capital injection once-for-all, whether in cash or in bonds. While to 
establish AMCs to issue bonds in exchange for NPLs of the "big four" at face value to some 
extent has avoided the difficulties in valuation. 
D. THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN RECAPITALIZATION AND MARKET DISCIPLINE 
1. Methods to Enhance Market Discipline: Asian Experience 
A dilemma that faces governments attempting to restructure their banking system is always 
similar: The idea of a wholesale government rescue raises serious moral hazard problems, 
meaning a precedent is set whereby taxpayers will always pay for banker's mistakes. But, if 
the government pushes banks to raise private capital, the risk is that banks will try to conceal 
their problems from the investors whose support they are seeking. " 
3' See Zhang, Chunlin, `How to Appraise the Sustainability of Government Debt in China? [ruhe pinggu woguo 
zhenfu zhaiwu de ke chixvxing]', Economic Research Journal (jingji yanjiu) No. 2,66, at 66 (February 2000). 
ss Partial recapitalizations, as in the Hungarian case, could have undermined the incentive for a change in bank 
behavior going forward by increasing the possibility of future recapitalization. See Lardy, Nicholas R., supra 
note 28, at 159. 
56 See, e. g., Montagnon, Peter & Jacob, Rahul, `Asian Recovery: Banking on Borrowed Time', Fin. Times 
(November 18,1999). Cf. Stiglitz, Joseph E., supra note 24. Stiglitz argued that injection of capital into banks 
in China would not bear any moral hazards because most the NPLs were loans to SOEs under government 
instruction and banks should be allowed to operate in the new system with better balance sheets. Stiglitz, 
however, did emphasize that the recapitalization must be once-for-all. Id. 
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All "Asian crisis countries" faced this dilemma when various governments had to 
recapitalize ailing banks. Efforts were made by authorities in these countries to minimize the 
moral hazards accompanying the government bailout of banks. In all the countries, bank 
restructuring was linked with corporate sector restructuring; " initiatives were taken to 
strengthen prudential regulation and supervision, bank governance and market discipline, 
with the intention to bring domestic standards closer to internationally accepted practices. 58 
Actually, the bank recapitalization itself in these crisis countries has been a process to 
enhance prudential regulation and supervision, bank governance and market discipline. 
First of all, in all "Asian crisis countries", the bank restructuring strategies relied on a 
tightening of rules for loan provisioning and observance of minimum capital requirements. 
This gave banks a basis for recognizing their losses based on international best practices, 
identifying their capital shortfalls, and putting forward recapitalization plans. In Thailand, for 
example, an 8.5% CAR for commercial banks applies in full while the loan loss provisioning 
requirements are increased each semester until the end of year 2000.59 The principle that 
existing shareholders should bear losses until their capital has been fully written off was 
generally applied in all the "Asian crisis countries", although in some countries shareholders 
were left with nominal stakes to take into account legal restrictions on a full write-down or to 
avoid costly legal challenges by the old shareholders. 60 
Second, as mentioned before, authorities in "Asian crisis countries" endeavored to 
achieve a private sector-based resolution, rather than complete State bailout of distressed 
banks. 
Moreover, public support was conditioned upon matters such as cost reduction, and 
increases in return on assets. The South Korea authorities, for example, requested from banks 
with CARs below 8% self improvement plans to reach that threshold, including contributions 
S' See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 3, at 63-4. 
ss Id., at 64. 
59 The ensure the safety of the banking system, the government introduced strengthened provisioning rules in 
1998 as part of the financial reform program. Under the rules, all banks must have provisions for 20% of bad 
loans by the end of 1998, rising by 20 percentage points every six months and to 100% by end-2000. See, e. g., 
Bardacke, Ted, `Thailand: Banks Post Big Losses', Fin. Times (January 25,1999); 'Thailand: Provisions Push 
Banks Deep into Loss', Fin. Times (January 22,1999). 
60 E. g., in Thailand, the shares of owners in intervened banks have been written down to token values. 
Furthermore, in Indonesia, the authorities pursued former shareholders of failed banks for personal 
indemnification for past central bank liquidity support in those cases where banks have been in violation of 
prudential regulations, especially for connected lending. See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra 
note 3, at 51. 
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of new capital from existing or new shareholders. Approval of those plans was a requirement 
for banks to keep their license and for them to receive public sector support through the sale 
of NPLs to KAMCO or in the form of equity. Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) were 
used to document the approval of the plans and the conditions attached to them. The latter 
typically included operational improvement benchmarks on matters such as cost reduction, 
labor shedding, and rate of return on assets. 6' 
2. Implications for China 
The government recapitalization of the "big four" bears moral hazards as well. The State 
recapitalization of banks, and the money being poured by the MOF into the AMCs would 
give banks the expectation of government bailout in the future. 
Some cautions have already been taken to avoid this moral hazard. A cut-off has been 
made clearly. 62 Banks was warned that the money being poured by the MOF into the AMCs 
would be the last such injection and bankers would henceforth be subject to strict new 
disciplines. " Besides, the government divided the NPLs in the "big four" into three 
categories: NPLs issued after January 1,1996, irrecoverable loans issued before January 1, 
1996, and NPLs other than irrecoverable loans issued by January 1,1996. The AMCs only 
take over the third category of NPLs, while the banks are required to deal with the first and 
second categories of NPLs themselves. 64 The rationale behind the cut-off is that as NPLs 
issued before 1996 were mostly loans issued under the credit plan or government instruction, 
banks should not be required to be responsible for them. After the implementation of the 
Commercial Banking Law on July 1,1995, commercial banks in China, including State 
commercial banks, are required to operate on commercial bases. NPLs issued afterwards 
therefore should be dealt with by banks themselves rather than be bailed out by the 
61 See, e. g., Park, Yung Chul, `The Banking Reform in Korea: Issues and Challenges' in Strengthening the 
Banking System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,263, at 264 (October 1999). 
6z The importance of the cut-off has been emphasized by Janos, Kornai. See Kornai, Janos, Highway and 
Byways, 123 (1995). 
67 Dai's remarks came as the first AMC just became operational at one of the "big four". See Montagnon, Peter 
& Harding, James, 'China: Bank Cut Non-performing Loans', Fin. Times (September 13,1999). 
64 Section 4, the Proposal of the PBOC, MOF and CSRC on the Establishment of China Cinda Assets 
Management Corporation, issued by the General Office of the State Council on April 4,1999 (hereinafter 
referred to as "the Proposal on Cinda AMC"); and also Zhao, liaikuan, supra note 14, at 27. 
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government. 65 More importantly, the "big four" are required to sign "governance contracts" 
with the PBOC to set out performance goals and to establish supervisory boards. " 
As argued above, it is difficult for the "big four" to raise private funds at this moment. 
At least in one point, however, China could follow these Asian countries, i. e., to enhance 
prudential banking regulation and supervision, and to promote bank internal controls, so that 
the increase in NPLs can be curbed. 
III. CHINA'S AMC PROGRAM 
A. WHY ASSET MANAGEMENT COMPANIES IN CHINA? 
How to deal with NPLs accumulated with a country's banking system is one of the most 
critical and complex questions for bank restructuring. The two extreme choices include 
setting up a government agency with full responsibility of acquiring, restructuring, and 
selling the assets or letting banks manage their own NPLs. 67 Both approaches have been 
employed to tackle NPL problems in different countries. The former has been employed in 
countries such as Malaysia and South Korea, where State-owned centric AMCs were 
established to tackle the mass of NPLs. The latter approach was used in Poland. 68 In-between 
these two extremes include the approach employed in Thailand, where the government 
principally acted as an intermediary for the market-based sale of NPLs while at the same time 
encouraged private asset management through tax incentives. 69 
1. The Polish Experience: Leaving the NPLs inside the Banks 
65 See Zhao, Haikuan, supra note 14, at 26. 
66 See, e. g., the IMF, International Capital Markets: Development, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, 74 
(September 1999). 
67 See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 3, at 7& 53. 
61 See Montes-Negret, Fernando & Papi, Luca, The Polish Experience in Bank and Enterprise Restructuring 
(the World Bank, November 1996). 
69 Thailand followed the exactly US RTC model. FRC in Thailand was authorized to take over and handle the 
NPLs of closed finance companies; while in the US, RTC was established to close insolvent S& Ls using the 
new stream of funding. See, e. g., Lim, Alvin K., 'The S&L Crisis Revisited: Exporting An American Model to 
Resolve Thailand's Banking Problems', 9 Duke J. Comp. & Int'1 L. 343 (Fall, 1998). 
There was a U-turn in early 2001, however. A state agency was created to buy up most NPLs from 
private commercial banks, in an intention to use the government's leverage as major creditor to promote a 
fundamental corporate restructuring. See Kazmin, Amy, 'Bangkok to Buy Banks' Bad Debts', Fin. Times 
(February 25,2001); 'Thais Unveil Private Bank Debt Deal', Fin. Times (March 9,2001). 
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The Polish government chose, in 1990, to leave NPLs inside the banks. Banks in Poland were 
required to separate irregular credits from regular credits and establish separate workout 
departments for irregular credits. These workout departments were set up and staffed with 
experts from outside the banks, with external technical assistance provided by international 
donors. Accountability was enforced by the bank supervisory board and a special unit of the 
Ministry of Finance, which monitored performance against the work-out departments' 
detailed business plans. 7° 
The following paragraph illustrates the Polish Government's motivations behind that 
decision: 
We did not believe in our ability to create, within a reasonable time, a strong central institution in 
terms of the high quality of its staff and internal organization. Nor did we believe in the possibility of 
devising an adequate incentive system that would ensure the institution's active approach toward 
restructuring SOEs. We did not believe that such an institution could resist political pressure. We also 
felt that the centralized solution did not address the causes of the problem, which we believed lay 
primarily in the banks' lack of experience in handling credit. By painlessly removing the burden of 
bad debt from the banks, the centralized approach creates a danger that a bad loan portfolio will re- 
emerge in the near future. It does not contribute to enhancing the banks' experience in conducting 
credit operations and facing bad debt situation. Instead we recapitalized the banks to such an extent 
that they were able to create adequate provisions for the bad loans. The amount of ex ante 
recapitalization was a function of an estimate of the bad debts that could be recovered, so as to 
introduce an incentive to remove as much debt as possible. " 
There are disadvantages with the Polish approach, however. First, leaving NPLs with 
banks may result in NPLs remaining on the bank balance sheets for a long period until the 
actual write-off or recovery. In a country with weak bankruptcy proceedings, this can take 
years. During that period banks will be reporting high (albeit maybe substantially reserved) 
levels of NPLs, damaging confidence in the banks and absorbing the attention of their 
managements. Second, because it takes time for banks to build up adequate loan loss 
provisions or write off NPLs, this approach also allows for the possibility of regulatory 
forbearance. Third, because banks do not sever their ties with bad debtors, old debt may thus 
be financed with new loans. 72 Fourth, the Polish approach can only be effective when "banks 
70 See Montes-Negret, Fernando & Papi, Luca, supra note 68, at 10. 
See Kawalec, Stefan, Sikora, S& Rymaszewski, P, `Dealing With Bad Debts: The Case of Poland', in 
Caprio, Gerard, D Fokerts-Landau and Lane, T D, Building Sound Finance in Emerging Market Economies (the 
IMF 1994). 
72 To avoid this disadvantage, the Polish government had to pass legislation to prevent banks from extending 
new credit to enterprises whose debt had been placed in the bad loans portfolio, unless such credit was given in 
connection with a conciliation procedure. Banks were also subject to a two-year deadline to either recover the 
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have sufficient skills and resources to deal with their problem" and when the restructuring of 
loans is limited to "case by case resolutions that have little economy-wide impacts. "" 
It might be safe to conclude here that when banks have little leverage to impose the 
reorganization of troubled firms, and when bankruptcy procedures function poorly, removing 
the loans from the banks and placing them in a specialized AMC appears to be a better 
solution. 74 
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Specialized Agency Solution: the Experience of 
"Asian Crisis Countries" 
A specialized agency can be justified for its following advantages7' compared to letting banks 
manage their own NPLs: (1) From the macro-economic point of view, by taking bad assets 
from banks, AMCs can help banks meet risk-based capital requirements and other 
obligations. Banks with clean balance sheets will have more credit funds for the real 
economy. This cannot be achieved if banks have to deal with NPLs themselves. 76 (2) Clean 
balance sheets allow for greater transparency - tighter accounting standards and more 
rigorous prudential supervision - to be introduced. This is especially important for countries 
lacking appropriate banking regulation and supervision. In these countries, having the banks 
managing their own NPLs may make it easier for banks to hide issues of malpractice behind 
the NPLs. 77 (3) Establishing AMCs can concentrate the limited human skills and other 
resources available for debt recovery. A specialized agency is required because the task of 
bad loans or obtain bankruptcy decision. See, e. g., Dornbusch, Rudi & Giavazzi, Francesco, supra note 34, at 
51. 
" See Sheng, Andrew, supra note 6, at 41. 
70 See Dornbusch, Rudi & Giavazzi, supra note 34, at 51-2. The U-tum in Thailand serves as a good example 
for this points, supra note 69 and the accompanying text. 
75 These advantages are recognized by Chinese scholars as well. See, e. g., Zhu, Ming & Huang, Jinlao, : On 
China's Assets Management Corporations [lun zhongguo de zichan guanli gongsi]', Economic Research 
Journal No. 12,3, at 4 (December 1999). 
7' E. g., Nozomu Kunishige, an analyst at Lehman Brothers, when commenting on the bulk bad loan disposal by 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Ltd, said, "Even banks say they have finished putting aside reserves for their bad 
loans, there was always the possibility that asset prices would fall further, undermining the value of collateral. 
But by removing bad loans from their balance sheet, banks will be able to use funds more freely, for example 
on new areas of business. " Quoted in Dow Jones News Service, 'BOT-Mitsubishi Shrs Up After Bulk Bad Loan 
Disposal Report' (April 4,1999). 
" E. g., in Indonesia, the idea to have private AMCs to deal with failed banks were ruled out due to governant 
concerns that associates of some of the failed banks could set up private AMCs to circumvent rules for pricing 
and prudent governance. See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles el al., supra note 3, at 57. 
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dealing with NPLs is fundamentally different from that of making new loans and is often 
beyond banks' management capacity. 78 (4) The unloading of NPLs from banks to AMCs 
would enable banks to focus their resources on managing good assets and improving 
operations. 79 (5) A centralized AMC can be given special legal powers to expedite loan 
recovery and bank restructuring. (6) A centralized AMC centralizes ownership of collateral, 
thus providing more leverage over debtors and more effective management. 8° 
It is because of its above-mentioned advantages that the AMC approach has been 
perceived as the optimal choice to deal with bank NPLs for countries facing systemic NPL 
problem. The IMF, for example, when organized a bailout package for Indonesia, ruled that 
banks' NPLs had to be handed over to the Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). $' 
There are risks with a centralized AMC, however, as clearly identified by the Polish 
authorities: low quality of the staff, no experience with loan workouts, a bureaucratic 
organization, weak incentives, etc. Besides, a centralized AMC often does not have enough 
resources to tackle the NPLs in individual banks promptly, and that will cause delay in 
resolving the problem. In South Korea, for example, many banks are now considering NPL- 
backed quasi securitizations, 82 partly driven by the slow pace of asset resolution by the 
Korean Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO). $' Furthermore, a centralized AMC is 
often State-owned, which means costs to taxpayers and difficulties in determining transfer 
prices if dealing with private banks. 84 Last but not least, values of acquired assets erode faster 
when they are outside a banking structure because a centralized AMC does not have 
'a See the World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2000 Report, 86-7 (December 1999). 
79 It was reported that that the ICBC, BOC, CCB and BOCOMS all experienced significant growth in profits in 
the year 2000, making 2000 the best year for business in six years, partially attributable to the removal of NPLs 
from their balance sheets. See Chinaonline, 'Banks Cash in on Best Business in Six Years' (January 19,2001), 
available at 'http: //wwiv. chinaonline. com/topstories/0/O/ 19/J/B20101150/. asp '. 
80 See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 3, 'Box 8. Advantages and Disadvantages of a 
Centralized Public AMC' at 57. 
81 A centralized public AMC became fully operational in April 1998 within the IBRA to purchase loss lgans 
from State banks, and private banks, eligible under the government's joint recapitalization scheme. See, e. g., 
Xinhua English Newswire, '11.5 Bln Dollars in Indonesia Bad Bank Assets Seized' (April 3,1999), available 
at '1999 WL 7931247'. 
$` See Chu, Vivian, 'Korea's Kookmin Debuts Own NPL-Backed Bond', Emerging Mkts. Debt Rep. 
(December, 13 1999), available at '1999 JVL 26056658'. 
a' Bankers expect that once KAMCO starts buying Daewoo bonds from investment trusts, they may have no 
more capacity to buy NPLs from banks. Id. 
84 This is due to the valuation difficulties for impaired assets. AMC asset purchases at inflated values amount to 
a back-door recapitalization of the bank selling the assets and a bailout of its shareholders. If the prices are set 
too low, banks may be deterred from selling their NPLs to the AMC because the sale forces immediate 
recognition of the value of the loan. See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 3, at 57. 
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knowledge of specific borrowers. It is because of these disadvantages of a centralized AMC 
that at least one Asian crisis country - Thailand - chose a decentralized process 
encouraging each commercial bank to establish its own separate AMC, although a public 
AMC was established to purchase residual assets from the Financial Sector Restructuring 
Agency (FRA). " 
3. Implications for China 
In China, the "big four" are entirely State-owned. A public owned AMC would not cause 
problems such as difficulties in determining transfer prices. And, because of the lack of 
resources of the banks to deal with the NPLs themselves, State-run AMCs become an 
inevitable choice. That does not mean, however, that China should not have AMCs run by 
banks themselves or other private parties. They can be developed to tackle NPLs in banks 
other than the "big four" and non-bank financial institutions. As will be discussed below, 
four State-owned AMCs have been established respectively for the "big four". To avoid the 
disadvantages of a centralized AMC, China chose to have one specific AMC for each of the 
four largest State-owned banks. 
B. CHINA'S AMC PROGRAM 
In China, using intermediaries such as AMCs to solve the State commercial bank NPL 
problem was recommended as early as 1993.86 Liu, Zhunyi and Qian, Yinyi proposed the 
establishment of an Enterprise-Bank Restructuring Fund to take over NPLs from banks and 
subsidize enterprises in difficulties for a fixed period of time. 87 Li, Daokui and Li, Shan later 
proposed to establish an Enterprise Restructuring Center to compensate banks suffering loss 
" The structure in Thailand has been that the FRA was to auction off the assets of the closed financed 
companies, the State-owned AMC was set up to act as bidder of the "last resort" for assets of closed finance 
companies. Id., `Table 9. Public Asset Management Companies in the Asian crisis countries', at 56. The Thai 
Government had a policy U-turn in early 2001 by establishing a state agency to purchase most NPLs from the 
country's financial institutions, however. See supra note 69 and the accompanying text. 
86 See, e. g., Zhou, Xiaochuan, 'The Restructuring of Bank-Enterprise Relationships [qiye yu yinhang guanxi de 
chongjian]', Gaige [Reform] No. 6 (June 1993). 
" See Liu, Zhunyi & Qian, Yinyi, 'Proposals for Bank/Enterprise Financial Restructuring [guanyu zhongou de 
yinhang yu qiye caiwu chongzhu de jianyi]', Jingjiyu Shehui Tizhi Byiao No. 5 (1994). 
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in enterprise restructuring. 88 Zhang, Chunlin suggested a split of State commercial bank 
NPLs, with banks taking care of those granted after 1996 and special intermediaries taking 
care of older NPLs and deciding the fate of debtor enterprises. 89 
These proposals, however, were not applied until 1999. In January 1999, the State 
Council and the PBOC ordered that State commercial banks should move NPLs to special 
accounts and that AMCs should be formed to take NPLs from banks. 90 Four separate AMCs 
were established within a span of six months (April-October) in 1999 to handle NPLs of the 
"big four" respectively. They are: the Cinda AMC for the CCB, the Dongfang (Orient) AMC 
for the BOC, China Great Wall AMC for the ABC, and China Huarong AMC for the ICBC 
(see Annex V). On November 10,2000, the State Council promulgated Regulations on 
Financial Asset-Management Companies, concluding the AMC program in China. 9' 
AMCs in China are mandated to purchase, manage and handle NPLs from the banks 
respectively. 92 There is a cutoff, however. AMCs in China only deal with the NPLs issued 
before 1996, with NPLs scheduled to be written off to be excluded from purchase. "' NPLs 
granted after the beginning of 1996 are left to banks themselves. 9; By the end of June 2000, 
the four AMCs had taken over RMBI. 3trillion (US$157bn) from the "big four", marking the 
basic completion of the transfer of NPLs from the "big four". 9s 
8e See Li, Daokui & Li, Shan, 'A New Idea for SOEs' Debt Restructuring [guoyou qiye zhaiwu chongzhu de 
yige xin shilu]' in Wu, Tianlin (ed. ), Theory and Practices of State Sector Debt Restructuring [guoyou jingji 
zhaiwu chongzhu lilun yu shiwu], 77 (1997). 
89 See Zhang, Chunlin, 'On SOEs' Debt Problem', in Wu, Tianlin (ed. ), Theory and Practices of State Sector 
Debt Restructuring [guoyou jingji zhaiwu chongzhu lilun yu shiwu], 96 (1997). 
90 See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'China's Troubled Financial Health Reflected in State Commercial Banks' (February 
5,1999), available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/top_stories/industry_b2_99020516. html ; and 'China's 
State-Owned Banks to Sell Bad Loans; Establish Asset Management Companies' (January 19), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/top_stories/today_b2_9901 /9/1. html' . 91 Regulations on Financial Asset-Management Companies jjinrong zhichan guanli gongshi tiaoli], promulgated 
by the State Council on November 10,2000 and effective as of the same date (hereinafter referred to as 'AMC 
Regulations'). 
92 Id. art. 2. 
93 The Proposal on Cinda AMC, supra note 64, sect 4; O'Neill, Mark, 'Asset Manager Launch Hailed But 
Buyers May not Come Running', South China Morning Post 4 (April 21,1999); and also China Daily, 'China: 
Firm Set up to Manage Assets' (April 21,1999), available at '1999 WL 5969010'. 
" Upon special approval of the State Council, the AMCs can purchase beyond the stipulated scope or amount. 
AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 11. 
Cinda, for example, in addition to assuming NPLs from CCB, had taken over RMB 100bn NPLs from 
the State Development Bank by the end of 1999. See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'Damage Control Xinda AMC 
Launches 38 Debt-for-Equity Projects' (September 14,2000), available at 
'h ttp: //www. chinaonline. com/issus/econ_news/currentnex s/secure/B200091307. asp'. 
9s See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'Asset Management Cos. Receive US$157bn of Bad Assets from Banks' (August 3, 
2000), available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/issues/econ_news/currentnews/secure/B200072705. asp'. As a 
result, the amount of NPLs for the "big four" dropped 10%, and their CAR rose from 3% to 8%. See 
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AMCs in China are under the supervision of the MOF, the PBOC and China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 96 The MOF carry out supervisions over AMCs' 
financial situation. 97 AMCs' operations are supervised mainly by the PBOC, with their 
securities business supervised by CSRC. 98 
The AMCs set branches in main cities. 99 By end-February 2000, for example, Cinda 
had set branches in Urumgi1°° and Wuhan. 1°' 
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S AMCS 
1. Bank-Specific AMCs 
China's AMC program bears some unique features in the sense that State-owned AMCs 
independent of banks are established to deal with NPLs of respective banks. This 
distinguished China's AMC program from the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) practices 
in the US, and from the AMC practices in South Korea and Malaysia, where State-owned 
centralized AMCs were established to tackle the NPLs of the whole financial system. China's 
AMC practices are also quite different from the practices in Poland, where banks were left to 
deal with their NPLs themselves. 
This quasi-centralized approach based on the primary role of State-owned AMCs 
makes sense in China for many reasons. First, the bank-specific structure guarantees that 
NPLs in each of the "big four" would be tackled without delay. Given the huge amount of 
Chinaonline, 'A Little off the Top: Big 4 Banks Drop 10% of Bad Debt' (December 19,2000), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/industry/financial/newsarchive/secure/2000/December/c00121 S06. asp'. 
96 AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 4. 
To supervise AMCs more efficiently, the MOF set up a financial supervisory and inspection office in each 
city where there is an AMC outlet to oversee their financial situation. See China Daily, 'China: AMCs Enhance 
Financial System' (October 24,1999). 
98 See, e. g., Chinaonline, `China Get Second Asset Mgmt Co., Two More This Week' (October 18,1999), 
available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/industry/financial/currentnews/secure/C9101508. asp ; Chinaonline, 
'China Gets Third Asset Management Co., Another Wednesday' (October 18,1999), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/B2-99/ 01805. asp '. 
" AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 7. Accordingly, an AMC must obtain the approval of the MOF to set 
up branches. 
10° On September 6,1999, Cinda set up an office in Urumqi. That was the first office of the AMC outside 
Beijing. See Shi, Runmei, 'Cinda AMC Set up Office in Urumqi[xinda zichan guanli gongshi urumuqi 
bangshichu chengli', Jinrong Shibao, 12 (September 9,1999). 
10' See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'Four Asset Management Firms Open Shop in China's Wuhan' (February 18,2000), 
available at 'hitp: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/0002 /8/2/00002 /706. asp'. The four AMCs' Wuhan 
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NPLs accumulated in the "big four" and the urgency to release the banks from these burdens, 
it is better to have four AMCs rather than just one. Second, the bank-specified structure can 
to some extent avoid one disadvantage of a centralized structure: lack of knowledge of the 
borrowers. The bank-specific structure allows AMCs to make good use of banks' information 
about the debtors. 102 Moreover, because the AMCs are bank-specific, most of their staffs are 
recruited from within the respective banks. These staff, when finished with their task at the 
AMCs, will bring back to banks their experiences and skills acquired from their posts at the 
A MCs 103 
2. State Ownership and Heavy Administrative Color 
AMCs in China are owned by the State. The MOF capitalized them with RMBIObn each. 10' 
AMCs in China also bear heavy administrative color. They are put at the same level as the 
PBOC on the "administrative ladder". The board members of AMCs are mostly government 
officials, rather than experts in law, accounting or finance. "' 
The State ownership of AMCs and their administrative color raise a question about 
whether they can deal with the NPLs better than State-owned banks. 1°6 Like State-owned 
banks, AMCs in China are vulnerable to government interference. The problem of 
administrative intervention was so serious that Zeng Peiyan, chairman of the State 
Development and Planning Commission had to call publicly in the People's Daily for 
tightening the screening of firms eligible for debt-equity swaps so as to curb the 
"administrative intervention" in the selecting process. 1°7 
Furthermore, the State-ownership means that the State will eventually have to take 
care of the NPLs that the AMCs fail to workout or recover. 1 ' The State-ownership in this 
branches each takes on the delinquent assets from the provincial branch of the respective State commercial 
banks. Id. 
102 This advantage, which is strong in market economies, might be mitigated in China and other transition 
economies where the information system is weaker and informative asymmetries more severe. 
107 See, e. g., Zhu, Ming & Huang, Jinlao, supra note 75, at 5. 
104 AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 5. 
pos See, e. g., Zhu, Ming & Huang, Jinlao, supra note 75, at 4. 
106 See, e. g., Chinaonline, ̀ Economists Examine China's Potential Debt-to-Equity Conversion' (September 21, 
1999), available at 'http: /hvww. chinaonline. com/indutry/fina... /currentnews/open/B1-99090711-SS. doe. asp'. 
107 See Reuters English News Service, 'China: China Planner Seeks to Cool Fevour on D/E Swaps' (November 
5,1999). 
1° AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 32, which reads as follows: 
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sense creates disincentives for AMCs to do their best to avoid unloading debt onto the 
government. 
3. Wide Business Scope and Powers 
AMCs in China are granted wide business scope and powers. According to the AMC 
Regulations, AMCs can carry out the following business activities in managing and handling 
NPLs purchased from State-owned banks: (1) debt collection; (2) leasing, transferring or 
restructuring the assets they take over from the banks; (3) debt-equity swaps and holding 
enterprise equity for a certain period of time; (4) listing recommendation and securities 
underwriting to the extent of NPL management; (5) issuing financial bonds and borrowing 
from financial institutions; (6) financial/legal consulting and project evaluation; and (7) other 
business activities authorized by the PBOC and CSRC. 1°9 
To facilitate their operation, the State Council grants AMCs preferential treatment. 
AMCs are exempt from taxes in their purchase of NPLs from State-owned banks and in their 
managing, handling and disposal of NPLs. 1° They are also exempt from administrative 
charges such as registration fees. "' 
D. PROBLEMS WITH CHINA'S AMC PROGRAM AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTION 
AMCs in China are modeled on the US RTC, which successfully solved the S&L crisis in 
early 1990s. "Z Dai, Xianglong said that the objective of the AMC program in China is "to 
make credit officers accountable for their practices. . . to 
deal with non-performing assets in a 
clear, specific manner [and] to improve the balance sheets of the State-owned banks. ""' 
For the final losses incurred during the handling of NPLs by financial asset-management companies, the Ministry of Finance 
shall propose a solution to be executed at the approval of the State Council. 
109 Id. art. 10. 
"o Id. art. 28. 
nt ld. 
"' This was admitted by China's Premier Zhu Rongji. See Associate Press Newswires, 'Clinton Zhu Text By 
the Associated Press' (April 9,1999). RTC's former chairman, L. William Seidman, advised the Chinese 
government for the program. See Pomfret, John, 'China Set to Tackle Economic Woes; Government Plan 
Readied to Deal With Massive Bank Debt', The Washington Post, A21 (January 16,1999). The Premier 
Minister might have not realized that the RTC in the US was in charge of closing insolvent S& Ls rather than 
taking NPLs from afloat banks. 
"' Quoted in Harding, James, 'China: Market Differences Emphasized', Fin. Times (January 28,1999). 
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Whether the AMCs in China can achieve these goals, however, remains doubtful. "' There 
are problems with China's AMC practices. 
1. The Dilemma Faced by Chinese AMCs 
AMCs in China are not only tasked to release banks of their NPL burdens, but also mandated 
to help SOEs get rid of their troubles. 15 Although AMCs in China are officially defined as 
non-bank financial institutions, "" they have to carry out some duties that should be carried 
out by government agencies. "' They are mandated to rescue as many "viable" SOEs as 
possible. Foreclosure and bankruptcy can only be applied as the last resort by AMCs in 
China. "' Thus, AMCs in China are actually facing a dilemma. On the one hand, they are 
creditors to SOEs and should recover as much as possible from their SOE debtors. On the 
other hand, they must sometimes sacrifice their creditors' rights to help SOEs out of their 
difficulties. This dilemma in some terms greatly limits AMCs' discretion in managing bank 
NPLs and imposes doubts on whether AMCs can carry out their missions as successful as 
their US counterpart. "" 
It will be unrealistic to propose that China ignore its SOE problem and put emphasis 
solely on the bank side. First, the "big four", although technically insolvent, are not suffering 
any liquidity problem. There are no obvious bank runs or bank panic in China. The concerns 
of the policy-makers, therefore, are mainly on negative effects of the NPL problem on the 
real economy. 120 This consideration, together with the fact that both bank creditors and 
enterprise debtors are State owned, decides that the solution to the NPL problem cannot only 
14 See, e. g., Reuters English News Service, `China: China's WTO Deal Heralds Radical Banking Reform' 
(November 16,1999). 
15 See Zhu, Ming & Huang, Jinlao, supra note 75, at 3. 
16 AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 2. 
See Zhu, Ming & Huang, Jinlao, supra note 75, at 4. 
1e See, e. g., Foo Choy Peng, `China Cinda Seeks Foreign Help', South China Morning Post, 8 (May 5,1999). 
19 The RTC in the US carried out a strategy of disposing of the impaired assets as quickly as possible and 
maximizing the recovery from the disposal. In its six years of existence, the RTC in the US had resolved 747 
insolvent thrifts and recovered $395bn of the $456bn in its charge. See Foust, Dean, 'The RTC's Epitaph: It 
Worked', Bus. K., 29 (January 15,1996). 
The RTC had accomplished its mission so expeditiously that it shut its doors one year ahead of its 
December 31,1996 sunset expiration date. See Lim, Alvin K., supra note 69, at 355-6. 
120 Banks trapped with huge amount of NPLs may become cautious on granting new loans. This cautiousness 
impedes the efficient implementation of "expansionary" monetary policy. See Zhu, Ming & Huang, Jinlao, 
supra note 75, at 3. 
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be based on banks' interest. Second, as a matter of fact, without solving the SOE problem, 
the NPL problem embarrassing the State commercial banks cannot be solved in reality. 12' 
The Polish experience might have some relevance to policy-makers in China. To 
enhance market discipline on banks and enterprises, the Polish government required that 
financial cooperation between banks and nonviable enterprises be terminated and nonviable 
enterprises be liquidated, except where liquidation was considered unfeasible because of 
political or social-economic considerations. Such cases were treated under the terms of a 
decree enacted in October 1995, which allowed special budgetary allocations (Industrial 
Development Agency-IDA) supporting restructuring or managing the liquidation. To prevent 
banks from conditioning conciliation agreements on the provision of budgetary assistance, 
the decree stipulated that budgetary resources should support a conciliation agreement only if 
it was conducted by the IDA. 12' The 1995 decree released commercial banks of the burden of 
subsidizing those "too big to fail" SOEs and facilitated their commercialization. 
The current author would suggest that the Chinese government take care of those "too 
big to fail" SOEs itself, so that AMCs in China can concentrate on solving banks' NPL 
problems. In other words, it should be the government's duty rather than that of the AMCs to 
bail out those economically and socially important SOEs. 
2. The Dependence of AMCs on the Respective Banks 
One advantage of AMCs over banks in managing bank NPLs is that AMCs will not be scared 
to investigate causes of NPLs. This advantage of AMC over banks will be lost, however, if 
AMCs are dependent on their banks. 
It is officially declared that AMCs hold independent civil liability. ''-' There remain 
doubts, however, that the AMCs in China can be independent of the banks in their 
operations, as they are supposed to be. All the four AMCs are carved out of former 
investment and trust companies subject to the respective banks. 12A Their staffs come from the 
': 1 Id. 
'22 See Fernando Montes-Negret & Papi, Luca, supra note 63, at 10. 
AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 3. 
124 Huarong AMC is based on Huarong Trust & Investment of the ICBC. China Great Wall AMC is based on 
the Great Wall Trust & Investment of the ABC. Dongfang AMC is based on Dongfang Trust & Investment of 
the BOC. Cinda AMC is based on Cinda Trust & Investment of the CCB. These investment and trust 
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banks as well. "' The supervisory boards of the AMCs comprise mainly officials appointed by 
the MOF, the PBOC, the State General Auditing Bureau, CSRC, and their respective 
banks. 12' Moreover, Their leadership appears to have close ties with the banks. For example, 
the State Council appointed Zhu, Dengshan, former vice president of CCB as Cinda's 
president, with Shi, chungui and Tian, Guoli, former vice and assistant presidents of CCB as 
Cinda's vice-presidents. '27 
The dependence of AMCs on respective banks is to some extent inevitable in China. 
The AMCs lack a network of branch organizations like banks. So when they deal with local 
borrowers, they will have to rely on banks' branch networks. Besides, the banks have the 
knowledge about their borrowers, which is essential to debt collection and debt restructuring. 
Lou, Jiwei, vice-minister of the MOF, required when speaking at the Great Wall's 
opening ceremony that the ABC should not completely stay away from operations of the 
Great Wall, although the later stood as an independent company - "the ABC should do it 
best to help the Great Wall with its asset recovering. " 28 
What the author would like to suggest here is that emphasis be placed on the 
accountability of AMCs. The State Council AMC Regulations provide that AMCs submit 
financial and statistical reports as well as other related materials in accordance with the 
requirements of the PBOC, the MOF, CSRC, and other related government department; "' 
and accept the auditing supervision of auditing authorities according to law. "' Whether these 
provisions can guarantee the accountability of AMCs, however, remains to be tested. 
3. The Lack of Expertise and Experience 
subsidiaries of commercial banks were "closed" by the government by February 1999. See Harding, James, 
'China: Five More Trust to Be Closed', Fin. Times (February 3,1999). 
'ZS The Proposal on Cinda AMC, supra note 64, sect. 2, which provides that staffs of Cinda should be mainly 
selected from the existing staff in the CCB. The main staff of AMCs is recruited from the State commercial 
bank employment pool. Only a handful of expertise is recruited from outside the banks. See, e. g., Zhu, Ming & 
Huang, Jinlao, supra note 75, at 5. 
'Z6 The Proposal on Cinda AMC, supra note 64, sect. 2. 
See, e. g., Agence France-Presse, 'China Opens First Asset Management Company for Bad Loans', (April 20, 
1999), available at '1999 WL 2586720'. 
'28 See China Daily, 'China: New Company to Handle Assets' (October 19,1999). 
'29 AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 29. 
10 Id. art. 30. 
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Handling NPLs requires skills and experiences in various fields. The debt recovery process is 
quite complex, and involves the conversion of the NPLs into real or financial assets, then the 
restructuring of these assets into easily sellable forms, and finally the selling process to 
maximize the net sale value. AMCs in China are in desperate need of personnel with such 
expertise. "' Cinda might be an exception. "' Cinda's managers, for the most part, are 
sophisticated financial engineers. "' But this is not the case for other three AMCs. 
In this respect, China should learn from South Korea, where joint-venture AMCs are 
set up so as to use foreign expertise and experiences. "' The State-run Korea Development 
Bank, for example, was reported to set up an AMC with Merrill Lynch & Co, and the US 
private-equity fund Lone Star Fund II. ' According to the report, Lone Star would take care 
of NPLs, while Merrill Lynch would do research work for reinvestments, including the 
issuance of asset-backed securities. 131 In Taiwan, international financial companies were 
invited to invest in a new institution to auction off bad debts sold by the island's banks to 
asset management corporations. "' Actually, even the RTC in the US relied heavily on 
expensive consultants because its fleeting life span made it difficult to recruit quality 
personnel. ̀  
The State Council Regulations on Financial Asset-Management Companies 
authorized AMCs to retain qualified intermediary institutions to take part in accounting, asset 
appraisal and legal services. 13' This may to some extent solve the problem. This author, 
"' Zhou, Xiaochuan, chief executive and president of CCB, admitted that AMCs created to take over NPLs 
from banks were short of experienced and qualified personnel. See, e. g., Wang, Xiangwei, 'Debt-clearing 
Scheme May Face Hurdles Official Says Swaps Not "A Free Lunch"', South China Morning Post 3 (December 
11,1999). 
"Z Cinda is leading the way in restructuring and disposing of NPLs. See, e. g., Chinaonline, supra note 94. 
113 See Business Week, 'China's Bad-debt Cops Get Going' (October 11,1999), available at '1999 WL 
27295452'. Fang Xinghai, a general manger at CCB and one of the founders of Cinda, for example, earned a 
doctorate in economics at Stanford University and spent five years at the World Bank before joining CCB and 
overseeing Cinda's creation. Id. 
"a See Tarrant, Bill, `South Korea: Analysis- Skorea Shifts to Tack on Asset Restructuring', Reuters English 
News Service (November 2,1999). 
"s See Dow Jones Newswires, `Korean Bank to Team with Two U. S. Firms to Manage Bad Loans', Asian Wall 
St. J., 5 (December 7,1999). 
16 See the Korea Herald, 'Korea Development Bank to Set up Asset Management Unit' (December 6,1999), 
available in '1999 WL 29057585'. 
"' See, e. g., Dichie, Mure, 'Taiwan to Form Debt Auction Institution', Fin. Times (November 30,2000). 
18 See Lim, Alvin K., supra 69, at 357. The RTC enlisted the aid of big-name consultants and investment banks 
to put together large deals so as to expedite the transactions and maximize value. Id. at 360. 
19 AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 27. Chinese AMCs actually went further to establish cooperative 
relationships with foreign intermediaries. For example, the Dongfang AMC signed a three-year cooperation 
memorandum with KAMCO in February 2001; and the Huarong teamed up with Ernst & Young to manage 
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however, still thinks that it is necessary for Chinese AMCs to recruit overseas professionals. 
For this purpose, the employment restriction will have to be relaxed or removed. "" 
4. Difficulties in Evaluating Assets 
Realistic valuation of bank NPLs is crucial for AMCs to take over NPLs from banks and to 
dispose of NPLs. There is no precise method for valuing NPLs in China, however, because of 
the lack of market prices for NPLs. ̀ 4' Also, it is hard to value collateral, not only because of 
uncertain prices and limited markets, but also because of uncertainty as to whether and when 
the creditor can seize the collateral. Further, even if these problems can be solved, it takes 
time to evaluate NPLs in such a huge amount, while NPLs need to be taken over urgently 
from the banks. 142 
The AMCs in China avoided the pricing problem by taking NPLs at their face value 
from the "big four". 143 This is quite different from the practices in "Asian crisis countries". '" 
Because both AMCs and banks are publicly owned, the moral hazard problem is not so 
serious. Face-value takeover, however, will have some disincentives for banks to help AMCs 
recover and restructure debts. "" Besides, because the NPLs were taken from banks at face 
assets. See Chinaonline, 'Chinese, South Korean Firms Sign Nonperforming Asset Management Agreement' 
(February 12,2001), available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/010212/1/C01020508. asp ; `Huarong 
Asset Management Partners with Ernst & Young' (February 26,2001), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/0/0226/]/COI022/02. asp'. 
140 It was reported that China's financial institutions below the provincial level are opening up leadership and 
upper-management posts to talented personnel from other industries and even from overseas. This decision was 
reached at the China National Financial System Organization Meeting held on Jan. 9,2001. See Chinaonline, 
'Financial Institutions Woo Overseas Professional' (January 11,2001), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. comltopstoriesIO101 11 1/1 /B101010901. asp '. 
"" According to the International Valuation Standards Committee (IVSC), Emerging market economies such as 
China often struggle with asset valuation, as individuals and companies have widely divergent ideas about the 
worth of assets where markets are not fully in place. The IVSC is a London-based organization formulating and 
promoting international valuation standards. See Chinaonline, 'Beijing Reveals New Assets Valuation Rules' 
(November 17,1999), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/industry/financial/NewsArchive/Secure/1999/November/B2-99111603. asp'. 
142 See, e. g., Zhu, Ming & Huang, Jinlao, supra note 75, at 6. 
143 AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 12, which reads as follows: 
Within the amount stipulated by the State Council, a financial asset-management company purchase at book value related loan 
principal and corresponding interest claims receivable charged to profit and loss. Interest claims receivable not charged to 
profit and loss shall be transferred without compensation. 
In Indonesia, NPLs were taken from banks at zero value. In South Korea, the discounts are 45% of face 
value for secured loans and 3% for unsecured loans. In Malaysia, the average discount has been 37% 
(excluding one large loan, it has been 60%). See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 3, 'Table 
9. Public Asset Management Companies in the Asian Crisis Countries' at 53. 
1°s Proper transfer pricing is of key importance for the incentive structures for both the AMC and the banks - 
there is a need to set a system that provides the right balance. Excessive prices for NPLs may induce banks to 
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value, it is hard to appraise how well the AMCs have done their job16 and creates 
disincentives for AMCs to maximize the recovery of NPLs. 147 The State Council AMC 
Regulations provide that the MOF should determine the operational objectives for handling 
NPLs by AMCs according to the quality of the NPLs and carry out the evaluation and 
supervision; "" and that AMCs should make operational policies and related measures in 
accordance with their particularities, improve internal management, and establish internal 
restriction and motivation mechanisms. 1' The author doubts that these provisions can be 
carried out efficiently under the current face-value take-over. 
The evaluation problem is not only limited to NPL takeover. NPLs will have to be 
valued when they are disposed of or restructured. There are already reported crosses between 
AMCs and enterprises on the valuation of enterprises' net asset in debt-equity swaps. The 
AMCs wanted a re-valuation of the net asset, while the enterprises insisted that book value be 
used. 'so 
E. IMMEDIATE LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHINA'S AMC PROGRAM AND 
RECOMMENDED SOLUTION 
AMCs in China are mainly operating on the basis of State Council Regulations"' and 
Decisions, "' and the SETC rules; '" while in most other countries, AMCs are established and 
operated on the basis of laws adopted by legislators, usually the parliament. An AMC Law is 
needed in China because of the probable conflicts between AMC practices and laws adopted 
by the NPC or its Standing Committee. These conflicts can only be solved by special 
legislation of the NPC or its Standing Committee, rather than by State Council Regulations. 
reduce their recovery efforts, which could lead to a general deterioration of credit discipline and loan values 
throughout the banking system. Id., at 58. 
146 There is suggestion that an appraisal committee comprising officials from the MOF, the PBOC, State 
commercial banks, and AMCs should be established to access the value of the NPLs taken from banks. See, 
e. g., Zhu, Ming & Huang, Jinlao, supra note 75, at 6. 
147 See, e. g., Li, Xia, "'Debt-equity Swaps Should be Carried out on the Commercial Basis [zhaizhuanggu 
yunzhou ying gengjia shichang hua]', Jingrong Shibao, 12 (September 15,1999). 
108 AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 24. 
149 Id. art. 25. 
Aso See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'China's Debt -Equity Program Has Yet to Be Implemented' (January 13,2000), 
available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/0001131CO0011330. asp'. 
E. g., AMC Regulations, supra note 91. 
's2 E. g., the Proposal on Cinda AMC, supra note 64. 
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In addition to the need for a proper statute spelling out the statues, the business scope, and 
powers of the AMCs, there are special legal issues that need to be sorted out by the NPC or 
its Standing Committee for AMCs to operate smoothly in China. 
1. Immediate Legal Issues Related to AMC Practices in China 
(i) The Notification Obligation under the Contract Law 
Under the current Chinese Contract Law, "' an obligee may assign its rights under the 
contract in whole or in part to a third party. 15' The obligee, however, should notify the 
obligor; and the assignment will not be binding upon the obligor if the obligee fails to give 
such notice. "' The relevance of these provisions with the AMC practices is that banks must 
notify the borrowers when they sell NPLs to their AMCs. If banks fail to fulfill this 
notification obligation, when AMCs later on claim against the debtors, the debtors might be 
able to argue that AMCs do not have the authority to do so. 
The absence of notice has other legal effects as well: (1) Debtors can continue to pay 
the banks rather than the AMCs. This, however, is not an objection because the AMCs might 
wish that their banks continued to collect loan principals and interests on behalf of them. (2) 
Debtors without notice can continue to acquire new set-offs and defenses. (3) It may be 
necessary for AMCs to join the banks in an action against debtors. 
Although the State Council approved that once NPLs are purchased by AMCs, the 
AMCs become the creditors of the purchased loans and enjoy all the rights as creditors, '' it 
is also required by the State Council that AMCs go through relevant procedures so as to 
enjoy the creditor's rights. 'S$ Even if this does not mean that appropriate notification must be 
made to debtors, whether the State Council's regulation can supersede the NPC legislation 
remains a problem. It is therefore necessary to pass special legislation to ensure that AMCs 
have a clear title to assets purchased and notification to borrowers is not necessary. 
's' See, e. g., Li, Xia, `The Scope and Preconditions for Candidate Enterprises for the Debt-Equity Swap Scheme 
[shishi zhaizhuanggu qiye de fangwei yu tiaojian]', Jingrong Shibao, 12 (September 15,1999). 
1S° Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National 
People's Congress on March 15,1999 and effective as of October 1,1999. 
iss Id. art. 79. 
"1d. art. 80. 
's' AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 13. 
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(ii) Procedural Requirements for the Transfer of Security Interests 
Under the 1995 Security Law, 159 a lender's right can be secured by a guarantor, mortgage, 
pledge, lien, or earnest money. 16° The security interests, however, will not automatically 
transferred with the loans. Acquiring NPLs from banks does not necessarily mean that AMCs 
take over the security interests as well. The AMCs must go through certain legal procedures 
to be the new holders of the security interests. 
In accordance with article 22 of the Security Law, if the security takes the form of 
personal guarantee, the guarantee contract does not need to be specifically assigned for the 
guarantor's obligation to remain unaffected by the assignment of the main right, unless the 
guarantee contract provides otherwise. If the security takes the form of mortgage, however, 
the AMCs will need to perfect its security interests by registration since unregistered 
mortgages will be ineffective against third parties or ineffective to all intents. 16' This will be 
very burdensome for AMCs since they are taking NPLs and their collateral in large scale. 
(iii) AMCs' Liabilities to Debtors 
Another problem arises from art. 82 of the Contract Law. That article provides that upon 
receipt of the notice for assignment of obligee's rights, the obligor may assert against the 
assignee any of its defenses against the assignor. These provisions may prove troublesome 
for the AMCs. If there are no special provisions exempting AMCs from a lender's 
obligations, the borrowers may be able to ask AMCs to perform some obligations under 
original lending contracts. Because AMCs in China are now only in charge of NPLs extended 
by 1996, this concern, however, might only have remote theoretical significance. 
1S8 The Proposal on Cinda AMC, supra note 64, sect. 4. 
1S9 Security Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the 14th Session of the Standing Committee of 
the 8th National People's Congress on June 30,1995 and effective as of October 1,1995 (hereinafter referred 
to as "the Security Law"). 
1 b° Id. art. 2. 
16' Under the Security Law, a mortgage is not necessary to go through registration, although the parties may 
choose to have registered. Id. art. 43. For mortgages on real estate (including land use rights, buildings and 
forest), aircrafts, ships and vehicles, or mortgages on enterprise assets, including equipments or other movable 
property, registration is compulsory, however, the mortgage will not go into effect until it is registered. Id. arts. 
41,42. For mortgages on other properties, without registration, the mortgage cannot bind third parties. Id. art. 
43. 
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2. Recommended Solution 
To sum up, AMCs in China are now operating mainly on the State Council Regulations, 
while there are provisions in the NPC legislation, such as the Contract Law and the Security 
Law, impeding the smooth operation of AMCs. Whether the State Council Regulations can 
challenge the NPC legislation remains a big problem. The Supreme People's Court, in an 
attempt to solve the possible problem in judicial practice, issued Provisions on Issues of the 
Application of Law Concerning Financial Asset Management Companies in Their 
Purchasing, Managing and Handling of State Bank's Non-performing Loans on April 11, 
2001.162 Again, whether the Supreme People's Court has the appropriate authority to give 
such solution is an unsettled issue itself. It might be necessary that the NPC adopt special 
legislation to facilitate the smooth operation of AMCs in China. 
IV. TWO MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES TOWARDS NPLS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA 
Collecting NPLs from banks is only the first step. NPL management is a more crucial step for 
the success of the AMC program, as US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers said at a 
joint press conference with China Minister of Finance Xiang, Huaicheng - creating AMCs 
and having them take over NPLs from banks are not a total solution "because [this] does not 
ensure that assets will be recycled or restructured or managed rather than warehoused". "' 
Theoretically, there are two basic management strategies towards NPLs - asset 
management strategy (asset disposal) and loan management strategy (debt restructuring). 
'62 Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Application of Law Concerning Financial Asset 
Management Companies in Their Purchasing, Managing and Handling of State Banks' Non-performing Loans 
[zuigao renming fayuan guanyu shenli jinrong zhichan guanli gongsi shougou, guanli, chuzhi guoyou yinghang 
buliang diakuan xingcheng de zhichan de anjian shiyong faly ruogan wenti de guiding], adopted by the 
Supreme People's Court Judicial Committee at its No. 1167 meeting on April 3,2001, published by the 
Supreme People's Court on April 11,2001 and effective as of April 23,2001. According to the Provisions, the 
banks should carry out its notification obligations by advertising the transfer of loans in major national or 
provincial newspapers to satisfy the notification requirements of the Contract Law. Id., art. 6. The AMCs, when 
taking over mortgaged loans, are not required to go through the registration procedures and will be the new 
mortgagee automatically. Id., art. 9. 
16' See Chinaonline, 'U. S. Treas Sec Comments on China's Asset Mgmt Cos. ' (October 27,1999), available at 
'http. //chinaonline. coni/topstories/c910273 ]. asp'. 
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AMCs must choose between these two strategies or implement a combination of these two 
strategies. 
A. TWO MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES TOWARD NPLS 
The overarching objectives for NPL management should be to maximize the value of the 
impaired assets in the system, to minimize fiscal costs, and to prevent credit discipline of 
borrowers from deteriorating. ' Two basic strategies can be adopted to achieve these 
objectives (see Figure 2-1: NPL Management Strategies): one is an asset management 
strategy, applying to NPLs that are considered non-viable; the other is a loan management 
strategy, applying to loans that are considered viable. "" The asset management strategy (asset 
disposal) emphasizes the quick disposal and cashing in of NPLs, while the loan management 
strategy (debt restructuring) puts emphasis on maximizing the recovery value of NPLs. While 
disposal of NPLs usually does not need the involvement of the courts, in some countries, 
collateral foreclosure will have to be carried out within the court system. Debt restructuring 
can be carried out within or out of the court system as well (see Annex VI). 
As shown in Figure 2-1, in addition to loan collection and collateral foreclosure, asset 
disposal can take the form of loan sale, either privately or via public auction, or asset-backed 
securitization. As for debt restructuring, AMCs can tackle enterprises' arrears through debt- 
for-debt swaps or debt-equity swaps. 
B. CHOOSING THE RIGHT STRATEGY: EXPERIENCE OF MALAYSIA AND SOUTH 
KOREA 
Whether a loan is viable or not is mostly a subjective judgment. Given the specific situation 
and needs of a country, AMCs in different countries apply different policies towards 
collected NPLs. Even in the same country, different policies are applied in different stages. 
160 See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 3, at 53. These are the goals for Chinese AMCs as 
well. AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 3. 
165 These two terms are borrowed from the Guidelines issued by Malaysian Danaharta. See, e. g., Bernama, 
`Danaharta to Finish Restructuring by June, Unveils Guidelines' (April 7,1999), available at '1999 IL 
5598028'; and AFX, `Danaharta to Manage NPLs Based on Loan/Assct Management Strategies', available at 
'1999 WVL 14937128'. 
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The AMC in Malaysia, the Malaysian Danaharta, for example, applied debt- 
restructuring strategies to most of the NPLs it collected. Under the guidelines issued by the 
institution, an asset disposal strategy should only be applied when loan restructuring has 
failed. "" In an intention to maximize recovery on the assets collected, the Danaharta moved 
slowly to apply asset disposal strategy. 167 
Figure 2-1: NPL Management Strategies 
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On the other hand, the South Korean KAMCO had mainly applied an asset disposal 
strategy by the end of 1999. "' Since its designation in November 1997, KAMCO had 
acquired a total 55.9 trillion won in NPLs and disposed 20.9 trillion won worth as of the end 
of November 1999. ""' The quasi-government corporation disposed of' had assets by selling 
1i6 See. e. g., Bernaura, supra note 165; and AFX, supra note 165. The 11uideli nes, issued in April 1991), are 
supposed to promote transparency and provide the basis for borrowers and advisors to formulate workout 
proposals. The loan restructuring guidelines comprise four segments, namely, loan restructuring principles, 
guidelines for corporate borrowers, guidelines for individual borrowers and guidelines for guarantors. 
1' See Lopez, Leslie, 'Malaysia's Bad-Loan Agency is Moving Cautiously Toward Auctions', Asian Wa/I St. J. 
4 (December 15,1999). 
1b' KAMCO's sale strategy is to dispose of NPLs in the fastest way possible, but in a manner that maximizes 
recovery value. See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 3, 'Box 2. Korea KA`1CO 
Operations' at 120. 
1b9 See Reuters English News Service, 'South Korea: KAMMCO Plans to Issue Four Trillion Won ABS in 2000' 
(December 16,1999). 
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NPLs to international investors, foreclosing and selling underlying collateral, selling NPLs in 
a public auction, or collecting on loans. 170 Asset-back securitization was introduced in 1999 
as a way to dispose of NPLs as well. "' With the gradual recovery of the economy and the 
releasing pressures of NPLs on the financial system, the KAMCO decided to turn to the debt 
restructuring strategy at the end of 1999.172 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA 
China's AMCs are authorized to employ both asset disposal and debt restructuring strategies 
towards collected NPLs. "' In reality, however, AMCs in China have been mainly carrying 
out debt restructuring strategy so far, especially debt-equity swaps, "' although there are 
reported cases on bad asset disposal as well. 15 
Given the quantity, quality and type of assets collected by AMCs in China, and the 
market demand for such assets, the author would propose that AMCs in China mainly apply a 
debt-restructuring strategy to the NPLs they collected. First, because most of the debtors are 
SOEs at the edge of bankruptcy, if AMCs apply debt collection widely, a massive bankruptcy 
of SOEs will be triggered and hence de-stabilize the society and the economy. 1' Second, the 
10 As of June 1999, for example, KAMCO had recovered about W9 trillion from loans with a face value of W 
17 trillion. Among them, NPLs with face value of W 2.9 trillion were sold to international investors, NPLs with 
face value of W 2.1 trillion were disposed of via foreclosure auction, NPLs with face value of W 0.2 trillion 
were sold publicly, while the lion's share of NPL face-valued at W 11.3 trillion were disposed through 
collection. See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et a!, supra note 3, 'Box 2. Korea KAMCO Operations' at 
120. 
"' See Reuters English News Service, ̀ South Korea: S. Korea KAMCO to Issue 265bn Won ABS on Dec. 27' 
(December 15,1999); and also Reuters English News Service, supra note 169. 
"Z See Tarrant, Bill, supra note 134. 
"' AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 10. 
10 Government officials were reportedly saying that debt-equity swaps should be the mainstay of future state 
sector reforms. See Dickie, Mure, 'China: Government Launches Fresh Drive on Bad Loans', Fin. Times 
(October 18,1999). The State Council AMC Regulations devote a whole Chapter on debt-equity swaps. AMC 
Regulations, supra note 91, arts. 16-23. 
"s See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'For the First Time, China Auction off A Bad Asset' (November 23,1999), available 
at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/99112202. asp'; 'Sanlian Group to Invest in Troubled Baiwen Co. ' 
(December 5,2000), available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/001205/1/000120417. asp'; and 
'Huarong Asset Management Files Bad Debt Lawsuits' (January 2,2001), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. conVtopstorieslOl01OIIIICOOI22706. asp'; 'Huangrong Asset Management Looks 
Overseas for bad-debt buyers' (March 5,2001), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/issues/econ news/NewsArchive/secure/2001llfarch/B2010221l. asp'; 'Huarong 
Asset Management Turns to Net to Unload Nonperforming Assets' (April 2,2001), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/010403/b 10/ 032933. asp '. 
16 See, e. g., Zhu, Ming & Huang, Jinlao, supra note 75, at 7. Some local governments even go to that far to 
require that a creditor must get the local government's approval before they can file a case against local debtors. 
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market in China is extremely thin compared to the huge amount of NPLs, and care needs to 
be taken not to destroy values for the entire banking system through "fire-sale" liquidations. 
AMCs in China have to dispose of some NPLs, however, because not all NPLs can be 
restructured. For example, it was revealed that only 60% of CCB's NPLs to SOEs met 
eligibility requirements for debt-equity swaps; ̀ some of the NPLs would have to be 
auctioned or simply written off. Besides, to have AMCs manage the assets for a very long 
time is costly and takes the risk that asset prices may decline further during this period, 
particularly if the AMC staff do not have the skills of managing the assets. 1' In Sweden, for 
example, it was initially thought that its AMC would operate for 15 years but subsequent 
calculations comparing the holding costs of the assets they held with likely price rises led 
them to adopt a five-year period instead. 1" It is hard to predict how long the AMCs will have 
to run in China. It should be clear, however, that AMCs should not warehouse NPLs. 
V. DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS 
A. DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 
Debt-equity-swaps have been used worldwide to tackle bad debt problems. Examples include 
the debt-equity swaps in 1980s to workout the lesser-developed-countries' debts, "" Russian 
"loans for shares" deals in 1996, '$' and the recent practices in East Asian countries. 1B2 This 
See Chinaonline, 'Asset Management Firms Struggling to Recoup Debts' (April 19,2001), available at 
'http: //Www. chinaonline. com/topstories/0l04/9/l/COl041105. asp'. 
"' See Chinaonline, `China Cinda Asset Mgmt to Take Only 60% of CCB's Debt' (November 4,1999), 
available at 'http: /hvww. chinaonline. com/topstories/B2-99110402. asp'. Of the CCB's RMB250bn NPLs to 
SOEs, only RMB 140bn, or 60% is owed by SOEs that qualify for debt-equity swaps. Id. 
"a See Hawkins, John & Turner Philip, supra note 33. 
1791d. 
1BO For a detailed description of the Latin American LDC's debt/equity swaps, see Hilton, Andrew, Debt/Equity 
Swaps: Costs, Benefits and Prospects (1988). Countries involved include Chile, Mexico, the Philippines, 
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay, Jamaica, etc. 
'B' Under this scheme, commercial banks offered to provide the government loans in exchange for managing 
the state's remaining shares in selected large enterprises, which, if the government did not repay the loan, 
would be transferred to the banks. See European Bank For Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 
1998: Financial Sector in Transition, note 4 of Chapter 1 at 4 (1998). 
182 See, e. g., Bardache, 'Thai Oil: Debt Plan Wins Approval', Fin. Times (August 25,1999); Barnes, William, 
'Thai Oil: Creditors Agree $2.2bn Debt Deal', Fin. Times (October 23,1999); Barnes, William, 'German 
Lender Swaps Debt for TelecomAsia Stake', Fin. Times (October 2,1999); Asia Pulse, 'Indonesia to Save Auto 
Maker through Debt/Equity Swap' (November 10,1999), available at '1999 1VPL 27967423 ; and also Business 
Asia, `South Korea: Faltering Financials' (April 5,1999), available at '1999 {VL 10768537'. 
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type of scheme typically allows a bank to take a free equity stake in a company while 
forgiving part of its debt. 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS IN CHINA 
Debt-equity swaps were used in China occasionally in the 1980s. Between 1984 and 1988, 
loans valued at RMB66bn were converted into State investment in enterprises. "' Although 
debt-equity swaps were proposed as early as the mid-1990s as a solution to the bank NPL 
problem, 184 it was not until 1999, with the establishment of the four AMCs, that debt-equity 
swaps started being carried out on large scale. '85 The State Econimic and Trade Commission 
(SETC) announced the initiation of the debt-equity swap scheme on August 3,1999. On 
November 10,2000, the State Council promulgated Regulations on Financial Asset- 
Management Companies. The AMC Regulations confirmed the debt-equity swap scheme 
initiated by the SETC1S6 and authorize the SETC to organize, guide, and to coordinate the 
swaps. ' 87 
1. The SETC Debt-Equity Swap Scheme 
Under the SETC's debt-equity swap scheme18' - 
Only the Four AMCs and SDB Can Conduct Debt-Equity Swaps with SOEs. The four 
AMCs, together with the SDB, forgive debts owed by SOEs to them in exchange for equity 
stakes in the enterprises. The equity holding of an AMC is not limited by its net asset value 
or registered capital. "' 
Only Debts Initially Borrowed by 1997 Can Be Swapped. 
"' See, e. g., A Ming, `State-Owned Enterprises: How to Confront the Debt Ratio? ', Jingrong Shibao (Beijing), 
1 (October 7,1995). 
184 See, e. g., Policy Study Office of the PBOC, Issues on Bank and Enterprise Debt Restructuring, 35-54,82-4 
(Beijing 1995). 
gas See generally World News Connection, Article by ZXS reporter Tao Guangxiong: 'Focus of State-Owned 
Enterprise Reform: Converting Debts into Shares Helps Ease Difficulties in State-Owned Enterprise Reform' 
(September 18,1999), available at '1999 6VL26443497'. 
'eb AMC Regulations, supra note 91, arts. 16-23. 
Id. art. 23. 
'ea See, e. g., Li, Xia, supra note 153. 
'89 AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 16. 
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Enterprises Must Satisfy Several Conditions before Their Debts Can Be Converted 
into Equity. First of all, enterprises that can be chosen for the SETC scheme should be: (1) 
Industrial SOEs established during the period of the "Seventh-Plan" (1986-1990) or the 
"Eighth-Plan" (1991-1995), or during the first two years of the "Ninth-Plan" (1996-1997). 
The construction of the enterprises must have been mainly financed by loans from banks in 
domestic or foreign currencies. And as a result, the enterprises become loss making and have 
difficulties in repaying loan principal and interest. Or, (2) Industrial enterprises among the 
512 key enterprises that become excessively leveraged and consequently loss making because 
of expansion. The debtor must be an independent legal person. Trading enterprises can only 
be exceptionally chosen for this pilot trial. 
Second, candidate enterprises must have the potential to return to balance after the 
swaps. Detailed criteria are set to judge this potential - the enterprises must have readily 
marketable products, advanced and environmentally-friend technology and equipment, good 
management (judged on the capacity of the enterprise mangers, the financial and accounting 
system of the enterprises, and the legal documentation of contract relationships of which the 
enterprises are parties); and, most importantly, the enterprises must have a plan to restructure 
its operations in line with the modern enterprise system, with the purpose of improving 
efficiency, and with the redundancy plan approved by local government. 
2. The Implementation of the Scheme 
To implement the scheme, the SETC sent working groups to various localities to work out a 
list of candidate enterprises based on industries and quotas. 19° According to Sheng, Huaren, 
the SETC director, among China's 16,000 large and medium-sized SOEs, over 2,000 had 
applied for debt-equity swaps, and the SETC recommended 601 SOEs for swaps. 19' 
A debt-equity swap leading group was established to oversee the implementation of 
the scheme, comprising representatives from the SETC, the PBOC, the MOF and other 
relevant government agencies. All debt-equity swap agreements are subject to the approval of 
the leading group. As of June 2000, the leading group had already approved nearly 70 of the 
10 See, e. g., Xinhua News Agency, "'Converting Debts into Shares", An Important Form of SOE Reform' 
(September 3,1999), available at '1999 WL 7397282'. 
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agreements reached between AMCs and recommended SOEs. j92 This practice was later 
confirmed by the State Council AMC Regulations. "' 
The first debt-equity swap deal was signed on September 2,1999 between Cinda and 
Beijing Building Material Group. 194 In September 1999 only, Cinda signed five deals - 
Beijing Cement Plant deal, Shanghai Jiaohua Plant deal, Meishan (Group) Co. deal, Jiangxi 
Guixi Fertilizer Plant deal, and a deal concerning a firm in Xinjiang that produces reeds. 1' 
The other three AMCs joined the scheme after their establishment. In addition to the four 
AMCs, the SDB has also participated in debt-equity swaps. 19" By the end of 2000, debt- 
equity swaps worth RMB395.1bn (USS47.72bn) were completed by 569 SOEs, with the 
debt-to-asset ratio of these SOEs decreased from more than 70% to below 50%. j9' Most of 
the deals involve more than one AMC, with the biggest creditor playing a leading role. 198 
C. POLICIES BEHIND THE SETC DEBT-EQUITY SWAP SCHEME 
1. The Debt-Equity Swap Scheme as Part of the Government Anti-deflation Policies 
1 See Chinaonline, 'China Denies Debt-Equity Swaps Just "Word Games"' (February 7,2000). available at 
'http: //Www. chinaonline. com/topstoriesIO00207/2/CO0012604. asp'. 
192 See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'Asset-management Firms Continue Restructuring Money-losing State-owned 
Enterprises' (June 28,2000), available at 
'http: //wtvw. chinaonline. corn/topstories/000628/1/b200062612%20. asp'. 
19} AMC Regulations, supra note 91, paragraph 2, art. 18, which reads as follows: 
The debt-equity swap plan and agreement shall be subject to the examination of the SETC. the Ministry of Finance and the 
PBOC, and be implemented at the approval of the State Council. 
194 See, e. g., Asia Pulse, 'Chinese Firms Sign Country's First Debt-to Equity Deal' (September 3,1999), 
available at '1999 6VL 18772310'. In June 2000, Beijing Cement Plant was transformed into a limited liability 
corporation, with registered capital of RMB9630m (Cinda: 71.4%; Beijing Building Material Group: 28.6%). 
See, e. g., Pan, Yanxi, 'Beijing Cement Limited Liability Corporation Established after Debt-Equity Swap 
[quanguo shuojia zhaizhuanggu gongshi zai fing chengli]', People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 1 (June 29, 
2000). 
1 See, e. g., O'Neill, Mark, `Foreign Bankers Remain Skeptical as Cinda Takes Equity in Five Companies 
Debt-swap Deals to Test Reform Plan', South China Morning Post, 2 (October 14,1999). 
'% It was reported that the SDB has already made an agreement with the State Investment Management Co. to 
convert RMB 100bn worth of debt to equity. The first two enterprises to use these RMB 100bn quotas are China 
Petroleum Corp. and China National Petroleum Corp.. RMB30bn of their debts are swapped into equity held by 
the State Investment Management Co. See. e. g., Chinaonline, 'CNPC, Sinopec to Swap US$3.6bn in Debt for 
Equity' (October 27,1999), available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstorieslc9lO260S. asp'. 
197 See Chinaonline, 'PBOC: Financial Adjustment and Control Targets Achieved in '00' (January 19,2001), 
available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. cons/topstories/0/0119/1/B20101160S. asp'. 
1 See, e. g., Dow Jones International News, 'China Asset Management Companies, Devt Bk Sign First Joint 
Debt Deal' (October 29,1999). 
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China has been facing deflation for years. 19' The debt-equity swap scheme is in fact part of 
the government anti-deflation policies. There have been complaints that banks are avoiding 
giving out loans because of rising NPL levels. 200 Two reasons can be identified for this 
"credit crunch": On the enterprise side, the creditworthiness of enterprises is deteriorating 
sharply due to the deflation. On the bank side, the banks' ability to provide credits is greatly 
limited because of the huge amount of NPLs accumulated on their books. Debt-equity swaps 
tackle the two sides simultaneously. Banks' ability to lend will be enhanced when their NPLs 
are taken over by AMCs, while the creditworthiness of enterprises will be enhanced when 
their capital structure is improved after debt-equity swaps. 201 
2. The Micro-economic Effects: a Win-Win Situation for SOEs and Banks 
Some economists in China note that debt-equity swaps will lead to a "vin-win" situation for 
banks and SOEs, as the swaps help SOEs solve the problem of a heavy debt burden and help 
banks avoid financial risks simultaneously. 112 
The debt-equity swap can relieve the burden on many Chinese SOEs struggling under 
the weight of loan payments, allowing them to direct their resources on efforts to modernize 
and restructure. Beijing Cement Plant is a good example of this. After the transaction, the 
company's debt-asset ratio fell from 80.5% to 31.7%. The restructured company is expected 
to turn its loss into profit and earn profits up to RMB 15m from 2000 on. 20' A more general 
example is the 42 enterprises recommended by the SETC to the Huarong AMC for debt- 
equity swaps. It was calculated that the swaps would reduce these companies' annual interest 
payments by a total of RMB 1.78bn, a figure that exceeded their aggregate book loss in 1998 
'" See Wu Jinglian, 'The Macroeconomic Trend in 1999 and Policy Options' in Strengthening the Banking 
System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,116, at 116-7 (October 1999). 
20° These complaints were dismissed by the PBOC, though. See Xinhua English Newswire, 'China's Bank 
Loans on Target' (April 5,1999), available at '1999 JVL 7931582'. 
zog See Wu, Youchang & Zhao, Xiao, 'Debt-to-Equity Swap: A Theoretical and Policy Analysis Based on 
Corporate Governance [zhaozhuangu: jiyu qiye zhili jiegou de lilun yu zhenche fengxi]', Economic Research 
Journal (jingji yanjiu) No. 2,26, at 30 (Feb. 2000). 
2°2 See, e. g., CBNet, `China: Debt-to-equity Swaps: A "Win-Win" Choice for Banks and Firms' (October 20, 
1999), available at '1999 WL 17731561'. 
203 See, e. g., Pan, Yanxi, supra note 194. 
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of RMB1.04bn. Within a year of the swaps, the 42 SOEs are expected to report combined 
profits of RMB740m. 20'4 
More importantly, the debt-equity swap could also diversify the ownership of SOEs203 
and improve their corporate governance. After the swaps, the SOEs will have to give board 
representation to AMCs and tailor business decisions to meet investor demands. 
Therefore, in the short term, converting debts into shares will help China attain the 
goal of freeing its SOEs from difficulties in three years; 20' and in the long run, converting 
debts into shares will serve as a booster enabling SOEs to establish a modern enterprise 
system. The achievement of these goals, however, depends on AMCs' capacity to run 
industrial businesses, and whether the restructured companies can find strategic investors207 
who become involved in the management of the firms and place them under pressures to 
become profitable. 208 
Because the swaps are carried out by AMCs rather than the State commercial banks, 
the swaps will not have direct impact on banks' balance sheets. 20' However, the improvement 
204 See Chinaonline, 'China Huarong to Relieve ICBC of Bad Loans Worth US$42.3bn' (December 3,1999), 
available at 'http: //x vw. chinaonline. com/topstories/99/203/B9/20238. asp'. 
ms In Shanghai, for example, dozens of SOEs plan to swap debts totaling RMB 20-30bn into equity by the end 
of 1999. That is estimated to decrease the proportion of state shares in these enterprises from 65% to 50%. See 
Chinaonline, 'Dozens of Shanghai SOEs Plan Debt-for-Equity Swaps' (October 4,1999), available at 
'http: //www. ch inaonline. com/topstories/C9092909. asp '. 
206 The three-year goal was pledged by Zhu Rongji in early 1998 when he was appointed China's Premier. This 
goal was reiterated at the 4' Plenum of the 15`h Central Committee of the CCP held in September 1999. See, 
e. g., Chinaonline, `China Reiterates Goal to Make SOEs Profitable in Three Years' (September 24,1999), 
available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/C9092211. asp'. 
By the end of 1997, a total of 6,599 medium- to large-size SOEs were in red. The government's goal is 
to reduce the number of companies in debt by one third in three years by push them into mergers, bankruptcy, 
reorganization, regrouping and management restructuring. See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'China SOEs Must 
Turnaround By Next Year- Official' (November 24,1999), available at 
'http: //Www. chinaonline. com/topstoriesl99/124/b9/]2320. asp'. 
There were reports that the three-year reform goals for SOEs had been successfully achieved by the 
end of 2000. See Chinaonline, `Three-year Goals for SOE Reform and Relief Mostly Realized' (January 2, 
2001), available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/0l 0102/000122803. asp'. 
207 In China, a strategic investor is defined as a legal person closely associated with the issuing firm and 
intending to hold issued stocks for a long term. Circular on Improving Stock Issuance, issued by the CSRC in 
October 1999. 
209 According to Zhang, Chunlin, a delegate for the World Bank in Beijing, investors who purchased state firms 
might face difficulties in freeing the companies from the control of local governments, making it difficult to 
return companies to profit. Thus, if the AMC cannot resist the interference from government, it will not make 
sense whether it holds shares or debts in the company. See, e. g., AFX (AP), 'Interview' (September 6,1999). 
available at '1999 WL 25400825'. 
209 Many Chinese scholars ignore the fact that AMCs are legally independent from the banks by arguing that 
debt-equity swaps reduce the NPL level of banks. See, e. g., Zhou, Tianyong, 'The Transfer Mechanism of 
Debt-to-Equity Swap Programme and the Operation Risk [zhaizhuanggu de liucheng jili yu yunxing fengxian]', 
Jingji Yanjiu (Economic Research Journal) No. 1,22, at 22 (January 2000). 
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in SOE profitability will certainly increase the enterprises' capacity in repaying loan principle 
and interest and thus help improve banks' profitability and avoid potential financial risks. 
3. Justification for Converting SOEs' Debts into Equity 
There are arguments against the current debt-equity swaps on the basis that the scheme gives 
SOEs unfair market advantages by releasing their debt burden. 21° These authors, however, 
forgot to investigate how SOEs have developed high debt-asset ratios. "' 
It is a common practice that owners provide their firms with sufficient capital. This 
rule, however, was not obeyed by the Chinese government, the owner of SOEs. Starting in 
1980, working capital was partially provided in the form of bank loans. "' In July 1983, a 
circular was issued by the State Council to put all SOEs' working capital under the 
management of the banks, with different interest rates charged on working capital loans 
according to their terms. 2' With regard to the financing of fixed-asset investment, a pilot trial 
started in 1979 to issue loans for fixed-asset investments. 21° In 1984, budget financing for 
fixed-asset investment was completely replaced by fixed-asset loans. 21S It was not until 1996 
that minimum capital requirements were set for fixed-asset investment. 21" In other words, the 
government, as the owner of SOEs, had stopped providing SOEs with sufficient capital for a 
period of time. That explains to some extent why SOEs in China have such high leverage 
210 See, e. g., Chinaonline, supra note 106. 
21 The discussion in the paragraph and the following paragraphs draws heavily from Wu, Xiaolin & Xie, Pin, 
'Some Ideas about SOE's Debt Restructuring' in Policy Study Office of PBOC, Issues on Bank and Enterprise 
Debt Restructuring, 2-3 (Beijing 1995). Ms. Wu and Mr. Xie were the heads of the PBOC Policy Study Office 
when they wrote the cited paper. 
Z'Z See Policy Study Office of PBOC, supra note 184, at 104. 
21 Circular of the State Council Approving and Promulgating the Report of the People's Bank of China on 
PBOC's Unified-Management of State-Operated Enterprises' Working Capital, issued by the State Council on 
June 25,1983. 
214 See Policy Study Office of PBOC, supra note 184, at 104. By the end of 1980,619 loan contracts had been 
signed for fixed-asset investments. Id. ' 
Z's Interim Provisions Converting All State Budgetary Capital Construction Investment from Appropriations to 
Loans, adopted by the MOF on December 14,1984. The budget financing for fixed-asset investment started 
again in 1985 when the budget financed 10 construction projects. From 1988 on, a Central Basic Construction 
Fund was established to finance state construction projects. See Policy Study Office of PBOC, supra note 184, 
at 104. 
Z'6 Circular of the State Council on Implementing on a Trial Basis the System of Capital Funds in Projects 
which Involve Investment in Fixed Assets [guowuyuan guanyu shixing guding zichan touzi xiangmu shixing 
zibenjin zhidu de tongzhi], issued on August 23,1996. The Chinese Version of the Circular is available at State 
Council Gazette [guowuyuan gongbao], No. 27,1074-1077 (September 27,1996). The Circular requires that 
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ratios. "' Anecdotal evidence supports this assertion as well. Beijing Cement Plant, the first 
SOE selected for the debt-equity swap, was built between March 1993 and mid-1995. The 
initial budget was RMB393m. Due to a sharp rise in the cost of steel and cement, however, 
the final cost reached RMB818m and the balance was totally financed by CCB loans. "' 
To conclude, SOEs should not be blamed solely for their high debt-asset ratios. And 
the government should at least to some extent bear the responsibility for that. Debt-equity 
swaps at least can give some SOEs an opportunity to restart. 219 
D. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT DEBT-EQUITY SWAP SCHEME AND 
RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 
1. Moral Hazard Problem 
Moral hazards are the biggest risks that need to be guarded against in the implementation of 
the debt-equity swap scheme. There are moral hazards of debtor enterprises and of local 
governments. 22° 
Debt-equity swaps are de facto a gambling between the central government/AMCs 
and local governments/debtor enterprises. The central government and AMCs want to 
mitigate financial risks via debt-equity swaps and recover as much as possible when the 
financial situation of their debtors improves. The debtor enterprises and local governments, 
however, aim at releasing themselves of the debt burdens by debt-equity swaps and paying as 
little dividend as possible to AMCs. 
Theoretically, SOEs in China fall into three categories: Enterprises in the first 
category are those who can pay their debts on time. Enterprises in the third category are those 
who have no potential to return to profit. Enterprises between them, i. e., those who have 
the owner of a fixed-investment project must have invested a certain amount (varies for projects in different 
industrial lines and regions) of capital funds. 
See Chinaonline, supra note 106. 
218 See South China Morning Post, 'Cement Plant Finds Life After Debt-Equity Swap' (October 25,1999). 
219 Compared to closure & liquidation, or keeping the enterprise floating without tacking their extensive debt- 
asset ratio, debt-equity swaps might be an optimal option. Closure and liquidation cannot be applied 
ubiquitously, given the important role SOEs play in the economy. Second, if the enterprise debt-asset ratio 
remains at unreasonably high level, most of the SOEs will not have chance to return to profit. Moreover, there 
will be moral hazard problem with over-leveraged enterprises. See Wu, Youchang & Zhao, Xiao, supra note 
201, at 30. 
220 The discussion in the section draws heavily from Zhou, Tianyong, supra note 209, at 22. 
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difficulties in paying bank loan principal and interest because of their irrational capital 
structure fall into the second category. If the criteria set by the SETC can be strictly applied, 
debt-equity swaps should only be applied to the second-category-enterprises. 
The real picture is much more complicated, however. There are disincentives for 
enterprises of the first category. Because they are in better financial condition, they are not 
qualified for debt-equity swaps and thus have to pay their debts in full; while those 
enterprises who are not doing as well as them can enjoy the debt forgiveness (although they 
will have to pay dividends to AMCs later, the payment of dividends are not compulsory). 
Enterprises of the first category therefore may choose to "downgrade" themselves to qualify 
for debt-equity swaps. In other words, they have incentives not to work as hard as before. 
Enterprises in the third category will have incentives to "qualify" themselves for debt equity 
swaps by polishing their accounting reports and providing incorrect information about their 
potential in returning to profit. The enterprises in the second category, while they are 
qualified for debt-equity swaps, might have the expectation to be bailed out by the 
government in the future and lack incentives to improve their management and operations 
after their debt burdens are mitigated. Making matters worse, enterprises are often 
countenanced or even helped by local governments to "qualify" for the scheme. In this way, 
local governments are competing for resources. It is therefore no wonder that more than 500 
SOEs with assets of RMB358.5bn applied to the SETC to join the scheme in a month after 
the scheme was initiated. "' 
The problem was so serious that Shen Huaren, the SETC director, stated at the 
Working Conference of State Economy and Trade in Beijing in later November 1999 that 
"[d]ebt-for-equity swaps should be conducted within a proposed name list recommended by 
the SETC", "[a]ny unauthorized swap is not permitted. "222 To prevent local governments 
from imposing their enterprises on AMCs for the scheme, Mr. Shen warned that if fraud were 
discovered, such deals would be canceled "and debt-for-equity swaps for enterprises in the 
entire province will be suspended. "22' The announcement had a retrospective effect. 224 The 
ZZ' These enterprises had an average debt-asset ratio of 80.3%, and RMB138.2bn in long-term liability. See 
World News Connection, supra note 185. 
Z'-' See Chinaonline, `Unauthorized Debt-equity Swaps Are Void- Beijing' (November 23,1999), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. conVtopstoriesl991123lb9ll223/. asp '. 
223 Id. 
" According to Mr. Shen, Those debt-equity swap deals unauthorized by the SETC "already completed are 
considered no longer effective, otherwise no new programs will be approved". Id. 
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AMC Regulations promulgated by the State Council in November 2000 confirmed that 
AMCs could only conduct debt-equity swaps with enterprises recommended by the SETC. 225 
The strict restriction on candidate enterprises can surely to some extent solve the 
moral hazard problem. There are other concerns, however. First, whether the SETC can carry 
out the criteria completely remains doubtful. Because of the information asymmetry between 
the SETC and the local governments (and enterprises), the SETC has to rely on information 
provided by enterprises and local governments to make the selection. And, because the SETC 
does not bear the cost and responsibilities for debt-equity swaps, they have all the reasons to 
bend to pressures from local governments and enterprises. 226 Second, because all the 
transactions are subject to the approval of the SETC, there are disincentives on AMCs. Since 
the final decisions are not made by AMCs but by the SETC, AMCs will have an excuse when 
a deal proves unsuccessful later on. 
In selecting candidate enterprises, the author here would suggest that AMCs be 
granted discretion not to carry out debt-equity swaps with recommended enterprises so that 
they can double check the financial situation and potential of the enterprises. 
2. Lack of Workable Reorganization Plan 
The success of the debt-equity swap scheme cannot be taken for granted. If the enterprise 
cannot be effectively restructured, if the enterprise governance structure cannot be 
improved, "' the debt-equity swaps by no means can really return SOEs to profits and reduce 
223 AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 18, which reads as follows: 
The State Economic and Trade Commission shall recommend enterprises to AMCs for debt-equity swaps. The AMCs shall 
conduct independent evaluation and examination of the recommended enterprises, draft plans for the debt-equity swaps and 
sign swap agreements with the enterprises. 
226 E. g., at least one of the announced deals signed by Cinda - with a Xinjiang company that is the largest reed 
producer in the mainland's northwest - raises concerns. That company is part of the military-owned 
Construction and Engineering Group (Bingtuan), one of the biggest industrial and agricultural entities in the 
border region. The deal appears to flaunt the SETC swap guidelines because reed cannot be considered a 
priority product. There is suspicion that Cinda was forced into the deal by the political lobbying power of the 
Bingtuan and Beijing's preferential policies for border regions, which are less developed than the cast coast. 
See O'Neill, Mark, supra note 195. 
_=' Although high leverage ratios contribute to SOEs' low profitability. It is the management capacity of 
enterprise manager, the product marketability that really decides the profitability of an enterprise. See, e. g., 
Yuan, Gangming, `Empirical Analyses on China SOEs' Bad Debts [zhongguo guoyu qiye buliang fuzhai de 
shizheng fengxi]', Economic Research Journal No. 12,12, at 17 (2000). 
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financial risks"' - the increase in enterprise book profits by reducing interest payments 
remains a paper game. 229 It is therefore essential that a workable reorganization plan can be 
agreed and enforced in debt-equity swap transactions. "' 
China's AMCs concluded debt-equity swap agreements with SOEs recommended by 
the SETC in a hurry, mainly because of the SETC requirement that framework agreements 
for debt-equity swaps should be research by mid 2000.211 On December 28,1999 only, for 
example, the nation's four AMCs signed agreements with ten SOEs to swap RMB4.13bn of 
their aggregate debt. 232 That made debt-equity swaps look like debt amnesty in China. 233 
It seems that emphasis has mainly been put on improving enterprises' book profits by 
reducing their interest expenditures, rather than on improving their real profit-earning 
capability in most of the reported deals. '-" Except in a few cases, most of the reported deals 
do not include substantial reorganization plans. Presumably, this is because most of the 
agreements so far reached are only framework agreements and need to be detailed by further 
negotiation. 
The current author, however, doubts whether there can be substantial reorganization 
plans later on. First, the governments at various levels are reluctant in pushing rigorous 
reorganization plans. Even the SETC itself provides that enterprises involved in debt-equity 
swaps are not permitted to merge or declare bankruptcy. 2 ' The local governments, concerned 
about the local welfare, are not willing to support reorganization plans including large 
layoffs. 236 And they are in the right position to kill such kinds of reorganization plans. "' 
228 If the profitability of the enterprise sector has not been improved, then although the banks are released of the 
NPLs, the government will have to bail out the AMCs eventually. Moreover, new loans to the enterprise sector 
will become NPLs again and new financial risks will be accumulated in the banking sector. See Wu, Youchang 
& Zhao, Xiao, supra note 201, at 30. 
229 Id., at 29. 
230 It is required that after the debt-equity swap, enterprise transform their operational mechanism, establish a 
standardized corporate governance system according to the requirement of the modem enterprise system; and 
that local government assist enterprise in cutting payroll, increasing returns, diverting the laid-off workers, and 
freeing the enterprise from extra social responsibilities. AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 19. 
"' See Chinaonline, supra note 150. The existence of a deadline was very important as to spur AMCs to finish 
the process so that NPLs will not stay with them too long. 
2'Z See Chinaonline, `Ten SOEs Signed Debt-to-equity Swaps in China' (December 30,1999), available at 
'h ttp: //Www. ch inaonline. com/industry/financial/ctirrentn ewslsectire/C9122903c. asp '. 
2.. See Chinaonline, `Debt-Equity Can Mean Debt Amnesty in China, Expert' (January 6,2000), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/lopstories/000106/CO0010630b. asp'. 
230 See Dow Jones International News, 'China Govt Paper Warns of Moral Risk in Debt-Equity Plan' 
(December 6,1999). 
Z's See Chinaonline, supra note 222. 
236 See Chinaonline, supra note 150. 
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Second, the AMCs do not have sufficient incentives and expertise to impose 
reorganization plans on SOEs. In many cases, AMCs only hold a minority stake and cannot 
carry out their influences efficiently. Besides, most deals bear a purchase-back provision, 
under which the parent company of the enterprise promise to purchase back equity held by 
AMCs during a certain period of time, 238 creating disincentives for AMCs to act positively in 
improving SOEs' profitability and operation. Moreover, even if AMCs are willing and 
allowed to make the intervention, whether they have the capacity of doing so is another 
problem. 23' 
There are suggestions that compulsory dividend distribution be provided in debt- 
equity swap agreements so that AMCs and their debtor enterprises will have incentives to 
improve enterprises' management and operation. 24° The current author, however, would argue 
that attention should be paid to include outsider investors in the debt-equity swap, breaking 
the circle among banks, AMCs and enterprises. Only if AMCs have transferred parts of the 
equity they acquired from the swaps to outside investors, can the corporate governance of the 
enterprises be improved. 
E. AMCS' EXIT PROBLEM 
1. The Importance of AMCs' Timely Exit 
AMCs are not NPL warehouses. They should only hold equity converted from debts 
temporarily. "" The exit of AMCs is essential to the success of debt-equity swap scheme. 
First, to the enterprise managers, debt constraints are harder than that of equity. 242 
With regard to SOEs in China, although debt constraints are not really hard budget 
"' See Li, Xia, supra note 153. According to the SETC guidelines, a restructuring plan involving large layoffs 
must be approved by the relevant local government. Id. 
238 E. g., in the Beijing Cement Plant deal, Beijing Building Material Group has the rights to purchase back the 
shares held by Cinda in three years after the deal. See Li, Xia & Wang, Xing, 'Debt-Equity Swap Started in 
China [zhanzhuanggu jingru shizixing chaozhou]', Jingrong Shibao, 12 (September 15,1999). The same 
provisions can also be found in the Metallurgy Group Co. (Ye Gang) deal. See Chinaonline, 'Xinda Asset 
Mgmt Lightens China Yegang Steel's Debt Load' (November 11,1999), available at 
'http: //www. ch inaon tin e. conz/topstories/991111/c91 11003. asp '. 
239 See, e. g., Wu, Youchang & Zhao, Xiao, supra note 201, at 31. 
240 See, e. g., Zhou, Tianyong, supra note 209, at 27. 
241 See, e. g., Zhu, Ming & Huang, Jinlao, supra note 75, at 8. 
242 See, e. g., Wu, Youchang & Zhao, Xiao, supra note 201, at 31. 
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constraints, compared to the owner of the SOEs - the State represented by various 
government agencies, banks as creditors are putting more constraints on enterprise borrowers. 
The debt-equity swaps actually remove the constraints from SOEs. 243 Second, as mentioned 
before, the AMCs lack the incentives and capacity to restructure enterprises and monitor their 
operations. It is therefore important for AMCs to dispose of the equity they acquired in a 
timely manner to those capable domestic or overseas investors. 
Moreover, at the end of the day, AMCs must cashout banks in return for the NPLs 
(which they currently have paid in bonds). If AMCs can neither receive dividends from SOEs 
nor cash in the equity they acquired via the swaps, they will have no resources to pay the 
banks. Consequently, banks will have no way to repay depositors, and the government will 
ultimately have to take responsibility for repayment. "' 
2. Probable Exit Routes for AMCs and Obstacles 
The government's idea behind the debt-equity swap scheme is that by converting their debts 
into equity, those SOEs, particularly enterprises in highly competitive industries, can be 
gradually introduced to private investors, making them truly public companies. In this way 
the AMCs can dispose of their shareholdings to the public. "' There are other possible exits as 
well, such as selling equities privately to domestic or foreign investors or selling the equities 
back to the enterprise. 24' All these exist routes are provided in the State Council AMC 
Regulations. 24' Whether AMCs can exit through these routes, however, remains doubtful. 
(i) Difficulties in Disposing Shareholdings by Selling Them to the Public 
To list the enterprises and sell shares to the public is considered the optimal route for AMCs 
to dispose of the shares they acquired via the swaps. There are at least three obstacles, 
however. 
243 Id., at 32. 
244 See AFX, 'China Debt Disposal Via AMCs Seen "Worse than Imaginable"' (December 8,1999), available 
at '1999 WL 25421659'. 
ges See, e. g., Chinaonline, supra note 106. 
246 See Liu, Min, `The Operation of "Debt-equity Swaps": the Exit of AMCs [zhaizhuanggu shishi ji tuichu 
fangshi chutuan]', Jingrong Shibao, 12 (September 15,1999). 
207 AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 21. 
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One is the listing criteria, including rules that require firms to have three consecutive 
years of profits before they can sell shares to the public. 248 That means it will at least take 
three years after the swap before the company can be listed because only loss-making SOEs 
are qualified for the swap scheme. 
Second, although there are now pilot trials to dispose of State shares in joint stock 
companies, State-owned shares, including those held by State-owned units, 2" are not allowed 
to circulate freely in the stock exchange. 25° If this rule cannot be changed, the shares held by 
AMCs, that are all wholly State-owned, will not be tradable in the stock exchanges even if 
the enterprise succeeded in listing eventually. 
Third, even if these two rules can be changed or zigzagged, disposing of 
shareholdings via stock markets will need a very long period of time. By the end of 2000, 
debt-equity swaps worth RMB395.1bn (US$47.72bn) were completed by 569 SOEs; ZS' while 
at the end of November 2000, the total market value of China's securities market only 
exceeded RMB4.6 trillion. 252 It is obvious that it will take a while for the domestic stock 
exchanges to digest the equity acquired by AMCs via debt-equity swaps. 
Listing abroad might be another choice. But there are problems as well. First, 
according to the 1994 State Council Special Regulations on Limited Stock Companies 
Issuing Stock and Listing Abroad, the dividend of a company listed abroad should be 
declared in RMB but paid in foreign currency in accordance with foreign exchange 
regulations. 25' The capital account control in China will therefore be an obstacle for SOEs to 
raise capital in foreign stock exchanges. Second, according to updated requirements and 
procedures for Chinese enterprises applying for an overseas stock market listing issued by 
2°e According to the Company Law of the People's Republic of China, a company that wishes to issue new 
stocks must have earned profits in each of the last three years and is able to pay dividends to its shareholders, 
the company's anticipated profit rate must at least meet the interest rate on bank deposits, in addition to other 
conditions. The Company Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the fifth Session of the Standing 
Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on December 29,1993 and effective as of July 1,1994 (as 
amended in 1999), art. 137. 
249 In China, shares issued by a joint stock company have been specially divided into state shares [guojiagu], 
legal person shares [farengu] (including state-owned legal person shares, collective enterprise legal person 
shares, institutional legal person shares), individual shares [gerengu] and foreign capital shares [waizigu]. State 
shares and state-owned legal persons shares are called state-owned shares. See, e. g., Gu, Minkang, 'Acquisition 
of State-owned Shares through Chinese Securities Markets: A Way of Privatization? ', International Business 
Lawyer, 386, at 386 (October 1999). 
250 Id. 
=s' See Chinaonline, supra note 197. 
252 See Chinaonline, 'China's Securities Market Valued at US$556.44B' (December 15,2000), available at 
'h ttp: //www. ch inaonl ine. coin/topstories/0012 / 5/1 /B20012 / 318. asp '. 
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CSRC in 1999, any Chinese enterprise wishing to list overseas must have net assets of more 
than RMB400m. The company's after-tax profits from the previous year should be no less 
than RMB60m. And, calculated according to a reasonably expected price-earning ratio, the 
financing should be no less than US$50m. 25' Third, there are requirements from the host 
securities exchange and/or commission as well. "' Last but not least, it seems unlikely that the 
foreign investors would be willing to invest in firms with uncertain future. "' 
(ii) Difficulties in Selling Shares to Strategic Investors 
Another way for the AMCs to dispose of their shareholdings is to sell them to domestic and 
overseas strategic investors. "' There are already such sales to domestic investors. "' 
The participation of foreign investment is essential. In view of China's national 
condition, the State sector is not able to absorb all the NPLs, and the developing private 
sector lacks the strength for large-scale participation. 2S9 China had had a total of 
US$348.62bn in accumulated foreign investment by the end of 2000.260 It remains a question 
... Special Regulations on Limited Stock Companies Issuing Stock and Listing Abroad, art. 27. 
"" See Chinaonline, 'China Updates Overseas Listing Rules' (July 20,1999), available at 
'http: //www. ch inaonline. com/industry/fina... Archive/Secure/1999/July/fn_c9071916. asp'. 
255 E. g., the IPO of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), for example, was held up by extensive 
scrutiny from the US securities regulator in February 2000. The delay was holding up a number of other 
Chinese listing hopefuls. See Lin, Ho Swee, 'CNPC: IPO Delayed by US Regulator' Fin. Times (February 2, 
2000). 
ßs6 The IPO of Beijing Capital International Airport in January 2000 served a good example for this assertion. 
The public portion of the BCIA equity offering on 28 January was under-subscribed and was expected to be 
priced at the lower end as underwriters struggled to place the paper. According to analysts, this issue is 
overshadowed by a domination of high-growth stocks. The SOEs are being overshadowed by the technology 
sector. Because China's State-run companies are perceived to have excessive production capacity, huge 
workforces, heavy debts, and be loss making, there is a lot of skeptics about any Chinese stock which does not 
have a clear growth potential. See Lin, Ho Swee & Ostrovsky, Arkady, 'Beijing: Airport IPO Short of Full 
Take-up', Fin. Times (January 28,2000). 
25' It is reported that Cinda offered 38 debt-equity swap projects to foreign investors in September 2000. See, 
e. g., `Debt-equity Swaps Are to Be Opened to Overseas Investors [zhaizhuanggu nidui waizi kaifang]', 
People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 5 (September 16,2000). 
258 E. g., in December 2000, China Iiuarong AMC sold its entire equity, worth RMB115m, in Xinjiang Shiyue 
Tractor Manufacturing (Group) Corp. to Xingjiang Guanhui Enterprise (Group) for 105% of the current value. 
The sale is the first of this kind for the country. See Chinaonline, 'China Huarong Asset Management Turns 
Liabilities into Assets with Sale' (December 12,2000), available at 
'http: //lvww. chinaonline. com/topstories/001212/1/CO0121/ 12. asp'. 
259 See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'Foreign Investors a Useful Tool in Disposing Nonperforming Assets in China, Exec 
Says' (January 3,2001), available at 'http. /hvww. chinaonline. com/topstories/010103///B100/225/0. asp'. 
2b0 See Chinaonline, 'Foreign Investment in China Surpasses US$40B Last Year' (January 18,2001), available 
at 'http: //Www. chinaonline. com/topstories/0l01/8/1/COI011707. asp', 
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whether foreign investors would be prepared to buy shares in State-run companies, 
however. "' 
Besides, the sale of State-owned shares in Chinese companies to foreign investors 
would prove difficult. In 1994, the Administration of State-owned Assets and the State 
Commission for Economic Restructuring jointly issued the Interim Provisions on the 
Management of State-owned Shares in Joint Stock Companies. According to the Interim 
Provisions, holders of State-owned shares intending to transfer State-owned shares to foreign 
investors should apply to the Administration of State-owned Assets for examination and 
approval; when the transfer of State-owned shares involves huge amounts or may result in 
changes in absolute or relative holding rights, the transferor must apply for examination and 
approval from the Administration of State-Owned Assets, the State Commission for 
Economic Restructuring and other related government agencies. 
(iii) Difficulties in Selling Back the Shares to the Debtor Companies or Their Parent 
Institutions 
Purchase-back clauses are not uncommon in debt-equity swap deals in China. 262 But this 
would also require that AMCs hold their shares for a long time, restructure the enterprises, 
establish a new management system and bring the companies back to profit. Otherwise, the 
companies cannot afford to buy back the shares. Or even if they managed to buy back the 
shares, the companies will remain unchanged, self-defeating the purpose of the debt-equity 
swap. 
F. SUMMARY 
It is not surprising that debt equity swaps are chosen as the main strategy for AMCs to deal 
with the NPLs they collected from banks. AMCs in China are not only mandated to improve 
banks' financial condition, but also to save SOEs. Macro-economically, the debt-equity swap 
261 There is report, however, that dozens of well-known foreign investment companies have had extensive 
contacts with Cinda, and both sides have reached substantial agreement on their intention for future 
cooperation. See Chinaonline, 'China Asset-Management Firms Offer Shares to Foreign Firms' (April 20, 
2000), available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/000420/2/CO0041910. asp'. 
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scheme is part of the government's anti-deflation policy. And, for some SOEs, if their 
excessive debt-asset ratios can be reduced to a reasonable level, they can hopefully grow out 
of difficulties. 
There are problems with the implementation of the scheme, however. First, although 
criteria have been set by the SETC on what enterprises are qualified for the scheme, it is 
doubtful whether these criteria can be carried out completely. Second, most of the deals 
signed so far do not contain substantial enterprise reorganization plans, putting doubts on 
whether the enterprises will improve their performance after the deal. Third, there are 
difficulties, both legally and economically, for AMCs to dispose of the equity they acquire 
via the swaps. 
VI. A PROPER LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DEBT DISPOAL AND 
RESTRUCTURING 
Debt disposal and debt restructuring can only be carried out under a proper legal 
infrastructure. For debt disposal, it is important to have an efficient, rapid and transparent 
legal process to enforce loan repayment. 26' For debt restructuring, a structure in which banks 
or AMCs can negotiate with their debtors is essential. Actually, these two structures are 
complementary to each other. For debt restructuring, it is important that there are pressures 
on debtors to reach debt-restructuring agreements with banks or AMCs. In this sense, the 
existence of an efficient, rapid and transparent legal process to enforce loan repayment is 
essential to the success of debt restructuring. 
A. CREDITOR PASSIVITY OF THE BANKS IN CHINA: THE LACK OF AN 
EFFICIENT LOAN COLLECTING MECHANISM IN CHINA 
1. The Phenomena 
X62 Supra note 238 and the accompanying text. There was report, however, that enterprises were unwilling to 
make purchase-back promises. See Chinaonline, supra note 150. 
"" See Hawkins, John & Turner Philip, supra note 33. 
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Creditor passivity of the banks denotes that creditors involuntarily or voluntarily tolerate 
their debtors' default. This term was first used by David Begg and Richard Portes in their 
1993 paper on enterprise debt and financial restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe. " 
The creditor passivity of the banks is pervasive in China. When enterprise debtors fail 
to pay loan principal and interest on time, instead of enforcing the loan contract against 
defaulting debtors, foreclosing the collateral, filing a bankruptcy case as the last resort, or 
seeking debt-restructuring arrangements, banks often choose to simply reschedule or roll over 
their loans. Zb5 Although the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law266 has been in effect since November 
1,1988, only a few enterprises have been placed in bankruptcy. 267 Furthermore, among all the 
bankruptcy cases, only a handful of them were initiated by banks. For example, in 1994, 
among all the bankruptcy cases filed with the court, only 1.7% of them were initiated by 
banks. 268 In 1995, only 47 of the 2,385 bankruptcies were initiated by banks; of the 6,232 
bankruptcies in 1996, only 72 were initiated by banks. 26° As an adjunct to the banks' 
reluctance in directing an enterprise into bankruptcy, the banks also become unwilling and 
sometimes strongly adverse participants in reorganization or compromise proposals. 27° 
Making matters worse, banks are often required by the government to subsidize enterprise 
reorganization. For example, to encourage acquisitions of weak industrial SOEs by healthy 
SOEs, banks are required to exempt or suspend the interest repayment of the loans to 
acquired SOEs. Z" To assist mergers of large- and medium-sized SOEs, declarations of 
264 See generally Begg, David & Portes, Richard, 'Enterprise Debt and Financial Restructuring in Central and 
Eastern Europe', European Economic Review No. 37,396 (1993). 
265 See, e. g., Wang, Wuyi, 'Analyzing Factors Influencing the Bankruptcies of China's State-Owned 
Enterprises', Jingji Yanjiu (Beijing), 41 (June 20,1994). 
266 The Law of Bankruptcy for Enterprises of the People's Republic of China (Trial Implementation), adopted 
by the 18th Session of the 6" NPC on December 2,1986 and effective as of November 1,1998 (hereinafter 
referred to as "the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law"). This law applies only to SOEs. For an English translation, see 
Boshkoff, Douglas G. & Song, Yongxin, 'China's New Bankruptcy Law: A Translation and Brief 
Introduction', 61 Am. Bankr. L. J. 359 (Fall, 1987). 
267 According to unofficial statistics, Chinese court had only accepted over 11,600 bankruptcy cases from, the 
effectiveness of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law to mid-1997. Among them, the majority were non-SOE 
enterprise bankruptcies. Furthermore, of those bankrupted SOE's the majority are small enterprises with fewer 
than 1,000 employees. See generally Miller, Sheryl, 'Institutional Impediments to the Enforcement of China's 
Bankruptcy Laws', 8 Int'1 Legal Persp. 187. 
268 See, e. g., Pan, Yue (ed. ), Policies and Procedures for Asset Restructuring, 209-10 (Beijing: 1997). 
269 See Macartney, Jane, 'China Sharply Accelerates Bankruptcies in 1996', Reuter News Service (January 28, 
1997). 
270 See, e. g., Harmer, Ronald Winston, 'Insolvency Law and Reform in the People's Republic of China', 64 
Fordham L. Rev. 2563 (May, 1996). 
27 Circular on How to Deal with Bank Loan Principal and Interest to Weak Industrial SOEs in 18 Pilot Cities 
when They Are Acquired by Healthy SOEs, issued by PBOC, SETC, and MOF on May 4,1995. 
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bankruptcy, and the closure or resource-drained mines, State commercial banks wrote off bad 
debts worth RMB 117.6bn (US$14.23m) from 1998 to 2000.212 
2. The Causes 
Janet Mitchell discusses causes of "creditor's passivity" using Hungarian experiences. 2' 
First, banks may not initiate bankruptcy proceedings because the expected value of the 
debtor's assets are less than the costs of enforcing bankruptcy, or because there is an option 
value in waiting. In the former case, there is no incentive for new lending, whereas the latter 
may justify rescheduling debt; a sufficiently favorable outcome may work wonders for 
existing NPLs. Second, taking action against debtors may signal the extent of the bank's 
NPLs. Third, there may be free rider problems when there are multiple creditors. If each bank 
foresees that a government bailout will become necessary because other creditors take no 
action, such an expectation may become self-fulfilling. 
In China, in addition to these normal causes, several factors can be identified as 
causes of banks' passivity in collecting loans. There are disincentive factors within and 
outside the banking regime. The disincentive factors outside the banking system include the 
reluctance of the government to allow insolvent SOEs' to file bankruptcy, weakness in the 
court system, the lack of an adequate social welfare, local protectionism, the short history of 
bankruptcy law in PRC, and so on. 274 A PBOC survey found problems such as bankruptcy 
practices not being standardized, the erosion of credit interests, and certain policies and 
regulations failing to match bankruptcy practice. 275 In the rest of the section, the author will 
mainly discuss the problems with China's bankruptcy and banking legislation. 
(i) The Disincentive Factors Within China's Banking System 
a. Soft Budget Constraints on State Commercial Banks 
272 See Chinaonline, supra note 197. 
Z" See generally Mitchell, Janet, `Creditor Passivity and Bankruptcy: Implications for Economic Reform', in 
Mayer, Colin & Vives, Xavier (eds. ), Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation (1993). 
274 For a detailed discussion of these issues, see generally Monfort, Mark E., 'Reform of the State-Owned 
Enterprises and the Bankruptcy Law in the People's Republic of China', 22 Ok/a. City U. L. Rev. 1067 (Fall, 
1997); Miller, Sheryl, supra note 267; and Harmer, Ronald Winston, supra note 270. 
110 
CIMPTER TWO- NON-PERFORMING LAON 14'ORKOL17S 
While the bank soft credits are now the main source of soft budget constraints on SOEs, the 
general budget constraints on China's State commercial banks remain soft as well. Despite 
the provisions of the Commercial Banking Law, 276 State commercial banks in China are not 
operating independently and hence cannot assume their civil responsibilities independently. 27 
First, as previously mentioned, a significant proportion of their lending remains policy loans 
or loans conducted under informal government intervention, therefore they have to extend 
loans to SOEs regardless of their creditworthiness. This, together with the various 
administrative controls on commercial banks, makes it difficult to hold banks responsible for 
their own profit and loss. Second, because of their State ownership and the "too big to fail" 
logic, State commercial banks can always expect government bailout. 
b. Inadequate Loan Classification and Provisioning Rules 
In China, the main indices in the assessment of a bank's business volume are the balances of 
deposits and loans, interest receipts, and, closely related to the interest income, the bank's 
profits. Outstanding loans after liquidation when the borrower and its guarantor go bankrupt 
would be classified as irrecoverable loans. '. and thus affect the banks' official evaluation. It 
is therefore understandable that bank managers, especially State commercial bank managers, 
would like to keep their borrowers afloat. 
Moreover, unlike banks in most developed countries, which usually maintain 
adequate reserves for bad debts, Chinese banks have maintained a very low ratio of NPL 
provisions to total assets. The "big four" only started to provision for irrecoverable loans in 
1988 at fixed percentages to their outstanding loans at the beginning of the year and the 
percentages ceiled the reserves. 270 In 1992, the ceiling was increased to 1% of the total 
Z" See China News Agency, 'Central Bank Cites Impact of Bankruptcies' (Dec. 18,1995), translated in FBIS- 
CNI-95-243,62 (Dec. 19,1995). 
176 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 8, art. 4. 
"' See Harding, James, 'China Passes New Banking Law', Fin. Times (May 12,1995). 
278 Article 3, Interim Provisions on State Specialized Banks' Irrecoverable Loan Reserves, issued by the 
Ministry of Finance and effective as of January 1,1988. 
"' The percentages required were quite low then: 0.1% for working capital loans to industrial production 
enterprises, commercial enterprises and construction enterprises; 0.2% for loans to agricultural sector, loans to 
urban & township collective enterprises, and loans to private enterprises and individual proprietor; 0.15% for 
export & import loans; and 0.2% for foreign exchange loans, loans for fixed assets and loans for technology 
updating. No reserves were required for loans substituting budgetary grants, special-purpose loans trusted by 
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outstanding loans at the beginning of the year, 28° and further increased to 1% of the year-end 
outstanding loans from 1998 on. 28' Extra provisions are not tax deductible. 
c. Lack of Autonomy in Loan Write-off 
Chinese banks do not have enough autonomy to write off NPLs. Before 1988, the "big four" 
were not allowed to write off any bad loans without specific approval from the State Council. 
After the implementation of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in 1988, a handful of firms were 
liquidated each year, but the banks still had little autonomy to write off loans they had 
extended to liquidated enterprises. Banks must get approvals from local PBOC branches, 
provincial PBOC branches, or even the State Council for writing off the irrecoverable 
loans. '" The result appears to be that banks are required to keep on their books many loans to 
liquidated borrowers. 289 
In addition to creating disincentives for State commercial banks to file bankruptcy 
cases against their borrowers, the lack of autonomy in writing off NPLs also constitutes 
obstacle for debt restructuring - banks do not have many tools to use in enterprise debt 
restructuring. 
(ii) Problems With China's Bankruptcy Legislation 
China's current bankruptcy legislation comprises the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and 
relevant provisions in the Civil Procedure Law. The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, 28' which 
local governments and authorities in charge of the enterprise, loans secured with collateral, inter-f inancial- 
institution loans. Id. arts. 5,6 & 7. 
280 The ceiling for the year 1993 was set at 0.5%. Banks were required to increase their reserves 0.1% annually 
from the next year on until their reserves reached 1% of their total outstanding loans at the beginning of the 
year. Article 2, Circular Revising Interim Provisions on State Specialized Banks' Irrecoverable Loan Reserves, 
issued by the MOF and effective as of January 1,1992. 
281 Circular of the Ministry of Finance on the Non-Accrual Loans and Loan Loss Provisions, Chengshi Jinrong 
Bao ( July 21 1998). 
282 See the World Bank, China: Financial Sector Policies and Institutional Development, 94-95, a World Bank 
Country Study (1990). 
283 In 1994, for example, the "big four' and the BOCOM applied altogether to write off RMB474m 
irrecoverable loans, only RMB4.172m was approved for writing-off. 
"' The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 266. To implement the law, the Supreme People's Court issued 
Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law (zui gao ren min fa yuan guars yu guan the zhi zing zhong hua ren min gong he guo po chan 
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applies to SOEs only, "' was adopted in 1986 and came into effect two years later on 
November 1,1988. The Law provides for bankruptcy filing and case acceptance, creditor 
meetings, reconciliation and reorganization, bankruptcy declaration, and liquidation. 286 
Bankruptcy of entities other than SOEs is governed by the 1991 Civil Procedure Law. 287 The 
Civil Procedure Law provisions are shorter, but basically replicate the main elements of the 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. 288 It is likely that the basic rules and procedures in both cases 
will be similar in State owned enterprise bankruptcy and non-state owned enterprise 
bankruptcy. 289 There are differences between the two laws as well. 290 
In the rest of this section, this author will focus on problems with China's SOE 
bankruptcy practices. From the author's point of view, problems with the Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law and its enforcement result in the banks' passivity. 
a. Problems with Bankruptcy Procedures 
Under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, SOEs may be placed in bankruptcy proceedings when 
they have "suffered serious losses and cannot pay (their) debts because of poor 
management". 29' This qualifies the right of creditors to force involuntary proceedings by 
fa ruo gan wen ti de yijian), promulgated by the Supreme People's Court in November 1991 (hereinafter 
referred to as "the Supreme Court Bankruptcy Opinions"). 
289 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 266, art. 2. 
286 For details of the proceedings provided by the Law, see Chen, Feng, 'Chinese Bankruptcy Law: Milestones 
and Challenges', 31 St. Mary's Law Journal 1,49 (1999); and also Lam, Joseph & Kan, Carmen, 'Rules and 
Regulations on Insolvency and Restructuring in China', 11 J. /. B. L., 351 (1999). 
287 The Supreme Court Bankruptcy Opinions, supra note 284, art. 74, which provides that the bankruptcy of 
non-state-owned legal person enterprises should be governed by the Procedure for Bankruptcy and Debt 
Repayment of Legal Person Enterprises prescribed in the Civil Procedure Law. Chapter 19, Law of Civil 
Procedure of the People's Republic of China [zhonghua renmin gonghegou minshi susongfa], adopted by the 
fourth session of the seventh National People's Congress on April 9,1991 and effective as of the same day 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Civil Procedure Law"). 
288 The Civil Procedure Law, supra note 287, Chapter 19. 
289 Article 253, Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Civil 
Procedure Law (zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu shi yong thong hua ren min gong he giro min shi su song fa 
ruo gan wen ti de yi jian, adopted by the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People's Court at its 528th 
meeting), provides that civil courts addressing issues of the bankruptcy and debt repayment by non-State- 
owned enterprises can refer to the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. 
290 For a detailed discussion of the differences between the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and the Civil Procedure 
Law, see Chang, Gordon G., 'Bankruptcy Law in China: too Much or too Little? ', 13 China Law and Practices 
No. 5,22-25 (June/July 1999). 
"'The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 266, art. 3. 
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requiring proof that the debtor's losses are due to poor operation and management. "' 
Creditors are also prohibited from filing bankruptcy case against public utilities and 
enterprises of major concern to the national economy and the general welfare of the public 
whose debts are to be repaid by government subsidies or through other arrangements with 
appropriate governmental departments. 293 Although the burden of proof on creditors was 
mitigated to some extent by the Supreme Court Opinions of 1991,291 given the difficulties in 
discovering the financial condition of an enterprise due to underdeveloped accounting and 
disclosure practices in China, 295 it is still not an easy job for a creditor to make the decision to 
initiate a bankruptcy case. 
Even if the creditor succeeds in building up evidence and filing a bankruptcy case 
against its debtor, the bankruptcy proceeding is still subject to various government 
interventions. '" The enterprise bankruptcy will almost inevitably involve such government 
agencies as the auditing authority, the administration for industry and commerce, the tax 
authority, the price-control authority, the civil affair department, the land administration, the 
labor and personnel department, and the social security authority. Actually, in most 
circumstances, the court will have to seek the collaboration of the relevant government 
authorities in dealing with the insolvent enterprises. Sometimes, the court cannot even 
292 Theoretically, enterprises whose losses could not be anticipated and prevented are outside the bankruptcy 
net, even though they are deeply in debt. 
""The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 266, art. 3. 
294 The Supreme Court Bankruptcy Opinions, supra note 284. Respecting article 3 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law, the "Opinions" stated that an inability to discharge matured liabilities meant that the time for discharge or 
payment of such debt (or debts) had expired, a creditor had demanded payment; and the debtor was obviously 
deficient in liquidity. Id. art. 8. Article 8 of the "Opinions" provided that a debtor should be deemed incapable 
of discharging matured debts if it has ceased repaying due debts continuously. These provisions, together with 
the provisions that a creditor needs only prove its claims against the debtor and the debtor's incapability of 
repaying the due debt when filing bankruptcy against the debtor (article 2 of the "Opinions") have obviously 
mitigated creditors' burden of proof in filing bankruptcy case against its debtor. 
29 Only with the assistance of a modem accounting system may the financial position of an enterprise fairly be 
ascertained. Because of the long period of command economy when accounting mechanisms were geared to 
provide basic cost and production information, it was not until mid-1993 that China began to adopt recognized 
and accepted international accounting techniques and standards. The accounting and disclosure practices 
remain poor in China. In addition to the poor accounting and disclosure practices, there are other obstacles in 
determining a SOE's real financial situation, including soft budget constraints, government intervention and 
great number of social burdens on SOEs. All these make it difficult in making a proper assessment of the SOE 
performance. See, e. g., Monfort, Mark E., supra note 274, at 1067. 
296 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law is shot through with references over to discretionary actions by government 
authorities. Government authorities are involved in the composition and reorganization of the insolvent 
enterprise, the liquidation of the bankrupt enterprise, the settlement of the redundant employees of the bankrupt 
enterprise and their welfare before re-employment, and the investigation of the liability for the bankruptcy of 
the enterprise. The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 266, arts. 4,17,20,24 & 42. 
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declare the bankruptcy of an insolvent enterprise without the collaboration of all the relevant 
government authorities. 29' 
The extensive government involvement makes bankruptcy cases unattractive to 
banks. In addition to the usual difficulties associated with multiple decision makers, it also 
results, in many cases, in a lengthy decision-making process; while an insolvency law that is 
proactive cannot be expected to provide benefits unless the process is permitted to operate 
quickly and efficiently, before the financial difficulties become acute and critical. 
b. The Pro-employee Asset Distribution 
According to article 37 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, the assets of the bankruptcy estate 
will not go to the unsecured creditor before salaries and labor insurance benefits owed by the 
debtor are given to its workers and staff, and then the taxation obligation of the debtor is 
satisfied. 29' A circular issued by the State Council in 1994 reiterates the bias in favor of 
employees. According to that circular, the first priority in a case of enterprise bankruptcy is 
to "resettle the employees in order to maintain order and stability in the society". 299 The 
circular provides that proceeds from the sale of land use rights (usually the most valuable 
property of the insolvent enterprise) should first be used to resettle the employees of the 
enterprise before it can be included in the bankruptcy estate for distribution; 30° and if the 
proceeds from the sale of the land use rights cannot satisfy the resettlement requirements, 
other assets in the bankruptcy estate should be used for resettlement purposes. 70' Likewise, 
the housing, schools, nurseries, hospitals, and other welfare facilities of the bankrupt 
enterprise will no longer be the property of the bankrupt enterprise, but rather will be 
_" See Wang, Zheng, 'Going Bankrupt in Accordance with the Law-Practices in Shenyang', People's Daily, 18 
November 1996. The dominant role of government in enterprise bankruptcy is clearly evidenced in the 
Bankruptcy of Achen Sugar Mill. The plant in Heilongjiang province was established in 1905, used to be one of 
the largest sugar mills in China. Because of poor management and heavy debt burdens, the enterprise stopped 
its production since 1993. At the end of 1997, the enterprise had asset worth only RMBO. 28bn, while its debts 
(principals and interests) accumulated at RMBO. 7bn. The company, however, was only able to apply for 
bankruptcy in June 1998 after the approval of the relevant government authorities. See Chen, Kaixing, 'The 
Bankruptcy of Achen Sugar Mill Go to Its last Stage (Athen Tangchang Pochan An Jingru Zhongjie Jieduan)', 
People's Daily (Oversea Edition), 1 (November 12,1998). 
298 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 266, art. 37. 
'" The Circular on the Trial of Bankruptcy of State-owned Enterprises in Several Pilot Cities, issued by the 
State Council on October 25,1994 under the authorization of Article 43 of the enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 
1 
J0° Id. art. 2. 
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administrated by the relevant government department, with their employees to be taken in or 
resettled by the unit that takes over the particular facility. "' 
In 1997, the State Council promulgated the Supplementary Notice on Issues 
Concerning the Trial Implementation in Several Cities of State-Owned Enterprise 
Bankruptcy and Merger and Re-employment of Staff and Workers. J03 It creates fundamental 
changes in the rights of creditors (both secured and unsecured) provided by the Civil 
Procedure Law, 304 the Security Law, 305 and the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, 306 stripping them 
of their expectancy in a search for funds to pay for the resettlement and reemployment of 
employees of bankrupt SOEs. Creditors of bankrupt enterprises covered by the 1997 Notice 
- State-owned industrial enterprises in what are now the 111 cities307 in the State Council's 
Capital Structure Optimization Program for Enterprises - are now to be paid only out of 
assets remaining after the costs of resettlement have been met. 30S Like the 1994 Circular, the 
1997 Notice provides that the cost of the resettlement of employees shall be paid for first by 
revenues from the disposition of land use rights. 309 The 1997 Notice, however, goes further to 
specifically state that land use rights that have been encumbered with security interests are 
also to be used for funding resettlement costs before any of the income from their 
dispositions is used to pay off secured creditors. "' These provisions have seriously reduced 
the amount of any bankruptcy estate available for creditors. As a result, banks become the 
largest losers in enterprise bankruptcy. "' 
'o' Id. art. 3. 
3021d. 
303 The Supplementary Notice on Issues Concerning the Trial Implementation in Several Cities of State-Owned 
Enterprise Bankruptcy and Merger and Re-employment of Staff and Workers, issued by the State Council on 
March 2,1997 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1997 Bankruptcy Notice"). 
30' The Civil Procedure Law, supra note 287, arts. 203-4. 
... The Security Law, supra note 159, art. 33. 
'06 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 266, art. 32. 
107 The relevant cities are listed in an appendix to the 1997 Notice and include Beijing, Changchun, Changsha, 
Chengdu, Chongqing, Dalian, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Haikou, Harbin, Jilin, Nanjing, Ningbo, Qingdao, 
Shanghai, Shenyang, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Wuhan, Xiamen and Wuxi. 
308 See Clark, Donald C., `State Council Notice Nullifies Statutory Rights of Creditors', 19 No. 4E. Asian 
Executive Rep. 9,9 (April 15,1997). 
109 The 1997 Bankruptcy Notice, supra note 303, art. 5. 
310 Id. 
"' E. g., in the Achen Sugar Mill bankruptcy case, after liquidation, the bankrupt enterprise had assets equal to 
RMB0.12bn. All of its assets were used to compensate its 4500 workers, the cost of which was estimated at 
RMBO. 13bn. All Loan principal and interest, which equaled to RMBO. 7bn, were written off. See Chen, 
Kaixing, supra note 297. 
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3. Policy Recommendation 
One common effort made by Asian countries in the post-crisis era is to update their 
bankruptcy laws. "' In Thailand and Indonesia, the existence of significant amounts of 
"strategic" NPLs - borrowers taking advantage of the crisis to stop paying their loans and 
hide behind impotent or outdated bankruptcy legislation - have highlighted the need for 
reform to the bankruptcy laws. To facilitate the debt restructuring, the three Asian countries 
that received the IMF help (South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia) all amended their 
bankruptcy laws after their currencies collapsed in 1997 -a key condition for the multi 
billion-dollar bailouts led by the IMF. 313 
A new bankruptcy law is urgently needed in China as well, given the inefficiency of 
its current bankruptcy legislation, which is actually a main cause of the creditor banks' 
passivity in China. Besides, banks in China should be granted more discretion in writing off 
and provisioning for NPLs. Incentives must be provided to encourage banks to pursue 
positively their creditor's rights. 
B. THE LACK OF CONSENSUAL MECHANISMS TO FACILIATE NEGOTIATION 
BETWEEN CREDITORS AND DEBTORS 
Consensual Mechanisms to promote debt restructuring vary from country to country. Three 
different models can be drawn worldwide, i. e. the statutory procedures provided in Chapter 
11 of US Bankruptcy Code, the "London approach" and its variations in "Asian crisis 
countries", and the bank-led restructuring represented by Poland (see Annex VI). Several 
common features can be identified for these three different institutional arrangements - i. e., 
(1) a neutral party to co-ordinate the negotiation between creditors and debtors (e. g., the court 
in the US Chapter 11 procedures, and the Bank of England in the London Approach); (2) the 
limitation on the ability of small creditors to block agreements; (3) the seniority of the 
"= Officials of the IMF, the World Bank and its private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation, 
largely agree that the single main obstacle to progress on corporate reform in Asia is legal systems that cannot 
cope with corporate workouts. Because the basic bankruptcy and legal framework is not there, lenders had very 
little leverage to force restructuring. See, e. g., Filder, Stephon, 'IMF Presses Asia on Corporate Reform', Fin. 
Times (December 5,2000). 
"' See Cecil, Morella, 'Asia Makes Slow Progress on Bankruptcies", Agence France-Presse (May 16,1999), 
available at '1999 WL 2603180'. 
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interim new financing over existing debt; and (4) a standstill of creditors. China will have to 
make appropriate arrangements so that creditors and debtors can negotiate for debt 
restructuring. 
1. The Conciliation and Reorganization Procedure Provided by the Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law Cannot Fit the Need of Debt Restructuring 
The 1986 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law does contain provisions for debt restructuring. Chapter 
IV of the Law provides for a reconciliation and reorganization procedure (see Annex VII). 
The Chapter IV procedure, however, cannot satisfy the need for debt restructuring because of 
its obvious deficiencies. 
First, the procedure can only be initiated by the government departments in charge of 
the debtor enterprise7" and the reorganization will be administrated by these relevant 
government departments. 3' This greatly impedes the debtor and its creditors' discretion in 
deciding whether to negotiate for debt restructuring and how to implement debt restructuring. 
Second, unlike the Chapter 11 procedure of the US Bankruptcy Code, the reorganization 
under Chapter IV of China's Enterprise Bankruptcy Law can only happen when the 
bankruptcy petition is filed by creditors. "' Third, the reorganization procedure provided by 
the Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy Law does not have the limitation on small creditors' 
ability to block a reconciliation agreement. "7 Last but not least, the reorganization procedure 
provided by the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law has not provided seniority interim of the new 
financing over existing debts. 
The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 266, art. 17. 
Id., art. 20. 
36 Id. art. 17. This is considered a main obstacle to the restructuring of GITIC. A number of international banks 
have officially and unofficially commented on the possibility of having GITIC reorganized after it was declared 
insolvent by the Guangdong Provincial High People's Court. Had GITIC not been suddenly closed down on 
October 6,1998 and had it not unexpectedly petitioned to be declared insolvent on January 11,1999, creditors 
of GITIC would have been able to initiate insolvency proceedings against GITIC. The PBOC, as the superior 
department-in-charge of GITIC, would then have had the opportunity to apply for reorganization of GITIC. See 
Lam, Joseph & Carmen, Kan, supra note 286, at 356 & note 15. 
The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 266, art. 16, which read as follows: 
Resolutions of the creditors' committee must be approved by a majority of creditors present at the meeting who are entitled to 
vote and whose claims represent a majority of the total amount of unsecured claims. But, a resolution concerning a draft 
agreement must be approved by more than two thirds of the total amount of the unsecured claims. 
Thus, if creditors representing up to one third of the total amount of the unsecured claims vote against the draft 
conciliation agreement, they can successfully block the adoption of the agreement. 
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2. The Main Bank System in China - Should China Develop Bank-led Debt Restructuring? 
China has been implementing the main bank system since July 1996 under the PBOC Interim 
Measures. "' In that year, 300 enterprises entered the pilot trial of the main bank system. The 
trial pilot was expanded to 500 enterprises in 1997.39 Under the main bank system, each 
borrower is paired with a "main bank" lender - actually a designated bank branch - with 
which it keeps its "basic account" and from which it receives all of its loans (unless the 
"main bank" is unable to meet its demand) (see Annex VIII). 
It seems that main banks are in a good position to lead enterprise debt restructuring, 
because they are often the largest creditors of the relevant enterprises, and they have the best 
knowledge of their clients. The Interim Measures Governing the Main Bank System in fact 
provide that enterprises are entitled to seek policy suggestion from their main bank about 
debt restructuring. 32' 
As pointed out above, banks in China do not have sufficient expertise and experience, 
however. Besides, strict limitations are imposed on commercial bank business activities by 
the Commercial Banking Law. 32' Whether commercial banks in China can lead debt 
restructuring properly remains doubtful, especially when there is an almost exclusive bank- 
enterprise relationships. 312 
3. Out-of-court Procedure 
One experience of "Asian crisis countries" in corporate debt restructuring is that in the 
absence of effective bankruptcy procedures, out-of-court procedures offer a mechanism for 
resolution. Almost all Asian crises countries turned to the "London approach" (see Annex 
VI). Since there is no available institutional arrangements in China's Bankruptcy Law to 
"' Interim Measures Governing the Main Bank System (zhuban yinhang guanli zhanxing banfa], issued by the 
PBOC on June 29,1996 and effective as of July 1,1996. 
s" See China Daily, 'China: Businesses Undergo Reforms' (March 30,1997). 
'20 Interim Measures Governing the Main Bank System, supra note 318, art. 17. 
12' The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 8, art. 43. 
12. Under China's current main bank system, no other banks are allowed to enter bank-enterprise cooperation 
agreement with an enterprise before that enterprise ends its bank-enterprise cooperation relationships with its 
main bank. The exclusive bank-enterprise relationship often impels the bank and their enterprise customers into 
an alliance at the expense of general public interests. 
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facilitate corporate debt restructuring, given the weakness of Chinese banks, ''-' the author 
would argue that China should follow the model of "Asian crisis countries" and employ the 
"London approach" to promote debt restructuring. A remote argument here might be the 
success of this approach in Hong Kong: 324 it will be easier for Mainland China to draw 
lessons and experience from Hong Kong because Hong Kong is now a special administrative 
region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China. 
Hawkins and Turner summarized ten important principles for the schemes in Thailand 
(see Annex IX). According to them, these principles apply to other schemes, such as those in 
Malaysia and Indonesia as well. 32' These ten principles particularize the common features 
drawn from the three basic models of institutional arrangements to facilitate debt 
restructuring negotiation between the debtor and its creditors - i. e., a neutral party to co- 
ordinate the negotiation between creditors and debtors, the limitation on the ability of small 
creditors to block agreements, the seniority of the interim new financing over existing debt, 
and a standstill of creditors. 
The author would like to suggest that China design its out-of-court institutional 
arrangements on the basis of these four common features; some adjustments, though, will 
have to make to tailor the arrangements to the particularities in China. In addition to the 
standstill of creditors, which is essential for the success of debt restructuring, a special 
committee should be established to oversee the debt-restructuring, collective action problem 
should be considered, and, more importantly, debtor enterprises should be able to obtain 
finance during the restructuring period. 
(i) Who Should Take Responsibility for Corporate Sector Restructuring in China? 
'Z' One conclusion the IMF made about the Asian financial crisis workout is that resolving the corporate sector 
problem requires properly functioning banks as counterpart. It is therefore important to conduct bank 
restructuring first when the banks are overall weak. Only when prudential regulation on banks becomes tighter 
and better enforced, banks' capital is enhanced to a certain standards can banks really lead financial 
restructuring of corporations. See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et a/., supra note 3, at 75-6. 
720 In Hong Kong, the Association of Banks released "Guidelines on Corporate Difficulties" based on the 
London approach, in April 1998, with the support of Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). The present 
scheme has been quite successful. See, e. g., Hawkins, John & Turner Philip, supra note 33. 
For details of the Hong Kong Approach, see 'Hong Kong Approach to Corporate Difficulties', Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority Quarterly Bulletin, 13-7 (November 1999). 
325 See Hawkins, John & Turner Philip, supra note 33. 
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Given the authorized functions and responsibilities of the SETC concerning the national 
economy and SOEs, 326 and the dominant role it is already playing in supervising the debt- 
equity swap scheme, ''`' the author would like to suggest that the SETC, together with the 
PBOC, establish a special committee to co-ordinate the negotiation between creditors and 
debtors regarding debt restructuring. The decisions made by the committee should bind both 
parties. 
(ii) Collective Action Problem in Debt Restructuring 
When many lenders hold claims on a borrower, the problem of attaining collective action 
must be taken account of. The collective action problem fully demonstrated itself in the 
Latin America debt crisis. In several cases, it has taken more time to persuade and cajole a 
sufficient number of banks to participate in the workout loan than to negotiate the agreement 
between the bank steering committee and the debtor. 32' The collective action problem shows 
the importance of limiting the ability of small creditors to block agreements (in the US 
Chapter 11 procedure, the "cramdown" of the reorganization plan by the court: see Annex 
VI). 
The sale by any creditor of his debt claim causes problems for the debt restructuring 
and should be conditioned as well, because the buyer may impede the restructuring process. 
That is why it is set as a principle in the Thai scheme that any creditor who sells his debt 
'26 These include: (1) regulating and solving problems in the operation of the national economy, and drafting 
objectives and policies for future operation; (2) overseeing the drafting and implementation of State industrial 
policies and comprehensive trade laws and policies, and directing the readjustment of the industrial structure; 
(3) managing the power, medicine, gold, silk and satin industries through corresponding bureaus; (4) planning 
industry investment distribution, directing use of commercial loans for projects not funded by the state, drafting 
policies for and supervising the use of foreign investment, drafting policies concerning the transfer of assets, 
equity and management power by SOEs to foreign investors, and helping enterprises internationalize their 
operations; (5) reforming the goods distribution system and market system, regulating the supply and demand 
of major commodities, coordinating internal and external trade policies, and planning the import/export and 
shipment of major manufactured goods and raw materials; (6) macro-managing all enterprises, drafting policies 
for reforming SOEs and lightening their financial burdens, promoting the development of large enterprise 
groups as well as small and mid-sized enterprises, managing the internal legal work of enterprises, training their 
managerial staff, and drafting policies, etc. for supervising enterprises' state property; and (7) directing 
enterprises' technical renovation, technology imports, localization of major imported equipment, R&D of 
technical equipment and resource utilization, organizing industries' environmental protection efforts, and 
developing the environmental protection industry. See the State Council Secretary Department (ed. ), The 
Organization Structure of the Central Government (zhongyan zhengfu zhuzhi jigou] 122-130 (1998). 
AMC Regulations, supra note 91, art. 23. 
See generally Herring, Richard, J. 'The Economics of Workout Lending', 21 Journal of Money, Credit, and 
Banking No. 1,1 at 10 (Feb. 1989). 
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claim should ensure that the buyer does not impede the restructuring process (see Annex IX). 
Besides, the "Bangkok approach" requires that creditors should take account of the impact of 
any action on other creditors and on potentially viable debtors (see Annex IX). 
The situation in China is much simpler. Because the "big four" are entirely owned by 
the State, the government could undertake coordination and persuasion easily if banks cannot 
reach agreement themselves. In the current debt-equity swap scheme, the rule seems that the 
largest creditor takes the lead. 32' If a debtor has creditors including foreign banks, or other 
non-bank foreign or domestic institutions, the collective action problem will emerge, 
however. It is therefore better if clear rules could be set in advance to solve the problem. 
(iii) Pro-claim debts 
a. The Economics behind the Pro-claim Debt 
Permission to issue prior-claim debt is a basic feature of the Chapter 11 procedure of US 
Bankruptcy Code . 
33' By providing the troubled borrower with protection against the claims of 
past creditors, the issuance of prior-claim debt permits the borrower to finance productive 
new projects that have an expected return greater than the opportunity cost of funds. In the 
absence of such protection, it may be impossible to finance such projects because new 
lenders would be deterred by the knowledge that all returns from the new project would have 
to be shared with past creditors who hold unsatisfied claims on the borrower. Permitting the 
borrower to issue new debt that has a prior claim over existing indebtedness will not only 
benefit the debtor, but also the existing creditors - heavily exposed lenders are no longer 
"obliged" to advance new funds and can thus avoid to exacerbate concentrations of exposure 
to the troubled debtor. 
The merits of the pro-claim debt explain why seniority is granted to interim new 
financing over existing debts even in out-of-court institutional arrangements for debt 
restructuring. In Thailand, for example, under the "Bangkok approach", new credit extended 
'=' That is similar to the principle 4 of the "Bangkok Approach". 
"o Countries without this system are now considering including that in their insolvency laws. See. e. g., Kelly, 
Jim, `Investing: Insolvency Laws Must be Given US-Style Shake-up', Fin. Times (April 26,1999). 
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on reasonable terms to help the debtor continue operations is granted priority status (see 
Annex IX). 
b. The Closed-end Loan in China: Is it a Pro-Claim Debt? 
China's Enterprise Bankruptcy Law contains no provisions on pro-claim debt. On July 26, 
1999, Interim Measures Governing Closed-end Loans was issued, aiming to facilitate closed- 
end loans to loss-making SOEs that would otherwise not be eligible for bank loans. "' 
The closed-end loans are working capital loans issued to industrial SOEs, which are 
suffering from excessive leverage or losses and ineligible for normal banks loans. "' Acording 
to the Interim Measures, closed-end loans are commercial loans, rather than policy loans and 
should only be issued at the discretion of commercial banks. "' Companies eligible for the 
loans must already have some marketable and profitable products, and must promise that the 
loans be used only for productive activities, and not to pay off old debts. "; The borrowers 
must put the loans in a special bank account with withdrawals requiring the approval of the 
creditor banks. 335 
The closed-end loans are to some extent similar to pro-claim debts, in terms that both 
of them are aiming at financing loss-making borrowers to grow out of their difficulties. There 
are differences between them, however. First, closed-end loans will only be provided to those 
loss-making SOEs that governments at or above the county level already decide to help (with 
a detailed aid plan). "' Those SOEs which are listed in the government plans to go bankrupt 
or go through M&A in three years are not eligible for closed-end loans. "' In other words, 
closed-end loans are not designed for enterprises under debt restructuring. Second, unlike 
pro-claim debt, closed-end loans do not have priority over existing debts, what the banks 
have is that the borrowers must put the loans in a special bank account with withdrawals 
"' Interim Measures Governing Closed-End Loans [Fengbi Daikuan Guanli Zhanxing Banfa], issued jointly by 
the PBOC, the MOF, the SETC, the State Tax Bureau, and the State Development and Planning Commission on 
July 26,1999. The issuing of closed-end loans to foreign trade companies is not regulated by the Interim 
Measures. Id., art. 23. 
32 Id. art. 2. 
"' Id. art. 3. 
71 Id. arts. 5&6. 
"s Id. arts. 12-15. 
36 Id. arts. 2&5. 
"' Id. art. 23. 
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requiring the approval of the creditor banks. Proceeds from the sale of the products must be 
fully put in the special account and must not be used for other purpose. 338 And, before the full 
repayment of the principal and interest of the closed loans, the borrowers cannot use the loans 
to pay off existing debts (including wages in arrears); tax authorities are not allowed to 
collect tax from the special account; and the people's courts shall not freeze the special 
account or order the borrower to pay off debts from that account. 339 
Given the fact that closed-end loans have existed in China for more than 2 years34° 
and that commercial banks, the PBOC, and other government departments have all 
accumulated experience with closed-end loans, the author would suggest that closed-end 
loans be applied to enterprise debt restructuring. Necessary adjustments, though, should be 
made so that closed-end loans can fit the need for debt restructuring - enterprises under debt 
restructuring should be eligible for closed-end loans, rather than just those included in the 
government aid plan. Besides, it must be clarified that closed-end loans have seniority over 
existing debts of the borrower. 
VII. SUMMARY 
Recapitalization is the core of any bank rehabilitation strategy. The government 
recapitalization of the "big four" can be justified by the State ownership of the "big four", the 
low profitability of banks, and their difficulties in raising capital. The problem here is not 
whether public money should be injected into the "big four", but how the money should be 
injected so as to mitigate the moral hazards accompanying public capital injection. The 
failure of the 1998 RMB270bn recapitalization led to the establishment of four AMCs in 
1999. The AMCs were mandated to issue bonds guaranteed by the MOF to their respective 
banks in exchange for NPLs. Banks are virtually captalized in this way. 
"$ Id. art. 15. 
391d. art. 14. 
'40 Banks in China started issuing closed-end loans to foreign trade enterprises as early as in the second half of 
1997. In September 1997, the Provisional Procedure on the Management of Closed-End Loans to Foreign 
Trade Companies is issued jointly by the PBOC and other four state departments. See, e. g., AsiaPort Daily 
News, 'New Loan Procedure Supports Exports' (September 2,1997), available at '1997 {VL 22634372'. 
By the end of 1998, a total amount of RMB9.8bn in closed-end loans was issued. See Wang, Baoqing, 
'PBOC Official Explains the Interim Measures Governing Closed-End Loans to Reporter (jiu fengbi daikun 
guanli zhanxing banfa, renhang youguan fuzeren da jizhe wen]', Jingrong Shibao, 1,2, (August 3,1999). 
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There are problems with China's AMC program, however. AMCs in China are not 
simply tasked to solve the bank NPL problem, but also mandated to help SOEs grow out of 
their difficulties. Moreover, whether the incentives and capacity of AMCs to deal with NPLs 
collected from banks are sufficient remains doubtful. Last but not least, there are legal 
obstacles to AMCs' smooth operation in China: (1) It is not clear whether the borrowers must 
be notified of AMCs' take-over of the loans from the banks, as required by China's contract 
law. (2) AMCs must take cautions to accomplish legal procedures for the transfer of security 
interests on the loans. (3) The borrowers' right to assert against AMCs their defenses against 
banks may prove troublesome. Efforts must be taken to solve these problems appropriately. 
Collecting NPLs from banks is only the first step. NPL management is a more crucial 
step for the success of bank and enterprise restructuring. There are two basic strategies for 
managing NPLs: one is to dispose them as quickly as possible (asset management strategy), 
the other is that AMCs hold and try to restructure the NPLs in an expectation of returns in the 
future (loan management strategy). AMCs in China are mainly applying a debt-restructuring 
strategy towards the NPLs they collected, mainly in the form of debt-equity swaps, although 
they will have to dispose at least some of the NPLs they collected. 
A sweeping debt-equity swap scheme has been carried out in China, attempting to 
solve the bank and enterprise problem simultaneously. This scheme, however, bears heavy 
moral hazards. Moreover, there are obstacles for AMCs to dispose of the equity they acquired 
via the swaps. 
A solid legal infrastructure is a necessary precondition for the success of the AMC 
program and NPL management in China. An AMC Law should be adopted by the NPC or its 
Standing Committee so that AMCs will have more authority to manage NPLs. Besides, 
China must reform its bankruptcy legislation and banking regulation regime so that banks 
will be more proactive in collecting their loans. Moreover, an out-of-court consensual 
mechanism must be established to facilitate debt restructuring, featured with a neutral party 
to co-ordinate the negotiation between creditors and debtors, the limitation on the ability of 
small creditors to block agreements, the seniority of the interim new financing over existing 
debt and a standstill of creditors. 
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PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION, PROMOTING 
BANK INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The inappropriate banking regulation and supervision, and weak internal controls in 
commercial banks have been identified as two main causes of the bank NPL problem in 
China. To prevent the creation of new NPLs, efforts should be taken to enhance banking 
regulation/supervision and to improve bank internal controls. 
After decades of development, the PBOC has developed from the country's mono- 
bank into a central bank in charge of monetary policy operation and financial regulation and 
supervision. As one of the country's three financial supervisors, ' the PBOC carries out 
prudential regulation/supervision against over-risk-taking and irregularities of banks and 
other financial institutions under its supervision (see Annex X). Moreover, the 1995 Central 
Banking Law2 establishes the PBOC operational independence and authorizes it adequate 
resources to carry out banking regulation and supervision (see Annex XI). The independence 
of the PBOC was further enhanced through the organizational restructuring at its 
headquarters and local levels (see Annex XI), which cuts off the intervention of local 
governments into the PBOC's monetary policy operation and financial supervision and 
guarantees a more efficient financial supervision. 
In this chapter, comments will be made on China's current banking regulation and 
supervision as compared with the Basle Committee Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision. Issues related to bank internal controls in China would also be discussed. 
' They are: the PBOC in charge of banking supervision, CSRC supervising the securities businesses, and China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) supervising the country's insurance industry. See Annex X. 
2 The Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China, adopted at the 3rd Session of the 
8' NPC on March 18,1995, effective as of the same day (hereinafter referred to as "the Central Banking 
Law"). 
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The rest of the Chapter is organized in four sections. Section II discusses the progress 
in removing unnecessary administrative controls on banks. In Section III, comments are 
made on China's current banking regulation and supervision, as compared with the Basle 
Committee Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. Section IV reviews the 
development of bank internal controls in China, in comparison with the Basle Committee 
Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organization. A summary is offered in 
Section V. 
II. REMOVING UNNECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ON STATE 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
The causal relation between administrative controls on State commercial banks and their 
NPL problem has been fully explored in Chapter One. As mentioned in that chapter, the 
division of business scope among State specialized banks was removed as early as mid 
1980s. In this section, this author will concentrate on the removal of credit plan and the 
relaxation of interest rate controls. 
A. INDIRECT MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS VS. DIRECT MONETARY 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
As indicated in Chapter One, administrative controls on commercial banks result from the 
PBOC's over-reliance on direct monetary policy instruments. The situation has changed since 
1993, with the gradual removal of some administrative controls on commercial banks. 
In 1993, the State Council promulgated the Resolution on Financial Reform, ' calling 
for more reliance on indirect monetary policy instruments. The Resolution, however, retained 
the credit plan as one of the main monetary policy instruments. " Following the Resolution, 
the 1995 Central Banking Laws provided the PBOC with market-oriented mechanisms, such 
as deposit reserve requirements, base interest rate fixture, rediscounting windows, central 
bank's credit to commercial banks, and open market operation to implement monetary policy. 
' Resolution on Financial Reform, State Council, No. 91 (1993). 
'Id. sect. 1. 
' The Central Banking Law, supra note 2, art. 22. 
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The credit plan was not even listed as a specific monetary policy tool. The PBOC, however, 
was not completely prohibited from using direct instruments to implement monetary policy. 
Article 22 of the Central Banking Law provided that the PBOC, in addition to the listed 
indirect instruments, could apply other monetary policy instruments defined by the State 
Council. Actually, the credit plan continued its application after the implementation of the 
Central Banking Law. ' Besides, the central bank is still controlling commercial banks' RMB 
deposit and lending interest rates. 7 
B. CREDIT GUIDANCE VS. CREDIT PLAN 
1. The Removal of Credit Plan 
The economic reform in China has observed the gradual relaxation of credit plan. The 
traditional distinction between budget funds for financing enterprise fixed capital/quota 
working capital, and bank credits for financing enterprise above-quota working capital was 
abandoned shortly after the initiation of the economic reform. Credits were increasingly used 
to finance not only enterprise working capital but also fixed capital requirements! 
From the mid-1980s, efforts were made to eliminate overall direct credit controls on 
bank lending. For many years before 1985, banks submitted deposits to their headquarters, 
received targets for loan making, and requested funds when they needed them. " This strict 
management of credit funds guaranteed the full implementation of credit plan. Since 1985, 
the central bank began to adopt a method of dividing funds among specialized banks and 
linking the amount of loans made by them to the deposit they took. The central bank was no 
longer the only supplier of funds to specialized banks. Banks could borrow in financial 
markets as well. 1° As a result, though credit ceilings continued to be assigned to specialized 
6 See, e. g., Xinhua News Agency, 'Financial System Reform to Move into New Stages', available at '1999 WL 
7302553'. 
'The Central Banking Law, supra note 2, art. 5. 
e Circular of the State Council Approving The Report of the People's Bank of China on PBOC's Mono- 
Management of State-Operated Enterprises' Working Capital, issued by the State Council on June 25,1983; 
and Report of the PBOC Concerning the Division of Business Scope in Fixed Asset Loans Among Specialized 
Banks, approved by the State Council on May 13,1984. 
° Decisions of the State Council On the PBOC's Exclusive Role as Central Bank, issued by the State Council on 
September 17,1983, art 3. That article confirmed the system. 
1° See, e. g., Dai, Gengyou, 'A Review of PBOC's Monetary and Credit Policy', China Finance (Being) No. 
12,27 (1999). 
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banks in accordance with the annual credit plan, " they were virtually no longer mandatory. '' 
Although the direct credit control was reintroduced in the late 1980s as inflationary pressures 
mounted, the State commercial banks already possessed some autonomy in extending 
working capital loans, which accounted for 60% of the credit plan. " 
A new round of financial reform started in 1993.14 The establishment of the three 
policy banks, and the adoption of the Central Banking Law and Commercial Banking Law, 
increased the autonomy of State commercial banks in their lending activities. Although the 
credit plan was strictly enforced in 1994 and 1995, State commercial banks were granted 
increasing autonomy in making investment-lending decisions within their individual credit 
ceilings and gained some independence to pursue commercial objectives. 
In 1994, the PBOC issued new prudential ratios in pilot form to guide the operations 
of banks and non-bank financial institutions, " requiring banks to keep their loan-deposit ratio 
below 75%. 16 The new ratios were introduced to complement the credit plan. Credit ceilings, 
however, still applied to banks whose lending volume exceeded the prescribed loan-deposit 
ratio and banks that did not have stable deposit resources. " The 1995 Commercial Banking 
Law legitimized asset-liability management ratios. '8 In 1997, the application of credit plan 
was limited to the "big four" and the three policy banks. 19 On December 24,1997, the PBOC 
" Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Bank Administration, issued by the State Council 
on January 7,1986, art. 35. 
See generally the World Bank, China: Finance and Development (1988). 
" The banks' freedom to allocate investment loans, however, was still circumscribed by a detailed lending 
program drawn up by the State Planning Commission in consultation with the central bank, the MOF, and the 
SETC. See generally the World Bank, The Chinese Economy: Fighting Inflation, Deepening Reforms, 27, a 
World Bank Country Study (1996). 
14 In November 1993, the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth National Congress of the CCP set the future course of 
financial sector development in China. See generally `Decisions on Issues Concerning the Establishment of the 
Socialist Market Economy System', Beijing: Xinhua Monthly 6 (November 1993). 
's Circular of the PBOC Concerning the Asset-Liability Management of Commercial Banks, issued on February 
15,1994 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1994 PBOC Circular on Asset-Liability Management"). 
16 See generally Appendix to the Circular of the PBOC Concerning the Asset-Liability Management of 
Commercial Banks, issued on February 15,1994; the World Bank, supra note 13, at 28; and Fernando, Montes- 
Negret, `China's Credit Plan: An Overview', 11 Oxford Rev. of Econ. Pol'}, No. 4,25, Box 2 (Winter, 1995). 
" The 1994 PBOC Circular on Asset-Liability Management, supra note 15, art. 6. 
1e The Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks, adopted at the 13th Session of the 
Standing Committee of the 8th NPC on May 10,1995, and effective as of July 1,1995 (hereinafter referred to 
as "the Commercial Banking Law"), art. 39. 
" See Editorial Comment, `A Major Reform to Macro Financial Regulation and Control [jingrong hongguang 
tiaokong de zhongdagaige]', People's Daily, (December 26,1997). The three policy banks are still subject to 
credit ceiling control. See Circular on Improving the Loan Size Management for State Commercial Banks 
[zhongguo renming yinhang guanyu gaijing guoyou shangye yinhang daikuan guimo guili de tongzhi], issued 
by the PBOC on December 24,1997 (hereinafter referred to as "the Circular on Improving the Loan Size 
Management"). 
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issued a Circular announcing the abolition of the ceiling control on State commercial banks' 
loan sizes since January 1,1998.20 
2. The Introduction of Credit Guidance 
The removal of credit plan does not mean that the PBOC is to carry out a complete laissez- 
faire policy towards bank lending. According to the PBOC Circular, after the abolishment of 
compulsory credit plans, commercial banks should issue loans according to lending rules set 
by the PBOC and industrial policies set by the government. 2' 
A new bank credit management system was introduced immediately after the 
phasing-out of the credit plan. 22 Under the new system, the PBOC formulates annual and 
quarterly guiding plans for the new lending of commercial banks since January 1,1998. 
Unlike the former compulsory plan, the new guiding plan is not binding to commercial banks 
(including the "big four"). " Commercial banks are now entitled to issue loans with their 
legally raised money after depositing required reserve, leaving adequate standby reserve, 
repaying loans falling due to the PBOC, and purchasing policy financial bonds. 24 
The headquarters of each commercial bank is required to draft and issue annual and 
quarterly credit plans for the whole bank on the basis of the PBOC guiding plans, credit 
policies, and asset-liability ratio management requirements. The banks must file these plans 
25 with the PBOC. 
3. The Implication of the Reform 
According to Dai, Xianglong, the removal of mandatory credit plans represents the shift from 
direct to mainly indirect regulation and control of monetary policy and has deep ramifications 
zo Id. 
21 Id. "The reform of the credit fund management policy should not result in less support to enterprises, should 
not result in any negative impacts on the implementation of state industrial and regional development policies. " 
Id. 
22 Id. 
23 The guiding plan sets an indicative, non-binding target. The guiding plan to State commercial banks for the 
year 1999 covered bank lending worth of RMB 1000bn. See Dai, Xianglong, 'PBOC Will Follow an 
Appropriate Monetary Policy and Focus on Improving Financial Supervision to Promote Sound Economic 
Development and Guarantee Financial Safety', China Finance No. 2,4, at 4 (February 1999). 
24 See the Circular on Improving the Loan Size Management, supra note 19. 
25 Id. 
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for China's financial reform. "' In terms of the commercialization of the "big four", the 
introduction of the new system levels the playing field for them to compete with other 
commercial banks and forces them to improve their internal controls. 27 
The achievement of these goals, however, depends on many factors. Ultimately, the 
shift from direct to mainly indirect regulation and control of credit will depend on much 
greater flexibility of interest rates on lending, greater sensitivity of banks to costs, and on 
further reforms in the corporate sector that increase the sensitivity of firms to the interest rate 
charged on loans. Otherwise, the PBOC will have to rely mainly on direct control 
instruments. 29 
C. DECONTROL OF INTEREST RATES 
The negative effects of interest rate controls were discussed in Chapter One. In this 
subsection, this author will discuss China's current RMB interest rate control system, the 
efforts so far in liberalizing the interest rates, and the future of RMB interest rates 
administration in China. 
1. China's Current RMB Interest Rate Administration System under the 1999 Interest Rate 
Administration Provisions 
China's current interest rate control system is provided by the 1999 PBOC Interest Rate 
Administration Provisions. 29 The Provisions apply to financial institutions, postal savings, 
and other legal persons or organizations who engage in RMB deposit-taking or lending 
activities within the territory of the PRC (excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan). " 
26 See Xue, Fei & Yang, Bin, 'Press Conference on China's Financial Situation Held by the 1" Session of the 9' 
NPC (Shidang zhengjia huobi gongyingliang, baochi guoji shouji pingheng)', People's Daily (Overseas 
Edition), 2 (March 9,1998). 
27 See the Circular on Improving the Loan Size Management, supra note 19. 
28 At least in 1999, most of the credits were still directly regulated and controlled. See, e. g., Qiu, Bin & Bian, 
Weigang, 'On Bank Lending Strategy Adjustments [giantan xinxingshi xia yinghang xindai chele de 
tiaozheng]', China Finance No. 7,10, at 10 (1999). 
29 Provisions on RMB Interest Rate Administration [renminbi lily guanli guiding], promulgated by the PBOC 
on March 2,1999, effective as of April 1,1999 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1999 Interest Rate 
Administration Provisions"). 
301d. art. 2. 
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The 1999 Interest Rate Administration Provisions authorize the PBOC to take the 
responsibility of interest rate administration, free of interruption from any other institution or 
individual. " The Provisions divide the responsibilities between the PBOC headquarters and 
its branches and sub-branches. The headquarters' responsibilities include formulating interest 
rate policies and administrative regulations, fixing and adjusting interest rates, supervising 
and monitoring interest rates, and planning for the reform of interest rate administration 
system in China. 32 The PBOC branches and sub-branches should, under the authorization of 
the headquarters, carry out the day-to-day supervision and monitoring of interest rates, 
establish and improve interest rate illegalities reporting system, propagate and explain 
interest rate policies and relevant laws and regulations to the public, and organize survey and 
research on interest rate policies. " 
According to the 1999 Interest Rate Administration Provisions, the PBOC is 
responsible for stipulating the PBOC deposit, lending and re-discounting interest rates, 
deposit and loan interest rates for commercial banks and other financial institutions, 
preferential lending interest rates, penal interest rates, inter-bank deposit interest rates, and 
interest rate floating scope. " The interest rates stipulated by the PBOC are legally binding 
and may not be changed by any institution or individual. " Individual financial institutions, 
however, are allowed to determine floatable interest rates within the scope set by the PBOC, 
interest rates for internal fund flows, inter-bank interest rates and discount rates. 36 Financial 
institutions must take the responsibility of internal interest rate management, propagating and 
explaining interest rate policies to their clients, accepting the interest rate examination and 
inspection of the PBOC, and reporting to the PBOC on issues arising out of the 
implementation of interest rate policies. " 
2. Efforts towards the Liberalization of Interest Rates 
(i) Establishing and Improving the Floating Rate System 
Id. art. 3. 
'z Id. art. 7. 
Id. art. 8. 
ýa Id. art. 5. 
's Id art. 3. 
'6 Id. art. 6. 
" Id. art. 9. 
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The establishment and improvement of the floating rate system has played a critical role in 
liberalizing China's interest rate regime. " The floating rate system started with rural credit 
cooperatives in December 1981.39 In the 1980s, rural credit cooperatives, and trust and 
investment companies were authorized to raise their deposit rates up to ceilings stipulated by 
the PBOC. 4° The deposit interest rate floatation, however, resulted in the flight of deposit 
from banks to rural credit cooperatives and trust and investment companies. To compete with 
the cooperatives and trust and investment companies, other financial institutions had to raise 
their deposit interest rates, even without the authorization of the PBOC. 41 The PBOC 
therefore deprived trust and investment companies of their right to raise deposit interest rates 
in 1985, and removed that of rural credit cooperatives in 1990.42 Afterwards, financial 
institutions have never been allowed to float their deposit interest rates again. 
The ceilings and floors for the floatation of lending rates have varied during the 
reform era. At the very beginning, there were only ceilings for bank lending interest rates. By 
1990, financial institutions were allowed to raise their working capital lending rates up to 
30% higher than the basic rates. 43 In 1996, to lower the interest rate burden of enterprises, the 
ceiling for the floatation of working capital lending rate was lowered to 40% and 10% 
respectively for rural credit cooperatives and other financial institutions (commercial banks 
and non-bank financial institutions). " 
From 1986 to 1988, fixed-asset lending rates could be raised up to 20% higher than 
the basic rates. The ceiling was raised to 30% after February 1989, but was lowered to 20% 
again in February 1999. "' 
" See, e. g., Zhou, Rongfan, Chao, Deyun, 'The Reform and Development of China's Floating Interest Rate 
System' [woguo fudong lily zhidu de gaige he fazhan]', China Finance No. 10,23 (1998). 
39 Rural credit cooperatives were allowed to have deposit and lending interest rates higher than that of banks 
then. Id., at 23. 
ao To stimulate the development of trust and investment companies, they were authorized to float their deposit 
rates up to 20% higher of bank deposit interest rates in the early part of the 1980s. Rural credit cooperatives 
were authorized the same floating right in 1987. In 1989, rural credit cooperatives were authorized to raise their 
deposit interest rates up to 70% higher than that of bank deposit interest rates. Id. 
n Id. 
42 Id. 
" Id. Credit cooperative enjoyed higher ceilings. Rural credit cooperatives were allowed to raise their lending 
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It was not until 1990 that banks were allowed to lower their lending rates. To 
stimulate the economy and to carry out the government industrial policies, in April 1990, the 
PBOC set a floor for working capital lending rates at 10% lower than the basic interest 
rates. 46 
In October 1998, to stimulate lending to small and medium-sized enterprises, the 
PBOC allowed wider rate floating scope for lending to small enterprises. Rural credit 
cooperatives were allowed to float their lending rates up to 50% higher and down to 10% 
lower than basic rates when they lent to small enterprises; while the scope for commercial 
banks, urban credit cooperatives were set at 20% (ceiling) and 10% (floor). ` The scope was 
further widened in September 1999. Commercial banks, urban credit cooperatives were 
allowed to raise interest rates up to 20% higher than basic rates when they lend to small and 
medium-sized enterprises. "' 
To improve the floating rate system, in August 1993, the PBOC required that 
individual financial institutions formulate detailed implementation measures to carry out the 
floating rate system, which involves charging different interest rates to their borrowers within 
the floatation scope on the basis of government industrial policies and the borrower's 
creditworthiness. After the widening of the floating scope in October 1998, commercial 
banks and urban credit cooperatives formulated new implementation measures accordingly. 49 
The development of floating rate system is granting banks more and more discretion 
in deciding lending rates. First, the floatation scope and the application of floating rates have 
been widened. Second, the October 1998 and September 1999 policies no longer 
distinguished between working capital lending and fixed-asset lending. Third, financial 
institutions are now required to decide lending rates within the stipulated floating scope on 
the basis of the loan size and the risk involved, the borrower's creditworthiness and its 
liability-asset ratios, and whether the loan is secured. " 
(ii) The Reform of Loan Interest Rate Categorizing and Calculation Measures 
46 Id. 
°7 Id., at 24. 
es Id. 
'9 Id., at 23. 
so Id., at 24. 
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For a long time in China, loans were divided into working capital loans and fixed-investment 
loans with different interest rates set for loans of different categories. " With the deepening of 
the financial reform, especially the phasing-out of credit ceiling controls, it becomes 
unnecessary to set interest rates separately for working capital loans and fixed-investment 
loans. The 1999 Interest Rate Administration Provisions therefore divide loan interest rates 
into short-term loan interest rates and medium- and long-term loan interest rates. " In other 
words, loan interest rates are now set on the basis of the term of the loan rather than the 
purpose of the loan. 
Financial institutions in China had no freedom in deciding how interests should be 
calculated and collected. " The 1999 Interest Rate Administration Provisions at least grant 
financial institutions some freedom in deciding how interests on short-term loans should be 
calculated and collected. Financial institutions and their borrowers can now decide to 
calculate and collect interests on short-term loans either monthly or quarterly. S° 
3. Prospects of Interest Rate Liberalization in China 
The Chinese government is determined to liberalize RMB interest rates. As early as 1993, a 
limited scope for interest rate administration system reform was defined. " The State 
Council's Resolution on Financial Reform in 1993 called for a reform of interest rate policies 
and vested the power to formulate policy decisions in the PBOC under the leadership of the 
sb State Council. The PBOC, accordingly, formulated a plan to liberalize interest rates in three 
s'Id, at23. 
'Z The 1999 Interest Rate Administration Provisions, supra note 29, arts. 20 & 21. 
" See Zhou, Rongfan, Chao, Deyun, supra note 38, at 24. 
sa The 1999 Interest Rate Administration Provisions, supra note 29, art. 20. 
"See 'Decisions on Issues Concerning the Establishment of the Socialist Market Economy System', supra note 
14. It was stated that the central bank should adjust the basic interest rate in a timely fashion according to the 
demand and supply of funds in the market, and allow the deposit and lending rates of commercial banks to float 
within a limited margin. Id. 
s6 Resolution on Financial Reform, supra note 3, sect. 4. 
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stages, " with the inter-bank market rate liberalization as the first stage, followed by the 
lending rate liberalization and finally the deposit rate liberalization. " 
Progress has been made in this area. On June 1,1996, ceilings on inter-bank lending 
interest rates were abolished. " With the establishment and improvement of the floating rate 
system, financial institutions can now charge different interest rates on the basis of their 
borrowers' creditworthiness within the floating scope. 6° Since September 21,2000, financial 
institutions have been allowed to set their foreign currency lending rates in line with that of 
international markets; rates on foreign currency deposit of more than US$3m have also been 
liberalized. " To date, the liberalization of interest rates, however, has not touched the 
foundation of the interest rate controls in China. Commercial banks must set their RMB 
deposit and lending rates pursuant to the ceiling and floor interest rates defined by the 
PBOC. 62 Moreover, except for short-term loans, banks and other financial institutions are not 
allowed to decide how interests should be calculated, paid, or collected. 63 
There is still a long way to go before interest rate control can be completely 
abolished. A World Bank survey lists five preconditions for the successful interest rate 
liberalization, i. e., a financial sound real sector (in China, mainly SOEs); banks with positive 
net worth; bank management with high quality; high regulatory and supervisory standards; 
and a gradual process. " While China has made considerable progress in all these areas, the 
weak financial health of the State enterprise sector and the deteriorating quality of banks' 
assets, however, suggest that interest liberalization cannot be achieved in China quickly. "' 
37 See generally Xie, Ping, `Toward a Market-Oriented Interest Rate Policy in the Transformation of China's 
Economy', in Mehran, Hassanali, Laurens, Bernard & Quintyn Marc (eds. ), Interest Rate Liberalization and 
Money Market Development, 19 (1996). 
S8 It is important to put deposit interest rates liberalization after the lending rates liberalization. Without a prior 
or simultaneous freeing of lending rates, freeing deposit rates would result in a substantial squeeze on bank 
margins, drastically reducing their already low level of profits. 
See, e. g., Dai, Gengyou, supra note 10. 
60 See Chinaonline, 'Dai Xianglong: China to Adopt Market Interest Rates' (January 24,2000), available at 
'h ttp: //www. ch inaonl ine. com/topstories/000I24/CO0012003. asp '. 
b1 See, e. g., Kynge, James, `Beijing Move on Foreign Currency', Fin. Times (September 5,2000). 
62 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, arts. 31 & 38. 
63 For details of how interests should be calculated, paid or collected, see the 1999 Interest Rate Administration 
Provisions, supra note 52, arts. 11-29. 
60 See generally the World Bank, supra note 13, Box 3.1. 
6s Dai Xianglong was reported to have predicted a three-year-period for decontrolling interest rate. See Kynge, 
James, `China to Liberalize Rates Regime within Three Years', Fin. Times (July 19,2000). 
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III. CURRENT BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN CHINA: AS 
COMPARED WITH THE BASLE COMMITTEE CORE PRINCIPLES FOR 
EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 
Banking regulation and banking supervision are closely connected with each other. Banking 
regulation can be defined as the establishment of rules, both acts of the legislator (the NPC 
and its Standing Committee in China), and statutory instruments or rules of the competent 
authorities (the State Council and its subordinated ministries, including the PBOC in 
China). " Banking supervision, according to Dr. Lastra, b' in a broad sense can be defined as a 
process with four stages or phases: licensing, on-going supervision, sanctioning, and crisis 
management. 68 In other words, banking supervision is a process of enforcing banking 
regulations established by the legislator and other competent authorities. The licensing, on- 
going supervision, sanctioning and crisis management must be carried out according to rules 
established by the legislator and other competent authorities. 
In this section, comments will be made on China's current banking regulation and 
supervision as compared with the Basle Committee Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision. 69 Given the relationships between banking regulation and supervision, the 
discussion will be organized around different stages of banking supervision. 
A. LICENSING PROCESS AND APPROVAL FOR CHANGES IN STRUCTURE 
1. The Core Principles' Requirements 
Sound licensing and structure requirements are an entry policy to protect safe and sound 
banking practices. They act as filters to prevent "bad" banks and dishonest people from 
" See, e. g., Lastra, R. M., Central Banking and Banking Regulation, 108 (1996). 
67 Id. 
68 The crisis management, namely, the central bank's role of lender of last resort, a deposit insurance scheme, 
and bank insolvency proceedings, are to be discussed in Chapter Four. 
69 It has been a consensus that China should bring its bank regulations in line with international "best practices", 
especially the Basle Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. See, e. g., Burke, Michael E., IV, 
'Improving China's Bank Regulation to Avoid the Asian Bank Contagion', 17 UCLA Pac. Basin L. J., 32,32 
(Summer 1999); and also Meng, Long, 'The Basle Core Principles and China Financial Regulation and 
Supervision [baseer hexing yuanze yu zhongguo de jingrong jianguan]', China Finance No. 7,14, at 14,16 
(1999). 
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entering the banking system. 7° The 2°d through the 5' Core Principles suggest minimum 
standards for the licensing and structure of banks. The Core Principles' first entry policy is a 
standard definition of those activities a "bank" may undertake, " to be enforced through a 
licensing process overseen by a central regulator who uses objective standards in reviewing 
applications requiring the disclosure of the entity's organization, management, and operating 
plan. ''- After granting the initial license, the regulator must be able to review a bank's transfer 
of control to a third party" and a bank's major acquisitions or investments to ensure that the 
bank is not exposed to undue risk through corporate relationships. '' 
2. Licensing and Structure Change Approval in China 
The criteria applied in China are similar to those applied in other countries. Under China's 
Commercial Banking Law, no organization or individual should receive money deposits from 
the public or do any other businesses of a commercial bank or use the title of "bank" without 
the approval of the PBOC. 75 The Law lists out the businesses a commercial bank may engage 
in with the authorization the PBOC. 76 
There are five requirements to establishing a commercial bank: " (1) articles of 
association in conformity with the Commercial Banking Law and the Company Law; (2) 
minimum amount of registered capital; 78 (3) senior managerial personnel (including chairman 
of the board of directors (president) and general manager) with expertise and professional 
experience required by their positions; 79 (4) sound organizational and management structure; 
70 See generally Lastra, R. M., supra note 66, at 109-10. 
" Basle Committee, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (September 1997), available at 
'http: //www. bis. org/publ/bdbs30a. htm' (hereinafter referred to as "the Basle Core Principles"), principle 2. 
72 Id. principle 3. 
" Id. principle 4. 
74 Id. Principle 5. 
's The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, art. 11. 
'b 1d. art. 3. 
" Id. art. 12. 
78 The minimum registered capital for the establishment of a commercial bank should be RMB1bn, for the 
establishment of an urban cooperative commercial bank should be RMB100m and for the establishment of a 
rural cooperative commercial bank RMB50m. Id. art. 13. 
The registered capital should be paid-in capital. The PBOC may raise the floor amount of the 
registered capital for the establishment of a commercial bank in the light of economic development. Id. 
" The Commercial Banking Law prohibits anyone who has one of the following backgrounds from holding 
high managerial positions in a commercial bank: (1) having once been sentenced to imprisonment or deprived 
of political rights on account of graft, bribery, illegal possession of property, embezzlement of public property 
or disruption of social economic order; (2) having served as a director of the board of directors, the director or 
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and (5) up-to-standard business site, safety measures and other facilities relevant to the 
business thereof. Appropriate documentation evidencing the foregoing must be filed with the 
PBOC. $° 
Commercial banks in China are permitted to set up branches within or outside the 
territory of the PRC in keeping up with their business needs. 8' Commercial banks, however, 
must apply to82 and obtain approval from the PBOC for setting up branches. B3 The total sum 
of the working capital to be allocated to all branches of a bank should not exceed sixty 
percent of the total capital of the commercial bank. 8' 
According to the Commercial Banking Law, any organization or individual intending 
to buy more than ten percent of the shares of a commercial bank should obtain the approval 
of the PBOC. as 
Chinese commercial banks are prohibited from engaging in trust investment or stock 
business, or investing in real estate not for its own use within the territory of the PRC. 86 
Neither are they allowed to invest in non-bank financial institutions or enterprises within the 
manager of a company which went bankrupt because of mismanagement and having been personally 
responsible for the bankruptcy; (3) having been the legal representative of a company whose business license 
had been revoked on account of violation of the law and having been personally responsible thereof; or (4) 
having failed to repay a fairly large debt already due. Id. art. 27. 
80 Id. arts. 14 & 15. According to these two articles, an applicant should supply to the PBOC for the 
establishment of a commercial bank (1) an application for the establishment of a commercial bank, specifying 
the name, location, registered capital and business scope of the bank thereof; (2) a feasibility study report; and 
(3) other documents and information required by the PBOC. After the PBOC's examination and approval of the 
preliminary application, the applicant should fill a formal application form and submit the following documents 
and information: (1) a draft of the statute of the commercial bank to be established; (2) qualification documents 
of the senior managerial staff to be employed; (3) a certificate of capital confirmation from a legitimate capital 
confirmation authority; (4) a list of the names, capital contributions and shares of the share holders of the 
commercial bank; (5) credit certificate and other relevant information of the share holders each holding more 
than ten percent of the registered capital of the commercial bank; (6) the guideline and plan for the operation of 
the commercial bank; (7) information of the business site, safety measures and other facilities relevant with the 
business of the commercial bank; and (8) other documents and information required by the PBOC. 
BI Id. art. 19. 
aZ Id. art. 20, which reads as follows: 
For the establishment of a branch, the applying commercial bank should submit the following documents and information: (1) 
an application for establishing a commercial bank branch, specifying the name, amount of working capital, business scope and 
the locations of the headquarters and branch of the commercial bank; (2) a financial report of the last two years of the 
applicant; (3) certificates of qualifications of the senior managerial officials to be appointed; (4) the business guideline and 
plan; (5) information related to the business site, safety measures and other facilities relevant with the business thereof; and (6) 
other documents and information required by the PBOC. 
81 Id. art. 19. 
sa Id. 
as Id. art. 28. 
86 Id. art. 43. 
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territory of the PRC. 87 A commercial bank is allowed to invest into or acquire another 
commercial bank, subject to the approval of the PBOC, however. 88 
To ensure that the PBOC monitor and supervise the structure changes of a bank, the 
Commercial Banking Law requires that a bank obtain the approval from the PBOC in the 
event of any of the changes in (1) name; (2) registered capital; (3) the business sites of the 
head office and/or branch(es); (4) business scope; (5) major shareholdings (shareholders, 
each holding more than 10% of the total capital or total shares of the bank); or (6) articles of 
association and other changes specified by the PBOC. B9 The law also requires that when a 
commercial bank needs to replace its chairman of the board of directors, or general manager 
with a new one, the qualifications of the appointee should be reported to the PBOC for 
examination. 
3. Are China's Requirements in Conformity with the Basle Core Principles? 
At the first look, China's practices in licensing and structure change approval comply with 
the Basle Core Principles requirements. There are problems with China's entry policy, 
however. While thorough, transparent, objective, and sound licensing policies are essential 
for an efficient and effective entry policy; 90 there is still a long way to go before China can 
achieve these standards. The five requirements to establishing a commercial bank set by the 
Commercial Banking Law need to be detailed and publicized. Efforts have been made these 
years to better define the five requirements. For example, better definitions of the 
professional knowledge and specialized work experience a banker should possess were given 
in the Interim Provisions on the Administration of Qualifications for Financial Institution 
Senior Management in 1996.9' These provisions, however, are PBOC's internal rules and not 
properly publicized. Besides, there are other issues, such as the types of operational facilities 
a bank should possess, that need to be specified. The lack of detailed requirements and -the 
87 Id. 
ea Id. art. 25. 
89 Id. art. 24. 
90 See Folkerts-Landau, David & Lingdgren, Carl-Johan, Toward a Framework for Financial Stability, 32-6 
(1998). 
91 Interim Provisions on the Administration of Qualifications for Financial Institution Senior Management 
(jinrong jigou gaoji guanli renyuan renzhi zhige guanli zhanxing guiding], issued by the PBOC on September 
13,1996. 
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lack of transparency give the PBOC too much discretion92 and allow for political 
interference. 
B. ARRANGEMENTS FOR ONGOING BANKING SUPERVISION 
Prudential regulation and supervision in the banking sector seeks four goals: (1) establishing 
procedures that allow only financially viable banks to operate; (2) limiting excessive risk- 
taking by bank owners and managers; (3) establishing appropriate accounting, reporting, and 
valuation rules; and (4) providing for corrective measures and restrictions on activities of 
weak institutions. " The achievement of these goals requires both prudential regulations 
setting standards for banks and on-going supervision to ensure that banks operate in 
compliance with these standards and to correct banks' failure to do so. 
1. Prudential Regulations and Requirements 
The Core Principles devote 10 out of the 25 Core Principles to setting standard prudential 
regulations that aims at effective risk-management: 9' capital adequacy- principle 6; credit risk 
management- principle 7 (credit-granting standards and credit monitoring process), principle 
8 (assessment of asset quality and adequacy of loan loss provisions and reserves), principle 9 
(concentrations of risk and large exposure), principle 10 (connected lending), and principle 
11 (country and transfer risk); market risk management- principle 12; other risk management- 
principle 13; and internal controls- principles 14 , 15. 
China has implemented most of these 
standard prudential regulatory requirements. 
Asset-liability ratio management requirements: In 1994, the PBOC issued a set of 
new prudential ratios in pilot form to guide the operations of banks and non-bank financial 
institutions. 95 The 1995 Commercial Banking Law legitimized the asset-liability ratio 
management requirements by providing that a commercial bank in its loan business should 
92 Actually, the PBOC is granted discretion by the Commercial Banking Law. The law requires that the PBOC 
in examining the application for the establishment of a commercial bank should take into account the need for 
economic growth and the competition of the banking industry. The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, 
art. 12. 
9J See Folkerts-Landau, David & Lindgren, Carl-Johan, supra note 90, at 11. 
90 These risks includes but not limited to: credit risk, country and transfer risk, market risk, interest rate risk, 
liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk, and reputation risk. 
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abide by the regulations on the asset-liability ratios as follows: " (1) the capital adequacy rate 
shall not fall short of 8%; (2) the ratio of the outstanding balance of loans to that of deposits 
shall not exceed 75%; (3) the ratio of liquid assets to liquid liabilities shall not fall short of 
25%; (4) the ratio of loans to one borrower to the capital of the bank shall not exceed 10%; 
and (5) other stipulations by the PBOC on asset and liability management. On December 12, 
1996, the PBOC issued Monitoring and Supervisory Indexes of Asset-Liability Ratio 
Management for Commercial Banks, 97 further specified the ratios set by the Commercial 
Banking Law and added new ratio management requirements to cover market risk and off- 
balance-sheet items. 
Prohibitions on connected lending: Provisions are contained in the Commercial 
Banking Law prohibiting commercial banks from extending unsecured loans to related 
persons or providing related persons with secured loans on conditions more favorable than 
those to a borrower of a similar loan. 98 
General Lending Rules: As for credit granting standards and credit monitoring 
process, the PBOC issued General Lending Rules in 1996.99 The General Lending Rules 
contain 12 chapters providing rules on lending procedures, supervision on NPLs, lending 
responsibility system, protection of loan claim rights, and management of loan clearing-off. 10° 
Limitations on Foreign Exchange Exposure: What have been developed in the most 
detail might be limitations on foreign exchange exposure. In China, limitations on banks' 
foreign exchange exposure existed long before the Asian financial crisis, with the State 
See the 1994 PBOC Circular on Asset-Liability Management, supra note 15. 
The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, art. 39. 
Monitoring and Supervisory Indexes of Asset-Liability Ratio Management for Commercial Banks [shangye 
yinhang zhichan fuzhai bill guanli jiankong, jianche zhibiao], issued by the PBOC on December 12,1996 and 
effective as of January 1,1997 (hereinafter referred to as "Monitoring and Supervisory Indexes of Asset- 
Liability Ratio Management"). 
96 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, art. 40. Related persons in this article refer to: (1) the members 
of the board of directors, members of the board of supervisors, managerial personnel and staff of the credit 
department of a commercial bank, and their close relatives; and (2) the company, enterprise or other economic 
organization wherein the aforesaid persons have made investment or assumed senior managerial positions. Id. 
" General Lending Rules [daikuan tongze], published by the PBOC on June 28,1996 and effective as of 
August 1,1996. 
10° The twelve chapters are: Chapter I (General Provisions), Chapter II (Categories of Loans), Chapter III 
(Terms of Loan and Interest Rates), Chapter IV (Borrower), Chapter V (Lender), Chapter VI (Loan 
Procedures), Chapter VII (Supervision on NPL), Chapter VIII (Loan Responsibility System), Chapter IX 
(Protection of Loan Claim Rights and Management of Loan Clearing-off), Chapter X (Special Regulations on 
Loan Management), Chapter XI (Penalties), and Chapter XII (Ancillary Provisions). 
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Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)1°' responsible for ensuring: (1) that all 
international commercial borrowing by domestic institutions is approved in advance, and (2) 
that borrowed amounts do not exceed certain multiples of borrowers' net assets and foreign 
exchange earnings. Limitations on banks foreign exchange exposure in China were enhanced 
in the wake of the Asian financial crisis by the adoption of new regulations. 
According to these new regulations, the total value of guarantees overseas, guarantees 
of foreign exchange debts within China, and all foreign exchange-denominated debt of a 
bank or non-bank financial institution cannot exceed twenty times the value of its own 
foreign currency-denominated capital. '°2 
To measure more accurately and to discourage offshore borrowing by overseas 
subsidiaries or affiliates of Chinese firms and financial institutions, the regulations prohibit 
transferring for use in China proceeds from foreign currency-denominated bonds issued by 
foreign subsidiaries of Chinese financial institutions. 103 Advance approval is required for 
foreign currency commercial borrowing by overseas subsidiaries of Chinese financial 
institutions if the amount is US$50m or more, and these funds may not be transferred into 
China without the approval of the SAFE. "' Moreover, the new regulations require that 
foreign exchange deposits in Chinese banks by institutions and individuals outside China be 
"considered and managed as international commercial loans. "'os 
Internal Controls and Loan Classification: With regard to internal controls, the 
PBOC issued Guidelines for Enhancing Internal Controls of Financial Institutions on May 
16,1997.106 Respecting loan classification, the PBOC issued Guidelines for Loan 
101 The SAFE was established in 1980 as a department of the Bank of China by regulations issued by the State 
Council to regulate foreign exchange business. In 1983, the SAFE was placed under the jurisdiction of the 
PBOC. See Zheng, Henry R., China's Civil and Commercial Law, 87 & note 3 (1988). 
'0' Article 22, Detailed Rules of the SAFE for the Implementation of the Procedures for the Administration of 
Guarantees Overseas by Institutions in China, Jingrong Shibao, 2 (January 13,1998), translated in China 
Economic News, 8-10 (March 9,1998) and 6-9 (March 16,1998). 
103 Administrative Procedures for the Issuances of Foreign Currency Bonds by Institutions in China, Jingrong 
Shibao, 2 (December 16,1997), translated in China Economic News, 7-9 (February 9,1998), 7-9 (February 16, 
1998). 
104 Administrative Procedures for Borrowing International Commercial Loans by Institutions in China, arts. 30 
& 31. 
"' Id. art. 2. 
106 Guidelines of the PBOC for Enhancing Internal Controls of Financial Institutions [zhongguo renmin yinhang 
jiaqiang jinrong jiguo neibu kongzhi de zhidao yuanze], issued by the PBOC on May 16,1997 (hereinafter 
referred to as "the PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Financial Institution Internal Controls"). 
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Classification1°7 in 1998 to introduce a new loan classification and provisioning system in 
consistency with international standards and Basle Committee recommendation (see Annex 
XII). 
2. Methods of Ongoing Banking Supervision 
(i) General Introduction 
Ongoing banking supervision refers to the monitoring of the safety and soundness of a bank 
during its "healthy" life, by the oversight of banks' compliance with prudential regulations 
and requirements. "' Ongoing supervision is generally exercised by the public authorities 
through different measures and instruments including: reports, ratings, on-site examination, 
in-house surveillance, and consultations with high level management; complemented by 
reporting of independent external auditors. 1°9 It is recommend by the Basle Committee that 
banking supervisors have regular contact with bank management and a thorough 
understanding of the institution's operations; that banks be required to submit information on 
a periodic basis for review by the supervisors, and supervisors be able to discuss with banks 
all significant issues and areas of their business; and that banking supervisors have the ability 
to carry out consolidated supervision over banking organizations. 1° 
(ii) On-site Examination and Of site Surveillance in China 
With regards to methods of ongoing banking supervision. China has been making progress 
since the mid-1990s. 
a. From Solely Relying on On-site Examination towards the Combination of On-site 
Examination and Off-site Surveillance 
107 Guidelines for Loan Classification (for trial implementation) [daikuan fengxian fenglei zhidao yuanze 
(shixing)], the PBOC Document No. 151 (1998). The Guidelines are accompanied by an Implementing 
Explanation. 
108 See, e. g., Lastra, R. M., supra note 66, at 110-1. 
109 Id., at 111. 
1° The Basle Core Principles, supra note 71, principles 16,17,18,19 and 20. 
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For the last two decades, the PBOC in China mainly relied on on-site examination to collect 
information. The sole reliance on on-site examination satisfied the need when the focus of the 
PBOC was to ensure that banks (mostly State banks) operated in compliance with credit 
plans and other administrative provisions. "' When the regulatory and supervisory focus 
shifted to commercial bank's risk management capacity and asset quality, however, the 
PBOC could no longer manage the supervisory task by solely relying on on-site examination. 
First, the PBOC does not have sufficient resources to carry out on-site examination over 
thousands of financial institutions. Second, because on-site examination is mainly ex post 
examination, it becomes hard for the PBOC to establish early warning systems against 
financial risks. "' 
Under the authorization of the Central Banking Law and Commercial Banking 
Law, "' the PBOC started to establish an on-going supervision system incorporating both on- 
site examination and off-site surveillance in 1995. "° On April 5,1995, the PBOC issued 
Interim Provisions on Off-site Surveillance, 15 providing that off-site surveillance should 
focus on (1) the risk management capacity and asset quality of financial institution; and (2) 
whether financial institutions operate in compliance with laws and administrative 
regulations. "' The combination of on-site examination and off-site surveillance makes it 
possible for the PBOC to concentrate its resources on problem institutions. Off-site 
surveillance helps the PBOC identify those risky banks and problems with a specific bank so 
"' The 1994 Provisions on Financial Institution Administration [jinrong jigou guanli guiding], (promulgated by 
the PBOC on August 5,1994), for example, does not distinguish between on-site examinations and off-site 
surveillance. Under the Provisions, the PBOC and its branches have the power to conduct annual examination 
over financial institutions and conduct examination over financial institutions at any time (art. 45) to ensure that 
financial institutions: (1) have gone through all necessary application and approval procedures for 
establishment and alternation; (2) have presented to the PBOC true information and materials; (3) have 
adequate and true registered capital; (4) operate within their authorized business scopes; (5) have gone through 
all necessary procedures to change their legal representatives and other senior management personnel; (6) have 
conducted their businesses in compliance with laws and regulations; (7) have good financial condition; and (8) 
have operational sites and security facilities satisfying relevant requirements (art. 47). 
"= See, e. g., Liu, Zhangjun & Liu, Xiaoyong, 'Enhance Risk-prevention, Promote the Off-site Surveillance 
System in China (jiagiang fengxian fang fang, jiji tuijing woguo yinhangye fexianchang jianguan tixi jianshe]' 
in Handbook of Off-site Surveillance for Commercial Banks [shangye ), inhang feixianchang jianguan gongzhuo 
shuoche] 1, at 4 (China Finance Press, 1999). 
"' The Central Banking Law, supra note 2, arts. 32 & 33; the Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, arts. 61 
& 62. 
14 See, e. g., Liu, Zhangjun & Liu, Xiaoyong, supra note 112, at 1. 
"s Circular of the PBOC on Issuing Interim Provisions on Off-site Surveillance [zhongguo renmin yinhang 
guanyu yinfa feixianchang jihe jiandu zhanxing guiding de tongzhi], issued by the PBOC on April 5,1995. 
16 Interim Provisions on Off-site Surveillance, issued by the PBOC on April 5,1995, arts. 9,10. 
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that the PBOC can direct on-site examination against them. This allows the PBOC to carry 
out on-site examination more efficiently and effectively. "' 
b. Establishing Standards for On-site Examination and Off-site Surveillance 
Bank supervisors must be able to identify potential problems via on-going supervision, 
thereby providing detection and promoting corrective action before problems become more 
serious. To achieve this, a rating system must be established for bank supervisors to analyze 
the information collected via on-site examination and off-site surveillance and to determine 
the financial condition of a bank. The CAMEL system employed by the US supervisors1' is a 
good example of such a rating system. 
The PBOC has endeavored to establish its own rating system since it shifted its 
regulatory and supervisory focus to commercial bank's risk management capacity and asset 
quality. On December 12,1996, the PBOC issued Monitoring and Supervisory Indexes of 
Asset-Liability Ratio Management for Commercial Banks, "' providing a basis for the PBOC 
to collect and analyze information from commercial banks. '2° 
c. Establishing and Improving the Reporting System 
A reporting system is essential to the success of off-site surveillance. Banks worldwide are 
required to submit financial statements to their supervisors on a monthly, quarterly or annual 
basis. Though reports vary depending on the financial structure of each country and the size 
of the institution, they should generally include a report of condition (balance-sheets on a 
consolidated basis including subsidiaries), a report of income and dividends, a report of 
international operations and foreign exchange exposures, a report on past due loans and 
NPLs, a report on ownership of the reporting bank, and a report on off-balance sheet 
activities. "' 
See, e. g., Liu, Zhangjun & Liu, Xiaoyong, supra note 112, at 4-5. 
CAMEL was developed by the Federal Reserve System (FRS) and the Office of Currency Comptroller 
(OCC) to rate the financial performance of banks in the US. It is formally called the Uniform Financial 
Institutions Rating System and was originally developed in 1978-9. 
19 Monitoring and Supervisory Indexes of Asset-Liability Ratio Management, supra note 97. 
120 The indexes consist of 16 categories, including most of those required by the CAMEL system. 
'Z' See Lastra, R. M., supra note 66, at 111. 
146 
CHAPTER THREE- NON-PERFORMING LOAN PREVENTION 
The PBOC in China is authorized by the Central Banking Law to "demand financial 
institutions to submit balance sheets, statements of profits and loss, and other financial 
accounting reports and material in pursuance of regulations. "' 22 To consummate the reporting 
system, on March 6,1996, the PBOC issued a Circular on Collecting Financial Statements 
from Banks for Supervisory Purpose. ''-' Accordingly, banks should submit to the PBOC on a 
consolidated basis (1) a report of financial condition (attached with monthly accounting 
record, balance sheet, loss and profit report, etc. ); (2) a report on the asset-quality; and (3) a 
report on the asset-liability ratio management. A bank with both RMB and foreign currency 
business must make a report on local currency business, a report on foreign currency 
business, as well as a report on the consolidated basis. '` The Circular further provides for the 
frequency of reporting. "' On January 1,1997, the Monitoring and Supervisory Indexes of 
Asset-Liability Ratio Management for Commercial Banks 126 came into effect. Banks were 
required to report to the PBOC under the new indexing system. '27 On December 16,1997, the 
PBOC issued Forms of Off-site Surveillance Reports for Commercial Banks and Their 
Description128 to unify the reporting contents and their forms. 
The unification of the reporting contents and their forms created conditions for 
computerizing the collection of information and materials from commercial banks. Since the 
first quarter of 1998, the PBOC has started to receive electronic reports from commercial 
banks. 12" There are plans to computerize the whole process of off-site surveillance. "' 
d. Consolidating On-going Supervision 
'Z2 The Central Banking Law, supra note 2, art. 33. This is supplemented by the Commercial Banking Law, 
which provides that a commercial bank should periodically submit to the PBOC balance sheets, profit and loss 
statements, and other financial statements and information. The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, art. 
61 
'Z' Circular of the PBOC on Collecting Financial Statements from Banks for Supervisory Purpose [zhongguo 
renmin yinhang guanyu yinhangye jianguan baobiao shixing zhuangshou zhidu de tongzhi], issued by' the 
PBOC on March 6,1996. 
124 Id. art. 2. 
125 Id. art. 3. 
'26 Monitoring and Supervisory Indexes of Asset-Liability Ratio Management, supra note 97. 
127 See Liu, Zhangjun & Liu, Xiaoyong, supra note 112, at 11. 
"8 Circular of the PBOC on Issuing Forms of Off-site Surveillance Reports for Commercial Banks and Their 
Description [zhongguo renmin yinhang guanyu yinfa shangye yinhang feixianchang jianguan zhibiao baobiao 
tianbao shouming he shangye yinhang feixianchang jianguan baobiao baogaoshu de tongzhi], issued by the 
PBOC on December 16,1997 and effective as of January 1,1998. 
'Z9 See Liu, Zhangjun & Liu, Xiaoyong, supra note 112, at 11. 
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An essential element of banking supervision is the ability of the supervisors to supervise the 
consolidated banking organization. "' This includes the ability to review both banking and 
non-banking activities conducted by the banking organization, either directly or indirectly 
(through subsidiaries and affiliates), and activities conducted at both domestic and foreign 
offices. In all cases, the banking supervisors should be aware of the overall structure of the 
banking organization or group when applying their supervisory methods. 1' 
In 1994, the PBOC issued a set of new prudential ratios in pilot form to guide the 
operations of banks and non-bank financial institutions. "' These ratios were applicable to a 
bank as a whole, including its headquarters and branches, and its subsidiaries. "' In its 1996 
Monitoring and Supervisory Indexes of Asset-Liability Ratio Management for Commercial 
Banks, the PBOC requires banks to apply asset-liability ratio management requirements to 
their foreign currency operations, as well as overseas operations and/or off-balance sheet 
operations. 1' 
(iii) Problems with China's Ongoing Supervision and Recommended Solutions 
a. Developing Clear Rules for On-site Examination 
On-site examinations are a means by which supervisors obtain information in situs on the 
financial condition of an institution, and its compliance with the law. 16 On-site examination 
and/or use of external auditors are necessary because they provide supervisors with means of 
validating information reported by banks. "' 
'301d. 
"' The Basle Core Principles, supra note 71, principle 20. 
13' The Basle Committee recommended supervision on a consolidated basis in its paper 'Consolidated 
Supervision of Banks' International Activities". 
'" The 1994 PBOC Circular on Asset-Liability Management, supra note 15. 
134 Id. art. 5. 
'" Monitoring and Supervisory Indexes of Asset-Liability Ratio Management, supra note 97. 
16 See Lastra, R. M., supra note 66, at 115. 
On-site examinations provide the supervisor with a means of verifying or assessing a range of matters 
including: (1) the accuracy of reports received from the bank; (2) the overall operations and condition of the 
bank; (3) the adequacy of the bank's risk management systems and internal control procedures; (4) the quality 
of loan portfolio and adequacy of loan loss provisions and reserves; (5) the adequacy of accounting and 
management information systems; (6) issues identified in off-site or previous on-site supervisory processes; and 
(7) bank adherence to laws and regulations and the terms stipulated in the banking license. 
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The provisions concerning on-site examination are very rough in China. According to 
article 32 of the Central Banking Law, the PBOC may audit, check, and supervise at any time 
the deposits, credits, settlements, bad loans, and other business affairs of a financial 
institution; and to check and supervise the raising or lowering of interest rates on deposits or 
loans by financial institutions in violation of regulations. "' The PBOC personnel in charge of 
the examination and supervision is required to produce legitimate certificates at the time of 
conducting examination and supervision. "' 
The roughness of rules for on-site examination makes on-site examination in China 
purely ex post supervision and punishments. Instead of identifying problems and providing 
early warning signals, on-site examiners in China work mainly as "firemen". It is therefore 
important that the supervisory agency should establish clear internal guidelines on the 
frequency and scope of the examination. In addition, examination policies and procedures 
should be developed to ensure that the examination is carried out in a thorough and consistent 
manner with clear objectives. 
b. Making Full Use of Independent External Auditors"" 
The report of external auditor is an important complement to the supervisory devices. The 
participation of specialized firms can help achieve greater transparency in the conduct of the 
banking business. "' In some countries, such as the UK, a professional duty was imposed on 
the statutory auditors of firms in the regulated financial sector (banks, building societies, 
financial-service firms, insurance companies, and friendly societies) to report to the 
competent supervisory authorities any irregularities or matters raising material prudential 
"g See also the Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, art. 62. 
191d. art. 62. 
140 A distinction must be made here between the public auditing of State-owned financial institutions and 
independent external auditors. According to the Audit Law of the PRC, State audit institutions should exe? cise 
supervision through auditing over the assets, liabilities, profits and losses of the State-owned financial 
institutions (art. 19). Actually, the PBOC's banking supervision over State commercial banks is supplemented 
by the State Auditing Bureau, which helped identifying irregularities of State commercial banks. The 2000 
State Auditing Bureau's audit of the ICBC and the CCB, for example, found that these institutions' illegal 
operations have cost the national treasury more than RMB10bn in losses. See Chinaonline, 'Auditor: ICBC, 
CBC's Illegal Operations Cost China US$1.2b' (July 11,2000), available at 
'http. //www. ch inaonline. com/topstories/000711 /1 /000070612. asp '. 
The State Auditing Bureau, however, because of its limited resources, cannot play a regular of rule of 
external audits, although the Commercial Banking Law does subject commercial banks to the audit control by 
the auditing authorities. The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, art. 63. 
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concerns of which they have become aware. '42 A similar obligation has been imposed at the 
European level with the final adoption of the Directive on the Reinforcement of Prudential 
Supervision (the so-called 'Post-BCCI' Directive). "' 
Ideally, the PBOC should mainly rely on its own resources to carry out on-going 
supervision. In this way the PBOC can identify problematic institutions and problems with a 
specific bank quickly and directly so that the problem can be solved in a timely manner. On- 
going supervision, especially on-site examination, however, requires a large number of 
experienced bank examiners, while training a bank examiner is costly and time-consuming. 14' 
It is therefore necessary for the PBOC to rely at least partially on independent external 
auditors. 1' 
The external audit for banks started in 1994 with foreign-invested banks in China. ̀ 
According to Provisions Concerning External Audit of Foreign-Invested Financial 
Institutions, "' a foreign-invested financial institution (FIFI) should retain external auditors 
approved by the local PBOC branch to audit its annual financial reports. "' The retained 
auditors should audit and make recommendations on the FIFI's (1) assets, liabilities, profits 
and losses, and asset quality; (2) financial statements that the FIFI is to submit to the PBOC; 
(3) internal controls; (4) computer system; and (5) asset-liability ratio management 
situation. 14' External auditors should produce a report after the auditing of a FIFI, pointing 
14' See Lastra, R. M., supra note 66, at 120. 
142 UK: Accountants (Banking Act 1987) Regulations 1994, SI 1994/524; Building Societies (Auditors) Order 
1994, SI 1994/525; Auditors (Financial Services Act 1986) Rules 1994, SI 1994/526; Auditors (Insurance 
Companies Act 1982) Regulations 1994, SI 1994/449; Friendly Societies (Auditors) Order 1994, SI 1994/132. 
14' European Parliament and Council Directive 95/26/EC of 29 June 1995, OJ 1995 L168/7,18 July 1995, art. 
5. 
104 It takes four to five years for an examiner just to learn the skills necessary to examine small, well-managed 
institutions. Also, recruitment of bank supervisory staff is in competition with the private sector where the 
compensation is greater. See, e. g., Polizatto, V. P., 'Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision' in Vittas, 
Dimitri (ed. ), Financial Regulation: Changing the Rules of the Game, 310 (1992). 
149 See, e. g., Fan, Qixing, Wu, Yuyun & Yang Lixin, `Necessity to Improve External Auditing of Commercial 
Banks [shangye yinhang waibu shenji jidai wanshan]', China Finance No. 4,42 (April 2000). 
146 Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Foreign-invested Financial 
Institutions [zhonghua renmin gonghe guo waizi jinrong jigou guanli tiaoli], issued by the State Council on 
February 25,1994 and effective as of April 1,1994. The Regulations requires a foreign-invested financial 
institution to retain PRC CPAs approved by the local PBOC branches. Id. art. 34. 
147 Provisions Concerning External Audit of Foreign-Invested Financial Institutions [weituo zhuche kuijishi dui 
waizi jinrong jigou jingxing shenji de guiding], issued by the State Council as an appendix to Regulations of the 
People's Republic of China on the Administration of Foreign-invested Financial Institutions. 
148 Id. arts. I&2. 
149 Id. art. 2. 
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out problems with the audited institution. 15' FIFIs are required to submit the external 
auditors' report to the local PBOC branch in 3 months after each financial year. Local PBOC 
branches may require external auditors to make explanation about certain problems identified 
in the report; and, if necessary, demand audits of specific issues. "' 
In 1999, the PBOC issued Guidelines on External Audit for Foreign-Invested 
Banks. 15' The Guidelines are similar to the Provisions Concerning External Audit of Foreign- 
Invested Financial Institutions, except that accountants are now required to audit a foreign- 
invested bank in accordance with newly issued prudential regulations"' such as Guidelines 
for Loan Classification (1998 No. 151), Monitoring and Supervisory Indexes of Asset- 
Liability Ratio Management for Commercial Banks, "' Guidelines of the PBOC for 
Enhancing Internal Controls of Financial Institutions, '' and the Basle Committee Framework 
for Internal Control systems in Banking Organizations. "' The Guidelines on External Audit 
for Foreign-Invested Banks actually make reporting from independent external auditors part 
of the PBOC's on-going supervision on foreign-invested banks in China. 
External audit on State commercial banks, joint stock commercial banks, and city 
commercial banks, however, has not developed fully in China, "' despite the provisions of the 
Commercial Banking Law that a commercial bank should announce its business performance 
and audited statement of the previous fiscal year1S8 within three months after the end of every 
fiscal year. 15' On March 15,1996, the PBOC recommended more than 70 accounting firms to 
commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions. '60 Accordingly, financial institutions 
iso Id. art. 3. 
Id. art. 4. 
'sZ Guidelines on External Audit for Foreign-Invested Banks [waizi yinhang waibu shenji zhidao yijian], issued 
by the PBOC in May 1999. 
"' Id. art. 5. 
Aso Monitoring and Supervisory Indexes of Asset-Liability Ratio Management For Commercial Banks [shangye 
yinhang zhichan fuzhai bili guanli jiankong, jianche zhibiao], issued by the PBOC on December 12,1996 and 
effective as of January 1,1997. , iss The PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Financial Institution Internal Controls, supra note 106. 
Basle Committee, Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organizations (September 1998), 
available at 'http: //www. bis. org/publ/bcbs40. htm' (hereinafter referred to as "the Basle Framework on Internal 
Controls"). 
's' See, e. g., Fan, Qixing, Wu, Yuyun & Yang Lixin, supra note 145, at 42. 
isa The fiscal year of a commercial bank begins on the first of January and ends on the thirty-first of December 
of the Gregorian Calendar. The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, art. 58. 
's91d. art. 56. 
'bo Circular of the PBOC on Issues Concerning Recommended Accounting Firms [zhongguo renmin yinhang 
guanyu tongyi tuijian kuiji (shenji) shi shiwushuo youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued by the PBOC on March 
15,1996. 
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may retain one of these recommended accounting firms to verify their registered capital and 
total capital, to examine the qualification of investors, and to audit their annual financial 
reports. The PBOC examines and approves the establishment and alternation of a financial 
institution on the basis of reports by these accounting firms. These reports are also a basis for 
the PBOC's supervision over financial insitutions. " 
The PBOC, however, has not adopted any administrative measures or guidelines on 
the external audit of financial institutions other than FIFIs. So far, very few city commercial 
banks or joint stock commercial banks retain accounting firms to conduct external audit. 162 
To promote external auditing of domestic banks, it is necessary that the PBOC formulate 
administrative measures and guidelines on the external audit of domestic commercial banks. 
Besides, special training programs should be run so that accountants can have sufficient 
knowledge to audit commercial banks, to discover problems, and to report to the PBOC. 16J A 
mechanism should be put in place to facilitate discussions between the PBOC and external 
auditors. In many instances, these discussions should also include bankers. " 
It is worthwhile to point out here, however, that external auditors cannot replace 
supervisors: They have different responsibilities and are accountable to different groups. "" In 
all cases, the supervisory agency should have the legal authority and means to conduct 
independent checks of banks based on identified concerns. 
c. Developing Consultations between the PBOC and Bank Senior Management 
Consultations with the bank senior management are a friendly form of supervision, in 
contrast to the most intrusive way of monitoring banks by on-site examination. As such, it is 
preferred in countries where the supervisory system is based on trust, in the UK for 
instance. "' Consultations with senior management are time and cost saving compared to on- 
site examinations, because it is possible that banking supervisors consult with senior 
16' Id. art. 1. 
162 See, e. g., Fan, Qixing, Wu, Yuyun & Yang Lixin, supra note 145. 
'63 Id. 
'" The Basic Committee has reviewed the relationship between bank supervisors and external auditors and has 
developed best practices with regard to their interaction with external auditors. See "The Relationship between 
Bank Supervisors and External Auditors' - Volume III of the Compendium. 
'65 See Lastra, R. M., supra note 66, at 120. While supervisors work for the government, auditors work for the 
institutions that they audit and have an interest "in keeping things going" to earn their fees. Id. 
'" ld., at 118. 
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management of several banks at once. The author believes that consultations can be 
developed between the headquarters of the PBOC and headquarters of commercial banks, and 
between the local PBOC branches and commercial bank branches. Bank supervisors should 
be able to identify some problems and try to find out solutions to these problems via 
consultations with bank senior management. 
d. Developing a Rating System Similar to the CAMEL System so as to Establish Early 
Warning Systems 
The purpose of on-going supervision is to monitor the safety and soundness of a bank during 
its "healthy" life. This purpose cannot be achieved without an efficient early warning system 
(EWS) based on an effective rating system. An EWS can be designed for a whole financial 
system or for individual banks. The EWS of a financial crisis is economic variables, financial 
ratios and accounting measures that predict a bank panic or a financial crisis. A bank specific 
EWS is conducted by examining the business and performance of each individual bank. As 
mentioned before, China has developed standards for on-going banking supervision. These 
standards, however, are by no means as advanced as the CAMEL system in the US. 
The CAMEL system comprises two principal elements. First, an assessment is made 
of five critical aspects of a bank's financial condition: Capital adequacy, Asset Quality, 
Management, Earnings, and Liquidity (thus, the acronym CAMEL), which are rated on a 
scale of 1 through 5, with 1 being the most favorable. The second element combines the five 
factor ratings into a composite rating. 16' Composite rating I indicates a sound institution. 
Composite rating 2 indicates a fundamentally sound institution with modest weaknesses that 
can be corrected in the normal course of business. Composite rating 3 indicates a 
combination of weaknesses ranging from moderately severe to unsatisfactory. Composite 
rating 4 indicates an immoderate volume of asset weaknesses, or a less than satisfactory 
combination of other conditions. Composite rating 5 indicates that corrective action and 
constant supervisory attention are necessary. 168The CAMEL is considered an international 
guideline for bank supervision and has been adopted by banking supervisors worldwide. In 
167 Id., at 113-114. 
168 Id., at 114 & note 194. 
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Canada, for example, it has been developed into CAMELOT by adding the quality of 
Operations and Treasury management into CAMEL. 
'69 
It is necessary that a similar rating system be developed in China so that the PBOC 
can determine the soundness of individual banks by analyzing the collected information and 
rectifying the problems in the bank promptly. It might be unrealistic for the PBOC to develop 
a rating system as advanced as the CAMEL right away. The PBOC, however, can at least set 
minimum requirements and carry regulatory actions against these banks that cannot reach the 
minimum requirements. 
C. SANCTIONING: FORMAL POWERS OF SUPERVISORS 
Despite the efforts of supervisors, situations can occur where banks fail to meet supervisory 
requirements or where their solvency comes into question. In order to protect depositors and 
creditors, and to prevent more widespread contagion of such problems, supervisors must be 
able to conduct appropriate intervention. For this purpose, banking supervisors must have at 
their disposal adequate supervisory measures to bring about timely corrective action and to 
enable a graduated response by supervisors depending on the nature of the problems 
detected. 170 
1. China Has Developed a Set of Supervisory Measures to Bring about Prompt Corrective 
Action (PCA) 
China has developed an array of weapons to enforce banking laws and punish violations once 
detected. These mechanisms include "cease-and-desist" orders, civil penalties, administrative 
penalties, criminal penalties and others, with the revocation of a bank's license as the 
ultimate sanction. 
Under article 74 of the Commercial Banking Law, for example, when a commercial 
bank extends unsecured loans to related persons or extends loans against a collateral on more 
favorable conditions than to other borrowers of similar loans, the PBOC may order the 
169 This CAMELOT was developed by the Canadian Office of Superintendent of Financial Institutions. See 
Andrew, Sheng, ̀ Resolution and Reform: Supervisory Remedies for Problem Banks' in Andrew, Sheng (ed. ), 
Bank Restructuring: Lessons from the 1980s, 51 (1996). 
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commercial bank to make corrections (cease-and-desist), confiscate the illegitimate gains if 
there is any, and mete out a fine ranging from one to five times the amount of the illegitimate 
gains; or, if there is no illegitimate gains, mete out a fine ranging from RMB100000 to 
500000 (administrative penalties); if the case is particularly serious or the offender fails to 
make correction within the specified time, the PBOC may order it to suspend business and 
make rectification and consolidation, or revoke its banking permit. "' If the case constitutes a 
crime, the commercial banks and the responsible persons will be investigated for criminal 
responsibilities according to article 186 of China's Criminal Law"' (criminal penalties). 
According to art. 73 of the Commercial Banking Law, a commercial bank that delays 
or refuses repayment of the principal and interests of a deposit with no proper reason should 
assume the responsibility of paying interests accrued and other civil responsibilities of 
compensation for damages to the property of depositors (civil liabilities). 
On February 22,1999, the State Council adopted Regulations Concerning the 
Punishment of Irregular Financial Activities, "' consummating the supervisory measures to 
bring about PCAs. 
2. Problems with China's PCAs and Improvement Recommendations 
Unlike PCAs in developed countries, such as that in the US, where a gradation of sanctions 
linking the supervisory intensity with rating are designed to provide incentives for financial 
institutions to correct their operations in times of deteriorating ratings, in order to achieve 
business performance that accords to the safety and soundness standards of each banking 
regulators (see Annex XIII), sanctions in China are mainly designed to ensure that 
commercial banks operate in compliance with laws and administrative regulations. Looking 
through Chapter 8 of the Commercial Banking Law"' and the Regulations Concerning the 
Punishment of Irregular Financial Activities, only art. 75 of the Commercial Banking Law 
and art. 21 of the Regulations Concerning the Punishment of Irregular Financial Activities 
The Basle Core Principles, supra note 71, principle 22. 
The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, art. 74. 
"Z The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China [zhonghua renming gongheguo xingfa), adopted at the 
Second Session of the 5" NPC on July 1,1979, revised at the 5` Session of the 8' NPC on March 14,1997. 
"' Regulations Concerning the Punishment of Irregular Financial Activities, issued by the State Council on 
February 22,1999. 
10 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, arts. 73-86 (Chapter 8: Legal Liabilities). 
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provide for sanctions against commercial banks' breach of asset-liability ratio management 
requirements. 15 The sanctions, from the author's point view, are mainly ex post punishment 
rather than incentives for banks to correct their operations. 
It is therefore necessary for China to redesign its sanctions and PCAs. A system 
similar to that of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 1991 should 
be developed in China, under which, the PBOC should have the authority not only to restrict 
the current activities of the bank but also to withhold approval for new activities or 
acquisitions. It should also have the authority to restrict or suspend dividends or other 
payment to shareholders, as well as to restrict asset transfers and a bank's purchase of its own 
shares. The PBOC should have effective means to address management problems, including 
the power to have controlling owners, directors, and managers replaced or their power 
restricted, and where appropriate, to bar individuals from the business of banking. 
IV. PROMOTING INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS WITHIN COMMERCIAL BANKS 
A. THE BASLE COMMITTEE FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
IN BANKING ORGANIZATION 
Internal controls are systems established to provide reasonable assurance of effective and 
efficient operations, reliable financial information and reporting, and compliance with laws 
and regulations. "' A bank's internal controls can ensure the capital adequacy and minimize 
the market, transfer, and credit risks, and, by extension, secure the health of a banking 
system. 
"' Id. art. 75, which provides that when a commercial bank fails to abide by the stipulation on capital adequacy, 
the ratio between deposit and credit, the liquidity ratio, large exposure limitation, and other rules regarding 
asset-liability ratio management stipulated by the PBOC, the PBOC may order the commercial bank to make 
corrections, confiscate the illegitimate gains if there is any, and mete out a fine ranging from one to three times 
the amount of the illegitimate gain; or, if there is no illegitimate gains, mete out a fine ranging from RMB50000 
to 300000. See also Regulations Concerning the Punishment of Irregular Financial Activities, supra note 173, 
art. 21. 
176 See, e. g., Kinsella, Ray (ed. ), Internal Controls in Banking, 1 (1995). 
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The importance of internal controls has been widely recognized, especially after the 
textbook case of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) collapse. "' William 
J. McDonough, Chairman of the Basle Committee and President of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, stated that "the Basle committee has been focusing on ways of strengthening 
internal controls at banks in recognition of the fact that internal control deficiencies continue 
to be a source of major problems and significant losses for banks globally. """ 
The Basle Committee devotes two of its 25 Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision to bank internal controls. Principle 14 requires that banks have in place internal 
controls that are adequate for the nature and scale of their business. Principle 15 requires that 
banks have adequate policies, practices and procedures in place, including strict "know-your- 
customer" rules, that promote high ethical and professional standards in the financial sector 
and prevent banks from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, by criminal elements. 
In September 1998, the Basle Committee issued a Framework for Internal Control 
Systems in Banking Organization 11(hereinafter referred to as Internal Control Paper). In the 
Internal Control Paper, the Basle Committee establishes thirteen principles around five 
internal control elements for bank supervisors to apply in assessing the effectiveness of 
banks' internal control systems, and for banks to develop their internal control processes and 
procedures. The five internal control elements identified by the Basle Committee are: (1) 
management oversight and control culture; (2) risk recognition and assessment; (3) control 
activities and segregation of duties; (4) information and communication; and (5) monitoring 
activities and correcting deficiencies. 1 0 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANK INTERNAL CONTROLS IN CHINA 
"' It is concluded that the BCCI collapse shows how, in the absence of effective internal controls and 
compliance "culture", fraud and dissimulation will inevitably flourish. See. e. g., Mogg, John F., 'Internal 
Controls: The EC Response to BCCI', in Kinsella, Ray (ed. ), Internal Controls in Banking (1995). 
1' Basle Committee, The Basle Committee Issues a Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking 
Organization, Press Release (September 22,1998), available at 'http: //www. bis. org/press/p980922a. htm. 
The Basle Framework for Internal Controls, supra note 156. 
160 The Internal Control Paper reacts to supervisory lessons learned from internal control failures that jeopardize 
the safety and soundness of global banking system. The Basle Committee groups the types of control 
breakdowns typically seen in problem bank cases into five categories and therefore identified five internal 
control elements. 
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1. Bank Internal Controls before the Issuance of the PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Internal 
Controls of Financial Institutions 
Chinese banks started to develop their internal controls only recently. Commercial banks in 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone initiated the trial of asset-liability ratio management at the 
end of the 1980s. In the early 1990s, the CCB implemented the separation between the 
approval and the issuance of loans; the Merchant Bank carried out credit responsibility 
system's' and credit authorization system; 182 and the ICBC issued "Ten Prohibited Activities 
in Banking Operation and Management". ` 
The Commercial Banking Law sets rules for bank internal controls by providing that 
a commercial bank should exercise self-regulating mechanism on the principle of economic 
efficiency, safety, and liquidity. "' The Law provides that the Company Law of the PRC is 
applicable to the form and structure of the organization of a commercial bank. '" Besides, 
commercial banks are required to formulate business rules, and to establish and improve their 
business management, the system of cash control, and their security system in accordance 
with the stipulations of the PBOC. 186 They are also required to establish and improve the 
systems of examining and checking deposits, loans, settlements, bad and doubtful accounts, 
and other business activities; '. ' and to conduct regular examination and checks on their 
branches. ' 68 
In spite of these efforts, the internal controls developed by commercial banks in China 
during that stage were very rough and manifested a lot of deficiencies. First, the internal 
auditing system within a commercial bank was not independent and did not have sufficient 
authorities and resources to carry out efficient, effective internal examinations and checks. 
Second, there was no clear division of responsibilities among different departments within a 
bank. Third, there was no efficient and effective accounting control. Fourth, the personnel 
1e' Under the credit responsibility system, those who approve or issue the loans should take personal 
responsibilities to the repayment of the loans. 
'82 Under the credit authorization system, the headquarters of the bank set credit ceilings for its branches and 
clients. 
1.. The discussion in this paragraph draw heavily from Kang, Shusheng, Commercial Banks' Internal Controls: 
Borrowing and Innovation, 52 (1999). 
186 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, art. 4. 
ies Id. art. 17. 
'861d art. 59. 
Id. art. 60. 
188 Id. art. 60. 
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management system could not satisfy the need of risk-control. There was no training system 
for bank staff. Fifth, there were no effective internal controls for newly emerged activities 
such as off-balance-sheet operations. 189 
2. The 1997 PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Internal Controls of Financial Institutions: in 
Comparison with the Basle Committee Internal Control Paper 
To enhance internal controls in Chinese financial institutions, the PBOC issued Guidelines 
for Enhancing Internal Controls of Financial Institutions19' in 1997. The Guidelines contain 
32 articles in six chapters, governing internal controls of commercial banks and non-bank 
financial institutions. "' 
(i) Definition and Objectives of Internal Controls 
The Guidelines define internal controls as a self-regulating mechanism for a financial 
institution, which consists of measures, methods, and procedures to ensure the 
accomplishment of established targets, to avoid and mitigate financial risks, and to provide 
efficient controls on internal departments and staff against the risks involved in the 
performance of their duties. "' The Guidelines set three objectives for internal controls of 
financial institutions: to ensure the implementation of laws, administrative regulations, and 
the PBOC rules, "' to ensure efficient controls of risks involved in an institution's business, 
and to ensure the full accomplishment of development policies and strategies of an 
institution. "' 
The definition and objectives provided by the PBOC Guidelines are similar to that of 
the Basle Committee Internal Control Paper. According to the Basle Committee, internal 
control is a process effected by the board of directors, senior management and all levels of 
personnel. It is not solely a procedure or policy that is performed at a certain point of time, 
189 See generally Kang, Shusheng, supra note 183, at 52-3. 
190 The PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Financial Institution Internal Controls, supra note 106. 
19' Id. art. 4. 
Id. art. 2. 
19' This objective is provided as one of the principles for internal controls, i. e., principle of compliance - 
financial institutions must ensure that its internal control systems comply with applicable laws and regulations. 
Id. art. 7. 
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but rather it is continually operating at all levels within the bank. 195 Both the PBOC and the 
Basle Committee emphasize that internal controls are on-going process and each individual 
within an organization must participate in the process. 
The Basle Committee categorizes the main objectives of the internal control process 
into performance objectives (the internal control process seeks to ensure that personnel 
throughout the organization are working to achieve its goals with efficiency and integrity, 
without unintended or excessive cost or placing other interests before those of banks), 
information objectives (the internal control process seeks to ensure that reports needed for 
decision-making within the banking organization are prepared timely and reliably), and 
compliance objectives (the internal control process seeks to ensure that all banking business 
complies with applicable laws and regulations, supervisory requirements, and the 
organization's policies and procedures). 196 
The Basle Committee compliance objectives are exactly the same as the first 
objective set in the PBOC Guidelines. The performance objectives set by the Basle 
Committee are actually set by the PBOC as the third objective - to ensure the full 
accomplishment of development policies and strategies of the institution. The third category 
of objectives set by the Basle Committee - reliability, completeness and timeliness of 
financial and management information (information objectives) are not set by the PBOC 
Guidelines as objectives for internal controls. The PBOC Guidelines, however, do require the 
reliability, completeness and timeliness of financial and management information. "' 
(ii) Primary Elements of Internal Controls 
a. Management Oversight and the Control Culture 
Management Oversight The effectiveness of management oversight depends on the 
organizational structure of a bank. In China, the form and organizational structure of a 
commercial bank apply the Company Law of the PRC. 198 The Company Law199 provides two 
14 Id. art. 6. 
The Basle Framework for Internal Controls, supra note 156, at 8. 
19b Id., at 8-9. 
197 The PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Financial Institution Internal Controls, supra note 106, art. 19. 
198 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, art. 17. 
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forms of companies bearing different organizational structures: limited liability companies200 
and joint stock companies. 20' Accordingly, a company should have a shareholders' meeting 202 
(shareholders' general meeting for a joint stock company °3) as the organ of the authority of 
the company, a board of directors as the executive organ of the company, 201 and the 
management (manager, deputy managers) in charge of the day-to-day management of the 
company. 205 A joint stock company or a limited liability company with comparatively large 
size is required to have a supervisory board of not less than three members206 to examine the 
company's financial affairs, and to supervise the directors and the manager to see whether 
they violate laws, regulations or the company's articles of association during their 
performance of company duties; and when an act of a director or the manager is harmful to 
the company's interests, to require him to correct such act. 207 A limited liability company 
with comparatively small size may have one to two supervisors. 20' The Company Law 
contains provisions on the duties and responsibilities of the company organs and their 
decision-making procedures. 209 
The organizational structure provided by the Company Law is consistent with the 
requirements of the PBOC Guidelines that the organizational structure of a financial 
institution should be established to keep a balance among the decision-making system, the 
'" The Company Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the 5' Session of the Standing Committee 
of the 8' NPC on December 29,1993 and effective as of July 1,1994, as revised at the 13'h Session of the 9'" 
NPC Standing Committee on December 25,1999 (hereinafter referred to as "the Company Law"). 
200 A limited liability company is a company whose shareholders are liable toward the company to the extent of 
their respective capital contributions, and the company is liable for its debts to the extent of all its assets. Id, art. 
3, paragraph 2. 
201 In a joint stock company, or a company limited by shares, all of the company's capital is divided into equal 
shares, shareholders are liable toward the company to the extent of their respective shareholdings, and the 
company is liable for its debts to the extend of all its assets. Id. art. 3, paragraph 3. 
202 Id. art. 37. 
203 Id. arts. 102 & 103. 
204 Id. arts. 45-46 (limited liability company); art. 112 (joint stock company). The board of directors should 
decide on the business plans and investment plans of the company, formulate the proposed annual financial 
budgets and final accounts, profit distribution plans and plans for making up losses of the company, plans for 
the increase or reduction of the registered capital of the company, and should decide on the establishment of the 
company's internal management organization. Id., arts. 46,112. 
20 Id. art. 50 (limited liability company); art. 119 (joint stock company). The manager of a company should 
carry out the directions of the board of directors, draft plan for establishing the company's internal management 
organization and the company's basic management system, and should formulate the specific rules and 
regulations of the company. Id. art. 50 & 119. 
206 Id. art. 124 (joint stock company); art. 54 (limited liability company). 
207 Id. arts. 126 & 54. The supervisory board of a joint stock company can also propose the holding of 
extraordinary shareholders' general meetings; and exercise other functions and powers provided for in the 
company's articles of association. Id. 
208 Id. art. 52. 
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executive system, and the supervisory system. 210 It also satisfies the requirements on 
management oversight of the Basle Committee Internal Control Paper . 
Z" 
Control Culture is emphasized in the Basle Committee Internal Control Paper. A 
strong control culture requires that all personnel at a banking organization understand their 
role in the internal control process and be fully engaged in the process. The board of directors 
and senior management therefore should be responsible for promoting high ethical and 
integrity standards, and for establishing a culture within the organization that emphasizes and 
demonstrates to all levels of personnel the importance of internal controls. 212 
The importance of a strong control culture has also been recognized in China . 
2" The 
PBOC Guidelines require that a financial institution should carry out training and 
examination of its staff to ensure that all personnel at the institution understand their role in 
the internal control process. 214 
b. Risk Recognition and Assessment 
The Basle Committee emphasizes the importance of internal risk-management system in its 
Internal Control Paper. Principle 4 of the Internal Control Paper requires that the material 
risks that could adversely affect the achievement of the bank's goals are being recognized 
and continuously assessed. This assessment should cover all risks facing the bank and the 
consolidated banking organization. And, if necessary, internal controls should be revised to 
appropriately address any new or previously uncontrolled risks. "' 
The PBOC Guidelines underscore the risk-management-system as well. Risk-controls 
are set as one of the objectives for internal controls. "' Financial institutions are required to 
follow the principle of prudence and timeliness, adjusting internal controls to address new or 
previously uncontrolled risks in a timely manner. 2' Banks are required to assess all risks 
involved in their operations (local currency/ foreign currency operations, on-balance-sheet/ 
209 Id. arts. 38- 44,46,49,50, and 102-119. 
210 The PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Financial Institution Internal Controls, supra note 106, art. 9. 
21 The Basle Framework for Internal Controls, supra note 156, principles I&2. 
212 Id. principle 3. 
21 See, e. g., Kang, Shusheng, supra note 183, at 60-1. 
21 The PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Financial Institution Internal Controls, supra note 106, art. 27. 
215 The Basle Framework for Internal Controls, supra note 156, principle 4. 
216 The PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Financial Institution Internal Controls, supra note 106, art. 6. 
21 Id. art. 7. 
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off-balance-sheet operations) on a consolidated basis, 218 especially risks arising out of their 
lending business. 219 
To control credit risks efficiently, commercial banks are required to issue loans in 
compliance with laws, administrative regulations, and the PBOC rules. Banks must follow 
the principles of safety, liquidity, and profitability in their lending businesses. Credit risk 
management systems should be established to recognize and assess credit risks during the 
whole life of a loan. 220 An early warning system should be established by monitoring 
borrowers' creditworthiness constantly. 22' 
c. Control Activities and Segregation of Duties 
Control Activities should be an integral part of the daily activities of a bank. According to the 
Basle Committee Internal Control Paper, an effective internal control system requires that an 
appropriate control structure be set up, with control activities defined at every business level. 
These should include: top level reviews; appropriate activity controls for different 
departments or divisions; physical control; checking for compliance with exposure limits and 
follow-up on non-compliance; a system of approval and authorization; and, a system of 
verification and reconciliation. "' 
Similar requirements can be found in China's Commercial Banking Law and the 
PBOC Guidelines. Accordingly, a financial institution should set up an appropriate control 
structure, and should establish and improve various systems of approval and authorization 
according to its operations. "' 
The Commercial Banking Law introduced the concept of "unitary legal entity" and 
"unitary administration" by providing that a commercial bank should apply to its branches a 
financial system of unified accounting and centralized fund allocation and level-by-level 
management. Accordingly, branches of a commercial bank should not be qualified as body 
"' Id. art. 10. 
Z'9 Id. art. 11. 
Z2° For detailed of credit risk management systems, see Circular on Issues Concerning Loan Management 
[guanyu jinyibu jiagiang daikuan guanli youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued by the PBOC January 12,1998. 
22' The PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Financial Institution Internal Controls, supra note 106, art. 11. 
222 The Basle Framework for Internal Controls, supra note 156, principle 5. 
2" The PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Financial Institution Internal Controls, supra note 106, art. 14. 
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corporate and should do business within the scope authorized by the bank headquarters. " 
Following this theme, the PBOC issued Interim Management Measures of the Scope of 
Authority of Commercial Bank Functional Departments and Branches in 1996,225 requiring 
the headquarters of each commercial bank (including urban and rural cooperative bank) to 
clarify the powers and authorities of its functional departments and branches, with ceilings 
set respectively on a branch's lending, discounting, acceptance, and guarantee operations. On 
January 20,1999, the PBOC issued Interim Guidelines for Commercial Banks Setting 
Uniform Exposure Limits, 226 requiring commercial banks to set a consolidated exposure limit 
for each client as a body corporate, and to review periodically consolidated exposures of the 
headquarters and branches to a single client to ensure that the consolidated exposure limit is 
complied with. 227 
The PBOC Guidelines provide that authorizations from the headquarters of a 
commercial bank to its branches or functional departments or divisions should be in written 
form and should be reviewed periodically. 228 Each branch, department or division should 
perform its duties according to its authorization. 229 Special approval and authorization is 
required for transactions beyond the authorization. 230 
Segregation of duties, or the "four eyes" principle is established by the Basle 
Committee Internal Control Paper, which requires that there is appropriate segregation of 
duties and that personnel are not assigned conflicting responsibilities. Areas of potential 
conflicts of interest should be identified, minimized, and subject to careful and independent 
monitoring. "' 
The Commercial Banking Law and the PBOC Guidelines require segregation of 
duties as well. With regards to lending operations, the Commercial Banking Law requires 
that commercial banks implement the system in which the examination and the actual 
22° The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, art. 22. 
2Z' Interim Management Measures of the Scope of Authority of Commercial Bank Functional Departments and 
Branches [shangye yinhang shouquan, shouxin guanli zhanxing banfa], issued by the PBOC on November 11, 
1996. 
226 Interim Guidelines for Commercial Banks Setting Uniform Exposure Limits (shangye yinhang shishi tongyi 
shouxin zhidu zhiying (shixing)), issued by the PBOC on January 20,1999 and effective as of the same day. 
12' For a comments on the uniform exposure limits system, see, e. g., Yuan, Guanhua, 'Uniform Credit 
Authorizing System: the Check of Credit Risk [tongyi shouxin zhidu: xindaifengxian de kongzhiqi]', China 
Finance No. 9,28 (1999). 




CHAPTER THREE NON-PERFOR, tIING LOAN PREVENTION 
extending of a loan are conducted by separate departments and the examination and approval 
of a loan are conducted at different levels. "' 
The PBOC Guidelines require segregation of duties between (1) the custodian and the 
book-keeping of cash and securities; (2) the custodian and the use of important blank 
certificates; (3) the approval and the actual disbursement of funds; (4) the approval and the 
issuance of credits; and (5) loss verification and writing-off; etc. "" Cross-checking, double 
controls of assets and double signatures are also required by the PBOC Guidelines. ''" The 
Guidelines also provide for periodic reviews of the performance of key personnel of an 
institution. 235 
d. Information and Communication 
Adequate information and effective communication are essential to the proper functioning of 
internal control systems. Under the Basle Committee Internal Control Paper, banks should 
develop internal control systems that cover internal and external information variables 
relevant to the management's sound decision-making, e. g., financial, operational, and 
compliance data. Banks should also develop internal controls with reporting lines that 
promote the flow of information throughout the bank and that cover information systems and 
technologies such as in-house back-up and recovery procedures, software development and 
acquisition policies, and physical/logical access security controls. "' 
Information and communication is the weakest link of bank internal controls in 
China, despite the general requirements respecting the information and communication in 
banks. The PBOC Guidelines require that financial institutions should establish 
comprehensive information systems to keep record of every business activity, and to 
safeguard all original materials and documents. " ' There are also requirements on accounting 
procedures and electronic information systems. 
"' The Basle Framework for Internal Controls, supra note 156, principle 6. 
Z'2 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, art. 35. See also General Lending Rules, supra note 99, art. 
28. 
Z" The PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Financial Institution Internal Controls, supra note 106, art. 17. 
27 Id. arts. 16,18. 
Z" Id. art. 18. 
Z'6 The Basle Framework for Internal Controls, supra note 156, principles 7,8 & 9. 
2J The PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Financial Institution Internal Controls, supra note 106, art. 19. 
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Accounting Procedures The Commercial Banking Law requires that commercial 
banks establish and improve their financial accounting systems in accordance with the law, 
unified accounting standards, and relevant stipulations of the PBOC. Z'e The PBOC 
Guidelines require that financial institutions establish strict accounting procedures, including 
systems of bookkeeping, data processing, and financial analyzing. 2J' Evidence for account- 
keeping must be verified. "' Business activities should be recorded in a timely manner. z; ' 
The PBOC Guidelines also establishes principles for accounting procedures - (1) 
Accounting procedures should in compliance with the generally accepted accounting 
standards. (2) Accounting staff should carry out their duties within their authorization. (3) 
Accounting duties should be segregated appropriately. (4) Principle of crosschecking and 
dual controls. (5) Principle of safety and prudence. 242 
On July 30,1997, the PBOC issued Provisions on Enhancing Internal Accounting 
Controls and Management in Banks, 243 specifying rules for bank internal accounting control 
systems. 
These requirements for accounting procedures ensure that there are adequate and 
comprehensive internal financial data. That is essential to the proper functioning of internal 
controls. 244 
Electronic Information System Risk Controls Electronic information systems and the 
use of information technology bear risks that must be effectively controlled by banks to avoid 
disruptions to business. It is important that these systems be secured, monitored 
independently, and supported by adequate contingency arrangements. 
Computer security has always been a focus of the PBOC. The PBOC Guidelines 
contain provisions on issues relating to computer security. 245 "Decisions on Certain Issues 
Related to Reinforcing Computer Security and Preventing Financial Computer Crimes" were 
4 
238 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 18, art. 54. 




243 Provisions on Enhancing Internal Accounting Controls and Management in Banks (fing yi bu jiaqiang 
yinhang kuiji neibu kongzhi he guanli de ruogan guiding], issued by the PBOC on July 30,1997. 
244 The Basle Framework for Internal Controls, supra note 156, principle 7. 
245 The PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Financial Institution Internal Controls, supra note 106, art. 15. 
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issued in later 1999. On January 17,2000, the PBOC held a national computer security 
meeting to discuss the implementation of the Decisions. Z"' 
Problems with the Information and Communication System of Chinese Banks There 
are problems with the bank information and communication system in China, however. First, 
the accounting procedures under the PBOC Guidelines pay attention only to internal financial 
and operational data. Because of the poor disclosure and accounting practices in China, 
financial institutions have difficulties in collecting information about their clients. '-" Second, 
with regards to electronic information systems, the PBOC Guidelines have only provided for 
one aspect of the issue, i. e., controlling risks of electronic information systems. The author 
would like to suggest that financial institutions be encouraged to develop electronic risk 
recognition and assessing system so as to improve their risk-management capacity. "' Third, 
the PBOC Guidelines contain no provision on the communication of information. In practice, 
most financial institutions in China lack effective channels of communication to ensure an 
adequate flow of information through the organization. 249 
e. Monitoring Activities and Correcting Deficiencies 
According to principles 10,11 and 12 of the Basle Committee Internal Control Paper, a bank 
should develop internal controls that can be monitored daily by personnel from several 
different areas, covering all the bank's activities, branches, and subsidiaries, such that 
changes in particular areas can be easily integrated into the internal control process to ensure 
246 See Chinaonline, 'People's Bank of China Strengthens Computer Security' (January 17,2000), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/000/18/00001 18/00001I708. asp'. 
247 Cf.. The Basle Framework for Internal Controls, supra note 156, principle 7, which reads as follows: 
An effective internal control system requires that there are adequate and comprehensive internal financial, operational and 
compliance data, as well as external market information about events and conditions that are relevant to decision making. 
Information should be reliable, timely, accessible, and provided in a consistent format. 
2°a Financial institutions in China started paying attention to electronic risk-management systems. The BOC, for 
example, signed an agreement with Reuters on June 6,2000 to use the Kondor + Risk Management system for 
the bank's financial services operations. This is the first time the BOC has replaced a self-developed system 
with the technological solutions of a third party. The Reuters Kondor+ System is an applicable system for 
compounded trading management and risk management. It is equipped with functions for e-commerce, cash 
management, combined investment analysis, market strategy and credit and risk management. See Chinaonline, 
'BOC to Use Reuters' Risk Management System' (June 9,2000), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/industry/financiallcurreninews/secure/000060701. asp '. 
249 Without effective communication, information is useless. That is why the Basle Internal Control Paper 
requires effective channels of communication to ensure that all staff fully understand and adhere to policies and 
procedures affecting their duties and responsibilities and that other relevant information is reaching appropriate 
personnel. The Basle Framework for Internal Controls, supra note 156, principle 9. 
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its effectiveness. Banks should also facilitate reporting of internal control deficiencies, with 
material deficiencies being reported directly to senior management and the board of directors, 
through policies and procedures. "' 
The PBOC Guidelines provide for monitoring activities and correcting deficiencies as 
well. First, financial institutions are required to establish comprehensive internal controls 
fitting their particularities, including segregation of duties and crosschecking among different 
branches, departments, and divisions. "' Second, the Guidelines provide that a financial 
institution should monitor the effectiveness of its internal controls periodically and adjusting 
its internal controls to the changed operations, Government policies, and State laws. ZS' Third, 
financial institutions are required to establish effective EWS, which should include, among 
other matters, the ongoing monitoring of the internal control systems to detect deficiencies in 
internal controls. 253 Last but not least, the PBOC Guidelines provide for the internal check 
and examination of financial institutions' internal controls. 
Internal audit is an important part of the system for monitoring activities and 
correcting deficiencies. Internal auditing system plays a variety of roles . 
2'4 The PBOC 
Guidelines authorize the internal auditing department of a financial institution to manage the 
internal controls of the institution. The power of the internal auditing department include: (1) 
to suggest internal controls for various business activities; (2) to monitor and assess internal 
control systems; (3) to carry out evaluation on specific internal control systems; and (4) to 
punish those departments or personnel violating internal control rules. us Financial 
institutions are required to equip their internal auditing departments with sufficient qualified 
personnel and to formulate rules to ensure the authority and independence 256 of their internal 
230 Internal auditors should review deficiency reports on a daily basis and recommend corrective actions to the 
appropriate management level, both for isolated events and any emerging trends. 
Zs. The PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Financial Institution Internal Controls, supra note 106, art. 23. 
252 Id. art. 25. 
2s' Id. art. 20. 
254 For a discussion on the roles played by internal auditors, see Song, Taili R. Wang, Yanbing, 'On Roles of 
Commercial Bank Internal Auditors [qiantan shangye yinhang neibu shenji jihe de zhuoyong]', China Finance 
No. 9,41 (1999). 
255 The PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Financial Institution Internal Controls, supra note 106, art. 28. 
256 The independence of internal auditing department is provided by the PBOC Guidelines as a principle for the 
establishment of internal controls. Id. art. 7. 
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auditing departments. "' The internal auditing departments should report deficiencies detected 
and make deficiency correction recommendation in a timely manner. 258 
(iii) Evaluation of Internal Control Systems by Supervisory Authorities 
It is recommended by the Basle Committee that banking supervisors assess the internal 
control system in place at individual banks as part of their ongoing supervisory activities. The 
supervisors should also determine whether individual bank management gives prompt 
attention to any problems that are detected through the internal control process. "' 
The PBOC Guidelines also vest the PBOC with the power to evaluate internal control 
systems in financial institutions. Accordingly, the PBOC should assess the internal control 
system in place as part of their ongoing supervisory activities. And, if necessary, the PBOC 
may trust accounting firms to conduct external auditing to assess the internal controls of a 
financial institution. The PBOC may suggest deficiency correction to those financial 
institutions whose internal controls are problematic or impose legal liabilities on institutions 
or responsible personnel. "' 
C. PROBLEMS WITH INTERNAL CONTROLS IN CHINA'S COMMERCIAL BANKS 
As shown above, the PBOC Guidelines are in line with the Basle Committee Internal Control 
Paper. The real problem is how well these rules can be implemented in China. Two examples 
support this assertion, the organizational structure of State commercial banks and the 
information problem. The State commercial banks, because of their sole state ownership, do 
not have the shareholders' meeting as a check and balance power, resulting in their weak 
corporate governance. The information is always the weakest part of bank internal controls in 
China. Efforts have been made by the PBOC recently to help commercial banks collect 
information about the creditworthiness of their borrowers. It takes time, however, for banks 
to develop skills and expertise to analyze the information. 
23' Id. art. 22. 
2581d. art. 16. 
259 The Basle Core Principles, supra note 71, principle 14; and the Basle Framework for Internal Controls, 
supra note 156, principle 13. 
260 The PBOC Guidelines for Enhancing Financial Institution Internal Controls, supra note 106, art. 29. 
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1. The Organizational Structure of State Commercial Banks 
(i) The Organizational Structure of State Commercial Banks 
The organizational structure of State commercial banks is unique because the "big four" are 
solely State-owned. Their organizational structure applies that of the wholly State-owned 
companies. Z"' According to the Company Law, a wholly State-owned company does not have 
a shareholders' meeting. The organization authorized by the State to make investments or the 
department authorized by the State should authorize the company's board of directors to 
exercise part of the functions and powers of a shareholders' meeting and to decide the major 
matters of the company except the merger, division, dissolution, increase or decrease of 
capital, and the issue of company bonds of and by the company. 262 A wholly State-owned 
company does have a board of directors, which exercises functions and powers in accordance 
with article 46 (functions and powers of the board of directors of a limited liability company), 
and article 66 of the Company Law. 263 A wholly State-owned company has a manager as 
well, who should be engaged or dismissed by the board of directors. The manager exercises 
functions and powers in accordance with article 50 (functions and powers of the manager of a 
limited liability company) of the Company Law. 264 A wholly State-owned company will have 
a board of supervisors. Its members are mainly designated by the State Council or related 
departments or organizations authorized by the State Council, and should also include 
employee representatives265 (see Annex XIV, which reviews the development of board of 
supervisors for State commercial banks). 
To sum up, under its current organizational structure, there are only a board of 
directors, management, and a board of supervisors within a State commercial bank, with the 
functions of the shareholders' meeting partly played by the board of directors and partly, by 
26' A wholly State-owned company means a limited liability company invested in and established solely by an 
organization authorized by the State to make investments or department authorized by the State. The Company 
Law, supra note 199, art. 64. 
262 Id. art. 66. Decisions related to the merger, division, dissolution, increase or decrease of capital, and the issue 
of company bonds should be made by the organization authorized by the State to make investments or the 
department authorized by the State. Id. 
263 Id. art. 68. 
264 Id. art. 69. 
265 Id. art. 67. 
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government departments. This structure lacks effective check and balance, because the board 
of directors is authorized to carry out the functions and powers that should be carried out by 
the shareholders' meeting, 266 and because a member of the board of directors may serve 
concurrently as the manager. 26' The board of supervisors might be a checking power, but 
their check cannot be as effective as that of the shareholders' meeting. 268 This organizational 
structure will have to be improved. 
(ii) Diversifying the Ownership Structure of the "Big Four": a Solution to Their 
Corporate Governance Problem? 
There have been strong arguments for diversifying the banks' ownership based on the NPL 
prevention and the preparation for the competition after China's WTO membership. A report 
released by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences immediately after the US/China WTO 
deal, for example, asserted that the government must allow non-state investors, including 
foreigners, to buy into its "big four" banks "to eradicate the structural elements causing bad 
assets. "269 
The current author would like to argue for the diversification of ownership structure 
of the "big four" in terms of corporate governance. The weak corporate governance has 
always been blamed for the poor performance of China's commercial banks. 27° It has been a 
consensus that the State ownership blocked the process of bank commercialization"' - the 
State-ownership has facilitated government intervention into banks272 and led to banks' lack 
266 Id. art. 66. 
26' Id. art. 69. 
261 The supervisors can only attend the board of directors meetings as non-voting delegates. Moreover, not like 
the board of supervisors of a limited liability company, the board of supervisors of a solely State-owned 
company does not have the power to require correcting actions if an act of a director or the manager is harmful 
to the company's interest. Id. art. 67. 
269 See Reuters English News Service, 'China: China's WVTO Deal Heralds Radical Banking Reform' 
(November 16,1999). 
270 See Strengthening the Banking System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,331 
(October 1999). 
27 See, e. g., Kynge, James, 'Beijing: China Bank Reform "Yet to Tackle All Faults"', Fin. Times (August 18, 
1999). 
272 See Zhao, Haikuan, 'The State Commercial Banks Should Be Converted into Joint Stock Banks [guoyou 
shangye yinhang yiyu shixing gufengzhi]', China Finance (Beijing) No. 11,26, at 26 (November 1999). 
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of incentives to improve their operation. 2' Moreover, as mentioned before, the State 
ownership also leads to an unbalanced corporate government structure in State commercial 
banks. 
There are two obstacles to the diversification of the ownership structure of State- 
owned banks, however. The first one is a legal obstacle. Ownership control on banks and 
non-bank financial institutions has been employed by the PBOC as a tool to protect State 
banks from competition. According to the provisional regulations issued in 1994,2'4 foreign- 
funded and Sino-foreign joint equity financial institutions or enterprises are not allowed to 
invest in Chinese-funded financial institutions; 275 and, unless approved by the PBOC 
headquarters, a financial institution (apart from urban credit cooperatives and rural credit 
cooperatives) is not permitted to raise share capital from the public. 276 By the end of 1999, 
Shenzhen Development Bank and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank were China's only 
listed commercial banks . 
277 China Minsheng Bank went public in December 2000.278 Despite 
the signs that the restrictions are being relaxed recently, 279 there is no indication from the 
authorities that the government has any plan to sell their stakes in the "big four". Xie, Ping, 
the Director of the PBOC Research Bureau, for example, argues that "[w]hile it is generally 
acknowledged that privatization goes hand-in-hand with improved efficiency, this might not 
be the case in China because the very fact that the banks are owned by the State reassures the 
depositors. ""' 
2.. The State-ownership means the banks have an implicit guarantee from the government. Besides, because the 
banks are operating under the government's instruction, so far as it can carry out tasks imposed by the 
government, the banks will not be punished for their low profitability. Id. 
27 Provisional Regulations Concerning Investment in Financial Institutions through Purchase of Shares, 
promulgated by the PBOC on 28th July 1994. 
2.. Id., Sect. 12. 
211 Id., Sect. 14. 
Z" See Chinaonline, 'Bank of Communications Prepare to Go Public' (July 7,2000), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/000707/1/C00070503. asp'. 
278 See Kynge, James, 'China's Public Show of Capitalism', Fin. Times (December 17,2000). 
279 It was reported that the PBOC is throwing its support behind a new joint stock plan for the country's 
commercial banks. See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'China's Central Bank Backs Joint Stock Plan for Commercial 
Banks' (November it, 1999), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. condindustry/fina... rchive/Secure/1999/November/C9111004. asp'. 
zao Supra note 270, at 329. Xie admitted, though, that it should be realized that joint-ownership helps 
commercial banks to strengthen their capital bases and to improved governance. Id. 
It was reported that the PBOC would allow the "big four" to issue long-term financial bonds to absorb 
private funds and supplement capital. That might be the furthest the PBOC would go at this moment. See 
Chinaonline, 'State-owned Commercial Banks to Offer Long-term Financial Bonds' (March 14,2001), 
available at 'http. //Www. chinaonline. com/topstories/010314/1/C01031302. asp'. 
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Second, even if the government intended to sell their stakes in the "big four", there 
would be difficulties in diversifying the ownership structure of the "big four". Wang, Songqi, 
Deputy Director of the Finance Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
discussed three ways of diversifying the ownership structure of State commercial banks - 
listing in stock exchanges, selling equity to domestic non-state entities, or transferring equity 
to foreign investors - and concluded that it was unrealistic to diversify the ownership of 
State commercial banks by selling State stakes to domestic investors. 28' The only possibility, 
Want argued, was to sell off partial equity of the "big four" to foreign investors. 282 Without 
an obvious improvement in the asset quality of the "big four", it is doubtful whether foreign 
investors will be interested in purchasing stakes in them. "' 
2. The Information Problem 
As mentioned before, information and communication is the weakest part of bank internal 
controls in China. Because of the poor disclosure and accounting practices, financial 
institutions have difficulties in collecting information about their clients. Efforts have been 
made by the PBOC these years to help commercial banks obtain information about their 
borrowers (see Annex XV). Commercial banks in China, however, will have to develop skills 
and techniques to analyze the information themselves and it takes time for banks to develop 
these skills and techniques. 
3. Prospects 
China is in the right direction to improve bank internal controls. The problem now is not the 
lack of rules, but how can these rules be carried out fully in China. It seems to the author that 
it is easier to identify a problem than to really solve the problem. Taking the weakness of the 
governance structure of State commercial banks, and the information problem for example, it 
281 See Chinaonline, 'WTO Entry to Hurt China's State-owned Commercial Banks' (November 29,1999), 
available at 'http: //Www. chinaonline. com/industry/financial/currentnews/open/B9112403-SS. asp'. 
282 Id. 
2e' This has already been realized by Chinese policy-makers. Dai, Xianglong, the PBOC governor set out a road 
map for reforms to the "big four" at a PBOC press conference on January 19,2000. He said that the State banks 
had to slash their payrolls, clear out bad loans and exercise strict "credit discipline" before they could be 
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is clear that these two problems must be solved. It takes time to solve these problems, 
however. 
V. SUMMARY 
Enhancing prudential banking regulation/supervision and promoting bank internal controls 
are essential to prevent the creation of new NPLs on China State commercial banks' balance 
sheets. 
China has developed its prudential banking regulation and supervision in line with the 
Basle Committee Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. There are problems 
with banking regulation and supervision in China, however. First, because of the difficulties 
faced by SOEs, administrative controls on commercial banks have not been removed 
completely. The interest rate control, despite its relaxation, remains a main feature of China's 
financial system. And, despite of the removal of credit ceilings on January 1,1998, at least in 
1999, most of the credits were still directly controlled and regulated. Second, there are 
problems with banking supervision in China. The licensing and structure change approval 
procedures are not transparent enough. Among other matters, on-going supervision need to 
be improved - clearer rules are needed for on-site examinations; attention needs to be paid 
to how to make good use of external independent auditors; a more efficient EWS needs to be 
established. Third, the sanction provisions in China are mainly ex post punishments rather 
than incentives for banks to correct their operations. The solution of these problems takes 
time and cannot be taken for granted. 
To enhance internal controls in Chinese financial institutions, the PBOC issued 
Guidelines for Enhancing Internal Controls of Financial Institutions in 1997. The Guidelines 
give definition and objectives to internal controls consistent with the Basle Committee 
Internal Control Paper and cover all primary elements of bank internal controls - namely - 
management oversight and control culture, risk recognition and assessment, control activities 
and segregation of duties, information and communication, and monitoring activities and 
correcting deficiencies. The problem is not that China lacks clear rules for developing bank 
internal controls, but how well these rules can be carried out by Chinese banks. Taking State 
transformed into "shareholding" companies. See Kynge, James, 'China to Speed up Financial Reforms', Fin 
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commercial banks for an example, because the "big four" are solely State owned, there is no 
shareholders' meeting in the "big four", resulting in their poor corporate governance. 
Besides, information and communication is always the weakest part of bank internal controls 
in China. The solution of these two problems takes time. 
Times (January 21,2000). 
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Chapter Four BANKING SAFETY NET: MECHANISMS FOR CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION - DESIGNING A BANKING SAFETY NET 
A banking safety net can be defined as a set of mechanisms designed to prevent or reverse 
widespread de-intermediation from banks, losses in bank capital, and bank failures. ' In this 
view, prudential regulation and supervision should be recognized as a component of the 
banking safety net as well. 2 The deposit insurance, lender of last resort (LOLR), and 
prudential regulation and supervision, are considered to constitute the tripartite safety nets in 
the present model for financial stability. 3 
The focus of this chapter is the safety net for individual banks. 4 Accordingly, the 
author will discuss a tripartite banking safety net comprising a deposit insurance scheme, 
LOLR, and insolvency resolution. Banking regulation and supervision is not to be discussed 
in this chapter for two reasons. First, banking prudential regulation and supervision is such a 
broad term that it is not limited to individual bank crisis management. 5 Second, banking 
prudential regulation and supervision has already been discussed in Chapter Three. 
The rest of the chapter comprises four sections. In Section II, issues related to the 
LOLR are surveyed, with suggestions on how to define LOLR facilities in China. Section III 
1 See Demirguc-Kunt, Ash, Designing a Bank Safety Net -A Long-term Perspective, World Bank Mimeo 
(1999), available at 'http: //www1. worldbank. org/finance/html/designing_a_bank_sn. html'. 
2 Some authors include prudential regulation and supervision as part of a banking safety net. See, e. g., 
Demirguc-Kunt, Ash, supra note 1. 
See, e. g., Ketcha, Nicholas J Jr., 'Deposit Insurance System Design and Considerations' in Strengthening the 
Banking System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,221 (October 1999). 
"Crisis situations" of individual banks include situations of either liquidity or insolvency that may threaten the 
continuation of the activities of a particular bank or banks on a temporary or permanent basis, often a result of 
management mistakes of the particular bank(s). These situations are different from a generalized banking crisis 
(a system crisis), which is often a result or a reflection of the deterioration of the economic environment or of 
poor macroeconomic management. See, e. g., Lastra, Rosa Maria, Central Banking and Banking Regulation, 
124-5 (1996). In a systemic banking crisis, the safety net designed for individual bank crisis might not suffice, a 
systematic solution will therefore be needed. The whole thesis is actually devoted to the systematic solution to 
the NPL problem trapping China's banking system. 
S Id. Dr. Lastra divides the bank supervisory process into four stages: licensing, supervision stricto sensu, 
sanctioning and crisis management, which comprises lender of last resort, deposit insurance and special bank 
insolvency proceedings. Id., at 5. 
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focuses on designing a deposit insurance program to fit China's need, referring to 
international experience and lessons. Mechanisms for bank insolvency resolution are 
discussed in Section IV. The chapter ends with concluding observations in Section V. 
II. DEFINING THE LENDER-OF-LAST-RESORT IN CHINA 
A. A GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1. Understanding the LOLR Properly 
The central bank lending to commercial banks (or other financial institutions) can be made 
under various situations. A central bank may lend to commercial banks for the 
implementation of monetary policy. The central bank may also lend as a liquidity source or 
"bankers' bank": Due to the nature of the business and the structure of its balance sheet (non- 
marketable assets and demand deposit), a bank may need to borrow from the central bank for 
the need of its normal business. These two kinds of central banking lending are not the 
LOLR facilities discussed here. The LOLR in this chapter is an instrument of banking 
supervision in a "crisis situation" stage, i. e., the central bank provides assistance to a bank (or 
banks) suffering from a liquidity crisis. 
The LOLR facilities should be distinguished from central bank lending as monetary 
policy. It is argued that: "For the sake of economic stability, it is important that the Fed 
distinguish at all times between its monetary policy and its LOLR function. The lender of last 
resort should replace liquidity lost as a result of customer demands; it should not force 
additional liquidity into the system. ,6 
Because a central bank can both act as "banker's bank" and as "banking supervisor", 
the distinction between these two aspects of central bank lending is not very relevant in 
practice, at least in those countries where central banks function as banking supervisor as 
well. The distinction, however, is relevant in countries where central banks do not function as 
banking supervisor, such as in the UK, where a Financial Service Authority was set up to 
take the banking supervisory responsibilities from the Bank of England. In these countries, it 
is even not right (at least not exact) to define the LOLR as an instrument of banking 
See Benston, G., et al., Safety and Sound Banking: Past Present and Future, 113 (1986). 
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supervision in "crisis situation" stage. Rather, it will be better to define it as an instrument to 
carry out central bank's responsibility for financial stability. 
2. The History and Theoretical Foundation of the LOLR 
The term lender of last resort was first introduced by Sir Francis Barings, who in 1797 
referred to the Bank of England as the "dernier resort" from which all banks could obtain 
liquidity in times of crises.? The theoretical foundation of the LOLR doctrine was first set by 
Thornton in 1802 and refined by Bagehot in 18738 - i. e. 
9 
- (1) The central bank - acting 
as the LOLR - should prevent temporary illiquid but solvent banks from failing. (This type 
of lending is by nature short term). (2) The central bank should lend freely, but charge a 
penalty rate. (3) The central bank should accommodate anyone with good collateral, valued 
at pre-panic prices. (4) The central bank should make its readiness to lend freely clear in 
advance. 
Two further operating principles typically apply. 1° First, the central bank's LOLR 
role is discretionary, not mandatory. " Second, the central bank assesses not only whether the 
situation is of liquidity or solvency, but also whether the failure of an institution can trigger 
by contagion the failure of other institutions. 
3. Defining the LOLR in Practice 
It is by no means an easy job to define a central bank's LOLR role in practice, at least not as 
easy as setting the theoretical principles for the LOLR. The definition and principles set out 
in the previous section are not always followed in practice. 
First, the LOLR's guiding principle - lending to illiquid but solvent institutions - 
seldom seems to be applied. 12 This may be because the distinction between whether a bank is 
illiquid or insolvent is not always clear when the lending decision is made. For example, a 
See, e. g., Lastra, R. M. 'Crisis Management and Lender of Last Resort' in Lastra, R. M., Schiffman, Henry N. 
(eds. ), Bank Failures and Bank Insolvency Law in Economies in Transition, 21, at 21 (1999). 
See Lastra, Rosa Maria, supra note 4, at 126 and n. 220. 
9Id., at 127. 
'° Id. 
11 See, e. g., Federal Reserve Act, 10 (b), as amended by the Federal Deposit Corporation Improvement Act in 
1991, which reads as follows: 
A Federal Reserve Bank shall have no obligation to make, increase, renew, or extend any advance or discount under this Act to 
any depository institution. 
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US study found that 90% of LOLR credit extended by the Fed went to banks that 
subsequently failed. 13 During the recent Asian financial crisis, central banks in all crisis 
countries provided liquidity under various emergency lending and LOLR facilities to banks 
that were already insolvent. '4 
Two reasons can be attributed to the disparity between theory and practice: 15 (1) With 
developed money and inter-bank markets the central bank is typically called upon to assist an 
institution when other sources of financing have dried up (i. e., when there is a perception in 
the market that such institution is already suffering from insolvency problems). 16 (2) The 
immediacy of the need for such assistance often makes it difficult to assess at that moment 
whether the institution is illiquid or insolvent. A situation of bank illiquidity (i. e., lack of 
illiquid funds) can be an indication of technical insolvency (i. e., value of liabilities exceeds 
market value of assets) or can quickly turn into insolvency if assets are sold at loss value or 
fire sale price. 
Second, as mentioned above, in deciding LOLR, a central bank assesses not only 
whether the situation is of liquidity or solvency, but also whether the failure of an institution 
can trigger by contagion the failure of other institutions. In other words, a LOLR is designed 
to avert banking panics, but not individual bank runs. While it is easy to draw conceptual 
distinction between banking run and banking panic, " it is by no means an easy job to make 
12 See Lastra, R. M., supra note 7, at 27. 
1; Cited in Garcia, G, Deposit Insurance: A Survey of Actual and Best Practices, IMF Working Paper 99/54,23 
(April 1999). 
14 E. g., in South Korea, 10.2 trillion won and $13.3bn liquidity supports were provided respectively in 
November and December 1997, accounting for 7% of GDP; in Thailand, altogether 1,037bn baht were provided 
in early 1997, accounting for 22% of GDP. See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., Financial Sector 
Crisis and Restructuring Lessons from Asia, 26 & table 3 (IMF, September 1999). 
15 See Lastra, R. M., supra note 7, at 27-8. 
16 Dr. Lastra refers to Goodhart and Schoenmaker to support this point. Those two authors argue that "with an 
efficient money and inter-bank market, a commercial bank that is generally believed to be solvent, can almost 
always, obtain sufficient additional money to meet its liquidity difficulties" and, therefore the central bank will 
fenerally act as LOLR "in circumstances where the solvency of the borrower is subject to doubt. " Id., at 28. 
7A widespread demand by depositors for immediate conversion of their deposits into currency is termed a 
bank run. A run that spreads from one bank to other solvent banks because of a loss of confidence in' the 
banking system is termed a banking panic. 
Individual bank runs should not threat the whole banking system, because - (1) A run on an 
individual bank need not lead to its insolvency. The run can be halted and confidence in the bank restored by a 
demonstration that an amply supply of currency is available to satisfy all depositor demands (a sound bank shall 
be able to borrow from the market). (2) Even if that bank is forced into solvent, the failure of that bank does not 
necessarily result in a multiple contraction of deposits and reduces the stock of money of the financial system. 
Depositors might move from one institution perceived to be unsound to another perceived to be sound or switch 
from deposits to safe securities. 
Banking panic is different. Because all banks will need liquidity in a banking panic, only if additional 
currency and reserves are provided to the banking system can the damaging effects on the aggregate money 
stock of a panic be avoided. 
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the distinction in practice. When there is an individual bank run, it is hard for a central bank 
to judge whether it will lead to a banking panic or not. Making matters worse, the central 
bank takes the risk of triggering banking panic if it refuses to provide liquidity support to 
individual banks, because the market may misinterpret that the central bank is not ready to 
lend. That explains why practically, a central bank provide emergency lending to preserve 
the stability of the banking system as a whole by supplying extra reserves to all banks 
suffering from large cash withdrawals, as well as to support a single bank suffering from a 
liquidity crisis. 
Third, it is increasingly difficult to define a scope of financial institutions that can 
access the LOLR. The growing blurring of frontiers between the banking and the securities 
business have led to an extension of the safety net - "Though the central bank typically 
bails out domestic commercial banks, it can also stand ready to provide emergency liquidity 
assistance to securities firms and other financial institutions, as the Fed did in the stock 
market crash of October 1987. "18 In the US, Regulation A of the Federal Reserve System 
allows the Fed to extend emergency credit to "individuals, partnerships and corporations that 
are not depository institutions if, in the judgment of the Federal Reserve Bank, credit is not 
available from other sources and failure to obtain such credit would adversely affect the 
economy. "19 The Fed can also agree to supply emergency liquidity to foreign institutions 
operating in the country - Regulation A provides that "except as may be otherwise 
provided, this part [i. e., the extension of credit by Federal Reserve banks] shall be applicable 
to United States branches and agencies of foreign banks subject to reserve requirements 
under Regulation D in the same manner and to the same extent as [domestic] depository 
institutions. "20 
B. DEFINING THE PBOC'S LOLR ROLE 
1. The PBOC's LOLR Role Is Not Well Defined in China 
1e See Lastra, Rosa Maria, supra note 4, at 126. 
19 12 CFR 201.3 (d). 
20 12 CFR 201.7 (CFR revised as of January 1,1996). However, 'the rate applicable to such credit will be above 
the highest rate in effect for advances to depository institutions. Where the collateral used to secure such credit 
consists of assets other than obligations of, or fully guaranteed as to principal or interest by, the United States or 
an agency thereof, an affirmative vote of five or more members of the Board of Governors is required before 
credit may be extended. " 
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In China, the conditions and procedure to provide LOLR are not clearly defined. There are 
provisions in the Central Banking Law that the PBOC can lend to commercial banks for 
monetary policy purpose. 21 Besides, the Central Banking Law authorizes the PBOC to 
"maintain the legitimate, stable and sound operation of the financial industry. "22 Even if 
these two articles could be understood as the legal basis for the PBOC's LOLR role, they are 
by all means only broad provisions, leaving the conditions and procedure to provide liquidity 
totally at the discretion of the PBOC. 
In 1993, the PBOC issued Interim Measures Governing the PBOC Lending to 
Financial Institutions. 23 Under the Measures, the PBOC can extend credit to financial 
institutions through either advances or discounts. 24 The term of the advance can be 20 days, 
three months, six months or one year, 25 while discounts can be up to 6 months. 26 According 
to the Measures, only those financial institutions established with the approval of the PBOC, 
holding a financial business permit, and having basic account with the PBOC are eligible to 
apply for the PBOC credit. 27 To be qualified for the PBOC advances or discounts, a financial 
institution must not occur severe liquid problem, and shows the creditworthiness and 
capacity to repay the PBOC credit. 28 In other words, the Interim Measures have not much to 
do with the PBOC's LOLR role. 
Because of the lack of rules, in practice, the PBOC follows a case-by-case approach 
in providing LOLR supports. This kind of practice, while granting the central bank some 
"constructive ambiguity" about the conditions under which it will provide assistance so as to 
discourage banks from relying on it, 29 leave the PBOC vulnerable to political pressures from 
the central and local governments. 
Due to the lack of information, we cannot tell how well the PBOC has played its 
LOLR role in China. But at least in one case, liquidity support was given to an insolvent 
2t The Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China, adopted at the 3rd Session of the 
Eighth National People's Congress on March 18,1995, effective as of the same date (hereinafter referred to as 
"the Central Banking Law"), art. 27, which reads as follows: 
The People's Bank of China may, as needed for implementing monetary policies, determine the amounts, duration, rate of 
interest and form of loans to commercial banks, but the duration shall not exceed one year. 
22 Id. art. 30. 
23 Interim Measures Governing the PBOC Lending to Financial Institutions [zhongguo renming yinhang dui 
inrong jiguo daikuan guanli zhanxing bangfa], issued by the PBOC on March 3,1993. 
24 Id., art. 8. 
23 Id., art. 9. 
26 Id., art. 10. 
27 Id., art. 6. 
29 Id., art. 7. 
29 See Hawkins, John & Turner Philip, 'Bank Restructuring in Practice: An Overview' in Bank Restructuring in 
Practice, 6,52, BIS Policy Papers No. 6 (August 1999). 
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financial institution. In December 1997, just one month before the closure of the Hainan 
Development Bank, the central bank provided more than RMB3bn in liquidity support to it. 30 
2. Legal Definition of the LOLR: the US, UK and Japan Models 
(i) The US Model 
In the US, the terms and conditions of liquidity provision to specific banks are statutory 
defined. Regulation A clearly states the conditions in which the Federal Reserve Banks can 
extend credit. 3 
Regulation A raises several situations in which credit is to be advanced to depository 
institutions. The LOLR is what the Regulation refers to as "extended credit". 32 Accordingly, 
"extended credit" is provided when "similar assistance is not reasonably available from other 
sources... where there are exceptional circumstances or practices affecting a particular 
depository institution including deposit drains, impaired access to money market funds, or 
sudden deterioration in loan repayment performance... the extended credit will be made to 
depository institutions that may be experiencing difficulties adjusting to changing money 
market conditions over a long period. "33 
There is also a limitation to who can access the extended credit. First, only those that 
have been appraised as "critically undercapitalized"34 or "undercapitalized"35 can request the 
advance. Second, only insured depository institutions are eligible for this credit. 
The credit advance is also limited in maturity - "no advances.. . may be outstanding 
for more than 60 days in any 120-day period" unless "the head of the appropriate Federal 
banking agency certifies in advance in writing to the Federal Reserve Bank that any 
30 See Xie, Ping, `Bank Restructuring in China' in Bank Restructuring in Practices, 124, at 125-6, BIS Policy 
Papers No. 6 (August 1999). 
31 12 CFR 201. 
32 This is opposed to "adjustment credit" (which is advanced for temporary requirements or to cushion more 
persistent shortfalls of funds pending an orderly adjustment (12 CFR 201.3 (a))), "seasonal credit" (which is 
extended for periods longer than adjustment credit to assist small institutions meet expected fluctuations in 
deposits and loans (12 CFR 201.3 (b))), and "emergency credit" (12 CFR 201.3 (b)). 
33 12 CFR 201.3 (c). 
34 An institution is critically undercapitalized, according to section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act as 
amended by FDICIA when it "fails to meet any level specified under subsection c (3)(a)', (i. e., when the 
leverage ratio of tangible equity is less than 2% of total assets). 
35 An undercapitalized depository institution is defined as not critically undercapitalized, deemed to be 
undercapitalized under the FDICIA, and has received a CAMEL rating of 5 or equivalent. 12 CFR 201.2(h). 
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depository institution is viable. "36 Satisfactory collateral is required. 37 And a penal interest 
rate above the market rate will be charged. 38 
The LOLR is discretionary rather than compulsory. This has been stressed by the 
FDICIA's amendment to Section 10 (b) of Federal Reserve Act: "A Federal Reserve bank 
shall have no obligation to make, increase, renew, or extend any advance or discount under 
this Act to any depository institution. " 
To discourage the Federal Reserve from lending to insolvent institutions in an 
emergency crisis, the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) provides strictly that Federal Reserve banks may have outstanding advances to 
critically undercapitalized depository institutions "only during the 5-day period beginning on 
the date the institution became critically undercapitalized or after consultations with the 
Board. After the end of this 5-day period, the Board [of Governors] shall be liable to the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for the excess loss (i. e., for the loss that exceeds the 
loss that the FDIC would have incurred if it had liquidated the institution as of the end of that 
5-day period), without regard to the terms of advance or any collateral pledged to secure the 
advance. "39 
(ii) The UK Model 
The UK approach of defining the LOLR is contrary to the US. There is no clear statutory 
definition of the circumstances for their LOLR facilities. Actually, the Bank of England 
(BOE) is not even statutorily required to provide emergency credit or to oversee the stability 
of the financial system. The role of ensuring financial stability has been developed by 
practices of the BOE at first, 40 and was later laid out in the Chancellor's statement on May 
20,1997.41 
36 Federal Reserve Act sections 10 (a) and 10 (b), as amended by FDICIA on December 19,1991. 
37 12 CFR 201.5. 
38 12 CFR 201.52. 
39 Federal Reserve Act section 10 (b), as amended by FDICIA on December 19,1991. Cited in Lastra, R. M., 
supra note 7, at 29. 
ao The BOE, for example, supplied liquidity in the Overend and Gurney Crisis (1866) and the City of Glasgow 
Bank failure (1878). In the first Baring Crisis (1890), the BOE stood ready to do so. See, e. g., Wood, Geoffrey 
E., `Crisis Management and Lender of Last Resort and Deposit Insurance in Economies in Transition: Comment 
- Routes to Systemic Stability' in Lastra, R. M., Schiffman, Henry N. (eds. ), Bank Failures and Bank 
Insolvency Law in Economies in Transition, 71, at 72 (1999). 
41 See Rodgers P., `Changes at the Bank of England', Bank of England Q. Bull., 246 (August 1997). In October 
1997, the BOE, Treasury and the Financial Service Authority exchanged a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU), clarifying the framework for cooperation on financial stability. 
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According to the letter exchanged between the BOE, the Treasury, and the Financial 
Service Authority (FSA) on October 1997, LOLR facilities will only be provided in 
"exceptional circumstances"; and there must be "a genuine threat to the stability of the 
financial system to avoid a serious disturbance in the UK economy. 9942 
The attitude of the BOE toward the LOLR provision has changed over the past 
decades. The BOE previously encouraged troubled institutions to take remedial actions by 
seeking refinancing from shareholders of the institution. Later on, the BOE became more 
pre-committed to act as a LOLR - although the BOE still limited its financial exposure to 
minimal levels and only extended emergency credit when other parties were not willing to 
assist, it was reluctant to leave a troubled bank unattended, whether it was illiquid or 
insolvent. 43 
Following the enactment of the Bank of England Act in 1998, it is predicted that the 
BOE will become more cautious in providing emergency credit since it will have to consult 
with two other parties (the Treasury and the FSA). Besides, the accountability required by the 
Band of England Act will necessitate clear reasoning and criteria when any such operation is 
carried out. 44 
(iii) The Japan Model 
In Japan, the LOLR is stated in the Bank of Japan Law. Under the law, the Bank of Japan can 
provide credit to maintain an orderly financial system45 and when a situation stated in the 
Banking Act arises (i. e., when there is a serious threat to the safety and soundness of the 
financial system, and cease of operations or revocation of banking license is contemplated). 46 
The Bank of Japan is restricted in extending liquidity support because their LOLR facilities 
can only be triggered by a request from the Ministry of Finance. 47 And, only on exceptional 
situations can loans be made without collateral. 48 
42 See Rodgers P., 'The Bank of England Act', Bank of England Q. Bull., 97-99 (May 1998). 
43 See Hadjiemmanuil, Christos, Banking Regulation and the Bank of England, 267 (1996). °' Bank of England Act 1998, sect. 15, which requires any decision involving intervention in the financial 
market should be publicized. 
as Bank of Japan Law, art. 38-1. 
46 Art. 57-2 of Japan Banking Law (Law No. 59 of 1981) states that the Financial Revitalization Commission 
should consult the Ministry of Finance when there is a serious threat to the safety and soundness of the financial 
Y stem, and cease of operations or revocation of banking license is contemplated. 
Bank of Japan Law, art. 38. 
48 Id., art. 38 and art. 37-1, which provides that loans can be made un-collateralized for an exceptional and 
accidental situation of computer failures. 
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3. Implications for China 
It is hard to compare between these three models introduced just above. There are things 
common among them, however. In all the three countries, the central bank is pre-committed 
to extend credit to illiquid financial institutions at a penalty rate on collateral. Moreover, as a 
reflection of the global trend of concerns over moral hazard, pre-conditions are set for central 
bank's LOLR facilities. In the UK and Japan, a support operation can only be provided when 
there is genuine, serious threat to the soundness and stability of the financial system. In the 
US, more detailed rules are set. The maturity of LOLR facilities is also subject to ceiling in 
these three countries. Moreover, there are procedural requirements for the central bank to 
extend credit as the LOLR. In Japan, a MOF request is required. In the UK, the BOE must 
consult with the Treasury and the FSA. While in the US, the authority of the Board of 
Governor of the Federal Reserve System and its decision-making procedure are clearly 
provided by legislation. Given the difficulties in distinguishing between illiquid and insolvent 
banks, 49 these procedural provisions are essential to check that a central bank plays its LOLR 
role properly. 
Given the legal tradition in China, 50 the author would not recommend the UK model 
for China. The application of the US model requires that the country has highly-qualified 
banking supervisors and advanced supervisory instruments, which are yet to be developed in 
China, at least at this stage. 
The Japan model, i. e., defining the LOLR role of the central bank by provisions in 
central banking law, with financial stability as the primary objective, might be the best option 
for China. It must be clarified that the central bank should only extend credit to those 
temporary illiquid but not insolvent financial institutions when there is threat to the 
soundness and stability of the financial system and the extension of the credit is necessary to 
avoid a serious disturbance in the economy. The credit advance should be limited in maturity 
and extendibility and require satisfactory collateral. More importantly, procedures for 
decision-making should be described by the legislation as well, including the authority of the 
person or persons to make the decision (the PBOC Governor, or the PBOC Monetary Policy 
49 This is even true in countries like the US. It was revealed that 90% of lender of last resort credit extended by 
the Federal Reserve went to banks that subsequently failed. See, e. g., Garcia, G, supra note 13, at 23 
50 China has the tradition of writing law. 
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Commission) and the consultative requirements (such as the requirement that the PBOC 
should consult with the MOF before it decides to extend emergency credit). 
III. INTRODUCING A DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM INTO CHINA 
A. WHY DEPOSIT INSURANCE? 
1. A Brief Survey of Deposit Insurance Programs Worldwide 
From a global prospective, deposit insurance is a recent phenomenon. Of the sample of 50 
deposit insurance systems studied by the IMF in 1999, nine were adopted in the 1960s, six in 
the 1970s, 17 in the 1980s, and 15 in the 1990s. 5' 
In spite of its short and controversial history, 52 deposit insurance has been 
implemented in almost all developed countries and most developing countries. At the 
regional level, the EC adopted its Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes on May 30,1994 
"to ensure a harmonized minimum level of deposit protection wherever deposits are located 
in the Community. , 53 Member states are required to develop such schemes in compliance 
with the Directive. At the international level, there has been an increased use of government- 
sponsored deposit insurance, pushed by the World Bank and the IMF. 54 By the end of 1995, 
among all the countries in the world, there are only a little bit more than 70 countries, all but 
one from the developing countries, offerring no deposit insurance scheme. 55 
2. Pros and Cons of Deposit Insurance 
Deposit insurance must be the most controversial component of a banking safety net. There 
are arguments either in favor of or against deposit insurance. 
51 See Garcia, G, supra note 13, at 8 and Chart 1. 
Sz Some authors even argue that with an effective LOLR, it might not be necessary to have deposit insurance. 
See Wood, Geoffrey E., supra note 40, at 75-6. 
S' Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes. 
54 The World Bank frequently advises the establishment of deposit insurance programs as a component of 
adjustment programs. Another international organization, the IMF provides technical and policy-based advice 
on system designs. See, e. g., Miller, Geoffery P., `Deposit Insurance for Economies in Transition' in Lastra, R. 
M., Schiffman, Henry N. (eds. ), Bank Failures and Bank Insolvency Law in Economies in Transition, 37, at 37- 
8(1999). 
55 See, e. g., Goldstein, Morris & Turner, Philip, Banking Crises in Emerging Economies: Origin and Policy 
Options, BIS Economic Paper No. 46,30 (1996). 
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Arguments for Deposit Insurance Those in favor of deposit insurance argue on the 
basis of the necessity to prevent bank runs, consumer protection, and fair competition 
between large and small deposit-taking institutions. 
The principal justification for deposit insurance is that it reduces the danger of bank 
runs and bank panics. 56 Deposit insurance helps build up public confidence in the safety of 
bank deposits and thus promote the stability of individual banking institutions. 57 In this 
sense, deposit insurance is supplementary to the capital adequacy requirements (focusing on 
solvency) and LOLR (purposed to help banks facing liquidity problem). 58 
In terms of consumer protection, a deposit insurance scheme is designed to minimize 
or eliminate the risk that depositors placing funds with a bank will suffer a loss. It thus offers 
protection to the deposits of households and small business enterprises, which may represent 
life savings or vital transaction balance. 
A related effect of deposit insurance that may be important in some financial systems 
is that it levels the playing field to a degree for large and small institutions. Under a 
formalized deposit insurance program, all institutions have access to depositor protection in 
the amounts specified by the coverage rules. 59 
Finally, the explicit rules of a deposit insurance program provide added certainty 
regarding the resolution process for failed banks. A properly balanced deposit insurance 
program can provide order in winding up the affairs of a failing institution, and can thus 
facilitate the establishment of an effective exit mechanism. 60 
Arguments against deposit insurance There are numerous arguments against deposit 
insurance. With regard to deposit insurance as an antidote to runs and panics, it is argued that 
bank runs are not totally bad. Indeed, some economists argue that bank runs have beneficial 
56 E. g., in the U. S., it was because of the failure of the Federal Reserve System in preventing the financial crisis 
of the early 1930s that the Congress established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1933. See, e. g., 
Sinkey, Joseph F. Jr., 'Regulatory Attitudes toward Risk', in Aspinwall, Richard C. & Eisenbeis Robert A. 
(eds. ), Handbook for Banking Strategy, 349 (1985). 
In Canada the introduction of deposit insurance in 1967 followed a bank run on a sound institution, 
although prevention of bank runs was not the main focus of the legislation. See Schwartz, Anna J., 'Financial 
Stability and the Federal Safety Net', in Harif, William S. & Kushmeider, Rose Marie (eds. ), Restructuring 
Banking & Financial Services in America (1988). 
s' See Ketcha, Nicholas J Jr., supra note 3, at 223. Ketcha argues that no amount of prudential supervision can 
provide protection against runs that is equivalent to deposit insurance. Id. 
8 See Dewatripont, Mathias & Tirole, Jean, The Prudential Regulation of Banks 59-60 (1994). Capital 
adequacy requirements and lender of last resort do not rule out panics when a bank becomes insolvent, if 
depositors fear that they will not be fully reimbursed in case of failure. Those two authors attributes the absence 
of bank runs of large shock in the US in late 1980s to the depositors' trust in the deposit insurance system. Id. 
59 See Ketcha, Nicholas J Jr., supra note 3, at 224. 
60 ld., at 225. 
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monitoring effects: because bank managers can quickly and covertly substitute riskier asset 
with less risky assets; and the private market arguably imposes a particularly stringent form 
of discipline against managerial misconduct. b' In these authors' view, even a banking crisis, 
for all its costs, functions as a stringent form of marketplace discipline. 62 
The strongest argument against deposit insurance is that it creates a severe moral 
hazard63 on the part of insured banks. "Public deposit insurance encourages bank owners and 
managers (particularly in troubled banks) to take irresponsible or excessive risks than if bank 
deposits were not insured. It also encourages insured depositors and sometimes soother bank 
creditors not to monitor the bank as carefully and diligently as they would without 
insurance. , 64 
The macro-economic consequences of deposit insurance are also used to oppose 
deposit insurance. It is argued that the insurer will have to pay out large claims to depositors 
of failed banks in the event of a banking crisis and such a situation may create a nearly 
irresistible urge to obtain the necessary funds through central bank borrowing and 
consequently creates a clear and present danger of inflation. 65 
Another macro-economic effect of deposit insurance is that it can mask economic 
problems until those problems are so far advanced that they impose real costs on the 
economy. To the extent that deposit insurance removes a source of discipline on policy- 
makers, it creates a danger of poor economic policies in the future. 66 The final macro- 
economic effect of deposit insurance is that if the government faces a banking crisis, it may 
attempt to manipulate policy to reduce the government's liabilities. 67 
3. Doctrine of Necessity 
As shown above, there are no overwhelming arguments in favor of establishing deposit 
insurance. As Professor Geoffery Miller concludes, arguments for and against deposit 
61 See, e. g., Calomiris C. W. & Kahn, C. M., `The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking 
Arrangements', 81 American Economic Review 497 (1993). 
62 See, e. g., Miller, Geoffery P., supra note 54, at 41. 
63 The term "moral hazard" - drawn from the nineteenth century insurance practice - refers to the fact that a 
party who is insured against a risk may fail to take adequate precautions against the harm occurring. Id., at 42. 
See Lastra, Rosa Maria, supra note 4, at 130. 
65 See, e. g., Miller, Geoffery P., supra note 54, at 43. 
66 Id. 
67 Although there is no direct evidence to this effect, it appears possible that the Federal Reserve kept American 
interest rates low during the late 1980s and early 1990s in part to reduce the costs of the S&L debacle. Id., at 
43-4. 
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insurance are finely balanced. 68 Then why have so many countries chosen to adopt a deposit 
insurance system? 
The doctrine of necessity might be able to offer a good explanation, although not 
necessarily satisfactory. International experience shows that in the case of a severe banking 
crisis, a government will have no choice but to bail out depositors even if the government has 
made no explicit promise to do so. In country after country, governments that have closed 
banks and attempted to allow depositors to incur losses only found they themselves to extend 
assistance subsequently in order to deal with political outrage and prevent a widening of the 
crisis. 69 In developing or transitional economies, even if there is no explicit deposit 
insurance, there is often a form of implicit insurance with much the same effect, albeit 
subject to a degree of uncertainty as to the size or scope of the guarantee. 70 
The up and down of deposit insurance in Argentina shows clearly how the doctrine of 
necessity works. Before 1991, there operated an explicit deposit insurance system in the 
country. In 1991-2, Argentina reversed course by repealing its deposit insurance program. It 
was stated that under no circumstances would the government rescue a failing bank. Yet this 
announcement seemed to go by the wayside during Argentina's financial crisis of 1995-1996. 
Political pressures from bank failures and economic instability became so severe that theory 
had to yield to necessity: a new deposit insurance system was established immediately after 
the crisis. 7' 
4. To Replace the Implicit Government Guarantee in China with Explicit Deposit Insurance 
(i) China's Current Government Implicit Guarantee 
To date, there is no explicit deposit insurance in China, despite the general provisions that to 
encourage household deposit and savings, the government shall protect the ownership and 
72 other legitimate rights on household deposit and savings. The Commercial Banking Law 
provides that "A commercial bank shall guarantee the payment of the principal and interests 
68 Id. 
69 See Talley, S. H. & Mas, I., Deposit Insurance in Developing Countries, the World Bank Policy Research and 
External Affairs Working Paper WPS 548,4 and note 3 (1990). 
70 See, e. g., Miller, Geoffery P., supra note 54, at 49. 
'1 Id., at 50. 
72 Regulations Governing Deposit and Savings [chuxv guanli tiaoli], promulgated by the State Council on 
December 11,1992 (hereinafter referred to as "Regulations Governing Deposit and Savings"), art. 5. 
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of every deposit and shall not delay or refuse the payment thereof. "73 The law also gives 
priority to individual depositors when banks go bankrupt. 74 
But in fact, China has long been carrying out an implicit government guarantee. 75 
Although the government has made no legally binding commitment to fully repaying the 
household deposits of ailing institutions, such commitments were made on the closure of 
China Agricultural Trust and Investment Company, Hainan Development Bank and other 
financial institutions. 76 In China's first financial institution bankruptcy case - the 
Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation (GITIC) case, GITIC's 
individual depositors were fully paid by Guangdong province government in their deposit 
principals. 77 
In the most recent closure of three Wuhan financial institutions that allegedly violated 
regulations and consequently were not able to repay their debts on time, the PBOC Wuhan 
branch promised that individual creditors would be paid fully in principals and interests. 78 
The government's main concern, obviously, is the social stability. 
(ii) Arguments for and against Government Implicit Guarantee 
There are arguments in favor of implicit deposit insurance. Implicit insurance may not cost 
taxpayers as much money if the bank can be stabilized without a full-scale deposit payout. 79 
" The Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks, adopted at the 13th Session of the 
Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on March 18,1995, and effective as of July 1, 
1995 (hereinafter referred to as "the Commercial Banking Law"), art. 33. See also Regulations Governing 
Deposit and Savings, supra note 72, art. 14. 
74 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 73, art. 71. Paragraph 2 of this article reads as follows: 
At the time of bankruptcy liquidation, a commercial bank shall give priority to paying the principal and interests of savings 
deposits after paying the liquidation fees and its staff wages and labor insurance fees in arrears. 
75 See, e. g., Lau, Lawrance J., 'The Macroeconomy and Reform of the Banking Sector in China' in 
Strengthening the Banking System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,59, at 74 (October 
1999). 
76 In all these cases, individual depositors were fully paid off. See Chinaonline, 'Gitic Bankruptcy Follows Four 
China Financial Institution Closures Since 1996', available at 
'http: //Www. chinaonline. com/top_stories/today_b90/ 1326. html '. 
" It was announced at the GITIC creditors' meeting on January 10,1999 that, with the approval of the 
Guangdong Provincial People's Government, the Guangdong Provincial Finance Department would transfer 
funds to the BOC for the purpose of repaying the principal owing to GITIC's individual depositors; once 
repayment had been made, the BOC Guangdong Branch would, on behalf of the Guangdong Provincial Finance 
Department, subrogate to the rights of the individual depositors and register the claims as an ordinary creditor 
with the liquidation committee established by the People's Court. On January 11,1999, the BOC issued a public 
notice giving effect to the above arrangement. See Lam, Joseph, 'The Insolvency of GITIC', J. I. B. L No. 6,193, 
at 193 & note 2 (1999). 
78 See Chinaonline, 'Bankers' Hours Just Got Shorter: Central Bank Shuts Down Three Wuhan Financial 
Institutions' (July 11,2000), available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/000711/1/c00071008. asp'. 
79 See, e. g., Miller, Geoffery P., supra note 54, at 51. 
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Moreover, implicit deposit insurance does not require that depositors be paid. The 
uncertainty about the amount of coverage and the speed with which the payments will be 
made introduces "constructive ambiguity" into the system and retains a certain amount of 
market discipline. 80 
The arguments against implicit deposit insurance are more compelling, however. 
First, as discussed before, in the context of widespread banking disruption, the political 
pressure of angry citizens demanding to be paid will make it necessary as a practical matter 
to protect depositors even if the government has made no explicit promise to do so. Second, 
the implicit deposit insurance guarantee carries with it the danger that the government will 
not commit itself to supervising banks properly in order to prevent losses in the first place. 8' 
This hands-off approach gives the government greater flexibility. But, the resulting level of 
supervision may be inappropriate low. 82 Last but not least, an implicit guarantee cannot be 
limited. It is impractical for the government to announce on the one hand that it is not 
insuring bank deposits, while on the other hand set a ceiling for its guarantee. In this sense, 
an implicit deposit guarantee can end up costing more than an explicit guarantee because the 
implicit guarantee often means a 100% pay-out. 83 
(iii) Conclusion: China Should Replace the Current Government Implicit Guarantee 
with Explicit Deposit Insurance 
In addition to the above arguments against implicit government guarantee, there is another 
argument against the implicit government guarantee in China. The implicit government 
guarantee in China, because it is based on the State-ownership of most of the banks, has 
given State banks competitive advantages over non-state-owned banks. The closing down of 
the Hainan Development Bank and GITIC, for example, triggered a shift of tens of billions of 
savings from the non-state-owned banks to the "big four", although the financial situation of 
the "big four" is at least no better than most of the smaller banks» It is therefore necess. ary 
to have an explicit deposit insurance system that gives depositors in medium and small-sized 
80 See Demirguc-Kunt, Ash, supra note 1. 
s Indeed, the government may have an incentive affirmatively to avoid strict supervision, since if the 
government did supervise banks and represented to the public that banks were under government regulation, 
arguments in favor of a payout would be greatly strengthened. 
82 See, e. g., Miller, Geoffery P., supra note 54, at 51. 
83 Id. 
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banks some guarantee so that these medium and small-sized banks will not be too 
disadvantaged to compete with their large counterparts. 
With regard to the two arguments in favor of implicit government guarantee, the 
author would like to claim that these arguments do not exist in China. The implicit deposit 
insurance, instead of enhancing market discipline, may also provide an expectation of 
government bailout. It therefore fails in the view of those who favor stricter market 
discipline. Besides, because the government have to compensate individual depositors 
whenever a financial institution is closed, 85 it is hard to say that the implicit guarantee would 
save the government any money. The Chinese government has recognized the problem with 
its implicit guarantee and has given signal to the market by the GITIC case that the 
government cannot always be counted on to rescue troubled financial institutions. 
The conclusion is obvious here: China should substitute its current implicit 
government guarantee with an explicit and limited deposit insurance program. It is reported 
that China plans to establish a deposit insurance scheme to prop up fragile public confidence 
in the financial sector86 and enhance the commercial independence of Chinese banks. 97 
B. ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED AND PRINCIPLES TO BE FOLLOWED IN 
DESIGNING CHINA'S DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM 
1. Issues to Be Considered 
There are no fixed models for a deposit insurance program. The funding, coverage and 
administration of deposit insurance vary greatly across countries. 88 
84 See, e. g., Pu, Yonghao, 'Why China Won't Be Asia's Next Basket Case Economy', available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/commentary 
-anal 
ysis/ac_c9041941. html '. 
85 Because of the lack of deposit insurance scheme, when the net realizable assets of a closed financial 
institution are not enough to repay the principal of saving deposit of individuals, shareholders, local 
governments, or the central bank usually have to subsidize the repayment. See Xie, Ping, supra note 30, at 127. 
6 Although there is no contagious bank run in China, there have been reports about isolated bank runs. For 
example, it was reported that in April 1999, an Internet rumor about cash problems at the Zhengzhou branch of 
the Bank of Communications triggered a one-day bank run in which about RMB900m in savings was 
withdrawn. See, e. g., 'China Bank Reform', Far E. Econ. Rev., 74 (1999); and also Chinaonline, 'Trial Opens 
for 3 Accused of Spreading Rumors about the Bank of Communications' (June 30,2000), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/0006301 /1 /000062910. asp'. 
87 See, e. g., Harding, James, 'China Plans Savings Protection Scheme', Fin. Times (April 28,1999). 
as One of the IMF working paper surveys 50 deposit insurance systems worldwide and finds that 41 of 50 
schemes are compulsory. A substantial number of the systems surveyed exclude particular types of deposit: 12 
exclude foreign currency deposits, 36 do not cover inter-bank deposits, and 8 guarantee only household 
deposits. Thirty-eight systems maintain an ongoing fund, whereas nine impose ex post levies. Thirty-nine of the 
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A World Bank working paper observes a wide disparity among deposit insurance 
schemes, varying along dimensions such as: (1) whether the insurance is implicit or explicit; 
(2) the type of institutions covered; (3) public vs. private sponsorship; (4) compulsory tis. 
voluntary systems; (5) single vs. multiple funds; (6) amount and limits of coverage; (7) types 
of deposits covered; (8) methods of financing coverage; (9) methods for determining 
premium assessments; (10) assessment levels; (11) investment policies; (12) standards for 
admission and termination; (13) failure resolution devices; and (14) organization 
arrangements. 89 These are actually dimensions of a deposit system and should be considered 
one by one in designing a country's deposit insurance system. 
2. Principles for Designing a Deposit Insurance System 
In designing China's deposit insurance system, three principles must be followed. First, the 
deposit insurance system must be established by legislation, i. e., legislation must be adopted 
to provide for the organization, coverage and funding of the deposit insurance system. 
Second, in designing the organization coverage and funding of deposit insurance system, 
caution must be taken to mitigate or avoid the moral hazard problem inherent with the 
deposit insurance system. Third, the deposit insurance system must be in harmony with 
China's existing financial system. 
(i) The Explicit Deposit Insurance Should be Established by Legislation 
As discussed above, there are several problems with the government implicit guarantee. The 
explicit deposit insurance guarantee can eliminate or mitigate these problems because the 
government is forced to take some degree of responsibility in its financial planning for the 
costs of the contingent liability, and because the government is likely to behave more 
50 systems charge premiums to covered banks. Forty-three systems limit coverage in one form or another, but 
only 10 systems utilize co-insurance to combat moral hazard. Forty-six of the 50 systems are privately funded, 
although most of these receive official help at one time or another. Eleven systems are privately administered, 
23 are run by the government, and 14 are jointly operated. See Garcia, G, supra note 13. 
89 See Talley, S. H. & Mas, I., supra note 69. 
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responsibly in its supervision policies. 90 Most significantly, the explicit deposit insurance can 
be explicitly limited. 91 
These advantages, however, cannot materialize without proper predetermined rules 
and procedures. Legislation is therefore essential, as Chinese scholars have also recognized. 92 
(ii) The Deposit Insurance System Should Be Designed in as Incentive-compatible a 
Way as Possible 
The moral hazard problem of deposit insurance has been extensively discussed. To mitigate 
the moral hazards inherent to deposit insurance, market discipline needs to be introduced to 
limit or reduce the risks and costs of a bank failure to the insurer. Such discipline can be 
exercised by: 93 (1) setting a ceiling of protection; (2) introducing risk-based insurance 
premiums instead of a flat rate that does not consider risk taken; (3) establishing adequate 
firewalls so as not to subsidize trading activities; (4) raising bank capital requirements, which 
act as a deductible; and/or (5) introducing a system of coinsurance or a system of private 
insurance. 
It would be impracticable to include all these features into China's deposit insurance 
program at once, given the fact that they are not even totally contained in any single deposit 
insurance scheme in the world. The deposit insurance system in China, however, should 
include as many as possible these incentive-compatible factors. 
(iii) The Deposit Insurance System Should Be in Harmony with the Existing Financial 
System 
90 See Miller, Geoffery P., supra note 54, at 51. 
91 Making deposit insurance explicit is the only practical way to ensure that it is also limited in amount. 'See 
Macey, J. R. & Miller, G. P., `Deposit Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the 
Term Structure of Banks' Assets and Liabilities', 12 Yale Journal on Regulation 1 (1995). 
92 See Chen, Yin, `Basic Ideas on China's Deposit Insurance System (jianli woguo chunkun baoxian zhidu de 
jiben gouxiang]', Economic Science (jingji kexue) No. 4,25, at 25 (April, 1999). That author suggests that the 
law should provide for the operational procedures of deposit insurance system, the constitution of the deposit 
insurance corporation, the main function of deposit insurance corporation and its inspection powers, the 
premium rate and how to deal with problem institutions, etc. The author even suggests that the bill should be 
drafted jointly by the PBOC and the Ministry of Finance. Id. at 25-6. 
93 See, e. g., Lastra, Rosa Maria, supra note 4, at 133; and also Benston, George J. & Kaufman, George G., 
`Regulating Bank Safety and Performance', in Harif, William S. & Kushmeider, Rose Marie (eds. ), 
Restructuring Banking & Financial Services in America (1988). 
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The logic behind this principle is obvious. Deposit insurance, as part of a country's financial 
system, can only be established and operated within that specific system. This rule has 
special meaning in China. China is now reshuffling its financial system as part of its efforts 
to transform the planned economy to market economy. Attention needs to be paid to this 
transitional feature in designing China's deposit insurance system. 
C. DESIGNING CHINA'S DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM 
1. Organizational Structure, Coverage and Funding of Deposit Insurance94 
(i) The Organizational Structure 
The organizational structure of deposit insurance denotes the insurer's relationships with 
other government agencies (especially the banking regulators) and with the insured. 
Theoretically, an independent deposit insurer is necessary because the deposit insurer is 
vulnerable to political pressures, especially when there is a large-sized bank disruption. An 
independent authority is in the best position to resist such pressures. However, it must be 
recognized that establishing a separate authority for deposit insurance requires careful 
attention to the balance of powers among various banking authorities, given the incentives 
towards conservatism on the part of the insurer. 
Another related issue is whether the deposit insurer should also have direct 
supervisory authority. In cases where the insurer is not also a bank supervisor, the 
arrangement must provide the insurer with the necessary information on the current condition 
and operations of all insured institutions. When the deposit insurer also has supervisory 
responsibilities, the internal structure must provide for appropriate balance between these 
functions. In China, this issue becomes whether the insurer should be subordinated to the 
PBOC or independent from the PBOC. If the insurer is subordinated to the PBOC then it is 
not necessary to authorize it with supervisory powers and the insurer will not have problem 
in obtaining information about the insured. 
There is suggestion in China that a Deposit Insurance Company be established by 
adopting a Deposit Insurance Company Law. 95 That author suggests that the Company 
94 The discussion in this section draws heavily from Ketcha, Nicholas J Jr., supra note 3 and Demirguc-Kunt, 
Ash, supra note 1. 
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should not be a government agency, but a special policy financial institution, with the 
authority to inspect and examine the depositary institutions on the basis of deposit insurance 
contracts. 96 According to that author, the Company would collect premiums from deposit- 
taking institutions, manage the deposit insurance fund, deal with problem institutions, and 
would pay off depositors when a deposit-taking institution is closed. 97 
The current author agrees with these suggestions except that the insurer, from this 
author's point of view, should be a government agency rather than a special policy financial 
institution. Given that the government back-up is essential for the public confidence in the 
insurer, and that without a wide branch network, it would not be possible for the insurer to 
carry out efficient examination and inspection on depositary institutions nationwide, 98 it 
might be a good idea to make the deposit insurance company part of the PBOC, or at least 
closely affiliated to the PBOC. 
(ii) The Scope of Deposit Insurance 
The scope of deposit insurance denotes the scope of activities that should be brought under 
an insurance protection scheme. It is important to avoid including activities unnecessary, 
given the potential conflict between deposit insurance and market discipline. 
The attempt to minimize unwarranted expansion of the deposit insurance safety net 
raises questions about whether banking organizations should conduct non-banking activities, 
and what should constitute a banking activity for the deposit insurance purpose. Since 
commercial banks in China are now prohibited from engaging in non-banking activities, 99 
these questions are not urgent for policy-makers in China, at least for this moment. 
Problem remains, however, about whether the deposit insurance should protect 
deposits of all types, or be limited to protect individual depositors only. Of the deposit 
insurance scheme surveyed by Garcia, 27 exclude all or some foreign currency deposits, 45 
95 See Chen, Yin, supra note 92, at 25. 
96 Id., at 27. 
97 Id., at 26. 
98 It has been stressed that if a deposit insurance scheme is established, the agency needs adequate powers - 
"The creation of deposit insurance schemes with insufficient resources or legal powers to deal with the 
problems can be disastrous. These institutions give the illusion of a responsible agency without the substance. 
Deposit protection agencies in Kenya and the Philippines were not provided with sufficient resources to deal 
with the rising level of bank problems, and the end the rescuer had to be rescued. " See Sheng A., Bank 
Restructuring: Lessons from the 1980s, 47 (World Bank, 1996). 
99 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 73, art. 43. 
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do not cover inter-bank deposits, and 16 guarantee only, or mainly, household deposits. '°° 
The current author would suggest that the deposit insurance in China only protects the 
individual depositors, including both their RMB and foreign currency deposit savings in 
depositary institutions within the administrative territory of the PBOC, 101 in consistency with 
the scope of China's current government implicit guarantee. 
(iii) The Deposit Insurance Coverage 
Striking the right balance is critical in establishing the coverage limit for insured instruments. 
The coverage must be sufficient to prevent destabilizing bank runs, but not so extensive as to 
eliminate all effective market discipline on banks' risk-taking. 
The basic principle here is that to constrain excessive bank risk-taking, the formal 
insurance coverage should not be complete. The situation worldwide is that most countries 
specify an upper limit to the size of the deposit balance that is officially protected, some 
countries provide only co-insurance, such as protection for 80% of a deposit account 
balance; 102 while some countries employ both the ceiling and coinsurance. 103 These 
arrangements are important because they provide an incentive for all depositors to monitor 
bank risk-taking by exposing them to small losses. 
The coverage, however, must be sufficient to prevent destabilizing bank runs. It is 
intuitive that deposit insurance coverage limits should bear some relationship to measures of 
income and wealth, so as to provide a relatively constant amount of protection to savers. The 
IMF uses one or two-times per capita GDP as the general rule in advising countries on 
appropriate limits for deposit insurance coverage. 104 China might be able to follow this rule 
in deciding the coverage of deposit insurance. In one of the reported financial institution 
closure cases - the closure of 14 urban credit cooperatives in Beihai city, Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region, 105 a ceiling of RMB10000 was set to repay each deposit account, with 
100 See Garcia, G, supra note 13, at 10. 
101 See Chen, Yin, supra note 92, at 29. The administrative territory of the PBOC excludes Hong Kong and 
Macao. 
102 See Ketcha, Nicholas J Jr., supra note 3, at 229. 
103 E. g., in the UK, the deposit protection scheme covers 75% of the first £20000 of sterling deposits made with 
an "authorized institution. " See. e. g., Lastra, Rosa Maria, supra note 4, at 131. 
104 See Ketcha, Nicholas J Jr., supra note 3, at 229. 
105 For details of the case, see Liu, Shiyu, `China's Experience in Small and Medium Financial Institution 
Resolution' in Strengthening the Banking System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7, 
298, at 300-1 (October 1999). 
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the remaining debts to be paid in installments and in proportion depending on the proceeds 
from the sale of assets. 106 
This author would like to suggest that the law fix both a floor and a ceiling for 
compensation to household depositors. When the total amount of deposit savings held by an 
individual with a closed institution is under the floor, the depositor should be fully 
compensated. If the aggregate deposit savings of an individual with a closed institution 
exceed the floor, the depositor would be fully compensated for his/her deposit savings up to 
the floor but can only be paid a certain percentage of the remaining claims. Moreover, the 
aggregate compensation an individual can receive from the insurer shall be "ceiled". 107 
(iv) Funding the Deposit Insurance 
The majority of deposit insurance systems operate through a stand-alone fund against which 
draws are made from time to time as banks fail. 108 With regard to the funding of a deposit 
insurance fund, at the two extremities are a public-funded deposit insurance system and a 
stand-alone deposit insurance fund financed solely through premiums paid by insured 
institutions. 109 A combination of the two can also be considered, i. e., a stand-alone deposit 
insurance fund financed through premiums paid by insured institutions supplemented by 
public money. 
One benefit of establishing a stand-alone deposit insurance fund financed solely 
through premiums paid by insured institutions is that these institutions may perceive a direct 
stake in the financial health of the insurance system, providing motivation for them to 
scrutinize deposit insurance operations and maintain industry self-policing. 110 It must be 
stressed here, however, it is the financial capacity of the insuring entity that lends credibility 
to a deposit insurance guarantee, and thereby removes much of the incentive for bank runs. 
That explains why in many large economies the taxing and borrowing authority of the 
106 Id., at 301. The RMB 10000 ceiling guaranteed the full payment of small depositors (accounting for roughly 
60% of all depositors). Id. 
107 See also Chen, Yin, supra note 92, at 30. 
108 See Talley, S. H. & Mas, I., supra note 69, at 13. 
109 E. g., in the UK, the deposit protection scheme is financed through a levy on all authorized institutions in 
proportion to their deposit base. See, e. g., Lastra, Rosa Maria, supra note 4,131. 10 See Ketcha, Nicholas J Jr., supra note 3, at 231. 
198 
CHAPTER FOUR: BANKING SAFETY NET 
national government provides the maximum financial capacity and government-provided 
deposit insurance. ' 11 
In a country like China where banks and depositors have gotten so used to implicit 
government guarantee, and given the weak capital situation of most Chinese banks"' 2 the 
author would not suggest that China choose to fund its deposit insurance scheme solely 
through premiums paid by banks. The banks, however, should pay premiums which they can 
afford. In other words, the government would have to financially and administratively 
support the scheme at least for its initial stage. A stand-alone deposit insurance fund financed 
through premiums paid by insured institutions supplemented by public fund might be an 
optimal choice for China. 113 
2. Deposit Insurance Premiums 
A simple and relatively easy-to-implement system for assessing deposit insurance premiums 
is to assess all insured institutions at a given rate per unit of deposit or per unit of other 
assessment base that reflects the total coverage provided. Such a pricing system is aimed at 
maintaining adequate financial capacity for the insurer, and leaves the task of controlling 
moral hazard to the supervisory process and the market. 
This flat-rate system was employed in the US for almost 60 years and was widely 
criticized because the premiums were not risk related and therefore provided incentives to 
insured institutions to invest in risky projects and contributed to economic inefficiency by the 
subsidy to the borrowers. ' 14 The debates and criticisms eventually led to the introduction of a 
risk-related premium system in the US. 
Ideally, risk-based pricing of deposit insurance would influence bank decision- 
making well ahead of supervisory sanctions, providing incentives ex ante for institutions to 
avoid undue risk-taking. The implementation of the risk-based pricing, however, remains a 
111 Id., at 225-26.1 
112 It was estimated that if the "big four" in 1995 had made deposit insurance contributions of only 0.2% of their 
deposits, their reported pre-tax profits could have been reduced by one-third. See Lardy, Nicholas R., 'The 
Challenge of Bank Restructuring in China' in Strengthening the Banking System in China: Issues and 
Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,25 (October 1999). 
113 But Cf. Chen, Yin, supra note 92, at 27, where that author suggests that the size of the deposit insurance fund 
is not important because the deposit insurance corporation has the back up of the government. Chen proposes 
that the deposit insurance corporation needs only RMBIbn registered, capital, with RMB500m from the PBOC 
and the Ministry of Finance and other RMB500m contributed by the deposit-taking institutions. Id. 
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problem. Charging risk-rated premiums involves a reliance on regulators to measure bank 
risk-takings. Using market indicators to measure this risk would be difficult since market 
perceptions of bank risk would incorporate existing safety net policies. 
Indeed, in the U. S., where insurance premiums are risk-rated, the range of premiums 
charged is very small, with more than 90% of the banks qualifying for the lowest assessment 
rate of zero. ' 15 Such practices question the efficacy of controlling risk through risk-rated 
premiums. Actually, only 11 countries had adopted the risk-based pricing by 1999. And, 
none of these systems has gone through an entire banking cycle and must be considered as 
still in the experimental stage. ' 16 
Given the difficulties in implementing the risk-based pricing system, this author 
would recommend that China have a flat premium at first. ' 7 The premium, however, should 
be adjustable according to the changing situation. ' 18 
3. Membership of the Deposit Insurance System 
Currently, deposit-taking institutions in China include the "big four", other domestic 
commercial banks, urban credit cooperative, rural credit cooperatives, foreign bank branches, 
and postal savings. 119 There are three proposals regarding the membership of the deposit 
insurance system. Some propose a deposit insurance system covering only urban and rural 
credit cooperatives, while others propane a deposit insurance system covering all deposit- 
taking institutions in China. Between these two is a proposal that the "big four" should be 
exempted from joining the deposit insurance system. 120 
The current author would not discuss here whether foreign bank branches should be 
included in the deposit insurance system. Respecting other deposit-taking institutions, 
114 See, e. g., Schwartz, Anna J., supra note 56, at 50; Benston, George J. & Kaufman, George G., supra note 93; 
and also Peterson, Manferd 0., 'Regulatory Objectives and Conflicts', in Aspinwall, Richard C. & Eisenbeis 
Robert A. (eds. ), Handbook for Banking Strategy, 337-38 (1985). 
115 In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1995 cut premiums to zero for well- 
capitalized commercial banks. But a fewer weaker banks paid premiums as much as 0.27% of deposits. See 
Wilke, John R., 'FDIC Premiums for Most Banks Eliminated to Zero', Wall Street Journal, A4 (November 15, 
1995). 
116 See Ketcha, Nicholas J Jr., supra note 3, at 233. 
1" But Cf. Chen, Yin, supra note 92, at 29, where that author proposes a risk-adjusted premium system. Id., at 
32. 
1 18 E. g., in Japan, where falling stock and land prices weakened the banking system in the first half of 1990s, the 
Ministry of Finance in late 1995 raised annual deposit insurance contribution six-fold, from 0.012% to 0.084% 
of deposits. See Baker, Gerard, 'Insurance Fees to Leap for Banks in Japan', Fin. Times (December 23,1995). 
119 Regulations Governing Deposit and Savings, supra note 72, art. 4. 
120 See, e. g., Chen, Yin, supra note 92, at 28. 
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however, the author prefers a system covering all the deposit-taking institutions, including 
the "big four,,, 121 on the basis of the following three arguments. 
First, the "adverse selection" problem can happen if the membership in the insurance 
system is voluntary and the premium charged is not related to risk. Because such an 
insurance is much more valuable for weaker banks and costly for stronger ones, stronger 
banks tend to remain outside of the insurance scheme to avoid having to subsidize their 
weaker counterparts. A risk-related premium system can address the adverse selection 
problem, but to the extent that risk-related premiums may not fully reflect all the risks posed 
by insured institutions, compulsory membership still may be warranted. 122 
Second, the argument that it is unnecessary for the "big four" to join the deposit 
insurance system because they are wholly State-owned and have full backup from the 
government is losing its validity. With the deepening of the financial reform, the "big four" 
will sooner or later have to be independent from the government. Besides, with China's 
entrance of the WTO, the "big four" will face more and more competition pressures from 
transnational banks backed by deposit insurance in their home countries. 
Third, without the joining of the "big four", the deposit insurance system in China 
will not be able to be self-supported. The "big four" banks had about 63% of the deposit and 
loan market of the whole country in the year 1998. That means if they do not join the deposit 
insurance scheme, the scheme would not be able to be sufficiently funded. 
4. Summary 
Following the principles set in Section B, key components of a deposit insurance system are 
considered in this section on the basis of China's particularities. It is recommended that 
legislation be passed to establish a Deposit Insurance Company, providing deposit insurance 
to deposits in all depositary institutions in China (including the "big four"). The Company 
should have the authority to inspect and examine the insured institutions. The Company 
would collect premiums from deposit-taking institutions at a flat rate adjustable to the 
changing situation, would manage the deposit insurance fund and deal with problem 
institutions, and would pay off depositors when a deposit-taking institution fails. The 
company should be affiliated to the PBOC. Respecting the scope and coverage of deposit 
121 Id., at 28-9, where that author argues for a deposit insurance system including the "big four". 
122 See, e. g., Ketcha, Nicholas J Jr., supra note 3, at 232. 
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insurance in China, it is recommended that the deposit insurance only protect individual 
depositors, with "floor" and "ceiling" fixed for compensation to a single depositor. 
D. TIMING THE INTRODUCTION OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
Timing the introduction of deposit insurance appropriately is not an easy job. On the one 
hand, "starting a deposit insurance scheme while the banking system is unsound" is regarded 
as a "departure from best practice" as it is likely to lead to a scheme with very wide 
coverage. 123 On the other hand, restoring public confidence and avoiding runs are important 
elements in restoring the health of the banking system, which would argue for an earlier 
introduction. 124 
It is far beyond the author's charge for this study to suggest a timetable of introducing 
deposit insurance in China. The point the author would like to make here is that, after an 
explicit deposit insurance system is introduced, the government should adhere to its 
commitment to pay out only those deposits that fall within the terms of the guarantee and no 
others when the deposit insurance system is put to the test the first time. 125 
IV. INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION126 
A. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Effective and timely resolution of insolvencies is probably one of the most important 
elements for a banking safety net. The timely resolution of failed institutions would reinforce 
systemic stability, promote public confidence in the system, and would restore liquidity to 
the economy. 127 The way a bank is handled when failure is imminent affects the willingness 
of potential lenders to lend to the troubled bank, the willingness of the supervisory authority 
123 See, e. g., Garcia, G, supra note 13, at 10. 
124 See Hawkins, John & Turner Philip, supra note 29, at 51. 
125 See, e. g., Miller, Geoffery P., supra note 54, at 52. The first time is important, because if the government 
fails to stand behind its commitment the first time, it may never be able to do so again. On the other hand, if the 
government does hold firm in the face of the political pressure, then its commitment gains credibility for the 
future. Id. 
126 The strategies discussed in this section are mainly options to deal with individual bank failure in a sound 
economy, and is different from the strategies dealing with a systemic crisis discussed in Chapter One. Closure 
and liquidation, for example, is discussed both here and in Chapter One, but it bears different meanings. In 
Chapter One, we are talking about closing and liquidating at large size, while here we focus on issues related to 
the closure and liquidation of individual banks. 
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to intervene, and the willingness of the bank managers to act efficiently if they stand a 
chance of keeping their jobs under some forms of failure resolution. 
Excluding the regulatory forbearance (which has been discussed in Chapter One), 
basic regulatory options to deal with a failed bank might include closure and liquidation 
(deposit payoff), a rescue package or open bank assistance, merger and take over (e. g., 
purchase and assumption), and bridge bank. 128 To date, all these alternatives have been 
applied in some form, in China, 129 although the 1995 Commercial Banking Law130 only 
provides briefly for the management take-over (a variation of bridge bank) and liquidation 
(including bankruptcy) of commercial banks. 
B. CLOSURE AND LIQUIDATION (DEPOSIT PAYOFF) 
Closure and Liquidation is the legal process whereby the assets of an institution are sold and 
its liabilities are settled to the extent possible and its license is withdrawn. The bank closure 
can be voluntary or forced, within or outside general bankruptcy procedures, and with or 
without court involvement. In liquidation, assets are sold to pay off the creditors in the order 
prescribed by the law. If there is deposit insurance, insured depositors are paid immediately 
under the insurance scheme. 
Simple as it is, closure and liquidation is generally the most expensive solution, 
because the franchise value of the institution disappears and valuable bank-firm relationships 
are destroyed. 13 1 Besides, bank closures may be difficult to organize without provoking asset 
stripping by owners, managers, and employers. Moreover, because loan collections may fall 
after a bank closure, closure may increase the ultimate cost of resolving the insolvency of the 
institution. 132 
127 See, e. g., Ketcha, Nicholas J Jr., supra note 3, at 235-6. 
128 See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 14, at 23 & box 3; and also Dewatripont, Mathias 
& Tirole, Jean, supra note 58, at 66-71. 
129 See Zhu, Jun, `Closure of Financial Institutions in China' in Strengthening the Banking System in China: 
Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,304, at 307-9 (October 1999). 
130 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 73, arts. 64-72. 
"' Because of this, the liquidation is mainly applied to small banks. In the US, for example, only 25% bank 
failures in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in liquidations, none of the ten largest FDIC resolution transactions 
involved a payoff transaction. See Dewatripont, Mathias & Tirole, Jean, supra note 58, at 69-70. Dr. Lastra lists 
out another risk of the liquidation option, i. e., confidence in the banking system may be seriously damaged, 
resulting in runs on other institutions. See Lastra, Rosa Maria, supra note 4, at 138. 
132 See, e. g., Enoch, Charles, Interventions in Banks During Banking Crises: The Experience of Indonesia, 2, the 
IMF Policy Discussion Paper (March 2000). 
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In China, most ailing financial institutions are closed out of the court system. So far, 
there is only one financial institution bankruptcy case. 
1. Out of Court Liquidation: Voluntary Closure Vs. Administrative Closure 
Currently, there are two ways to close a financial institution out of court in China: "voluntary 
closure" with debt repayment, and administrative closure with the PBOC withdrawing the 
problem institution's business license. In both cases, liquidation will have to be carried out to 
repay deposit principals and interests, and other debts. 
Respecting the voluntary closure, it is provided that when a commercial bank splits or 
merges with another one; or dissolves on reason for dissolution pursuant to the statute of the 
bank, it should submit an application to the PBOC with reasons for the dissolution and a plan 
for liquidation, including repaying the deposit principals and interests. Approval from the 
PBOC must be obtained before the bank can be dissolved. 133 After the approval of the 
PBOC, a liquidation term should be formed to conduct liquidation under the supervision of 
the PBOC. 134 
Article 70 of the Commercial Banking Law provides for the administrative closure, 
which reads as follows: 
When a commercial bank's banking permit is revoked, the PBOC shall immediately form a liquidation 
group to conduct liquidation, formulate liquidation plan, and repay the principals and interests of 
deposits in time. 135 
The voluntary closure does not have a lot to do with insolvency resolution. In the rest 
of this part, this author will focus on the administrative closure, which has been applied 
extensively by the PBOC to cope with failing financial institutions. From 1997 to 1998, the 
PBOC administratively closed 42 problem depository institutions, including one commercial 
bank (the Hainan Development Bank), 23 urban credit cooperatives and 18 rural credit 
cooperatives, and two trust and investment companies (China Agricultural Trust and 
133 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 73, art. 69, paragraph 1. 
1" Id., art. 69, paragraph 2. 
135 Id., art. 70. 
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Investment Corporation, China Venture Investment Corporation) (see Table 4.1: 
Administrative Closure of Financial Institutions in China). 136 
(i) Legal Infrastructure for Administrative Closure 
Widely applied as it is, the administrative closure has not been provided in details under the 
current legislation. The main legal basis for administrative closure is relevant provisions in 
the Central Banking Law137and Commercial Banking Law. '38 
Article 74 of the Commercial Banking Law lists 8 circumstances where the PBOC 
can revoke a commercial bank's banking permit: 139 (1) that the commercial bank issues 
financial bonds or borrows funds from outside China without official approval; (2) that the 
commercial bank deals in government bonds, or deals in or acts as agent in dealing in foreign 
exchanges without official approval; (3) that the commercial bank engages in trust 
investment and stock business in the country, or making investment in real estate not for its 
own use; (4) that the commercial bank makes investment in non-bank financial institutions or 
enterprises in the country; (5) that the commercial bank extends unsecured loans to related 
persons or extends loans against a collateral on more favorable conditions than to other 
borrowers of similar loans; (6) that the commercial bank submit false financial statements or 
financial statements which conceal important facts; (7) that the commercial bank refuses to 
accept the supervision and examination by the PBOC; or (8) that the commercial bank leases 
or lends banking permit to a third party. 140 
With regard to non-bank financial institutions, the main legal basis is the Provisions 
on Financial Institution Administration 141 promulgated by the PBOC in 1994. Accordingly, 
136 See Liu, Shiyu, supra note 105, at 299. 
137 The Central Banking Law, supra note 21, art. 31. 
138 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 73, arts. 70,74. 
1391d., art. 74. 
140 These unlawful practices, however, do not necessary lead to the revoking of banking permit. Only if the case 
is particularly serious or the offender fails to make correction within the specified time, the PBOC may order it 
to suspend business and make rectification and consolidation, or revoke its banking permit. Id. 
141 Provisions on Financial Institution Administration (jinrong jigou guanli guiding], promulgated by the PBOC 
on August 5,1994. 
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Table 4.1: Administrative Closure of Financial Institutions in China 
Closed Institutions Closing Date Face Value on Closing Date 
(RMB: billion) 
Assets Liabilities 
5 Urban Credit Cooperatives in 16/12/97 5.4 5.9 
Hainan 
Hainan Development Bank 21/6/98 16.9 16.6 
Urban Credit Cooperative in 16/6/98 0.2 0.2 
Luchuan, Guangxi 
Hongye Urban Credit 12/7/98 0 0 
Cooperative in Qinghai 
12 Urban Credit Cooperatives in 26/10/98 1.5 1.5 
Beihai, Guanxi 
20 Urban Credit Cooperatives in 7/12/98 8.5 8.3 
Pingen, Guangdong 
CATIC (China Agricultural Trust 4/1/97 30.1 31.4 
and Investment Corporation) 
CVIT 6/98 10.3 10.4 
Total 72.9 74.3 
Sources: Table 2: Summary of Closure of Financial Institutions in China in Liu, Shiyu, 'China's Experience in 
Small and Medium Financial Institution Resolution' in Strengthening the Banking System in China: Issues and 
Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,298, at 299 (October 1999). 
the PBOC may close down a financial institution where: 142 (1) it has seriously violated 
relevant laws, administrative rules, or State policies; (2) it has not commenced business 
within 90 days of obtaining its "Permit of a Financial Institution with the Status of a Legal 
142 Id., art. 42. 
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Person" or "Business Permit of a Financial Institution"; (3) its capital no longer meets the 
minimum standards set by the central bank, or its management no longer meets the "fit and 
proper" requirements of the central bank; (4) it has ceased business for more than six 
consecutive months or an aggregate period of more than one year; (5) it has been acquired by 
or has merged with another financial institution; (6) the losses suffered by it during the last 
three consecutive years account for 10% of its capital or the amount of its losses accounts for 
15% or more of its capital; (7) it has failed in an annual inspection and rectification and 
alteration are unsuccessful, or it has failed in two consecutive annual inspections; (8) it 
provided false information or did something improper in the course of its application for 
approval of establishment; or (9) there arise other circumstances determined by the PBOC. '43 
The administrative closure based on the above-mentioned laws or regulations is 
therefore virtually an administrative tool available to the PBOC to ensure that banks and non- 
bank financial institutions operate in compliance with the law and regulations. 144 Fortunately, 
starting from 1997, the PBOC acquired some experience in administrative closure and 
established a set of standard procedures. '45 
(ii) Closure Procedures'46 
The PBOC takes the following steps to close a problem institution. First, the central bank 
publishes its decision to close the financial institution and to revoke its business license. At 
the same time, the closed institution stops operation. In the most recent administrative 
closure of the Hainan Hong Kong & Macao Trust and Investment Company (HHKMTIC), 
for example, the PBOC closed the HHKMTIC by revoking its business permit and foreign- 
currency transaction permit on February 26,2000.147 
Second, if necessary, the PBOC will designate a financial institution (usually a 
commercial bank) to take care of the claims against and liabilities of the closed institution, 
143 In practice, the PBOC will close a financial institution if: (1) it has been continuously loss-making for 
several years; (2) it is seriously insolvent, cannot meet maturing debts, and has suffered a bank run; or (3) it 
violates relevant rules or laws. See Zhu, Jun, supra note 129, at 306. 
141 Id., at 305; and also Wang, Hailin & Chui, Liguo, `Legal Issues Concerning the Closure of Financial 
Institutions [guanbi jinrong jigou youguan falv wenti de jidian shikao]', People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 5 
(October 3,1998). 
145 See Liu, Shiyu, supra note 105, at 299-300. 
146 The discussion in this section draws heavily from Zhu, Jun, supra note 129 and Xie, Ping, supra note 30, at 
126-7. 
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and to wind up its business. In the HHKMTIC case, the BOC was appointed by the PBOC to 
form a group to settle the HHKMTIC's debts. 148 
Third, a liquidation team will be set up to liquidate the assets of the closed institution, 
to calculate its losses and net assets, and to confirm and register its debt. The team usually 
comprises representatives from the PBOC and the closed institution, in addition to external 
experts. With regard to the closure of small institutions owned by local governments, since 
the repayment of their debts usually involves local budgetary funds, representatives from 
local governments are sometimes also included in the liquidation team. 
Fourth, the liquidation team promulgates principles for the repayment of debts and 
formulate liquidation plan. The liquidation plan must be submitted to the PBOC for approval. 
After the liquidation plan is approved by the PBOC, the liquidation term should repay 
deposit principles and interests and other debts in a timely manner according to the plan. 
The administrative closure procedures can be terminated once the liquidator finds that 
the institution incurred such heavy losses that it is impossible to repay most of its debts. In 
this circumstance, the institution or its creditors would apply to the court for bankruptcy. 
Once the bankruptcy procedures begin, the administrative closure procedures terminate. The 
GITIC is a typical example for that. The GITIC was declared closure by the PBOC on 
October 6,1998. In January 1999, the company applied for bankruptcy protection. The 
application for bankruptcy automatically terminated the administrative closure procedures. 149 
(iii) Advantages and Disadvantages of the Administrative Closure 
The administrative closure has been widely employed by the PBOC to resolve failing 
financial institutions. So far, the procedures prove to be effective in locking in the level of 
losses and liabilities, reducing cost in risk management, protecting small and medium 
depositors, and averting systemic risks. '50 
The process of administrative closure, however, takes a significant amount. of 
financial and labor resources on the part of the PBOC and the appointed liquidator (usually a 
commercial bank). Meanwhile, the resolution of non-performing assets proved to be very 
147 See Kynge, James, `China Closes ITICs in Hainan', Fin. Times (March 1,2000); and Chinaonline, 'China 
Shutters Hainan Hong Kong & Macao Trust' (February 29,2000), available at 
'http: //www. ch inaonl in e. com/topstories/000229/2/CO0022810. asp'. 
148 Supra note 147. 
49 See Zhu Jun, supra note 129, at 313. 
150 See Liu, Shiyu, supra note 105, at 301. 
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difficult. With regard to the administrative closure cases listed in table 4.1, until March 1999, 
only the liquidation of CATIC had been completed, other closed institutions were still in the 
liquidation process. 151 
2. Bankruptcy 
(i) Statutory Provisions 
The Commercial Banking Law provides for the bankruptcy of commercial bank. Article 71 
of the Law reads as follows: 
When a commercial bank is incapable of repaying its mature debts, may, with the consent of the 
PBOC, be declared bankrupt by the People's Court. When a commercial bank is declared bankrupt in 
accordance with the law, the People's Court may organize the PBOC and other relevant departments 
and personnel to form a liquidation group to conduct liquidation. 
At the time of bankruptcy liquidation, a commercial bank shall give priority to paying the 
principal and interests of savings deposits after paying the liquidation fees and its staff wages and labor 
insurance fees in arrears. 
Apart from this brief article, the only relevant legislation is the 1986 Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law, ' 52 which applies to "enterprises owned by the whole people"; '53 and 
Chapter XIX: Procedure for Bankruptcy of Enterprise as Legal Persons of the Civil 
Procedure Law, 151 which applies to non-state owned enterprise legal persons. 155 These two 
laws just list briefly in principle the bankruptcy procedures. 156 The sketchiness of the laws 
creates difficulties in their implementation. The GITIC case demonstrates fully the problem 
with the legislation. 
151 Id., at 300. 
152 Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Trial Implementation) (zhonghua renmin 
gonghegou qiye pochan fa (shixing)], adopted by the 18th Session of the Sixth NPC on December 2,1986 and 
effective as of August 1,1998 (hereinafter referred to as "the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law"). 
153 Id. art. 2. 
154 The Law of Civil Procedure of the People's Republic of China [zhonghua renmin gonghegou minshi 
susongfa], adopted by the fourth session of the seventh National People's Congress on April 9,1991 and 
effective as of the same day. 
Iss Id. art. 206. 
156 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law comprises only 43 articles, while Chapter XIX of the Civil Procedure Law 
contains only 8 articles (arts. 199-206). 
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(ii) Problems Raised by the GITIC Case 
The Guangdong International Trust and Investment Company is the first State-owned 
financial institution to go bankruptcy. GITIC was announced bankruptcy by the Guangdong 
Provincial High People's Court on January 16,1999 and is under liquidation now (see Annex 
XVI). 
The GITIC case has raised several interesting legal issues, with the distribution order 
of bankruptcy estate as the most controversial one. In addition, there are issues related to 
voidable transactions and the composition of liquidation committee. 
Under article 35 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, certain actions carried out during 
the six-month-period prior to bankruptcy shall be deemed null and void, including private 
distribution or gratuitous transfer of property, and irregular underselling of property and 
repayment of immature liabilities. '57 Challenges might be made by creditors under this 
provision against the transfer to the Guangfa Securities of the GITIC's securities trading 
business, probably one of the only valuable business operations of the GITIC (see Annex 
XVI). 
Second, the entire composition of the liquidation committee raises questions 
concerning possible conflicts of interest and the fairness of the liquidation process. In 
addition to a representative of Guangfa Securities, another member of the liquidation 
committee is a representative of the BOC, one of GITIC's largest creditors. Furthermore, the 
liquidation committee also includes officials from the Guangdong provincial government, 
which is technically the owner of the GITIC, as well as members of the former management 
of GITIC. All of them arguably have conflicts of interest. 158 This, together with the dominant 
role that is played by the liquidation committee, 159 makes potential conflicts very likely to 
occur between the liquidation committee and the creditors' committee. 160 This problem is a 
'" The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 152, art. 35. 
158 See, e. g., Chang, TK, 'The Easter Is in the Red', International Financial Law Review, 43, at 45 (March, 
1999). 
159 The liquidation committee has broad powers under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law respecting the valuation, 
disposition, and distribution of the debtor's property. The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 152, art. 24. 
160 In most circumstances, the conflict would not result in damaging creditors' rights. Under the Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law, the creditors' committee is authorized: (1) to examine evidence concerning claims, to 
determine whether the claims are secured or unsecured and their respective amounts; (2) to discuss and approve 
the draft conciliation agreement; and (3) to discuss and approve the plan by which the debtor's assets are to be 
administrated and distributed. Id. art. 15. The Law further provides that a plan for distribution "will be 
implemented following its discussion and adoption at a creditors' meeting and further submitted to the people's 
court for a ruling. " Id. art. 37. 
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result of the briefness of China's Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, which provides that the 
people's court shall designate members for liquidation committee from among the 
government departments in direct charge of the debtor enterprise, government finance 
departments, and other relevant departments and professional personnel. 16 1 
C. MERGER AND TAKE OVER (PURCHASE & ASSUMPTION) 
1. General Introduction 
Mergers are usually based on commercial principles. In such circumstances, the merger is an 
autonomous decision made by financial institutions. However, mergers can be used as 
restructuring instruments by banking supervisors. Banking supervisors may compel problem 
institutions to merge with each other or merge with a healthy and sound 
institution. 162 Compared to a straight liquidation, a merger or take over generally minimizes 
disruption in the economy by avoiding interruption of banking operations and allowing credit 
relationships to be maintained. '63 
Purchase and Assumption is a variation of merger. In aP&A operation, a solvent 
bank purchases a portion of the assets of a failing bank, including its customer base and 
goodwill, and assumes all or part of its liabilities. In a publicly supported P&A operation, 
the government will usually make up the shortfall in the value of the assets and the liabilities. 
Variations of P&A operations could be a purchase of assets, entitling the acquiring bank to 
return certain assets within a specified time period, or a contractual profit/loss-sharing 
There are possibilities, however, that a plan for distribution will be implemented even without the 
approval of the creditors' meeting, because the people's court, on its own, may approve a plan that has been 
submitted by the liquidation group to the creditors and still has not been passed "after being discussed several 
times. " Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Law of 
Bankruptcy for Enterprises of the People's Republic of China (November 7,1991), art. 31. 
161 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 152, art. 24, paragraph 2. 
162 See Zhu Jun, supra note 129, at 308. 
163 The only immediate effect of merger or take over on insured depositors is that the name of their bank has 
changed. In principle uninsured creditors may lose their money in the transaction, but most often in practice in 
the US and a number of other countries all depositor's claims are assumed. See Dewatripont, Mathias & Tirole, 
Jean, supra note 58, at 68. 
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agreement164 related to some or all the assets. P&A in the context of bank resolution can 
include that bad assets are liquidated or transferred to an AMC. 165 
2. The Chinese Practice 
Mergers have been widely applied by Chinese authorities to mitigate financial risks resulting 
from ailing financial institutions. From 1995 to 1998, for example, more than 2,000 urban 
credit cooperatives were merged into 88 city commercial banks. '66 
P&A has also been used in China to deal with failing financial institutions. In March 
1999, China Everbright Bank acquired the commercial banking assets of China's Investment 
Bank 167 (see Annex XVII). 
D. RESCUE PACKAGE OR OPEN BANK ASSISTANCE 
1. General Introduction 
Open bank assistance is a way to preserve the ailing entity by restoring its solvency and 
viability. The main feature of this option is that the failing institution is neither closed nor 
taken over by other institutions but is rescued on an "open bank" basis through the infusion 
of new funds. Rescue packages can take various forms, including soft loans or deposits from 
the government, asset (usually non-performing assets) or securities purchase, and assumption 
of liabilities or capital injection. 168 
Open bank assistance can be combined with private participation. The government, 
for example, may place a call on existing shareholders to recapitalize the institution or 
arrange a debt-equity swap with existing creditors. These methods, however, cannot be 
164 E. g., in the US, when the supply of failed bank assets expanded to unprecedented levels in the early 1990$, in 
order to stimulate bidding during the resolution process, the FDIC modified the P&A transaction to include a 
loss-sharing feature whereby the government agreed to cover a certain portion of potential losses on assets 
Purchased by the acquirer. See, e. g., Ketcha, Nicholas J Jr., supra note 3, at 236-7. 
65See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 14, at 23 & box 3. 
166 See Xie, Ping, supra note 30, at 125. 
167 See, e. g., Macmahon, William J., `Everbright and CIB Merge in a Strong Bank-Weak Bank Rescue', 
available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/top_storieslbreakingnews_b9031915. html'; Kynge, James, 'China: 
Everbright Acquires State Bank', Fin. Times (March 19,1999); Wang, Xiaowei, 'Huge Credit Risks Seen in 
CIB Acquisition Everbright Takes Over Bad Loans', South China Morning Post (March 19,1999); and Wang, 
Xiaowei, `Everbright to Double Assets CIB Branches Changing Hands', South China Morning Post (March 18, 
1999). 
168 See Macey, J. & Miller, G., Banking Law and Regulation, 643 (1992). 
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applied to a bank whose capital has eroded severely because of an extended period of 
inaction by regulators. Such circumstances often lead to the nationalization of the bank. 169 
In many cases, the management of the institution is revamped in a program of open 
bank assistance. The government can impose other conditions on the provision of assistance. 
In other words, there are chances for the government to force a restructuring of a ailing 
institution in open bank assistance. The use of open bank assistance, however, creates 
concerns involving fairness, cost, and moral hazard. ' 70 Reflecting these concerns, recent 
legislation in the US has restricted the FDIC's ability to recapitalize troubled institutions. The 
FDIC is required to show that open bank assistance is the resolution alternative least costly to 
the insurance funds. In addition, insurance fund moneys cannot be used to benefit 
shareholders of failing institution. '7' 
2. Application in China 
Like authorities in other countries, the Chinese government has applied open bank assistance, 
mainly in the form of liquidity support, to deal with problem institutions. The PBOC as the 
LOLR has provided liquidity to financial institutions coming across liquidity problem. 
Government injection of capital has also been applied. In 1998, the MOF 
recapitalized the "big four". There has been open bank assistance conducted by local 
government as well - when small-sized institutions owned by local governments meet with 
difficulties, it is usually the local governments that take responsibilities for assisting or 
rescuing them through new capital injection or liquidity support. 172 
One recent case of open bank assistance is the rescue of the Weihai City Commercial 
Bank (hereinafter referred to as the Weihai Bank). 173 The Weihai Bank was established via 
the merger of five urban credit cooperatives. Due to problems inherited from the former 
credit cooperatives, mismanagement, and deteriorating creditworthiness, the bank occurred 
serious liquidity problem and could not meet its obligations. In September 1997, the PBOC 
provided some loans to alleviate the bank's liquidity pressure and approved the bank's 
application to increase paid-in capital to RMB350m and a nominal capital adequacy to 9.09% 
169 See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 14, at 23 & box 3. 
170 See, e. g., Lastra, Rosa Maria, supra note 4, at 136-7. 
171 See, e. g., Ketcha, Nicholas J Jr., supra note 3, at 238. 
172 It was reported, however, that local governments were unwilling to inject fresh funds unless they were under 
great pressure. See Xie, Ping, supra note 30 at 125. 
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by raising RMB250m new capital. All these strengthened the bank's capacity to shield 
against risks. As a result, the bank's operation was gradually put back on track. 
The debt-equity swap technique has also been used to rescue weak financial 
institutions. 174 In October 1996, the Everbright Trust and Investment Company, whose 
largest creditors included a State oil firm and two State-owned commercial banks, could not 
meet its mature debts. To avoid its bankruptcy, the central bank decided to convert its debts, 
of about RMB5bn, into equity. 
E. MANAGEMENT TAKEOVER (A VARIATION OF BRIDGE BANK) 
1. The Bridge Bank Practice 
Sometimes an existing bank will be designated by the government to take care assets of 
ailing institutions; or, the government may choose to charter a new bank to do that. This is 
referred to as the bridge bank practice. 175 A bridge bank is often a temporary solution in 
order to take over the operations of a failed bank and preserve its going-concern value while 
the government is seeking a more permanent solution to the problem or until an acquirer is 
found. ' 76 
The bridge bank is particularly suitable for dealing with the failure of large bank with 
complex financial structure, because it affords the resolution authority sufficient time to 
evaluate and market the institutions. A disadvantage of using a bridge bank is that it entails 
greater government involvement in banking operations than other resolution methods. '77 
A central bank itself can be the bridge bank as well. For example, after the collapse of 
Baring in 1995, the bank was first placed in administration by the Bank of England before it 
was sold to ING, the Dutch banking and insurance group. '78 In the US, since 1987 the FDIC 
can own and operate a bank until a more permanent solution can be arranged. 179 
2. Management Takeover in China 
13 For details of this case, see Liu, Shiyu, supra note 105, at 301-2. 
174 The discussion in this paragraph based solely on Xie, Ping, supra note 30, at 125. 
175 See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles, et a/., supra note 14, at 23 & box 3. 
16 See, e. g., Lastra, Rosa Maria, supra note 4, at 138. 
77 See, e. g., Ketcha, Nicholas J Jr., supra note 3, at 237. 
178 See, e. g., Lastra, Rosa Maria, supra note 4, at 138. 
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Management take-over is the Chinese variation of the bridge bank practice. 180 The 
Management take-over is provided by the Commercial Banking Law as a solution to restore 
the health of failing commercial banks. Article 64 of the law provides that when "a 
commercial bank is in or is likely to be in a credit crisis thus seriously threatening the 
interests of the depositors, the People's Bank of China may take-over the said bank, " with the 
purpose of protecting the interests of the depositors and helping the commercial bank resume 
its normal operations. 18' One obvious advantage of the management take-over is that it will 
not disturb the existing bank-firm relationships: During the period of management take-over, 
the "debtor-creditor relationship of the commercial bank existing before the take-over 
remains unchanged. "' 82 
The Commercial Banking Law provides procedures for management take-over. 
Accordingly, a management take-over should be determined by the PBOC and carried out 
under the organization of the PBOC. 183 The PBOC should make public its take-over decision 
and specify the following contents in its take-over decision: (1) the name of the commercial 
bank to be taken over; (2) the reason(s) for the take over; (3) the entity taking over; and (4) 
the time limit of the take-over. 184 
A management take-over begins on the day of implementation of the take-over 
decision. The entity authorized by the PBOC to carry out the management take-over should 
begin exercising the power over the management of the commercial bank from the day of 
implementing the take-over decision. ' 85 On expiration of the term of the take-over, the PBOC 
may determine to prolong the take-over, but the term should not exceed two years to the 
maximum. 186 1 
A management take-over must be terminated in any of the following circumstances: 
(1) that the term of the take-over expires or the prolonged term of take-over determined by 
the PBOC expires; (2) that prior to the expiration of the term of take-over, the commercial 
bank has recovered its capacity of normal operation; or (3) that prior to the expiration of -the 
179 The FDIC operation of a bank is limited to two years (with a possible third-year extension). See 
Dewatripont, Mathias & Tirole, Jean, supra note 58, at 69. 
180See Liu, Shiyu, supra note 105, at 302. Management takeover has been applied as a resolution of problem 
urban credit cooperatives in Guiyang City, Guizhou Province. Id. 
181 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 73, art. 64. '82 Id. 
183 Id., art. 65. 
184 Id 
185 Id., art. 66. 
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term of takeover, the commercial bank has been merged or declared bankrupt in accordance 
with the law. ' 87 
F. PROBLEMS WITH CHINA'S BANK INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION 
As discussed above, China has applied most alternatives to resolve the problem of failing 
financial institutions. Most of the financial institutions so far tackled, however, are medium- 
and small-sized non-bank financial institutions. Only two commercial banks went through 
the resolution procedures: the Hainan Development Bank and China Investment Bank. 
Although the system has not been fully tested, problems have already arisen in the course of 
these limited practices. 
1. The Uncertainty in Treating Foreign Creditors 
The treatment of foreign creditors of closed financial institutions has experienced certain 
variability. This creates uncertainty and unpredictability for both foreign and domestic 
creditors. 
When the Hainan Development Bank was closed on June 21,1998. The PBOC stated 
that the ICBC would guarantee repayment of all external debts and all the principal and 
interest on deposits lawfully held by the PRC individuals. 188 That was the case for the closure 
of China Venturetech as well. 1 89 
The policy changed slightly, however, when the PBOC declared the closure of 
GITIC. In its notice to close the GITIC, the PBOC stated that "overseas liabilities registered 
with the foreign exchange administration authorities and the legal principal and interests of 
deposits of domestic natural persons shall have priority for repayment. "190 There are at least 
two major differences between this Notice and the previously cited ones. First, it was not 
mentioned in the earlier notices that the external debts had to be those that had been duly 
registered with the SAFE. Second, the repayment of external debts owed by the Hainan 
186 Id., art. 67. 
18' Id., art. 68. 
1B8 See, e. g., Lam, Joseph, ̀The Closure of GITIC', J. l. B. L. No. 4,127, at 127 (1999). 189 In the closure of China Venturetech, the PBOC published a public announcement dated June 22 1998 in the 
national press, which stated unequivocally: "The overseas liabilities and the legal liabilities to domestic natural 
persons of the original China Venturetech Investment Corporation shall be repaid in full. " See Chang, TK, 
supra note 158, at 45. 
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Development Bank and China Venturetech was guaranteed, whereas external debts owed by 
GITIC that had been registered with the SAFE would only be paid in priority along with 
household deposit and savings. 19' The GITIC Notice, however, still granted preferential 
treatment to foreign creditors. 192 
The GITIC bankruptcy marked the abolishment of preferential treatments to foreign 
creditors. At the January 10,1999 meeting held by the Liquidation Group announcing the 
resolution of the GITIC board of directors to petition for bankruptcy, Mr. Wu, Jiesi, the head 
of the Liquidation Group, indicated that all creditors, whether domestic or foreign, would be 
treated equally in accordance with the PRC company law and the bankruptcy law. Contrary 
to the PBOC Notice, overseas creditors would not get any priority in repayment even if their 
debts had been duly registered with the SAFE. 
The rule for pure administrative closure seems to have changed as well. In the most 
recent administrative closure of the Hainan Hong Kong & Macao Trust, 193 it was revealed 
that payment to foreign creditors was no longer a priority, while compensation for individual 
depositors would still be given top priority. 194 
Such changes are obviously in the right direction. 195 The author's concern here is that 
without clear rules, there is uncertainty for both overseas and local creditors. It is therefore 
important to establish clearly rules that foreign and domestic creditors will be treated equally. 
2. The PBOC's Autonomy in Dealing with Problem Institutions 
Ensuring the central bank's independence of action is a long-standing issue. In China, except 
the "big four", most of the financial institutions are either solely owned by local governments 
or largely controlled by them. Local governments usually appoint senior management of 
190 Id., at 44. 
191 See Lam, Joseph, supra note 188, at 127. 
192 The main consideration of the Chinese authorities was to protect the interest of foreign institutions and 
foreign investors, to maintain the creditworthiness of Chinese financial institutions, and most importantly, to 
keep the confidence of foreign investors in the sound development of the Chinese economy. The preferential 
treatment to foreign creditors, however, has been ruining the incentives for foreign lenders to monitor the 
creditworthiness of Chinese borrowers, resulting in their reckless lending to State-owned financial institutions 
in China. See Zhu, Jun, supra note 129, at 315. 
193 Supra note 147. 
194 See Kynge, James, supra note 147. 
193 It was suggested that with the establishment of a diversified financial system and strengthened financial 
supervision, the preferential treatments towards overseas creditors should be removed gradually to create 
competitive equality. See Zhu, Jun, supra note 129, at 315. 
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financial institutions and intervene heavily in their business. 196 While local governments 
assume limited responsibility for providing funds for the merger, restructuring, closure, and 
even bankruptcy of financial institutions, they often intervene in all the insolvency resolution 
on behalf of their interests. ' 97 This has greatly impeded the central bank from making 
decisions completely according to market discipline. 198 
Actually, even if the PBOC had full autonomy in deciding how to deal with problem 
institutions, there remains the problem whether the PBOC will make decisions completely 
following the market discipline. The PBOC, because it is simultaneously financial regulator 
and monetary policy agency, has to take into consideration the impact of financial institution 
liquidation on the entire financial system and the whole economy, and sometimes may prefer 
to apply other insolvency resolution approaches rather than closure and liquidation. 
3. Inadequate Transparency and Disclosure 
Inadequate transparency and disclosure has materialized in two aspects. In the disclosure 
aspect, although certain disclosure requirements for financial institutions have been 
established, few institutions publish their fundamental indicators regularly, and the reliability 
and accuracy of the information disclosed by these institutions remains doubtful, as clearly 
evidenced in the GITIC case. 
Creditors of GITIC had two blows with regard to the financial condition of the 
company. The first shock came at the creditors' meeting on January 10,1999, immediately 
prior to the declaration of GITIC's bankruptcy when the creditors were given the preliminary 
results of the verification of the assets and liabilities of GITIC. It was revealed that the 
GITIC had assets of only RMB21.471bn, compared to the RMB35.878bn prior to the 
verification. Furthermore, prior to the verification, the GITIC was thought to have 66 
domestic subsidiaries and 66 overseas subsidiaries, whereas after verification, the GITIC was 
discovered to have as many as 105 domestic subsidiaries and 135 overseas subsidiaries. 199 
The second shock was given in April 1999 at the first creditors' meeting after the initiation of 
1" See Xie, Ping, supra note 30, at 128. 
197 Id. 
198 See Zhu, Jun, supra note 129, at 317. 
1" See Chang, TK, supra note 158. 
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the bankruptcy procedure. It was revealed that the GITIC had recoverable assets of only 
RMB6.5bn ($785m), much lower than the RMB21.471bn announced in January. 200 
These discrepancies raise disquieting questions about the overall reliability of the 
financial statements of GITIC, which had been audited by international accounting firms, as 
well as the accuracy and adequacy of the disclosure in the offering memoranda, prospectuses 
and placement documents used in raising the over $4bn in indebtedness for GITIC. 201 
As for the transparency aspect, the opaqueness of the financial institution insolvency 
resolution is widely criticized, especially the opaqueness of the administrative closure 
procedure. The most obvious problem is the treatment of foreign creditors. As mentioned 
before, foreign creditors were given priority in all the administrative closures prior to the 
GITIC case, afterwards, however, only household depositors are given priority. The real 
problem here is not whether priority should be granted to foreign debts (although this has 
been widely criticized by domestic creditors202), but that this lack of uniform rules has made 
administrative closure procedures opaque and inconsistent. 
G. BUILDING UP A SOLID LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR BANK INSOLVENCY 
RESOLUTION 
1. General Consideration: Should China Adopt Special Legislation on Bank Insolvency 
Resolution 
In most countries, bank failures are not subject to general corporate bankruptcy procedures, 
but to special insolvency proceedings - "Though a bank becomes economically insolvent 
when the market value of its net worth reaches zero, an economically insolvent bank need not 
be declared legally insolvent by the responsible agency and may be offered instead financial 
200 See, e. g., Miller, Matthew, `Questions of Felony Emerge in Gitic Crash', South China Morning Post 3 (April 
23,1999). The estimation was raised to RMB7.69bn on October 22,1999 at the second creditors' meeting. See 
Lin, Ho Swee, 'GITIC: Payout Blow for Creditors', Fin. Times (October 23,1999). 
201 See Chang, TK, supra note 158. 
202 The domestic creditors, for example, protested the unfairness of such priority in the liquidations of China 
Venturetech and other cases. Id., at 45. 
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assistance. "203 The EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 204 for example, excludes 
banks and other financial institutions from its scope. 205 
Several reasons can be attributed to this differentiation. First, banks are the repository 
of the savings of the public and the principal source of credit to the economy. Therefore the 
law should be especially concerned with the fair and efficient resolution of bank insolvencies 
to limit the losses of savings and the decrease in sources of credit. 206 Second, banks are 
vulnerable to bank runs, a bankruptcy suit brought by creditors, even if proves unjustified, 
may terminally damage confidence in a bank. Hence there is a consensus that the initiation of 
insolvency proceedings against a bank should be left only to the supervisor or other 
government agencies. 207 
China has every reason to differentiate bank insolvency from normal enterprise 
insolvency, given the problems with its Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, its under-developed 
financial markets, and the importance of banks in its financial system and the whole 
economic system. The question becomes whether China should have a special law on bank 
insolvency, or make special rules for bank insolvency in its Commercial Banking Law. 
This author would recommend that China make special rules for bank insolvency in 
its Commercial Banking Law, instead of having a special law on bank insolvency, based on 
three considerations. First, bank failures do not happen frequently, it is not economic to 
spend time and other resources in drafting a separate law for bank insolvency. Second, the 
provisions of law that may govern bank insolvency can be exceedingly complex. It will be 
extremely difficult for the Chinese legislator to develop a practicable special legislation on 
bank insolvency. Third, China already adopts the model to include the provisions on bank 
insolvency in its Commercial Banking Law. 
2. Issues that Need to Be Clarified for Bank Insolvency Resolution in China 
203 See, e. g., Lastra, Rosa Maria, supra note 4, at 134-5. 
204 Convention on Insolvency Proceedings (CONV/INSOL/Xl). This is a document of the EU Council and is 
not effective yet. The Convention was signed by 14 Member States (but not the UK) in November 1995. 
205 The EU drafted a proposed directive in the mid 1980s concerning the "winding-up and reorganization 
measures" for credit institutions. Although it never reached the stage of a common position in the European 
Council by Ministers, it is an important piece of draft legislation that is still on the table of the EU Council. See 
generally Clarotti, Paolo, 'Legislation Related to Bank Insolvency in the European Union' in Lastra, R. M., 
Schiffman, Henry N. (eds. ), Bank Failures and Bank Insolvency Law in Economies in Transition, 311 (1999). 
206 See, e. g., Schiffman, Henry N., 'Legal Measures to Manage Bank Insolvency in Economies in Transition' in 
Lastra, R. M., Schiffman, Henry N. (eds. ), Bank Failures and Bank Insolvency Law in Economies in Transition, 
81, at 82 (1999). 
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(i) The Autonomy of the PBOC in Deciding Insolvency Resolution and Its Limitation 
It has been an established rule that banking supervisors should have discretion in taking 
PCAs (including the closure of insolvent financial institutions). 208 The 1998 institutional 
restructuring of the PBOC, which consolidated its branches into nine and aimed at reducing 
intervention from local governments, is an important step forward to a more independent 
central bank. The autonomy of the PBOC in deciding insolvency resolution of financial 
institutions, however, remains to be strengthened. It should be clarified that the PBOC has 
the power to make decision independently about how a problem financial institution should 
be dealt with, no matter it is owned privately or publicly, and no matter it is owned by the 
central government or local governments. 
It is also necessary, however, to impose some limitations on the PBOC's discretion in 
making insolvency resolution decisions. As indicated above, the dual roles of the PBOC as 
the monetary policy agency and bank regulator may result in the PBOC's bias against 
liquidation as an insolvency resolution approach. 
With regard to this issue, the author would like to suggest that China should at least 
adopt the cost-test criteria applied in the US, where the FDIC is mandated to minimize the 
"expected cost" of failure resolution. In particular, the FDIC is required to run a statutory 
cost test showing that the alternative measures are not more costly than liquidation. 09 
Although the broad requirements prove not very effective, 210 it would be better than having 
no limitation. 
(ii) Elaborating Provisions on Administrative Closure 
The administrative closure is one of the most controversial insolvency resolution procedures, 
partly because it is most extensively used in China. The legal basis for administrative closure 
is extremely thin in China. As mentioned above, the current legal basis for administrative 
closure is articles in the Commercial Banking Law and 1994 PBOC Provisions on Financial 
207 See Hawkins, John & Turner Philip, supra note 29, at 36. 
208 See, e. g., Schiffman, Henry N., supra note 206, at 95-8. 
209 See, e. g., Dewatripont, Mathias & Tirole, Jean, supra note 58, at 70-7 1. 
210 The carrying out of this principle involves a fair amount of judgment. On the one hand, it is hard to forecast 
the costs of liquidation or a merger. On the other hand, the cost does not need to be limited to the FDIC's 
monetary outlay but can include the cost of some externalities, such as the disruption of the local economy and 
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Institution Administration. These articles only list out the preconditions for administrative 
closure. Although the PBOC has worked out a procedure itself via practice, there are 
inconsistencies within the PBOC practices. 
In the current author's view, at least the following points should be made clear for the 
implementation of administrative closure in China: (1) that the administrative closure is not 
merely a punishment for illegalities or irregularities, but a PCA that the PBOC can take to 
deal with problem financial institutions; and (2) liquidation rules, especially the distribution 
order of the assets of the administratively closed financial institution. 
(iii) Rules on Bank Bankruptcy Must Be Established in More Details 
The insufficiency of the Enterprise Bankruptcy law in dealing with the bankruptcy of 
financial institution has been fully evidenced by the GITIC case. The Commercial Banking 
Law only contains one article on bank bankruptcy. 211 That is obviously not enough to tackle 
the complexity of bank bankruptcy. Hopefully, the GITIC case should be able to give the 
Chinese legislator some hints to formulate rules for bank bankruptcy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A banking safety net is essential to ensure that failures of individual bank will not affect the 
soundness and stability of the entire banking system. A well-designed banking safety net can 
also guarantee that depositors are properly protected when market discipline is imposed on 
unsound individual institutions. A banking safety net usually consists of various components 
such as LOLR, deposit insurance, and bank insolvency resolution. 
The importance of having a LOLR is seldom contested. The theoretical foundations 
for LOLR were set more than two centuries ago. To define LOLR in practice, however, is not 
an easy job. The difficulties in defining LOLR in practice call for an appropriate definition of 
LOLR either by legislation or by central bank practices. 
In China, the conditions and procedures to provide LOLR are not clearly defined, 
which leaves the PBOC vulnerable to political pressures from central and local governments. 
After comparing the US, UK and Japan models of defining LOLR facilities, the author 
the systemic risks. For these reasons, authorities have usually preferred to bail out unsecured depositors and 
have refrained from liquidating large banks. Id. 
21 The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 73, art. 71. 
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suggests that China should follow the Japan model to define the PBOC's LOLR role in the 
Central Banking Law, clarifying that the PBOC should only extend credit to those temporary 
illiquid but not insolvent financial institutions when there is a threat to the soundness and 
stability of the financial system and the extension of the credit is necessary to avoid a serious 
disturbance in the economy; and that credit advances should be limited in maturity and 
extendibility and require satisfactory collateral. Procedures for decision-making should be 
prescribed as well, including the authority of the person or persons to make the decision (the 
PBOC Governor, or the PBOC Monetary Policy Commission) and consultative requirements 
(the PBOC should consult with the MOF before it decides to extend emergency credit). 
Despite theoretical arguments in favor of or against establishing deposit insurance 
programs, deposit insurance has been developed in almost all developed countries and most 
of the developing countries. The doctrine of necessity offers a good explanation to the 
adoption of deposit insurance system by most countries. 
The doctrine of necessity exists in China as well. China has long been carrying an 
implicit government guarantee. It is time now for China to replace its current implicit 
government guarantee with an explicit and limited deposit insurance program. A Deposit 
Insurance Company should be established by legislation to provide deposit insurance to 
deposits in all deposit taking institutions in China (including the "big four"). The Company 
would collect premiums from depositary institutions (at flat rate), manage the deposit 
insurance fund, and would pay off depositors when an insured institution is closed. The 
Company would be affiliated to the PBOC, with the authority to inspect and examine the 
deposit-taking institutions and to deal with problem institutions. Respecting the coverage of 
deposit insurance, it is recommended that the deposit insurance only protect the individual 
depositors, with floor and ceiling set for compensation to a single individual depositor. 
Effective and timely resolution of insolvencies is probably one of the most important 
elements for a banking safety net. The timely resolution of failed institutions would reinforce 
systemic stability, promote public confidence in the system, and would restore liquidity to 
the economy. Basic regulatory options to deal with a failed bank include closure and 
liquidation (deposit payoff), rescue package or open bank assistance, merger and take over 
(e. g., purchase and assumption), and bridge bank. 
All these mechanisms have been applied in some form in China, although China's 
Commercial Banking Law only provides about the management take-over (a variation of 
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bridge bank) and liquidation (including bankruptcy) of commercial banks. To date, most of 
the financial institutions tackled are medium and small non-bank financial institutions. 
There are problems with China's current insolvency resolution practices, such as the 
unfair treatment of creditors, the local governments' intervention in the PBOC's decision- 
making in insolvency resolution, and inadequate transparency and disclosure. 
China needs a solid legal infrastructure for bank insolvency resolution. As a 
developing country, China has every reason to differentiate bank insolvency from enterprise 
insolvency. That does not mean, however, that China should adopt a special legislation on 
bank insolvency resolution. But clearer rules concerning bank insolvency resolution need to 
be established in China's Commercial Banking Law. 
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Chapter Five CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
RESTORING MARKET DISCIPLINE IN CHINA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the analyses on the causes of China's State commercial bank NPL problem, a 
number of recommendations can be made for bank NPL workouts and prevention on the 
premise that without restoring market discipline in China, especially market discipline on 
State commercial banks and SOEs, the NPL problem in China cannot be really resolved. 
Apart from the important premise raised above, this concluding chapter comprises six 
more sections. Section II concludes the analyses of Chapter One and points out that the 
failure of market discipline lies at the root of the State commercial bank NPL problem. In 
Section III, it is recommended that a comprehensive bank restructuring comprising bank 
recapitalization, NPL management, enhancement of banking regulation and supervision, and 
promotion of bank internal controls should be adopted by the Chinese Government to 
workout the existing NPLs and to prevent the creation of new NPLs. Discussions in Chapter 
Two are summarized in Section IV, focusing on the impact of the AMC practices on the 
restoration of market discipline in China. The legal framework for NPL management in 
China is discussed in this Section as well. Section V abridges the discussion in Chapter Three 
and concludes that a partnership relationship between banking regulation and market 
discipline should be developed in China. Section VI outlines the discussion in Chapter Four 
and concludes that an appropriate banking safety net needs to be established to enhance 
market discipline and prudential regulation in China. The Chapter ends with some concluding 
remarks in Section VII. 
II. THE FAILURE OF MARKET DISCIPLINE - THE ULTIMATE ROOT OF THE 
STATE COMMERCIAL BANK NPL PROBLEM 
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Most of the NPLs result from unsustainable borrowing, i. e., borrowing without the means or 
even the intention of repaying. Market discipline is one force that might limit such abuse of 
financial market: Market discipline implies that lenders penalize excessive borrowing, first, 
by requiring a higher interest rate spread and, ultimately, by excluding the borrower from the 
market. Moreover, the lender's discipline function can be expanded to the moment after the 
funds have been lent in two instances - The lender monitors the borrower to ensure that the 
use of funds is consistent with the loan contract; and more importantly, the lender forces the 
defaulted borrower either to restructure in order to survive or to exit. If market discipline 
could work effectively, credit will be hardened and hence unsustainable borrowing can be 
efficiently curbed. 
There are conditions for market discipline to work effectively. These conditions 
include the competitiveness of capital markets, the availability of information on the 
borrower's outstanding liabilities, no expectation for bailout, and the borrower's capability 
and willingness to respond to market signals provided by interest rate spreads. All these 
conditions fail in China. 
A. THE CAPTIVE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
The financial markets in China are extremely captive. In a State bank-dominated/bank-centric 
financial system, households and enterprises do not have many choices but to deposit or save 
their extra money with State banks. 
Banks are facing a captive market as well. Massive administrative controls on banks 
actually have deprived banks of the freedom to make lending decisions on commercial 
standards. Before the division of business scope among State specialized banks was 
abolished, the "big four" could only lend to enterprises in certain areas or industrial sectors. 
State banks had very limited freedom in deciding to whom to lend under the credit plan. 
Although the credit ceiling was removed in 1998, State commercial banks are still forced to 
lend to un-bankable projects and loss-making SOEs. 
B. THE INFORMATION PROBLEM 
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The information problem is not exclusive to socialist economies. This problem, however, 
bears unique features in socialist economies: In capitalist economies, the information is 
utilized in a decentralized way. Those using the information feel the benefits of it directly. In 
pre-reform socialist economies, attempts were made to centralize crumbs of knowledge and 
information that were scattered in all directions. And, if the information in the subordinate's 
possession had to be "passed up the ladder", it might not be in his interest to transmit it; or, it 
might be fully in his interest to pass it up in a distorted form. This explains why the 
information problem is more serious in formerly planned economies. ' 
The lack of incentive to use information survives the economic reform in China. 
SOEs, knowing that banks will eventually lend to them, have no incentive to produce 
favorable information about their financial situation, let alone unfavorable information. 
Banks, aware that they have to lend to certain enterprises or projects, do not have incentives 
to evaluate borrowers' creditworthiness and monitor borrowers' cash flow. Besides, the 
inappropriate prudential regulation is not enough of an external check that banks examine 
their borrowers' creditworthiness properly. 
The veracity of the information also poses a serious problem. The underdeveloped 
accounting rules and disclosure practices have impeded banks from obtaining reliable 
information about their borrowers. ' Actually, even if they obtained the relevant information, 
their immature internal controls and risk-management ability are still obstacles for them to 
evaluate the borrower's financial situation properly. 
C. THE BAILOUT EXPECTATION 
The implicit and explicit government guarantees have made banks and SOEs resort to 
government bailout whenever they encounter difficulties. The economic reform has 
substantially reduced budget subsidies, soft tax, and price subsidies on SOEs; the soft budget 
See Kornai, Janos, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, 129-30 (1992). 
2A random state audit of 100 SOEs in China found that 81 of the companies reported false assets worth 
RMB3.8bn, and that 89 SOEs reported false profits worth RMB2.7bn in 1999. To be worse, previous audits of 
the 100 SOEs by 82 public auditing firms found nothing awry with the accounts of 62 of the firms, which 
seriously undermines confidence in public auditors. See Chinaonline, `Random Audit Exposes Accounting 
Fraud in Most Chinese SOEs' (December 27,1999), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/issues/econ_news/ctirrentnews/secure/C9122305. asp '. 
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constraints, however, are far from ceasing its existence. Rather, they now mainly exist in the 
form of soft credit from banks. 
D. THE IRRESPONSIBILITY TO MARKET SIGNALS BY BORROWERS 
Borrowers' ignorance of market signals can be explained by the soft budget constraints. The 
soft budget constraints make the firm's interest in cost and profit very weak and pale. 
Actually, even if borrowers have the incentive to respond to interest rate signals, the interest 
rates in China are not signaling properly - banks are not allowed to adjust the interest rates 
freely. 
III. SYSTEMATIC BANKING AND SOE RESTRUCTURING - STRATEGIES 
TOWARD THE BANK NPL PROBLEM IN CHINA 
A. THE NECESSITY OF A COMPREHENSIVE BANK AND SOE RESTRUCTURING 
China's bank NPL problem is actually a reflection of the weakness in its financial and 
corporate sector and needs a systematic solution. The solution needs to be comprehensive and 
credible and should repair the weak and insolvent banks and corporations simultaneously. 
Theoretically, there are three strategies to deal with systemic banking problem: 
closure and liquidation in large scale, regulatory forbearance, and a systematic bank 
restructuring. Closure and liquidation in large size is not suitable for China simply because 
China cannot afford to close and to liquidate the "big four". Regulatory forbearance has been 
applied by authorities in China and proved a failure, because the prerequisites for the 
successfully application of regulatory forbearance do not exist in China. 
The necessity of a comprehensive bank and SOE restructuring can be argued for-on 
the experience of Asian crisis countries, on the risk of low-level equilibrium in economics' 
and on the seriousness and causes of the bank NPL problem in China. Moreover, it can be 
argued for on the basis of restoring market discipline on China's State commercial banks and 
SOEs. 
' See relevant discussion in Chapter One. 
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The Chinese Government has been trying to harden budget constraints on SOEs even 
since the very beginning of the economic reform. The efforts of the Government are 
progressing slowly, however. In his opening speech of the annual session of the NPC in 
1999, Zhu Rongji admitted that "financial discipline is [still] lax and economic order is 
somewhat in disarray. "4 Without solving the NPL problem, insolvent State commercial banks 
with large exposure to SOEs will have to continue to lend to loss-making SOEs, if they do 
not want to be pulled down by the collapse of their large borrowers (adverse selection). In 
other words, it is impossible to expect State commercial banks trapped in NPLs to exercise 
financial discipline on SOEs if NPLs cannot be removed from their balance sheets. 
B. KEY STEPS FOR BANK AND SOE RESTRUCTURING IN CHINA 
The IMF has summarized ten- critical steps in three phases in managing and resolving a 
systemic bank crisis and has concluded that although specific actions may differ among 
countries based on the depth of the crisis, the composition of the financial sector before the 
crisis, and local circumstances and preferences, the contents and sequence of the basic 
building blocks and strategies should be similar across countries. 
So far, China has succeeded in immunizing itself from the contagions of the financial 
crisis and has not experienced the acute crisis phase. And because of the comparative stability 
of China's financial system, there is no urgent need for the Chinese Government to apply 
immediate stabilizing methods. Several key steps aiming at the existing NPLs workouts and 
the prevention of the creation of new NPLs, however, are being taken or should be taken by 
the Chinese government. These include bank recapitalization, NPL management, 
enhancement of banking regulation and supervision, and promotion of bank internal controls 
(especially risk-management capacity). 
IV. RESOLVING THE STOCK OF NPL: BANK RECAPITALIZATION AND NPL 
MANAGEMENT 
Quoted in Hardings, James, `China Tackles Bad Management', Fin. Times (March 6,1999). 
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A. RECAPITALIZATION OF STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS VS. MARKET 
DISCIPLINE 
In recapitalizing the "big four", the Chinese Government face the dilemma facing 
governments all over the world to restructure their bank system: The idea of a wholesale 
government rescue raises serious moral hazard problems, meaning a precedent is set whereby 
taxpayers will always pay for banker's mistakes. But, if the government pushes banks to raise 
private capital, the risk is that banks will try to conceal their problems from the investors 
whose support they are seeking. Authorities worldwide apply different approaches in an 
intention to solve the conflict between recapitalization and market discipline. Some of these 
approaches are adopted by the Chinese government. 
1. Ex-ante Recapitalization Vs. Ex post Recapitalization 
Ex ante recapitalization and ex post recapitalization denotes whether to recapitalize banks 
before, or after corporate restructuring. It is not necessary that one of them is friendlier to 
market discipline. It is important, however, for a country to choose a tactic that fits its special 
circumstances. 
China chose to recapitalize the "big four" ex ante in 1998, which has proved to be a 
failure. The recapitalization scheme was neither good timed' nor in the right size. " Based on 
the lesson from the RMB270bn recapitalization of the "big four" in 1998, China has chosen 
to recapitalize the "big four" in a manner between the ex ante and ex post recapitalization. In 
1999, four AMCs were established to take over NPLs from the "big four" and to carry out 
corporate debt restructuring. The AMCs issued bonds guaranteed by the MOF to the 
respective banks in exchange for NPLs at their paper value. Because the bonds issued to the 
banks in exchange of the NPLs are Treasury-backed bonds, this transaction is in essence an 
injection of capital to the "big four". As will be shown below, however, the AMC practices in 
China bear moral hazards as well. 
s As part of its anti-deflation monetary policy, the PBOC in 1998 directed the "big four" to continue to extend 
additional loans to loss-making SOEs, creating expectation on the part of banks that additional recapitalization 
funds would inevitably be forthcoming. 
6 The RMB270bn recapitalization of the "big four" undertaken in August 1998 fell far short of the 
recapitalization amount that they would ultimately require. 
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2. Private Sector-based Solution & Conditioning Public Support 
To avoid the conflicts between public bailout and market discipline, authorities in Asian 
crisis countries endeavored to achieve a private sector-based resolution, rather than a 
complete state bailout of distressed banks. Besides, public support was conditioned upon 
matters such as cost reduction, and increase in return on assets. In countries such as South 
Korea and Thailand, Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) were used to document 
conditions. Moreover, the bank recapitalization itself in these crisis countries has been a 
process to enhance prudential regulation and supervision. 
Some efforts are taken by the Chinese Government to mitigate the conflicts between 
the government capital injection and market discipline, based on the lessons of the 
RMB270bn capital injection in 1998 and the experiences of Asian crisis countries. The "big 
four" have been warned that the recapitalization carried out by the AMCs would be the last 
such injection and bankers would henceforth be subject to strict new disciplines. Besides, a 
cut-off is made - AMCs only take over NPLs issued prior to January 1,1996, while banks 
are left on their own to deal with NPLs issued afterwards. More importantly, the "big four" 
are required to sign "governance contracts" with the PBOC, which set out performance goals 
and establish the board of supervisors in each bank. Last but not least, efforts are being made 
in China to enhance prudential banking regulation and supervision, as well as to promote 
bank internal controls. All these efforts can mitigate the moral hazards that accompany the 
government recapitalization. Because the "big four" will remain solely State-owned, 
however, it will be too optimistic to predict that they can implement efficient financial 
discipline over SOEs after the recapitalization. 
B. AMC PRACTICES IN CHINA: CAN AMCS IMPOSE MARKET DISCIPLINE ON 
SOES? 
1. Characteristics of AMCs in China 
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NPLs accumulated in a country's banking system can be dealt with in various ways. The 
centric-AMC approach is strongly recommended by the IMF to deal with bank NPLs in 
countries facing a systemic NPL problem because of its macro-economic and micro 
advantages compared with other methods. 
China mainly followed the centric-AMC approach. Instead of only having one AMC, 
however, four separate AMCs were established - i. e. - the Cinda AMC for CCB, the 
Dongfang (Oriental) AMC for the BOC, China Great Wall AMC for the ABC, and China 
Huarong AMC for the ICBC. This quasi-centric approach based on the primary role of State- 
owned AMCs guarantees that NPLs in each of the "big four" would be tackled without delay. 
Besides, the bank-specific structure allows AMCs to make good use of banks' information 
about the debtors. 
In addition to the bank-specific structure, AMC practices in China bear other 
characteristics. First, AMCs in China are solely State-owned - the MOF capitalized them 
with RMB 1 Obn each. Second, AMCs in China bear a heavy administrative color. They are 
put at the same level as the PBOC on the "administrative ladder". The board members of 
AMCs are mostly government officials, rather than experts in law, accounting and finance. 
Third, AMCs in China are granted a wide business scope and powers. They can engage in 
both commercial and investment banking activities and have great discretion in managing 
NPLs, including selling the bad assets to foreign investors. The four AMCs enjoy several 
preferential policies given by the State, including an exemption of registration fees and 
purchase and transaction taxes. 
2. The Debt-Equity Swap Scheme in China 
China's AMCs are authorized to employ both asset disposal (asset management) and debt 
restructuring (loan management) strategies towards collected NPLs. So far, AMCs in China 
have mainly carried out loan management strategies in the form of debt-equity swap. 
The SETC announced the initiation of the debt-equity swap scheme on August 3, 
1999. Under the SETC's debt-equity swap scheme, the four AMCs, together with the SDB, 
forgive debts owed by SOEs to them in exchange for equity stakes in their debtors. Not all 
SOEs are eligible for this scheme. Enterprises must satisfy several conditions before their 
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debts can be converted into equity. The SETC recommended 601 candidate enterprises for 
the scheme. AMCs are required to choose enterprises from the SETC recommended list; and 
if they choose any enterprise out of the recommended list, an approval from the SETC is 
required. 
3. Problems with China's AMC Practices 
Setting up four AMCs to tackle the NPLs of the "big four" is a great step forward in restoring 
market discipline in China. As mentioned before, it is unrealistic to expect banks that are 
heavily exposed to SOEs to impose financial discipline on their SOE borrowers. In this 
sense, AMCs, by taking NPLs off the balance sheets of the "big four", help restoring their 
financial discipline vis-ä-vis SOEs. Besides, AMCs are better positioned to impose financial 
discipline on their debtor SOEs because of their wider business scope and powers. It is 
expected that after the debt-equity swaps, AMCs, as shareholders of SOEs, can help to 
restructure the SOEs and improve the firms' corporate governance. This author, however, is 
not so optimistic about the success of AMC practices in China. AMCs in China lack both the 
capacity and incentives to impose market discipline on SOEs. Moreover, their tasks are self- 
conflicting. 
(i) The Dilemma Faced by Chinese AMCs 
AMCs in China are not only charged with releasing the banks of their NPLs, but are also 
mandated to rescue as many "viable" SOEs as possible. These two tasks cause a dilemma to 
AMCs. As creditors to SOEs, they should maximize their recovery from SOEs; while at the 
same time they should help SOEs out of their difficulties, AMCs will therefore have to 
compromise their creditor's rights sometimes. This dilemma has greatly limited their 
discretion in managing bank NPLs. 
It will be unrealistic to propose that China should ignore its SOE problem and put 
emphasis solely on the bank side, because without solving the SOE problem, the bank NPL 
problem cannot be really solved. AMCs in China, however, should be released of their 
burden to save SOEs so that they can impose disciplines on SOEs as creditors or shareholders 
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(after debt-equity swaps). It should be the government's duty, rather than that of the AMCs' 
to bail out those economically and socially important SOEs. 
(ii) AMCs' Capacity and Incentive Problem 
Whether AMCs in China will have sufficient capacity and incentives to deal with NPLs 
remains doubtful. Given their heavy administrative color, the possibility of government 
interference is not remote. Besides, the state-ownership means that the Government will 
eventually take care of the NPLs that the AMCs fail to work out or recover, hence creating 
disincentives for AMCs to do their best to avoid unloading debt into the Government. 
The capacity and incentives of AMCs' to deal with NPLs appropriately is also 
affected by the dependence of AMCs on their banks. One advantage of AMCs over banks in 
managing NPLs is that AMCs will not be scared to investigate the causes of NPLs. This 
advantage will be lost, however, if AMCs are dependent on the banks they have a liaison 
with. 
In China, All four AMCs are carved out of former investment and trust companies 
subject to respective banks. Their staffs come from the banks as well. Officials from the "big 
four" sit in the board of supervisors of the AMCs. Their leadership appears to have close ties 
with the banks. Moreover, because the AMCs lack a network of branch organizations 
themselves, when they deal with local borrowers, they will have to rely on the bank branch 
network. 
In addition, the lack of expertise and experience also impedes AMCs' smooth 
operation in China. Handling NPLs requires skills and experiences in various fields. The 
AMCs in China are not well equipped with personnel and expertise to manage the huge 
amount of NPLs collected from the banks. 
Last but not least, because there is no precise method for evaluating NPLs and loan 
collateral in China, the AMCs have taken NPLs at their face value from the "big four". This 
face-value take-over creates difficulties in appraising the AMCs' performance and creates 
disincentives for AMCs to maximize the recovery of NPLs. The valuation problem also 
creates difficulties for AMCs in NPL disposal and debt restructuring. 
To solve the incentive problem, emphasis should be placed on the accountability of 
AMCs. AMCs should be required to report periodically to the MOF and the PBOC about 
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their work. Public auditors should be employed by the MOF to audit the main transactions 
conducted by AMCs. More importantly, personal liabilities should be imposed on those 
AMC officials who fail to carry out their duty rightly. Regarding AMCs' capacity, China 
might be able to turn to those big name international investment banks for help. Setting up 
joint venture asset management companies might be a solution. Or at least, the four AMCs 
should be able to recruit expert worldwide. 
(iii) Moral Hazards Accompanying the Debt-Equity Swap Scheme 
Moral hazards are the biggest risk that needs to be safeguarded against to implement the 
debt-equity swap scheme. Respecting the debt-equity swap scheme in China, moral hazards 
exist in three aspects. 
First, local governments and SOEs are competing to have their debts swapped. The 
selection of candidate enterprises by the SETC surely can solve the moral hazard problem to 
some extent. This practice in itself creates moral hazards, however. Since the final decisions 
are not made by AMCs but by the SETC, AMCs will have an excuse when a deal proves 
unsuccessful later on. It is therefore important to grant AMCs at least the discretion not to 
carry out debt-equity swaps with SETC recommended enterprises so that they can double 
check the financial situation and the potential of an enterprise before they carry out the swap 
with the enterprise. 
Second, most of the debt-equity swap agreements signed so far do not include a 
workable plan to reorganize the enterprise. That makes debt-equity swaps like paper game (to 
increase enterprise book profits by reducing its interest payment) and equal to debt amnesty. 
Last but not least, AMCs have difficulties in disposing of the equity they acquired via 
the swaps, while the exit of AMCs is essential to the success of the debt-equity swap scheme. 
At the end of the day, AMCs must cash banks in return for NPLs (which they currently pay 
in bonds). If AMCs can neither receive dividends from SOEs nor cash in the equity they 
acquired via the swaps, they will have no resources to pay the banks. Consequently, banks 
will have no way to repay depositors, and the Government will ultimately have to take the 
responsibility for repayment. 
4. A Necessary Legal Framework for NPL Management in China 
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(i) An AMC Law Should Be Adopted by the NPC or Its Standing Committee 
The AMC practices in China are mainly based on State Council Regulations and the SETC 
rules; while in most other countries, AMCs are established and operated on the basis of laws 
adopted by legislators-usually the parliament. An AMC Law is needed in China because of 
the probable conflicts between AMC practices and laws adopted by the NPC or its Standing 
Committee. These conflicts can only be solved by special legislation of the NPC or its 
Standing Committee, rather than by State Council Regulations. In addition to the need for 
proper statutes spelling out the statues, the business scope, and powers of the AMCs, there 
are special legal issues that need to be sorted out by the NPC or its Standing Committee for 
AMCs to operate smoothly in China: (1) The notification obligation under the Contract Law 
should be waived when banks assign the NPLs to AMCs. (2) The procedures for the transfer 
of security interests should be simplified by the AMC Law. (3) AMCs' liability to debtors 
should be waived by the AMC Law. ' 
(ii) Updating China's Banking and Bankruptcy Legislation so that Banks Will Have 
Incentives to Be Positive Creditors 
The creditor passivity of the banks is not uncommon in China. Instead of enforcing the loan 
contract against defaulting debtors, banks often choose to simply reschedule or roll over their 
loans. Banks seldom initiate bankruptcy cases against enterprises. And, as an adjunct to 
banks' reluctance in directing an enterprise into bankruptcy, the banks also become unwilling 
and sometimes strongly adverse participants in reorganization or compromise proposals. 
Making matters worse, banks are often required by the government to subsidize enterprise 
reorganization. The causes of creditor passivity are complex. The disincentive factors within 
China's banking law and bankruptcy law, however, have certainly contributed to the creditor 
passivity of the banks in China. 
The disincentive factors within the banking regime include the soft budget constraints 
in State commercial banks, inadequate loan classification and provisioning rules, and the 
7See relevant discussion in Chapter 2. 
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banks' lack of autonomy in writing off NPLs. A new loan classification system has already 
been introduced into China. If the "big four" remain solely State-owned, however, it is hard 
to expect that their soft budget constraints can be really hardened. And, without granting 
them autonomy in charging off bad assets, bank management will not be willing to initiate 
bankruptcy cases against their hopeless borrowers. It is therefore necessary to change 
relevant rules in the banking regime so that banks will have incentives to be positive 
creditors. 
Problems with China's bankruptcy legislation, including problems with bankruptcy 
procedures and the pro-employee asset distribution rules, have greatly contributed to the 
creditor passivity of the banks in China! Unless these rules can be changed, it will not be too 
pessimistic to predict that banks will remain passive in enforcing loan contracts. And, AMCs 
will have to count how much they can achieve by filing bankruptcy cases against their debtor 
enterprises and must be cautious in doing so. Consequently, they will not impose any market 
discipline on SOEs harder than that imposed by the State commercial banks. 
(iii) Establishing An Appropriate Framework to Facilitate Negotiation between 
Creditors and Debtors 
Debt restructuring has become the main tool for Chinese AMCs to deal with NPLs they 
collected from the banks. The current debt restructuring in China, however, is mainly 
orchestrated by the government. AMCs in China are almost solely applying debt-equity 
swaps. There is no report of the use of other debt restructuring tools. One of the reasons, from 
the author's point of view, is the absence of an appropriate framework to facilitate the 
negotiation between creditors and debtors. ' Consequently, the creditors and debtors can do 
nothing without the orchestration of the government. It is therefore necessary to develop a 
consensual mechanism to facilitate the negotiation for debt restructuring in China. 
The author suggests that China develop an out-of-court mechanism similar to the 
London Approach and its variations in Asian crisis countries. The out-of-court mechanism 
should at least include a neutral party to co-ordinate the negotiation between the debtor and 
its creditors, the limitation on the ability of small creditors to block agreements, the seniority 
See relevant discussion in Chapter 3. 
9 Examples of such consensual mechanisms are discussed in Annex VI. 
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of the interim new financing over existing debt and a "standstill" on creditors. The SETC and 
the PBOC should jointly establish a special committee to co-ordinate the negotiation between 
creditors and debtors regarding debt restructuring. The decisions made by the committee 
should bind both parties. 
5. Conclusion 
AMCs are better positioned than State Commercial banks to deal with NPLs and impose 
market discipline on SOEs. If the problems listed above cannot be solved properly, and if an 
appropriate legal infrastructure cannot be put in place, however, it might not be pessimistic to 
predict that AMCs would not impose harder discipline on SOEs than banks. 
V. NPL PREVENTION: DEVELOPING A PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
BANKING REGULATION AND MARKET DISCIPLINE 
A. WHY A PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANKING REGULATION 
AND MARKET DISCIPLINE? 
A partnership relationship between banking regulation and market discipline is necessary 
because of the limitations of both market discipline and financial regulation. Actually, the 
rational of regulation is exactly the rational of market discipline. 
1. Rationale of Regulation, Rationale of Market Discipline 
Various grounds have been given to account for regulation. Among them, three views will 
help us to understand the relationship between market discipline and prudential regulation. 
The first is that the regulation exists for the public good. This view sees market failure, " such 
as the existence of natural monopoly or externalities, as prima facie evidence in favor of 
10 Summaries of the theories of market failure can be found in: Bator, Francis M., 'The Anatomy of Market 
Failure', 72 Quarterly Journal of Economics 3,351 (1958); and Baumol, William J., Welfare Economics and 
the Theory of the State (1965). For a more recent survey, see Stiglitz, Joseph E., et a!., The Economic Role of 
the State (1989). 
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government regulation. In this view, regulation as a remedy to the market failure should and 
must play in coordination with market forces. " 
The second view, the "capture" or "specific interest" theory, sees regulation as 
implemented and operated for the benefit of politically powerful special interest groups, 
rather than for the public interest. " In this view, even if regulation is implemented for the 
public good, regulatory agencies tend to become captured by regulatees or by other special 
interests. This model reminds us of the risk that regulation is being used for special interest 
groups and hence the importance of market forces in checking that regulation is being 
properly used. 
A third view extends the second analysis in recognizing that regulators and legislators 
are not passive agents of some special interests, but respond in purposeful ways to various 
incentives. According to this view, there is a dialectical process between bank regulation and 
innovation by market participants. Regulation imposed with good intentions leads to 
regulatees' avoidance and a consequent decreasing of the effectiveness of the regulation and 
other, perhaps harmful, unintended effects. Political pressure and bureaucratic incentives 
lead to re-regulation. " To avoid this negative dialectical process, there must be well- 
established regulatory objectives rooted in a clear understanding of why markets do not work 
well and how their functioning can be strengthened through government intervention. " 
2. The Limitation of Regulation 
No matter how advanced a regulatory system is there will be unregulated risks. The 
continuing incidence of financial instability and crises in industrial countries suggests that 
" When reading the literature on the insufficiency of market, what should not be forgotten, however, is another 
strand of literature, that persuasively shows how political action, politicians, and bureaucrats, perhaps even 
more significantly than the market, can fail to coordinate the economy. See, e. g., Buchanan, James & Tullock, 
Gorden, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (1962); and Niskanen, 
William A., Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1971). 
'' See, e. g., Stigler, George J. 'The Theory of Economic Regulation', 2 Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management 3 (Spring 1971). 
13 See, e. g., Kane, Edward J., 'Accelerating Inflation, Technological Innovation, and the Decreasing 
Effectiveness of Banking Regulation', 36 Journal of Finance 355 (May 1981); and `Good Intentions and 
Unintended Evil: The Case against Selective Credit Allocation', 9 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 55 
(February 1977). 
10 See, e. g., European Bank For Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998: Financial Sector in 
Transition, iv (1998). 
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regulatory and supervisory reform is unlikely to provide fail-safe protection in this area. The 
limit to the effectiveness of regulation and supervision has various sources. 
First, there is a continuing danger that new practices or transactions not yet 
adequately covered by the regulatory framework may prove a source of financial instability. 
And we can never be sure that all risks related to banking are under regulation. " 
Second, there are growing difficulties regarding the transparency required for 
regulation and supervision. As a result of financial regulations, the balance sheets and other 
returns of many financial firms have an increasingly chameleon-like quality, which reduce 
their value to regulators. 
Last but not least, the quality of most bank assets is susceptible to changes in the 
overall economic climate. No private-sector loan or other asset on a bank's balance sheet 
should be classified generically as "good". " So long as cycles of financial boom and bust are 
features of the economic system, so also will be unforeseeable deteriorations in the status of 
many bank assets. " Consequences of such boom-bust cycle were described in terms of the 
concept, "latent concentration risk" in recent literature on credit risk. '$ Large exposure 
limitation cannot handle the "latent concentration risk". " Whereas loan-loss provisions and 
higher prudential capital requirements can solve the problem to some extend, the financing 
associated with booms in the value of the property and other assets are difficult for 
"s See Kane, Edward J., 'Metamorphosis in Financial Services Delivery and Production', in Federal Home Loan 
Bank of San Francisco, Strategic Planning for Economic and Technological Change in the Financial Services 
Industry, Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference (1983), where the author argued that the existence of 
unregulated risks was due to the fact that avoidance lags are shorter than regulatory lags. The differential lags 
reflect differences in the adaptive capacities of the regulated institutions and the regulators in response to 
changes in technology, market forces, or banking practices. 
16 However reasonable the original managerial decision to make a loan and however justified its initial 
classification as low-risk by banking supervisors, the loan is vulnerable to the possibility of an eventual 
deterioration in its status. See Section C. 3, Chap. IV, Part I in UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 
(1998). 
" During such cycles risks take time to build up and become widely evident. For a while, indeed, the quality of 
loans can actually be enhanced by the very financing boom of which they are a part. Eventually, the effects of 
excess capacity generated by the boom and of the over-extended position of financial firms are likely to 
transform the boom into a movement in the opposite direction. See Akyuz, Yilmaz & Comford, Andrew, 
Capital Flows to Developing Countries and the Reform of the International Financial System, UNCTAD 
Discussion Papers No. 143,29-30 (November 1999). 
'" See Caouette, J. B., E. I. Altman & Narayanan P., Managing Credit Risk: The Next Great Financial Challenge, 
91,240 (1998). 
19 Traditionally, the concentration risk is handled in the context of banking regulation and supervision through 
limits on the size of exposures to particular borrowers. For this purpose "borrower" is typically defined to 
include groups of counter parties characterized by links due to common ownership, common directors, cross- 
guarantees, or forms of short-term commercial interdependency. See Basle Committee, Measuring and 
Controlling Large Credit Exposure, sect. IV. (1991). 
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supervisors to restrain with the measures at their disposal owing to the size of increases in 
expected income growth or capital gains which are frequently involved. 
3. Conclusion 
To sum up, market failures do justify regulation. There are, however, limitations with 
financial regulation as well. Therefore cares should be taken to make sure that regulations are 
complemented by doing what is possible to strengthen market forces. 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRUDENTIAL BANKING REGULATION IN CHINA AND 
ITS COMPATIBILITY WITH MARKET DISCIPLINE 
Despite all the progress China has made in developing banking regulation and supervision in 
line with international standards, 2° there are incompatibilities between China's banking 
regulation and market discipline. Efforts need to be made to develop a partnership 
relationship between market discipline and banking regulation in China. 
1. Fostering Competition Should Be One of the Objectives for Banking Regulation and 
Supervision in China 
The objectives for banking regulation and supervision are clearly defined by both the Central 
Banking Law and Commercial Banking Law in China. Accordingly, there are two objectives 
for banking regulation and supervision - to ensure the safety and soundness of commercial 
banking and to protect the legitimate rights and interests of depositors and other clients and 
other public interests. 21 
As have argued in Chapter One, the lack of competition in China's capital market, 
especially the domination of State commercial banks, has seriously undermined the market 
discipline. In the long run, a captive financial market is in conflicts with the objectives of 
20 See relevant discussion in Chapter Three. 
Z' The Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China, adopted at the 3rd Session of the 
Eighth National People's Congress on March 18,1995, effective as of the same day, art. 30; and the Law of 
People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks, adopted at the 13th Session of the Standing Committee of 
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ensuring the safety and soundness of commercial banking and protecting depositors and other 
public interests. It is therefore necessary to have a third objective for banking regulation and 
supervision in China, i. e., to foster a more competitive banking market. 
2. Removing Administrative Controls on Banks Completely 
Administrative controls on banking activities undermine the good functioning of market 
discipline. To date, most of the administrative controls have been removed or relaxed. 
Interest rate controls, however, are still featuring China's banking system. As discussed in 
Chapter One, among all the restrictions, interest rate controls do the greatest harm to the good 
functioning of market discipline. To restore market discipline in China, interest rate controls 
over bank deposit taking and lending will have to be removed. 
3. Promoting Disclosure Standards and Accounting Practices 
Market discipline requires that market participants can make informed judgments. This 
demands more disclosure of bank data, because if the marketplace is to play its role 
effectively, it must have adequate and reliable information via disclosure. 22 Appropriate 
disclosure is also crucial to effective banking supervision. Principle 21 of the Basle 
Committee Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision reads as follows: 
Banking Supervisors must be satisfied that each bank maintains adequate records drawn up in accordance 
with consistent accounting policies and practices that enable the supervisor to obtain a true and fair view of 
the financial condition of the bank and the profitability of its business, and that the bank publishes on a 
regular basis financial statements that fairly reflect its conditions. 
China's Commercial Banking Law contains disclosure requirements as well. Article 
55 of the Law provides that a commercial bank shall truthfully and in an all-round way 
record and reflect its business activities and financial position, produce its annual financial 
accounting report and timely submit its financial statements to the PBOC and the treasury 
the 8th National People's Congress on May 10,1995, and effective as of July 1,1995 (hereinafter referred to as 
"the Commercial Banking Law"), art. 1. 
22 See, e. g., `Survey: Prevention is Much Better than Cure', 350 The Economist 8104 (January 30,1999). 
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department. A commercial bank shall not establish accounting books other than those legally 
specified. Commercial banks are also required to announce their business performance and 
audited statement of the previous fiscal year within three months after the end of every fiscal 
year in accordance with the stipulation of the PBOC. Z' The problem is that these rules have 
never been implemented fully. 
According to Nicholas Lardy, except for the BOC, the largest State-owned banks did 
not disclose information on the quality of its loan portfolio and the magnitude of NPLs 
written off annually until 1998. Besides, except for the BOC, the rest of the "big four" did 
not present their balance sheets on a consolidated basis, allowing them to bury financial 
losses in their subsidiaries. More generally, both profit and loss statements and the balance 
sheets of most banks were presented on such an aggregated basis that it is difficult to evaluate 
their true financial condition. " The PBOC in 1996 acknowledged that some banks had lent 
funds "without recording them in their account books, " and that some non-bank institutions 
created "false assets" to cover up the "black hole" in their balance sheets caused by large 
financial losses. 25 
The poor accounting and disclosure practices not only undermine the market 
discipline but also thwart effective banking supervision. Taking large exposure limit for an 
example, Chinese banks do not disclose any quantitative information on loan concentration 
so it is impossible to judge the extent to which they are in compliance with this prudential 
rule. 
It is therefore necessary that more advanced accounting disclosure rules are developed 
in China, both for the good functioning of market discipline and a more effective banking 
regulation and supervision. Z" 
VI. DESIGNING AN APPROPRIATE BANKING SAFETY NET TO ENHANCE 
MARKET DISCIPLINE AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION IN CHINA 
The Commercial Banking Law, supra note 21, art. 56. 
24 See Lardy, Nicholas R., China's Unfinished Economic Revolution, 169 (1998). 
25 Id., at 206. 
26 Fortunately, progresses have been made in this area. In November 2000, the CSRC issued rules on disclosure 
by listed fmancial companies (including banks). Accordingly, listed commercial banks should comply with the 
PBOC system of classifying assets in five categories. In their statements, banks should disclose at least three 
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A. THE OVERALL CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE BANKING SAFETY NET AND 
MARKET DISCIPLINE 
1. The Inherent Moral Hazard Problem 
The Moral hazard problem has been puzzling the proponents for central bank's LOLR, 
deposit insurance system and bank insolvency resolution even since the first day they were 
proposed. A LOLR bears moral hazards, especially when it is not properly provided. If banks 
can always expect to get easy loans from the central bank whenever they come across 
liquidity problems (or even solvency problems), bank management will become incautious in 
watching the asset liquidity of the bank. Public deposit insurance encourages bank owners 
and managers (particularly in troubled banks) to take irresponsible or excessive risks and to 
hold less capital than if bank deposit were not insured. In the case of bank insolvency 
resolution, moral hazards will be presented because most of the regulatory options contain 
government aids, i. e., funding coming directly or indirectly from the government. " Making 
matters worse, in some cases, an implicit or explicit "too big to fail" will not only induce 
moral-hazard-behavior, but may also pose questions of fair competition. " 
The author has no intention to deny these charges. But if we try to understand the 
issue from another angle, however, we might be able to conclude that a well-designed safety 
net is essential for the good functioning of market discipline by facilitating banking 
regulators to impose market discipline on individual banks without jeopardizing the entire 
banking system. 
2. Understanding the Safety and Soundness Properly 
years' figures for their total debts and deposits, as well as their NPLs. See AFX News, `CSRC Issues Rules on 
Disclosure by Listed Financial Companies' (November 14,2000), available at '2000 WL 29253899'. 
27 There are four sources of external funding in the case of bank failures: banks, the central bank, the 
government or deposit insurance. However, funding from the deposit insurance or from the central bank can be 
an indirect way of granting government funding, thus exposing the interests of taxpayers. See generally 
Goodhart, C. & Schoenmaker, D., Institutional Separation Benveen Supervisory and Monetary Agencies, LSE 
Financial Markets Group, Special Paper No. 52 (April 1993). 
ZB See, e. g., Lastra, R. M., Central Banking and Banking Regulation, 136-7 (1996). 
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The safety and soundness of banking institutions is considered as the primary goal of banking 
regulation all over the world. 29 The understanding of the goal, however, is not always the 
same - although it is agreed that the overall goal of bank regulation is to maintain public 
confidence in the banking system, i. e., the protection of the system as a whole, " the goal of 
safety and soundness can also be interpreted as the protection of depositor accounts or the 
protection of individual institutions. " A banking safety net is therefore necessary because it 
help to resolve this inconsistency. 
In the absence of a LORL and the deposit insurance, it is difficult for banking 
regulators/supervisors to distinguish between the protection of depositor accounts, the 
protection of the system as a whole, and the protection of individual institutions. The failure 
of an individual institution may lead to runs on or failures of other institutions - institutions 
that were well run and sound. The protection of individual institutions would then be 
necessary to protect depositors of the given institution as well as of other institutions. The 
advent of a LOLR and the deposit insurance, therefore, to some extent frees regulators from 
the need to preserve individual institutions. 32 In some cases, orderly liquidation of troubled 
institutions, with a guarantee against loss by liquidation, isolated the problem so that it 
cannot spread to other institutions. It is in these senses that the author argues that a banking 
safety net is in overall consistent with market discipline. 
B. THE BANK SAFETY NET MUST BE WELL-DESIGNED AND OPERATED 
The overall consistency between a banking safety net and market discipline cannot be taken 
for granted. The harmony can only be attained if the bank safety net is well designed and 
properly carried out. 
To avoid or mitigate the conflicts with market discipline, the LOLR function of the 
central bank should be used only to alleviate short-term liquidity problems, by lending at a 
29 This is not surprising given the fact that the banking regulation regime in most countries was first established 
in the wake of financial crises with numerous bank failures. See, e. g., Harif, William S. R: Kushmeider, Rose 
Marie (eds. ), Restructuring Banking & Financial Services in America, x (1988). 
'o See Sinkey, Joseph F. Jr., ̀ Regulatory Attitudes toward Risk', in Aspinwall, Richard C. & Eisenbeis Robert A 
(eds. ), Handbook for Banking Strategy, 349-50 (1985). 
See Peterson, Manferd 0., `Regulatory Objectives and Conflicts' in Aspinwall, Richard C. & Eisenbeis 
Robert A. (eds. ), Handbook for Banking Strategy (1985). 
'Z For example, with depositors protected by government deposit insurance, the experience since 1934 in the 
U. S. indicates that failure of one bank seldom leads to runs on other banks. Id. 
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penalty rate on good collateral. Moreover, central banks must assure the sterilization of 
liquidity supports to banks. " To achieve this, the conditions and procedures to provide LOLR 
should be clearly defined in China's Central Banking Law. 
The design and operation of a deposit insurance system might be the most 
complicated part. The scope and coverage of the deposit insurance system should be limited 
so that at least depositors will have some incentives to monitor banks. More importantly, the 
government should adhere to its commitment to pay out only those deposits that fall within 
the terms of the guarantee and no others whenever the deposit insurance system is put to the 
test. China needs to replace its government implicit guarantee with an explicit deposit 
insurance scheme and include all these rules in its new deposit insurance system. 
With regard to insolvency resolution mechanisms, it is essential that insolvent 
intermediaries would be closed promptly when net worth on a market-value accounting basis 
declines to zero. 34 Moreover, banking supervisors and regulators should ensure that the risk is 
borne by equity owners of the intermediaries by adequate capital requirements. Basic 
regulatory options to deal with a failed bank include closure and liquidation, a rescue 
package, merger and take over, and bridge bank (e. g., management take-over in China). To 
date, all these mechanisms have been applied in some form in China, although the 
Commercial Banking Law only provides about the management take-over and liquidation 
(including bankruptcy) of commercial banks. There are problems with China's recent 
financial institution insolvency resolution practices. China needs to develop a solid legal 
infrastructure for bank insolvency resolution. 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
All four conditions for market discipline are absent in China. The malfunctioning of market 
discipline in China lies at the root of the bank NPL problem. A comprehensive bank 
" Sterilization enables central banks to recycle liquidity from banks gaining deposits to those losing deposits 
and credit lines. 
70 See, e. g., Benston, George J., Eisenbeis, Robert A, Horvitz, Paul M., Kane, Edward J. & Kaufman, George 
G., Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking: Past, Present and Future, 37-42,91-93 (1986). If the bank is 
declared legally insolvent at the exact moment the market value of its net worth reaches zero (i. e., at the point 
of economic insolvency), direct losses are only suffered by shareholders. If the bank is declared legally 
insolvent when the market value of its net worth is already negative, losses will accrue to not only shareholders 
but also uninsured creditors and/or to the insurance fund. The longer an economically insolvent bank is allowed 
to continue operations, the higher the cost to the insurance fund. Id. 
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restructuring is therefore necessary to restore the market discipline on State commercial 
banks and SOEs. 
China has established four AMCs to take over the NPLs from the "big four". There 
are problems with the current AMC practices in China. If these problems cannot be solved 
properly, it is hard to expect that AMCs can do any better than State commercial banks to 
discipline the SOE borrowers. Besides, caution needs to be taken to avoid or at least to 
mitigate potential conflicts between government recapitalization and market discipline. 
The creation of new NPLs must come to a halt, by enhancing banking regulation and 
promoting bank internal controls. The development of banking regulation and supervision, 
however, should not suppress market forces. 
An appropriately designed banking safety net comprising LOLR, deposit insurance 
and bank insolvency resolution helps banking regulators and supervisors to distinguish 
between the protection of depositor accounts, the protection of system as a whole, and the 
protection of individual institutions and therefore focus themselves on maintaining the public 
confidence in the banking system, so as to achieve a harmony with market discipline. 
The AMC practices, the enhanced banking regulation and bank internal controls, and 
a bank safety net will certainly help to restore market discipline in China. The success of 
these schemes, however, depends heavily on whether a solid legal framework can be put in 
place to facilitate the comprehensive bank restructuring, including laws relating to AMC 
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ANNEX III: REGULATORY FORBEARANCE - EXPERIENCES OF THE US AND 
JAPAN 
1. The Failed Regulatory Forbearance Policies towards the Thrift' Crisis in the US 
The experience of the US thrift industry in the 1980s exemplifies the risk of regulatory 
forbearance. Beginning in 1979, the mutual saving banks and savings and loans associations 
suffered severe losses. 2 In 1981,85% of the nearly 3,800 thrift institutions insured by the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) had negative earnings. 3 The 
FSLIC, facing a record number of problem thrift institutions, responded by merging or 
liquidating the weakest institutions, but allowing many of them to remain open. In 1982, the 
Congress codified this pattern of loose regulatory enforcement in the Garn-St Germain Act. 
The legislation relaxed accounting standards for thrifts and broadened the types of assets they 
could hold. The authorities chose the tactic of regulatory forbearance largely because the 
resources available to the FSLIC were grossly inadequate to pay off depositors of the thrifts 
that should have liquidated. 4 
During the mid-1980s the government encouraged adequately capitalized "healthy" 
thrifts to acquire inadequately capitalized "sick" thrifts. Such acquisitions, commonly 
referred to as "supervisory mergers, " were orchestrated by the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board (FHLBB) and the FSLIC. The government preferred merging insolvent thrifts rather 
1 The term "thrift" encompasses various types of state and federally chartered financial institutions, including 
building and loan associations, savings and loan associations, cooperative banks, homestead associations, and 
savings banks. Traditionally, thrifts accepted funds from individual depositors and then loaned them to the 
public in the form of single-family home mortgages. See 12 U. S. C. § 1424 (1988) (amended 1989). 
See Savage, Donald T., `Depository Financial Institutions', in Aspinwall, Richard C. & Eisenbeis Robert A. 
(eds. ), Handbook for Banking Strategy (1985). ' 
3 This was the worst of a series of increasingly un-profitable years for S& Ls. More significantly, the 1979-81 
surge in interest rates wiped out the industry's net worth, as measured by current market value. Even by the 
most lenient standards of generally accepted accounting principles, the financial health of thrift institutions 
deteriorated markedly during this period. See Romer, Thomas & Weingast, Barry R., `Congress: The Genesis of 
the Thrift Crisis', 2 
Stan. L. & Pol 'y Rev 37,37 at 37 (Spring, 1990). 
4 ̀ GAO Estimates FSLIC Ran out of Money in 1986, Incurred $3 Billion Deficit', Banking Report 422 (March 
9,1987). According to the former Chairman of the US League of Savings Institutions, "The hope [in the early 
1980s] was [that] we could get through this first hump, that interest rates would go down, and [that] we could 
save the bulk of the industry. " Cited in Felsenfeld, Carl, `The Savings and Loan Crisis', 59 Fordliam L. Rev. S7, 
S 28 (May 1991). 
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than liquidating them because supervisory mergers were believed to be less costly to the 
government and less disruptive to the insolvent thrift's depositors and borrowers. 5 
To encourage healthy thrifts to acquire sick thrifts, the FHLBB and FSLIC typically 
provided acquirers with financial assistance and forbearance agreements. 6 The terms 
contained in these forbearance agreements varied in substance depending on the transaction, 
but generally the agreements contained the FHLBB's or the FSLIC's7 expressed promise to 
refrain from enforcing the already relaxed capital requirements or mandating the use of 
accounting standards. 8 Mergers were arranged on an interstate basis, and both bank holding 
companies and some non-thrift firms were allowed to acquire S&Ls. 9 
In order to minimize the amount of FSLIC financial aid required, the FSLIC reduced 
by two-fifths the minimum net worth ratios required for thrifts to maintain in operation, and 
when proved inadequate, issued outright exemptions so that thrifts that failed to meet the new 
lower capital requirements could continue to operate. The Competitive Equality Banking Act 
of 1987 required that the FHLBB forebear against thrifts with regulatory net worth of more 
than 0.5% and whose low capital could be attributable to adverse economic conditions. In 
some cases even S& Ls with net worth of less than 0.5% were eligible for forbearance. Since 
regulatory capital often overstates the market value of capital by a large margin, these 
provisions ensured that a substantial number of firms would continue to operate with 
effectively no equity funds at risk. 10 At the end of 1987, for example, over 500 insolvent S& 
Ls continued in operation. " 
S See Levitt, Michael S., 'The Abrogation of Forbearance Agreements: FIRREA's Ambiguities Demand A 
More Principled Analysis', 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1314,1314-5 (June, 1993). 
6 See Coe, Linda B., 'Abrogation of Forbearance Agreements: Unauthorized by FIRREA and Unconstitutional', 
59 GEO. Wash. L. Rev 157,158 (1990). 
7 The FHLBB generally issued the forbearances for federally chartered institutions, and the FSLIC generally 
issued the forbearances for state chartered institutions. Id., at 161. 
8 Standard types of forbearances authorized and granted by the FHLBB and FSLIC included: (1) forbearance 
from enforcing regulatory capital requirements; (2) forbearance from requiring certain accounting requirements; 
(3) forbearance from curing deficiencies in liquidity requirements; (4) forbearance from compliance vith 
investment limitations in service corporations; (5) forbearance from prohibitions on unauthorized service 
corporation activities; (6) forbearance from prohibition on operations and investments inconsistent with FSLIC 
regulations; (7) forbearance from compliance with investment limitations in owned office buildings; and (8) 
forbearance from requirements to restructure troubled debt. See Zisman, Barry S. & Churchill, William 0., 
'Federal Assistance Relating to Failing and Failed Thrifts', 8 Banking Expansion Rep. 1,12 (1989). 
9 See, e. g., Harif, William S. & Kushmeider, Rose Marie (eds. ), Restructuring Banking & Financial Services in 
America, 23 (1988). 
10 Id., at 25. 
11 See. e. g., Hagermand, Deano & Gajewski, Gregory, 'Patterns of Financial Institution Failures: Some 
Thoughts on Policy Implications', Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Banking and Economic Review 8 
(May/June 1987). 
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The US Congress cooperated by eliminating Regulation Q interest rate ceilings on 
thrift institutions and authorizing "certain capital forbearance measures. "12 To provide 
longer-run aid, regulatory limitations on variable-rate mortgages were reduced or eliminated 
and the Supreme Court removed barriers to the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses. The 
thrifts, along with the commercial banks, were given a variety of new deposit instruments. 
The 1980 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act and the Garn-St 
Germain Act of 1982 also expanded the lending and investment powers of the thrifts in the 
expectation that their excessive concentration in mortgage could be reduced over time. 
Besides, Borrowings from the Federal Home Loan Banks increased, and a capital assistance 
program was initiated under the authorization of Garn-St Germain Act of 1982.13 
All these facilitated the over-risk-taking by thrifts and consequently led to their 
failures. 14 Because of the existence of deposit insurance, insolvent or nearly insolvent thrifts 
were able to continue to attract funds. By offering higher yields on deposit accounts, they 
could bid for funds nationwide using deposit brokers and direct advertising in an attempt to 
grow their way out of their problems. In an attempt to increase their profitability, in the mid- 
1980s thrifts abandoned their traditional focus on residential mortgage lending in favor of 
commercial real estate lending and investments in high-yield junk bonds. In this search for 
higher earnings that could be used to buttress their weak capital positions, the thrifts moved 
into unfamiliar business without fully understanding the greater risks involved. '5 
The regulatory forbearance tactics towards the thrift problem proved a financial 
disaster. The regulatory forbearance seemed to work over the next two years after the Gam- 
St Germain Act, with the fall of the number of thrifts that received direct or indirect FSLIC 
assistance. As interest rates declined, many observers came to believe that the crisis was 
over. Unfortunately, the period between 1983 and 1985 was just the calm before the storm. In 
late 1985, the FHLBB chairman Edwin Gray testified before the Congress that the FSLIC 
would require $14-15bn in additional funds to handle the rapidly growing number of 
insolvencies. When Congress passed legislation nearly two years later in 1987, S&L 
12 See Andrew, Sheng, Bank Restructuring: Lessons from the 1980s, 77 (1996). 
13 See Hagermand, Deano & Gajewski, Gregory, supra note 11. 
14 Of the 20 largest depository institutions failing from 1934 to 1984,17 have occurred since 1981 and of those, 
16 were thrift institutions. The heavy losses incurred by thrifts in the U. S. as a result of interest rate volatility 
suggest a need for greater capital than for commercial banks. See Nagle, Reid & Petersen, Bruce, 
`Capitalization Problems in Perspective' in Aspinwall, Richard C. & Eisenbeis Robert A. (eds. ), Handbook for 
Banking Strategy (1985). 
15 See Andrew, Sheng, supra note 12, at 79. 
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insolvency costs had grown to an estimated $50bn. 16 By the time bailout legislation was 
again considered in 1989, liabilities facing the FSLIC and American taxpayers had reached 
$200bn, 17 forcing the FSLIC into bankruptcy in 1989. 
The adoption of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989 (FIRREA)18 was an admission that the decade-long hope that the thrifts could grow 
their way back to solvency had failed. The scope of its regulatory reforms was expressed in 
the purposes of the Act: 19 (1) to promote, through regulatory reform, a safe and stable system 
of affordable housing finance; (2) to improve the supervision of savings associations by 
strengthening capital, accounting, and other supervisory standards; 20 (3) to curtail 
investments and other activities of savings associations that pose unacceptable risks to the 
Federal deposit insurance funds; (4) to promote the independence of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from the institutions the deposits of which it insures, by 
providing an independent board of directors, adequate funding, and appropriate powers; (5) 
to put the Federal deposit insurance funds on a sound financial footing; (6) to establish an 
Office of Thrift Supervision in the Department of the Treasury, under the general oversight 
of the Secretary of the Treasury; (7) to establish a new corporation, to be known as the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), to contain, manage, and resolve failed savings 
associations; (8) to provide funds from public and private sources to deal expeditiously with 
failed depository institutions; (9) to strengthen the enforcement powers of Federal Regulators 
of depository institutions; and (10) to strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal penalties for 
defrauding or otherwise damaging depository institutions and their depositors. 
The FIRREA's most important contribution to the solution of the thrift crisis was its 
acknowledgement that taxpayer's money would be required to close all insolvent S& Ls. 21 
The FIRREA provided $50bn over three years to close insolvent S& Ls, with additional 
funding available thereafter. The legislation also created the FSLIC Resolution Fund (FRD) 
16 The 1987 legislation only provided $10.8bn in additional FSLIC funding, less than regulators had requested 
in 1985. See Romer, Thomas & Weingast, Barry R., supra note 3, at 37. 
Id., at 38. 
1e FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73,103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U. S. C. ). 
19 12 U. S. C. § 1811 (Supp. 111 1991). 
20 FIRREA, through its Minimum Capital Requirements provision, supplies the regulatory framework for the 
recapitalization of the savings and loan industry. The provision authorizes the Director of the OTC to establish 
minimum capital requirements. 
2' By contrast, all previous legislative and regulatory actions understated the size of the problem and indicated 
that a combination of insurance premiums and special assessments on industry would cover the entire cost. 
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to cover S&L closing costs incurred before 1989. These funds were separated from the 
22 $50bn made available to close insolvent S& Ls beginning in 1989. 
With regards to the regulatory forbearance agreements, the OTC and RTC were 
empowered to review prior FHLBB and FSLIC cases respectively, including the terms 
contained in supervisory mergers. 23 "The Corporation [RTC] shall review and analyze all 
insolvent institution cases resolved by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
between January 1,1988, and the date of enactment of the Financial Institution Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989.... 9924 Regarding the scope of the RTC's power under 
its review duties, the provision states: The Corporation [RTC] shall exercise any and all legal 
rights to modify, renegotiate, or restructure such agreements where savings would be realized 
by such actions. 25 
2. The Failure of Japan's Regulatory Forbearance Policy and the U-Turn Afterwards 
Japan's banking crisis has been a slow-burn26 crisis that has gradually unfolded during the 
course of 1990s. 27 At the heart of the problem was a vast amount of unrecoverable loans 
backed by commercial property, whose value has collapsed since the early 1990s, 28 to which 
has been added unrecoverable loans to companies from Japan's long economic slowdown. 
29 
In 1993 the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) openly debated 
over how to respond to the deterioration in banks' loan portfolios. The MOF argued that, in 
the interests of financial stability, banks should be encouraged to make only a gradual 
22 See Barth, James R. & Brumbaugh, R. Dan Jr., ' Savings & Loan Crisis: Lessons and A Look Ahead: The 
Rough Road From FIRREA to Deposit Insurance Reform', 2 Stan. L. & Policy Rev. 58, at 58 (Spring, 1990). 
23 See Levitt, Michael S., supra note 5, at 1324-26. 
24 12 U. S. C. § 1441a (b) (11) (B) (Supp. 11989), amended by 12 U. S. C. § 1441 a (b) (11) (B) (Supp. 111 1991). 
251d. 
26 The slow-burn characteristic may explain why Japan chose to have the banks reserve or write off loans on 
their own books. 
27 The genesis of the crisis can be traced to late 1970s when Japan started its financial deregulation. Following 
that period was the period from mid-to-late 1980s when rising asset prices supported by massive bank lending. 
The 1990s have seen falling asset prices, resulting in problems in the banking sector, and the government's slow 
attempts to address them. See Ueda, Kazuo, `The Japanese Banking Crisis in the 1990s' in Strengthening the 
Banking System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,251, at 251 (October 1999). 
28 Ueda, Kazuo identified the role of real-estate-related loans played in causing the NPL problem by tracing the 
movements of the price index for land and its relationships with the increase in real estate loans and the 
deterioration in overall loan quality. He finds out that the increase in real estate loans in the mid to late 1980s 
corresponding with sharp increases in land prices after the mid 1980s and the long period of large declines in 
loan prices in the 1990s is consistent with the view that this has been the major cause of the NPL problem. Id., 
at 255. 
29 See generally Jon Choy, 'Japanese Fiscal Policy: Testing Economic Theory And Political Will' (April 30, 
1999), available at '/999 WL 11606577'. 
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adjustment to their published accounts; while the BOJ advocated immediate large-scale 
write-offs even if that meant, for some banks, reporting actual losses in the 1993-4 fiscal 
year. The MOF's view prevailed. The regulatory authorities adopted a forbearance policy 
that allowed banks to understate the scale of their problem loans in the hope that the passage 
of time would eventually alleviate the situation. 30 
The forbearance policy contained several key elements. 31 First, in January 1993 the 
Co-operative Credit Purchasing Company (CCPC) was established by 162 financial 
institutions to acquire banks' troubled loans at a discount based on an independent valuation 
of the underlying property collateral. The CCPC's loan acquisition was, in theory, financed 
by those banks disposing of their loans. Those banks that transferred their assets to the CCPC 
were able to take off the loans concerned from their balance sheets and offset the resulting 
losses against tax. The CCPC, however, operated on a full recourse basis - i. e., banks could 
be obliged to reacquire loans they "sold" if the agency failed to dispose the underlying 
property collateral. 32 
Second, banks were evidently encouraged by the authorities to handle their troubled 
loans in ways that did not require recognition of losses or disclosure of non-performance. 
Typically, this involved restructuring loans at concessionary, and even near-zero, interest 
rates. 33 
Third, the lax accounting rules in Japan helped banks to conceal their problems. 
Japanese banks applied "window dressing" widely to flatter their fiscal year results through a 
variety of accounting tricks every March. 34 
Following the regulatory forbearance was the banks' deliberate concealing of the 
problem. The FSA's inspection of the country's largest 19 banks prior to the injection of 
30 See generally Beattie, Vivien A., et al., Banks and Bad Debts: Accounting for Loan Losses in International 
Banking, 125 (1995). 
31 Id., at 125-7. 
32 This, under UK or US supervisory rules, however, would prevent the loans concerned from being taken off 
the banks' balance sheet. 
" It was estimated that if such restructured credits were classified as non-performing, they would then double 
the total NPLs reported by the 21 major banks at March 1993. See Beattie, Vivien A., et al., supra note 30. 
34 "Window dressing" comes in many forms. At one of the spectrum, some Japanese institutions have engaged 
in tobashi - or the illegal practice of shuffling losses into secret accounts. But Japanese institutions have also 
used completely tricks to flatter their accounts such as temporarily selling high-risk assets to remove them from 
their balance sheet. Between these two extremes lie a multitude of gray trades. Western brokers have 
temporarily bought shares from Japanese banks to allow their Japanese clients to record a profit on their equity 
portfolios - before selling them back to the same bank. Meanwhile, western investment banks have also sold 
derivatives that can disguise losses. See, e. g., Tett, Gillan, `Banking: Japanese "Window Dressing" May Cost 
Dear', Fin. Times (April 6,1999). 
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Y25,000bn of public funds into their capital base revealed that these banks had 
underestimated their risky loans by up to Y10,000bn. 35 
The forbearance approaches carried out in the earlier stage of the crisis proved a 
failure. The equity of Japanese banks declined significantly to a level well below the Basle 
Accord standard, while loans classified as "behind in payment" down to "non-recoverable" 
totaled at least 77 trillion yen, or 15% of GDP in 1998.36 The economic growth slowed down 
tremendously. After 1996, economic forecasts had caught up with the slow- growth reality 
and were no longer surprised by it. 37 
In 1998,38 the Financial Reconstructuring Commission (FRC) was established to 
oversee financial sector restructuring. Besides, the Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) was 
spun off from the MOF in June 1998 to handle issues related to the banking crisis. Two bad 
loan collection and disposal agencies (the Resolution and Collection Bank and the Housing 
Loan Administration Corporation) were consolidated into a new agency - the Resolution 
and Collection Corporation. The new agency has expanded authority to purchase bad loans 
not only from failed banks but also from solvent institutions. 39 Legislation was enacted in 
October 1998 that sharply increased public funds available to deal with problem 
institutions, 40 toughened the conditionality for bank recapitalization with such funds, and 
created mechanisms for temporary nationalization of failed banks . 
41 Two major banks were 
nationalized in the late 1998.42 The first round of capital injection was finalized on March 30, 
35 See Tett, Gillian, 'Japanese Banks' Underestimated Bad Loans', Fin. Times (November 26,1998). 
36 See Posen, Adam S., 'Financial Fragility and the Risks of Crisis: the Case of Japan', 23-SPG Fletcher F. 
World Aff. 109,118 (Winter-Spring 1999). 
37 Id., at 121. 
38 Cf. Ueda, Kazuo, supra note 27. That author contemplates that the policy turning started as early as the 
beginning of the 1990s. Ueda divided the 1990s into three stages: The stage until 1994 is one in which banks 
and regulators started to recognize the seriousness of the NPL problem, with the first troubled banks to be 
closed, with the injection of deposit insurance funds into rescuing banks, with the Cooperative Credit 
Purchasing Company created in 1993 and banks starting to disclose bad loan numbers in 1993. The second 
stage started in late 1994 in which the regulators embarked on serious attempts at resolving problems with 
credit cooperatives and housing finance companies (jusen). The third stage started in 1997. The credit crunch 
resulted from the closure of three large banks and securities companies led to the government's final decision to 
mobilize a large sum of public money to protect creditors of insolvent banks and to recapitalize some of the 
solvent ones. Id., at 251-2. 
39 See 'Annex II Banking System Developments and Corporate Sector Restructuring in Japan' in IMF 
International Capital Markets: Development, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, 28, at 38 (September 1999). 
40 To help banks meet the requirements, the government pledged Y60,000bn of public funds, consisting of 
Y25,000bn for injections into the banks' capital base to help them provision for or write off NPLs. See, e. g., 
Tett, Gillian, 'Sun Finally Rising on Japanese Banks: If Japan's Economy is to Show New Signs of Life, Banks' 
Bad Loans Must Be Written Off More Rapidly', National Post (March 20,1999), available at 1999 WL 
13668538. 
41 Supra note 39, at 28. 
42 The Long-Term CreditBank and Nippon Credit Bank were nationalized according to the Financial 
Reconstruction Law in 1998. 
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1999. The government injected altogether Y7,450bn ($62bn) into the 15 biggest Japanese 
banks43 in exchange of convertible preferential shares and bonds with different conversion 
terms of the banks. 44 As a result, the cumulative capital-to-assets ratio for Japan's 17 largest 
banks stood above 10% at the end of the fiscal year 1998.45 Almost all Japanese banks that 
received government capital injection in March 1999 posted pre-tax profits in the first half of 
1999 and forecast that they would post a profit for the entire fiscal year. 46 The bank 
consolidation waves in 1999 and 2000 are expected to further enhance Japan's banking 
47 system. 
43 The 15 banks were: Asahi Bank, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Daiwa Bank, Fuji Bank, Sakura Bank, SanwaBank, 
Sumitomo Bank, Tokai Bank, Chuo Trust and Banking Co., Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Corp., Mitsui Trust 
and Banking Co., Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., Toyo Trust and Banking Co., the Industrial Bank of Japan, 
and the Bank of Yokohama. The 15 major banks submitted management improvement plans for acceptance of 
public funds. See, e. g., Japan Weekly Monitor, 'FRC to Keep Urging Major Banks to Promote Restructuring' 
(May 3,1999), available at '1999 WL 8897362'. 
44See, e. g., Shimamura, Kazuhiro, 'Japanese Banks Issue Shares to Ride Out Dismal Fiscal Year', Agence 
France-Presse (March 31,1999), available at `1999 WL 2574953'. 
as The public funds injected into the banks offset drops in their ratios caused by the disposal of some Y10 
trillion in NPLs. Besides, banks have succeeded in boosting their capital equity through their own efforts, such 
as third-party share allocation, and the use of cost method to calculate the value of their shareholdings. See 
Dow Jones International News, `Cap Adequacy Ratio for 17 Largest Japan Bks Over 10%-Nikkei' (March 31, 
1999). 
46 See Tett, Gillian, `Improving Fortunes for Japan's Bank', Fin. Times (November 23,1999); `Japanese Banks: 
Profits Prompt Hope of Recovery', Fin. Times (November 22,1999); and Summaries Staff, `Japanese Banks 
Post Healthy Profits', Fin. Times (November 19,1999). The banks posting profits include: Asahi, Dai-Ichi 
Kangyo, Fuji, Sakura, Sumitomo, Tokai, Industrial Bank of Japan, Bank of Tokyo Mistubishi, Sanwa Bank, 
Daiwa Bank, Mitsubishi Trust Bank, Sumitomo Trust, Toyo Trust, Mistsui Trust and Chuo Trust. There profits 
are mainly due to the cheap cost of obtaining funds, improved management of bad loans and tight cost control. 
The profits strengthen the banks and thus make it easier for them to write off their bad loans. Id. 
4' The process of consolidation started with a declaration in the summer 1999 of a merger between the Industrial 
Bank of Japan, Fuji and Dai-Ichi Kangyo, and continued with the Sumitomo and Sakura deal in the autumn. 
These two largest mergers were followed by the February 2000 announcement of Sanwa, Asahi and Tokai, 
three of Japan's largest banks, to merge their operations next year. See Tett, Gillian, Nakamae, Naoko, Rahman, 
Bayan & Clifford, Lisa, `Three Japanese Banks to Merge', Fin. Times (March 14,2000); and Ibison, David, 
`Japan's Bank Groups Launch', Fin. Times (April 1,2001). 
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ANNEX IV: TECHNIQUES TO HELP BANKS IN DISTRESS - EXPERIECNE OF 
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Sources: 'Box 4 Different Kinds of Support to Banks' in Claessens, Stijin, 'Experiences of Resolution of 
Banking Crises' in Strengthening the Banking System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 
7,275, at 289 (October 1999); and also 'Table 3. Liquidity Support Provided to Financial Institutions', `Table 
6. Summary of Measures to Deal with the Financial Sector Turmoil' and 'Table 12 Instruments Used to 
Recapitalize and Purchase 'PI-s' in Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., Financial Sector Crisis and 
Restructuring Lessons from Asia, 26,45,61 (IMF, September 1999). 
Capital Injection Vs. Liquidity Provision. Looking at the different methods 
governments have taken in assisting distressed banks, a distinction can be made between 
operations aimed at recapitalizing banks and those that provide banks with liquidity. The 
latter is the most common immediate response to banking problems, but it can only provide a 
temporary relief. During the Asian financial crisis, all the five crisis countries (Thailand, 
South Korean, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines) provided central bank liquidity support 
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to financial institutions to offset the withdrawal of deposits and credits at some institutions. ' 
The liquidity support provides an opportunity for banks to buy unimpaired assets. This does 
not increase capital, however. Nor does it improve capital ratios because assets and liabilities 
increase by the same amount. 2 Moreover, the liquidity support can only be temporary. 
Central banks will have to sterilize the liquidity support sooner or later. 3 
Asset Side Vs. Liability Side. Bank recapitalization can affect both the asset side and 
the liability side. On the asset side, the main solution entails a transfer of government 
securities. This can be un-required, but more often securities are swapped for NPLs. Un- 
required injections of cash or bonds (negotiable or non-negotiable) will immediately increase 
a bank's net worth, improve its capital ratios and liquidity, and its potential profitability. 4 The 
main drawback of un-required cash or bond injection is, of course, that the government does 
not have any ownership or control rights. 5 Swapping impaired assets for cash of bond will 
usually be at market prices (less, possibly substantially less, than book value). Even so, these 
swaps will improve the bank's capital adequacy, liquidity, and its ability to make loans, and 
can reduce its funding costs. Risk-weighted capital ratios improve because the swap, 
generally, replaces risky loans with low-risk investment, such as government bonds or cash. 6 
On the liability side, recapitalization can occur through the purchase of new bank 
shares, the granting of long-term subordinated loans, or the assumption of bank liabilities. 
Equity purchase or subordinated loan granting by the government can immediately increase a 
bank's net worth, improve its capital ratios, liquidity, and its potential profitability. Liability 
assumption by government facilitates banks to re-negotiate its debts and obtain a breathing 
space. Debt renegotiation can sometimes even result in a bank's liability reduction, which 
improves the bank's capital-to-assets ratios and potential profitability. 7 
All the above-mentioned approaches have been employed in Asian crisis countries. 8 
In all the countries except Thailand and Philippines, centralized AMCs were established to 
take over NPLs from banks and other financial institutions. In Indonesia and Malaysia, bonds 
1 See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et a!., Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring Lessons from Asia, 
26 & table 3 (IMF, September 1999). 
2 See Claessens, Stijin, `Experiences of Resolution of Banking Crises' in Strengthening the Banking System in 
China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,275, at 289 & Box 4 (October 1999). 
3 See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring Lessons from Asia, 
27 (IMF, September 1999). 




'See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 3, at 61 & table 12. 
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were issued to banks in exchange for their NPLs. In South Korea, the banks transferred their 
NPLs to KAMCO in exchange for shares in public enterprises. In Indonesia, bonds were 
issued to banks in exchange for equity. In South Korea, government purchased equity or 
preferred shares in banks by bonds or cash. The Malaysia authorities purchased convertible 
preferred shares or subordinated debt with bonds or cash. In Thailand, bonds were issued to 
banks in exchange for equity or subordinated debt. 9 With regards to the government's 
assumption of bank's liability, in all the crisis countries except Philippines, blanket 
guarantees were provided by the government to depositors and most creditors of financial 
institutions that their claims would be honored: Thailand had announced the major elements 
of the guarantee in July 1997 which was reconfirmed under the IMF-supported program in 
August 1997. Korea established a full guarantee in November of that year. In Indonesia, the 
blanket guarantee was established as part of a IMF-supported program (January 1998), after a 
limited guarantee had failed to stabilize the situation. The government in Malaysia 
introduced a blanket guarantee in January 1998.10 
9 Thai banks can choose to apply for Tier-I capital support or Tier-2 capital support. Under the Tier-I scheme, 
the government matches capital injected by private investors in the form of equity paid up with 10-year tradable 
government bonds carrying a market-related interest rate. The new government/private capital injection would 
have preferred status to existing shareholders. The Tier-2 scheme was set up to encourage corporate 
restructuring. Under this scheme, the capital injection will be provided by the government buying debentures 
issued by the bank with a maturity of 10 years and paid for with non-tradable government bonds with matching 
maturity and carrying market-related interest rates. See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et at, supra note 3, 
at 164 & Box 5 (IMF, September 1999). 
10 See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et at, supra note 3, at 27-28. The blanket guarantee generally aims at 
(1) providing confidence in the banking system; (2) stabilizing the institutions' liability side; (3) buying time 
while the restructuring work is being organized and carried out; and (4) preserving the integrity of the payments 
system. Id., at 28. 
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ANNEX V: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF CHINA'S FOUR AMCS* 
Name of the AMC Date of Registered Capital Main Mission President 
Establishment 
China Cinda AMC April 20,1999 RMB I0bn from the To take over and Zhu, Dengshan 
MOF manage CCB's NPLs 
China Dongfang October 15, RMB1Obn from the To take on the debts of Sun, Changji 
(Orient) AMC 1999 MOF (Comprising the BOC issued before 
RMB6bn and the end of 1996 
US$500m) 
China Great Wall October 18, RMB1Obn from the To buy, restructure, and Wang, Xingyi 
AMC 1999 MOF recover the bad debts of 
the ABC 
China Huarong October 19, RMB 1 Obn from the To handle the bad debt Yang, Kai 
AMC 1999 MOF of the ICBC Sheng 
Sources: 
Cinda: Xinhua News Agency, 'China Opens First Asset Management Company' (April 21,1999), available at 
'1999 WL 7303136'; China Daily, 'China: Firm Set up to Manage Assets' (April 21,1999), available at '1999 
WL 5969010'; Harding, James, 'Banking Reforms Part of China WTO Bid', Fin. Times (April 21,1999). The 
CCB was chosen to do the pilot trial partly because of its high proportion of property loans, which are believed 
easier to sell, since a building is a single asset and the value can be reduced. See, e. g., O'Neill, Mark, 'Asset 
Manager Launch Hailed But Buyers May not Come Running', South China Morning Post 4 (April 21,1999). 
Dongfang: Chinaonline, 'China Gets Second Asset Mgmt Co., Two More this Week' (October 18,1999), 
available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/industry/financial/currentnews/secure/C9101508. asp ; Agence 
France-Presse, 'China Steps up Number of Asset Management Companies to Manage Bad Debts' (October 16, 
1999), available at '1999 WL25125484'; and Dickie, Mure, `China: Government Launches Fresh Drive on Bad 
Loans', Fin. Times (October 18,1999). 
China Great Wall: Chinaonline, `China Gets Third Asset Management Co., Another Wednesday' (October 18, 
1999), available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/B2-9910/805. asp ; China Daily, `China: New 
Company to Handle Assets' (October 19,1999), available at '1999 iVL 17782977'. 
China Huarong: Chinaonline, 'China's Fourth Asset Management Company Ready to Roll' (October 20, 
1999), available at 'http: //wwiv. chinaonline. com/topstories/C9101903. asp'; China Daily, `China: Asset 
Company to Manage Bad ICBC Loans' (October 20,1999), available at '1999 WL 17782996'; and Xinhua 
News Agency, 'China Wages Full War on Bad Assets of Banking Sector' (October 20,1999), available at 
'1999 WL 7308529'. 
*: In addition to these four AMCs, there are AMCs run by local government. The city of Shanghai, for example, 
has launched its own AMC as part of SOE reform. See M. Dichie, `China: Government Launches Fresh Drive 
on Bad Loans', Fin. Times (October 18,1999). The Guangdong Provincial government established Guangye 
AMC to manage state-owned industrial assets within the province. See Chinaonline, `Guangdong Guangye 
AMC Opens 6 Ailing Firms to Public Bidding' (March 29,2001), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/0l0329/]/COI032204. asp'. 
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ANNEX VI: CONSENSUAL MECHANISMS FOR CORPORATE DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING 
1. Statutory Procedures: Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code 
In the US, the bankruptcy law is federal law and primarily statutory law, comprising two 
different federal bankruptcy statutes: the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (commonly referred to as 
the "Act" and applied to cases filed prior to October 1,1979) and the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978 (commonly referred to as the "Bankruptcy Code" and applies to cases filed since 
October 1,1979). The Bankruptcy Code was amended significantly in 1984,1986 and 1994.1 
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code provides a proceeding for the rehabilitation of 
the debtor or the liquidation or other disposition of its assets and properties consistent with 
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 2 Before the primary reforms of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, business rehabilitations were covered by Chapters VIII, X, XI and XII 
of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. 3 They were consolidated into a single proceeding - Chapter 11 
proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code. 4 
Chapter 11 procedures are especially relevant to debt restructuring because they are 
designed primarily to address financial restructuring rather than liquidation. They are based 
on the premise that the value of the firm as a going concern exceeds the value of its assets in 
the event of liquidation. 5 Debtors are usually left in possession of their property, 6 and the aim 
of the proceeding is to facilitate orderly workouts in three stages. 7 
1 See Epstein, David G., Bankruptcy and Other Debt-Creditor Laws (5th edition) 130-1 (1995). 
2 See Rosen, Leonard M., et a!., `17. Approval and Confirmation of Chapter 11 Plans and Related Issues', in 
Business Loan Workout and Public Debt Restructuring 1988,601, at 607, Practicing Law Institute Commercial 
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 465 (1988). 
3 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 contains four separate chapters for the reorganization of businesses: Chapter VIII 
which dealt with railroad reorganizations; Chapter X that covered corporate reorganizations; Chapter XI for the 
arrangement of unsecured debts by corporations, partnerships and individuals; and Chapter XII which was 
available to non-corporate debtors who own encumbered real estate. See Epstein, David G., supra note 1, at 
331. 
° In addition to Chapter 11, Chapter 13 is also available to certain business debtors, i. e., "individuals with a 
regular income" and less than $100,000 of unsecured debts and $350,000 of secured debts. Chapter 13 is similar 
to Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 in that the case begins with the filing of a bankruptcy petition, Section 301. 
Chapter 13 is different from Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 in that only the debtor may file a Chapter 13 petition. 
There are no involuntary, i. e., creditor-initiated Chapter 13 cases. Any debtor who files a Chapter 13 petition 
could instead have filed a Chapter 11 petition, however. For detailed of the Chapter 13 procedures, see `Chapter 
XVIII Chapter 13' in Epstein, David G., supra note 1, at 369-384. 
5 Chapter 11 allows debtor to continue its operation with the protection of the bankruptcy court as it attempts to 
scale down its operations and/or restructure its debts in the hope that ultimately the debtor, its creditors and its 
equity security holders will be able to cooperate and agree on a consensual plan of reorganization. See, Rosen. 
Leonard M., eta!., supra note 2, at 1015. 
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At the outset the procedures allow for an automatic standstill on debt servicing in 
order to provide the debtor-in-possession with a breathing space from its creditors. 8 It is easy 
for a debtor to file a petition to commence a Chapter 11 case. Insolvency is not a pre- 
condition to a voluntary Chapter 11 petition. With two exceptions, 9 any person that is eligible 
to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 710 is also eligible to file a petition 
under Chapter 11. If the Chapter 11 petition has been filed by an eligible debtor, no formal 
adjudication is necessary. The filing of the petition operates as an "order for relief"(Section 
301). 
Second, the Code provides the debtor with access to working capital needed to carry 
out its operations. A seniority status is granted to debt contracted after the filing of the 
petition. The debtor can use encumbered property including cash collateral for its normal 
businesses. In a Chapter 11 case, the personal and real property that the debtor acquires after 
the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is generally protected from pre-petition liens. Section 
363 empowers the debtor in possession to continue using, selling, and leasing encumbered 
property. " Moreover, Chapter 11 provides a number of inducements to third parties to 
extend credit to a debtor that has filed a Chapter 11 petition. A post-petition unsecured credit 
transaction in the Chapter 11 debtor's "ordinary course of business" automatically has 
6 The debtor remains in control the business in most Chapter 11 cases. Pre-bankruptcy management will 
continue to operate the business as a "debtor in possession" unless a request is made for the appointment of a 
trustee and the court, after notice and hearing, grants the request. See Epstein, David G., supra note 1, at 336. 
A typical Chapter 11 case involves a business debtor that is attempting to continue its business operations by 
restructuring its financial obligations. And, the typical Chapter 11 case involves disputes among creditors as to 
the order and the amount of payment and disputes between creditors generally and the stockholders or other 
owners of the debtor as to how much if anything the owners can retain. Id., at 331-2. 
Bankruptcy practitioners view the Chapter 11 case as an ongoing negotiation among the interested 
parties, which include the debtor, equity security holders, the creditors' committee, and secured creditors. See 
Lurey, Michael S., '11. Issues For Restructuring Public Debt Under Chapter 11' in Business Loan Workout and 
Public Debt Restructuring 1988,601, at 607, Practicing Law Institute Commercial Law and Practice Course 
Handbook Series No. 465 (1988). 
8 The automatic-stay provision is based on the recognition that a "grab race" for assets by the creditors is 
detrimental to the debtors as well as to the creditors as a group. It allows the debtors the opportunity to 
formulate a reorganization plan and ensures that creditors are treated equally. ' 
9 The first exception is stockholders and commodity brokers: they are eligible for Chapter 7, but not Chapter 11. 
The second exception is railroads: railroads are eligible for Chapter 11, but not Chapter 7. See Epstein, David 
G., supra note 1, at 333. 
10 Section 109 (b) contains two limitations on the availability of Chapter 7 relief to a debtor: (1) The debtor 
must be a "person, " i. e., an individual, partnership, or corporations but not a sole proprietorship. (2) The debtor 
may not be a railroad, insurance company, or banking institution. Id., at 144. 
Encumbered property that is not "cash collateral" may be used, sold, or leased in the ordinary course of 
business without a prior judicial determination of "adequate protection. " On "request" of the lien creditor, the 
court shall condition the use, sale, or lease or encumbered property so as to provide adequate protection. Cash 
collateral, however, may only be used if the lien holder consents, or if the court, after notice and hearing, finds 
that creditor's collateral position is adequately protected and authorizes such use. Id., at 339-41. 
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administrative expense priority over pre-petition creditors. ' 2 The court may, after notice and 
hearing, provide administrative expense priority for credit transactions that are not in the 
ordinary course of business. 13 If priority over pre-petition unsecured creditors is not a 
sufficient inducement, the bankruptcy court may, after notice and hearing, authorize 
obtaining credit with: (1) priority over other administrative expenses, (2) a lien on the 
debtor's unencumbered property, or (3) a lien on the debtor's encumbered property. 14 As the 
"last resort" provision, section 364 (d) provide that if the debtor is unable to otherwise obtain 
credit, the court may authorize the debtor to grant its post petition creditors a "super 
priority", i. e., a lien on encumbered property that is equal or senior to existing liens. '5 
The final stage is the reorganization of the debtor's assets and liabilities and its 
operations. Chapter 11 grants the debtor a period of exclusivity to file a plan for 
restructuring. 16 A Chapter 11 plan may alter the rights of unsecured creditors, secured 
creditors, and/or shareholders. '? The debtor does not have to negotiate with each creditor 
individually. Chapter 11 provides that a creditors' committee shall be established so that the 
debtor can negotiate with the committee. 18 The Code discourages holdouts by a certain class 
of creditors, and the debtor can obtain court approval of the reorganization plans under the 
"cramdown" provisions. 
12 Bankruptcy Code, section 364 (a). 
13 Id. section 364 (b). 
14 Id. section 364 (c). 
15 The court may authorize such a "super priority" only if there is "adequate protection" of the pre-petition 
secured creditor's interest, however. See Epstein, David G., supra note 1, at 348. 
16 A Chapter 11 plan may be filed at the same time as the petition or any time thereof. Except as otherwise 
provided in Section 1121, the debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan for 120 days after the date of the order 
for relief in the Chapter 11 case (Section 1121 (b)). If the debtor files a plan during its 120-day-exclusivity- 
period, no other party may file a plan unless the debtor's plan is not accepted before 180 days after the Chapter 
11 order for relief. (Section 1121 (c) (3)). The court may for cause reduce or increase the debtor's exclusive 120 
and 180 day periods (Section 1121 (d)). See Lurey, Michael S., supra note 7, at 630. 
It has been very common for courts to extend the exclusivity period. In larger cases, exclusivity has 
been extended beyond two years. See Epstein, David G., supra note 1, at 345. 
Being the only party able to file a plan can be a very significant advantage to a debtor. So long as the 
debtor has exclusivity, creditors have the limited options of (1) accepting of what the debtor proposes or (2) 
moving to convert the case to Chapter 7 and liquidating all of the assets or (3) moving to end the debtor's 
exclusivity. Id., at 344. 
1' The plan shall divide creditors' claims into classes and treat each claim in a particular class the same, 
however. Id., at 345-6. A chapter 11 plan does not always provide for cash payments to creditors. A plan can 
offer creditors the debtor's debt or equity securities rather than cash. Section 1145 (a) exempts the issuance of 
the debtor's securities under a Chapter 11 plan from federal and state registration requirements. A creditor's 
resale of a security received under a Chapter 11 is also exempt from federal and state registration requirements 
(Section 1145 (b)). Id., at 348. 
18 The Bankruptcy Code requires a meeting of creditors. Section 1102 directs the United States trustee to 
appoint a committee of unsecured creditors as soon as practicable after the order for relief. A pre-petition 
creditor's committee will be continued if it was "fairly chosen and is representative of the different kinds of 
claims to be represented", however. Id., at 149. 
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Chapter 11 grants the bankruptcy court the authority to confirm the plan even if it has 
not received the necessary majorities. Approval of a Chapter 11 plan involves not only 
creditor acceptance but also court confirmation. A bankruptcy judge has the power to 
confirm a Chapter 11 plan that has not received the needed majorities, or not to confirm a 
Chapter 11 plan that has been accepted by all holders of claims and interests. Plans accepted 
by less than every class can be confirmed only if the additional requirements of section 1129 
(b) are satisfied, i. e.: (1) at least one impaired19 class of claims has accepted the plan; (2) the 
plan does not discriminate unfairly; and (3) the plan is fair and equitable. 20 
After confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan, the debtor's performance obligations are 
governed by the terms of the plan. The provisions of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan bind not 
only the debtor but also its creditors and shareholders "whether or not such creditor, equity 
security holder, or general partner has accepted the plan. " In short, confirmation of a Chapter 
11 plan operates as a discharge. 21 
The Chapter 11 procedures incorporate protections for creditors as well. 22 Just to list a 
few: (1) Section 521 of the Code obligates the debtor to file a list of creditors. Section 342 
requires appropriate notice of the order for relief. 23 (2) A creditors' committee will be 
established to consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the administration 
of the case, to investigate the debtor's acts and financial condition, to participate in the 
formulation of the plan, and to request the appointment of a trustee and perform such other 
services as are in the interest of those represented. 24 The creditors' committee may also 
appear at various hearings as a party in interest, and file a plan in those situations where the 
debtor ceases to have the exclusive right to do so. 25 (3) The creditors can request to appoint a 
trustee to operate the business. A trustee is to be appointed if there is a cause (fraud, 
dishonesty, mismanagement, or incompetence) or if the appointment of a trustee is "in the 
interest of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate. " Once a 
trustee is appointed, the trustee has responsibility for the operation of the business and 
19 The concept of "impairment" is unique to Chapter 11. Under section 1124 a class of claims or interests is 
impaired unless (1) the legal, equitable, and contractual rights of the holder are left "unaltered"; or (2) the only 
alteration of legal, equitable, or contractual rights is reversal of acceleration on default by curing the default and 
reinstating the debt. Id., at 348. 
20 Id., at 356. 
21 Id. 
22 See Lurey, Michael S., supra note 7, at 607. 
23 Generally, a creditor whose claim is included on a Chapter 11 debtor's list of creditors is not required to file a 
proof of claim, unless the claim is scheduled as disputed, contingent, or un-liquidated. Nonetheless, holders of 
unsecured claims often file proofs of claim in Chapter 11 cases. See Epstein, David G., supra note 1, at 334. 
24 Id., at 335. 
25 id. 
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formulation of the Chapter 11 plan. 26 In circumstances that no trustee is appointed, the court 
can order the appointment of an "examiner" when the appointment of an examiner is 
requested by a party in interest and the debtor's non-trade, non-tax, unsecured debts exceed 
$5,000,000, or "such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, 
and other interests of the estate. "27 (4) With regard to the file of the plan, if a trustee is 
appointed, the trustee, a creditor, the creditor's committee, and any other party in interest 
may file a plan. Similarly, if the debtor fails to file a plan and obtain creditor acceptances 
within the specified time periods, any party in interest may file a plan and more than one 
plans may be filed. 28 (5) Chapter 11 contemplates a consensual restructuring of the debtor's 
financial obligations. While Chapter 11 does not require that every holder of a claim approve 
the plan (and indeed allows the cramming down of a plan opposed by most holders of 
claims), it does require that all creditors receive adequate information about a plan and have 
an opportunity to vote on the plan. Section 1125 requires full disclosure before post-petition 
solicitation of acceptances of a Chapter 11 plan. Creditors and shareholders must be provided 
with a copy of the plan or a summary of the plan and "a written disclosure statement 
approved, after notice and hearing by the court as containing adequate information. "29 Both 
creditors and shareholders vote on Chapter 11 plans. 3° (6) The court will have to take into 
consideration the benefits of the creditor when confirm a plan. A plan accepted by every 
class of claims and interests must be confirmed by the bankruptcy court if the 11 enumerated 
requirements of section 1129 (a) are satisfied. 31 With regards to plans accepted by less than 
26 Id., at 336-7. 
27 Id., at 337. 
28 Id., at 345. 
29 Id., at 349-50. "Adequate information" is defined in section 1125(a) as information that it is "reasonably 
practicable" for this debtor to provide to enable a "hypothetical reasonable investor" who is typical of the 
holders of the claims or interests to make an informed judgment on the plan. 
30 The majority needed for a class of claims to accept a plan is two-thirds in amount and more than one half in 
number of the allowed claims that actually voted have accepted the plan (Section 1126 (c)). A class of interests 
has accepted the plan when the plan has been accepted by holders of interests holding two thirds in amount of 
the allowed interests whose holders actually voted (Section 1126 (d)). The votes of entities whose acceptances 
or rejections are determined not to have been in good faith, or whose acceptances or rejections are determined 
not to have been solicited or procured in good faith, are excluded from the majority (Section 1126 (e)). A 
creditor is deemed to act in bad faith in rejecting a plan when the creditor is a competitor of the debtor and acts 
with the ulterior purpose of destroying or injuring the debtor in its business in order to further its own 
competitive business interests. Section 1126 (f) provides that a class that is not impaired under a plan, and each 
holder of a claim or interest of such class, are conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan. Section 1126 
(g) provided that if a class is to receive nothing under the plan, it is deemed to have rejected the plan, and its 
vote need not be solicited. 
31 See Epstein, David G., supra note 1, at 355. Most of the requirements of section 1129 (a) are easy to 
understand, easy to apply. The core of these requirements is to protect the interest of creditors'. Section 1129 (a) 
(7) creates a "best interests of creditors" test. It requires that each dissenting member of a class-even dissenting 
members of classes that approve the plan - receive as least as much under the plan as it would have received in 
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every class, the court can only confirm the plan if the Section 1128 requirements that the 
bankruptcy court hold a hearing on confirmation and give parties in interest notice of the 
hearing so that they might raise objections to confirmation are satisfied. In situations where 
there are more than one plans meeting the confirmation standards of section 1129, the court 
"shall consider the preferences of creditors and equity security holders in determining which 
"32 plan to confirm. 
2. The London Approach and Its Application in "Asian Crisis Countries" 
The London Approach is not a set of detailed rules, but a flexible framework that enables 
banks and other interested parties to reach well-based decisions about whether and what 
terms a company in financial difficulty might be allowed to survive. The non-statutory, 
market-led system evolved in the UK over the last two or three decades. 33 Mr. Smith 
Michael, the former head of the Bank of England's Bank's Business Finance Division, when 
talking about the London Approach, said - "Thanks to the London Approach, a large 
number of UK companies owe their continuing existence to the fact that their bankers and in 
some cases, bondholders and other creditors have followed its precepts in deciding the terms 
"34 of a collective restructuring. 
The key features of the London approach include: (1) lenders are initially supportive 
and don't rush to appoint receivers; (2) decisions about a company's future are made on the 
basis of reliable information which is shared among all the parties to a workout; (3) such 
information provides a basis for lenders and other creditors to work together to reach a 
collective view on whether and how a company should be given financial support; and (4) 
pains is shared on an equitable basis. 35 These "common sense" principles, together with a 
number of more detailed "conventions" - for example, super priority being afforded to new 
a Chapter 7 liquidation. Section 1129 (a) (9) provides special treatment for priority claims. A holder of an 
administrative expense claim or a claim for certain post-petition expenses in an involuntary case must be paid in 
cash on the effective date of the plan unless the claim holder otherwise agrees. Wages claims, claims for fringe 
benefits, and certain claims of consumer creditors must be paid in cash on the effective date of the plan unless 
the class agrees to accept deferred cash payments that have a present value equal to the amount of the claims. 
Id., at 355-6. 
'2 Id., at 354. 
33 For a brief introduction of the approach, see Smith, Michael, `The London Approach and Trading in 
Distressed Debt', Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 222 (May 1996). 
'a Id., at 223. 
35 Id. 
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money - have developed within the banking community to serve their financial and 
"reputation" interests. 36 
The Bank of England helped the development of the London approach. In the 1970s 
and early 1980s, the Bank's Business Finance Division became very closely involved in 
individual workouts, virtually taking the lead, for example, in suggesting possible terms for 
re-financings and persuading lending banks of their merits. Although the Bank became less 
active in 1990s, it still responded to requests to help the lenders involved in a workout agree 
among themselves the terms of a refinancing. The Bank was actively involved in some 160 
multi-lender workouts during the early 1990s recession and has been kept informed of many 
others by the banks concerned. 37 When the Bank did involve itself, it acted as a mediator or 
"honest broker" to break logjams and to seek a solution that represents and acceptable 
compromise for those concerned. 38 
The London approach has been widely applied in "Asian crisis countries" to promote 
corporate debt restructuring. In Indonesia, a framework for the voluntary restructuring of 
corporate debt - the Jarkta Initiative - was announced in September 1998 to complement 
the Indonesia Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA) scheme and the amended bankruptcy 
law. The INDRA scheme provides exchange rate risk protection to private debtors who agree 
to restructure their extended debts, while the Jakarta Initiative provides a set of principles to 
guide and streamline out-of-court corporate restructuring. As of end-April 1999,170 
companies owing $20.6bn in foreign currency debt (an estimated 28% of the total corporate 
external debt) had signed up with the task force in charge of managing Jakarta Initiative, 
although only 16 firms had reached agreements in principle and just 4 had standstill 
agreements. 39 
Corporate restructuring in Korea is proceeding on two separate tracks: (1) a debt 
workout framework for the smaller chaebol and other large corporations, which follows the 
"London Approach" in its voluntary and extra judicial nature; and (2) a different approach 
for the top five chaebol with heavy government involvement. The approach applying to the 
smaller chaebol and other large corporations involves establishing a Corporate Restructuring 




" See, e. g., 'Box A3.1. Corporate Debt Restructuring in Asia' in the IMF, International Capital Markets: 
Development, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, 67, at 67-8 (September 1999). 
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institutions agree to follow specific procedures for debt workout, including an automatic 
standstill on debt repayments, emergency (syndicated) loans, and to subject themselves to 
binding arbitration by the Corporate Restructuring Coordinating Committee (CRCC). 
Leading banks or groups of institutions holding more than 25% of a firm's debt can form a 
creditor's committee and the leading bank - assisted by a group of foreign advisors - 
negotiates with the debtor. 40 In all cases, arbitration by the CRCC has been available to 
resolve bottlenecks in the negotiations .41 By March 16,1999, workout programs 
for 83 
companies had been authorized by these financial institutions. Among them, 72 firms 
survived through workouts, confirming their management normalization plans and 
submitting them to their creditors-financiers. 
In Malaysia, the Danaharta has been given very intensive powers in dealing with the 
borrowers of any loans it buys. These powers seemed to have had a significant effect on 
borrowers, because banks could threaten to sell their loans to Danaharta if the borrower 
failed to resume servicing the debt. 42 Besides, The Amendments to Section 176 of the 
Companies Act in late 1998 has impetus on debt restructuring. Previously, a highly leveraged 
firm could seek section 176 protection against its creditors without the creditors' consent or 
even knowledge. After the amendment, the company applying for the protection would first 
have to seek the consent of creditors amounting to more than 50% of its liabilities. 
Arrangements would have to be formalized within a stipulated period, and creditors' rights 
have been greatly enhanced (with debtors facing stricter requirements in terms of disclosure 
and asset sales during the 60-day standstill period). 43 In addition to the court protected debt 
restructuring, a Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) was established to act as 
an informal debtor/creditor broker to achieve debt restructuring as an alternative to 
companies filing for bankruptcy. 44 As of end-July 1999, the committee implemented a total 
of 10 debt-restructuring plans. 45 
40 Id., at 68. 
41 See note 34 in Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring Lessons 
from Asia, 126 (IMF, September 1999). 
42 Id., 'Box 10. Linkage with Corporate Restructuring', at 65. 
°J See the IMF, supra note 39. 
as See Balino, Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., supra note 41, at 137. The CDRC was set up to prevent 
companies from abusing the protection against creditors afforded by Section 176 of the Companies Act. The 
process of resolution can be initiated by either party, but once an appeal has been filed, there is a six-month 
moratorium on action during which credit committees will work with the affected parties to achieve a workout 
strategy. Id., at 138. 
45 See the IMF, supra note 39, at 68. 
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In Thailand, the Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee (CDRAC) was 
formed by the Bank of Thailand with representatives from debtor and creditor groups, which 
agreed upon a framework for corporate debt restructuring based on the London Approach 
(the "Bangkok Approach"). The Bangkok Approach calls for creditors to agree on a 
standstill, and perhaps provide new money senior to existing debt, while the firm and its 
advisers propose a restructuring plan. The CDRAC initially targeted large debt restructuring 
cases but expanded its coverage to small- and medium-sized cases later. A scheme that 
would combine government support for recapitalization with corporate debt settlement (Tier 
2 option) was also in place to encourage corporate debt restructuring. The Thailand also 
approved its new Bankruptcy Law in April 1998, which removed uncertainties on the degree 
of protection affordable to new money and the establishment of a specialized bankruptcy 
court. Also, creditors' rights legislation has been amended, with a view to facilitating 
foreclosure on assets. 46 
3. Bank-Led Restructuring 
Bank-led restructuring has been common in countries like Japan47 or Germany, 48 where each 
firm usually has a single bank for most of its business; and this bank will normally help 
resolve financial difficulties. Bank-led restructuring was developed fully in Poland. 
Among transition economies, Poland was a pioneer in the bank and enterprise 
restructuring. The main tool it used to implement the restructuring program was the 1993 law 
on financial restructuring of enterprises and banks (EBRP), in an approach that encouraged 49 
banks to play a central role in enterprise restructuring. 
Following the end of the socialist system, Polish enterprises were confronted with 
serious economic problems, resulting in the emergence and recognition of a huge wave of 
NPLs in banks' portfolios. For the entire banking system, about 28% of bank loans were bad 
46 Id., at 69. 
47 See, e. g., Sheard, Paul, 'Main Banks and the Governance of Financial Distress' in Aoki, Masahiko & Patrick, 
Huge (eds. ), The Japanese Main Bank System, 180-230 (1994). Sheard surveys 42 cases covering a 30-years 
period and finds out that the overall picture is one of the main bank coordinating, overseeing, and, in some case, 
taking charge of an informal reorganization of the firm. Id., at 193. 
as For a comprehensive review of the "bank-based" German system, see Edwards, Jeremy & Fischer, Klaus, 
Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany (1994); and also Baums, Theodor, 'The German Banking System 
and Its Impact on Corporate Finance and Governance', in Aoki, Masahiko & Patrick, Huge (eds. ), The Japanese 
Main Bank System, 409-449 (1994). 
49 The Law of February 3,1993 on Financial Restructuring of Enterprises and Banks. The law was in force from 
March 1993 to March 1996. An unofficial English translation can be found at the World Bank website. 
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(about 5.8% of GDP) by end-1992. Furthermore, Poland, like all transition economies, 
experienced a sharp increase in inter-enterprise arrears. 50 The severe distress in the banking 
and enterprise sectors forced Poland to tackle enterprise and bank problems simultaneously. 
The enterprise problems were mainly tackled through bank interventions. In practice, 
the Polish strategy operated mainly through an informal out-of-court approach under which 
banks would keep in their books the NPLs albeit in a restructuring form. 51 
The 1993 law provided banks with three new tools: bank-led conciliation agreements 
(BCAs), the public sale of bank debts on the secondary market, and the possibility of debt- 
equity swaps. According to the law, BCAs were to be used mainly with debtors that were 
SOEs or joint stock companies in which the state held at least 50% of the shares (art. 6). 
BCAs could be used for a limited period of three years (March 18,1993 to March 18,1996) 
as a special mechanism for rescheduling debtors' obligations to the banks and to other 
creditors (art. 37). 
The bank conciliation procedures were designed as a temporary process to bypass 
some shortcomings of Poland's existing judicial debt workout procedure - the law on 
"Arrangement Proceedings". The latter dated from 1934 (although significant amendments 
were made in 1990) and is extremely inflexible. 52 The bank conciliation procedure shifts 
power from courts and borrowers to banks. Banks are empowered to negotiate workout 
agreements with problem debtors and force them on dissenting creditors, providing that 
creditors representing over 50% of the value of outstanding debt agree. A firm can apply for 
the procedure to its leading bank creditor, as long as that creditor holds 20% of that firm's 
50 See Fernando Montes-Negret & Papi, Luca, The Polish Experience in Bank and Enterprise Restructuring, 1 
The World Bank, November 1996). 
A different approach was followed for those (often large) state-owned enterprises (SOEs) whose restructuring 
was assessed complex and very sensitive from a social and political point of view. For these enterprises and 
external approach was implemented involving the removal of their delinquent loans from the balance sheet of 
the originating bank to a government "resolution" agency. Id., at 6. 
52 For example, workouts under this law exclude secured creditors and government creditors (such as tax and 
social security offices), and thus in most cases the proceeding covers only trade creditors and bank creditors (to 
the extent they give up any security interests). In addition, the procedure requires only financial terms in the 
resulting agreement. Broader restructuring provisions, such as changes in employment, investment, or 
management, are not envisioned. Any agreement must be approved by a two-third majority (in terms of value of 
claims), or four-fifths for write-offs greater than 40%. Finally, only parties attending the proceedings are 
allowed to vote on the proposed agreement. It might be very difficult for a debtor with many creditors to 
assemble the required majority in one place for the vote. See note 25 in Gray, Cheryl W. & Holle, Arnold, 
Bank-Led Restructuring in Poland (I): An Empirical Look at the Bank Conciliation Process, 7 (World Bank, 
September 1996). 
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debt (or 10% if the amount is at least I billion zloty). The parties then negotiate whether to 
pursue this route or opt for one of the other choices provided under the EBRP. 53 
Borrowers and/or certain creditors acquire several potential advantages if they opt for 
restructuring under BCAs rather than judicial conciliation. 54 First, the process is likely to be 
somewhat quicker and less cumbersome, because the courts are not involved except to hear 
an appeal against an agreement. Second, priority rules change. The state Treasury loses its 
super-priority. 55 Third, the ability of small creditors to block agreements is more limited 
because of the lower voting majority required for an agreement to be approved. 56 Fourth, 
responsibility for monitoring the restructuring program is explicitly delegated to the lead 
bank. If the lead bank does not terminate the agreement when the restructuring plan is 
violated, it becomes liable for any additional losses incurred by the other creditors. 57 Fifth, 
the range of potential outcomes is broader under bank-led conciliation. 58 Finally, if the 
conciliation agreement is declared void, any concessions are unwound, and the original debt 
claims of all creditors are reinstated. This gives the borrower and the lead bank strong 
incentives to develop a reasonable plan. 
" Id., at 7. 
54 1d 
55 Unlike the court proceedings, the BCAs covered part of the enterprises' liabilities to the state, the agreements 
covering all receivables except social insurance, employment relations, and pension obligations. Secured 
creditors can choose to forego their security and become part of the process, as most indeed did - due to the 
virtual impossibility of collecting debts by foreclosing collateral in Poland. The social security office can and 
typically does negotiate a separate agreement with the problem debtor. 
56 The law stipulated that a voting majority based on outstanding debts was required to approve a BCA. 
57 Under the law, banks were required to make public announcements of the conciliation proceedings they 
intended to commence (art. 14). A bank or creditor initiating a BCA was also obligated to apply to the Ministry 
of Privatization for transformation of each SOE into a joint stock state treasury company. That provision was 
intended to allow creditors to convert their debt to enterprise equity and to encourage outside investors to invest 
in the enterprise paving the way for privatization. 
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the banks took on the role of managers of the conciliation 
agreements, defining the terms and conditions. One of these conditions was the obligation to establish a 
creditors council, which generally included a representative of the Ministry of Finance, the bank, and other 
major creditors, and often included representatives of the relevant municipality authority. These creditor 
councils monitored the implementation of the enterprise recovery programs, and they were empowered to file to 
a court a motion for terminating the conciliation agreement. However, creditors' councils appeared to have done 
very little in practices. Banks played the main role in supervising the agreement. See Fernando Montes-Negret 
& Papi, Luca, supra note 50, at 8. 
58 To increase flexibility the law provided for a range of possible settlements between bank and its debtors, 
including rescheduling of debt repayments; reduction of interest; cessation of interest compounding; conversion 
of debt to equity; debt forgiveness, including interest; and extension of new loans (art. 16). 
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ANNEX VII: THE CONCILIATION AND REORGANIZATION PROCEDURE UNDER 
CHINA'S ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAW 
Initiation of the Procedure: Under Chapter IV of the 1986 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, ' if 
creditors file a bankruptcy petition, the government departments in charge of the debtor may, 
within three months after the approval of the petition by the People's Court, apply for 
reorganization of the debtor. 2 The debtor should submit a draft conciliation agreement to the 
creditors' committee following the filing of the reorganization application, stipulating the 
term within which the debts of the enterprise are to be paid. 3 When the debtor and the 
creditors' committee enter into a conciliation agreement, the People's Court, following its 
confirmation of the agreement, should issue a public notice of the agreement and suspend the 
bankruptcy proceedings. The conciliation agreement is effective from the day of the public 
notice. 4 If no agreement can be reached between the debtor and its creditors, the people's 
court should issue a declaration of bankruptcy. 5 
The Administration and Effects of the Reorganization: The reorganization should be 
administered by the government departments in charge of the debtor. The status of the 
reorganization should be periodically reported to the creditors' committee. 6 The court would 
supervise the progress in reorganization and the implementation of the conciliation 
agreement. ' The creditors can only ask for repayment according to the reconciliation 
agreement. During the period of reorganization, mortgagors or pledgors should not 
foreclosure unless approved by the People's Court. 8 
I The Law of Bankruptcy for Enterprises of the People's Republic of China (Trial Implementation), adopted by 
the 18th Session of the Sixth National People's Congress on December 2,1986 and effective as of August 1, 
1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law"). 
2 Id. art. 17. The government departments should submit a reorganization plan to the people's court and the 
creditor's meeting. Article 34, Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Issues Concerning the 
Implementation of the Tentative Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu guan the zhi 
xing zhong hua ren min gong he guo po chan fa ruo gan wen ti de yi jian, which was promulgated by the 
Supreme People's Court in November 1991) (herein after referred to as "the Supreme Court Bankruptcy 
Opinions"). The reorganization plan shall includes: (1) analyses on the causes of the insolvency of the 
enterprise; (2) plans to adjust or replace the enterprise management; (3) analyses on the feasibility of new 
business projects; (4) measures to make up deficits and increase surpluses; and (5) the reorganization period (no 
longer than 2 years) and objectives. Id. 
3 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 1, art. 18. The draft conciliation agreement shall describe (1) the 
resources to repay debts; (2) debt repayment measures; and (3) a timetable of debt repayment. The Supreme 
Court Bankruptcy Opinions, supra note 2, art. 34. 
`The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 1, art. 19. 
s The Supreme Court Bankruptcy Opinions, supra note 2, art. 35. 
6 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 1, art. 20. 
The Supreme Court Bankruptcy Opinions, supra note 2, art. 36. 
81d. art. 39. 
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The Termination of the Reorganization Procedure: The reorganization should be 
terminated, and a declaration of bankruptcy should be issued if the people's court finds that 
any one of the following events has occurred: (1) failure to implement the conciliation 
agreement; (2) further deterioration of the financial condition of the debtor, provided that 
there is an application from the creditors' committee for termination of the reorganization; or 
(3) the occurrence of one of the acts listed in article 35 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, 9 
provided that it seriously impairs creditors' interests. If, through the reorganization the debtor 
is able to repay its debts in accordance with the terms of the conciliation agreement, the 
people's court would terminate the reorganization and issue a public notice thereof. If the 
debtor, upon the expiration of the period of time for the reorganization, cannot repay its debts 
in accordance with the conciliation agreement, the people's court should declare the debtor 
bankrupt and re-enter the claims. 10 
9 These acts are: (1) the concealment, secret distribution or gratuitous transfer of assets; (2) the sale of assets at 
an unusually low price; (3) the grant of security to previously unsecured creditors; (4) the repayment of 
immature debts; and (5) the relinquishment of claims held by the debtor. The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra 
note 1, art. 35. 
'old. art. 22. 
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ANNEX VIII: CHINA'S MAIN BANK SYSTEM 
The main bank system was introduced into China in July 1996 under the Interim Measures 
issued by the PBOC. ' In that year, 300 enterprises entered the pilot trial of the main bank 
system. The trial pilot was expanded to 500 enterprises in 1997.2 
The main bank system aims at implementing principal deposit account management 
for large and medium enterprises. Participating banks are responsible for organizing 
syndicated loans to support the enterprises. Meanwhile, the main banks will participate and 
support enterprises' debt restructuring. 
In principle, one enterprise can only have one main bank. 3 Only those extremely huge 
enterprise conglomerates, upon approval of the PBOC, can have more than one main banks. 4 
A bank becomes the main bank of an enterprise after the signature of `bank-enterprise 
cooperation agreement'. 
The main bank for an enterprise is entitled tos (1) be notified about the enterprise 
major operational and financial condition; (2) verify the enterprise's debt and deposit with 
other commercial banks; (3) discipline the enterprise against its breach of loan contracts and 
other illegitimate activities; and (4) lead and organize syndicated loans to the enterprise. The 
main bank should: 6 (1) provide information and propose for the development of the 
enterprise; (2) make loans to the enterprise to satisfy its reasonable funding needs (subject to 
the large exposure limitation); (3) help the enterprise to expand its funding resources; (4) 
subject to the consent of the enterprise, provide information about the enterprise's production 
and operation, debt-equity ratio, and creditworthiness upon the request of ancillary banks; (5) 
help ancillary banks to collect their loans; (6) to act as the leading bank to monitor and 
supervise the use of syndicated loans by the enterprise, ensuring that the enterprise repay 
loan principal and interests according to the terms of the syndicated loan contract; and (7) 
inform the enterprise of the recent development in monetary and credit policies, and financial 
legislation. 
1 Interim Measures Governing the Main Bank System [zhuban yinhang guanli zhanxing banfa], issued by the 
PBOC on June 29,1996 and effective as of July 1,1996. 
2 China Daily, 'China: Businesses Undergo Reforms' (March 30,1997). 
3 The main bank can be a branch or sub-branch of a commercial bank. 
° Interim Measures Governing the Main Bank System, supra note 1, art. 11. 5 Id. art. 15. 
6 Id. art. 16. 
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An enterprise subject to the main bank system is entitled to7 (1) finance most of its 
operations by loans from its main bank; (2) apply loans from other banks or request its main 
bank to co-ordinate syndicated loans when its main bank cannot satisfy its funding request; 
(3) request for policy suggestion from its main bank about its debt restructuring and other 
important investment activities; (4) enjoy financial services provided by its main bank at 
preferential terms; and (5) complain to the local PBOC branch or even the headquarters of 
the PBOC about its main bank's violation of bank-enterprise cooperation agreement. The 
enterprise should, 8 (1) put most of its deposits with the main bank; (2) inform its main bank 
of its issuance of bonds/shares or its borrowing from its employees timely; (3) inform its 
main bank of its main economic activities; (4) seek opinions from its main bank on its plan to 
transfer enterprise asset, to apply for bankruptcy, or to carry out merger or acquisition; and 
(5) notify its main bank about the change of its legal representative or management 
personnel. 
7Id. art. 17. 
e ld. art. 18. 
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ANNEX IX: GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR CORPORATE DEBT RESTRUCTURING IN 
THAILAND 
I. To further the long-term viability of the debtor, the plan should achieve a business, 
rather than just a financial restructuring. 
2. If the debtor's management is providing full and accurate information and 
participating in all creditor committee meetings, creditors should stand still for a 
defined (e. g. 60 days) and extendable period. Restructuring should not be used to hide 
NPLs. 
3. Debt forgiveness should only be used as a last resort and only in exchange for stocks 
and warrants. 
4. A lead creditor institution (and within it, a specified individual) must be appointed 
early in the restructuring process to coordinate according to defined objectives and 
fixed deadlines. In major multi-creditor cases, a steering committee which is of a 
manageable size while representative of all creditors, should be appointed. 
5. Decisions should be made on information that has been independently verified. 
6. Creditors' existing collateral rights must continue. 
7. New credit extended on reasonable terms to help the debtor continue operations must 
receive priority status. 
8. Lenders should seek to lower their risk (e. g., through improved loan collateral), rather 
than to increase returns (e. g., by raising interest rates). 
9. Any creditor that sells his debt claim should ensure the buyer does not impede the 
restructuring process. 
10. Creditors should take account of the impact of any action on other creditors and on 
potentially viable debtors. 
Source: `Table 11 General Principles for Corporate Debt Restructuring' in Hawkins, John & Turner Philip, 
'Bank Restructuring in Practice: An Overview' in Bank Restructuring in Practice, 6,32, BIS Policy Papers No. 
6 (August 1999). Hawkins and Turner summarized the principles in accordance with A framework for corporate 
debt restructuring in Thailand, published by the Board of Trade of Thailand, the Federation of Thai Industries, 
the Thai Bankers' Association, the Association of Finance Companies and the Foreign Banks' Association. 
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ANNEX X: THE EVOLUTION OF THE PBOC AS A BANKING REGULATOR AND 
SUPERVISOR 
The evolution of banking regulation and supervision in China is actually a history of the 
PBOC. In this annex, we will mainly review how the PBOC develops into a banking 
regulator and supervisor in China. 
1. The PBOC Before 1984 
Before 1984, the PBOC functioned as both the central bank of the country and a commercial 
bank. The Bank experienced three stages of development from 1949 to 1983. 
(i) 1949-1952: The Establishment of the PBOC 
On December 1,1948, The PBOC was formed at Shijiazhuang in Hebei province, by 
merging three banks in Liberated Areas - the Bank of Northern China, the Bank of North 
Sea, and the Northwest Peasant Bank. ' Alter the establishment of the PRC in 1949, other 
Liberated-Area banks were combined into the PBOC. 2 The PBOC continued its expansion. 
Under the "Resist American, Aid Korea" campaign, all the assets held by American banks in 
China were confiscated and put under the PBOC's management. 3 The PBOC moved its 
headquarters to Beijing in 1950. A four-tier-level operation was established: a national bank 
at the head office in Beijing, four regional banks in four administrative areas, forty sub- 
banks, and 1,200 branches across the country. 4 
During this period, the main functions of PBOC in financial supervision included: 5 
(1) taking over financial institutions owned or run by the Guomingdang Government in 
mainland China; (2) abridging foreign financial institutions of their privileges and monitoring 
their operations; (3) administrating and guiding private-owned financial institutions, 
1 See, e. g., Wan, Timothy Haosen, Development of Banking Law in the Great China Area: PRC and Taiwan, 
170 (1999). 
2 See Dong, Suping, Issues on Socialist Financial and Banking [She Hui Zhu Yi Chai Zheng Jing Rong Wen TiJ, 
458 (1981). 
3 See Wan, Timothy Haosen, supra note 1, at 170 and note 6. 
' See Lees, Francis A. & Liaw, K. Thomas, Foreign Participation in China's Banking and Securities Market, 20 
1996). 
See Wang, Baoqing, 'The Enhancing Financial Supervision and Administration in China [changyin zaishou- 
woguo jinrong jianguan buduan jiagiang]', Jinrong Shibao 1 (October 10,1999). 
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prompting public-private cooperation; (4) interdicting financial speculation so as to stabilize 
prices. 
(ii) 1953-1978: The Mono-bank Period 
The PBOC's mono-bank standing was established through the following steps: (1) the 
closing of the four PBOC regional banks and granting the headquarters of the PBOC direct 
controls over the PBOC branches nationwide; (2) the PBOC's absorption of the People's 
Construction Bank of China6 and the taking over of the banks from the Guomingdang 
government; ' and (3) the transformation of private banking industry. 8 After these three steps, 
a "mono-bank" system was established in China, with the PBOC as the "mono-bank" and the 
rural credit cooperatives as the grass root agents of the PBOC. 
During the mono-banking period, in addition to its commercial banking operations, 
the main functions of the PBOC included: (1) issuance of money9 and control of money 
supply; (2) internal administration and control to ensure that the PBOC branches operate in 
compliance with the state policies; 10 (3) supervision and control over rural credit 
cooperatives; (4) supervision and control of financial operations of government agencies, 
state-operated enterprises, and collectively-owned organizations through a specified cash- 
management plan; and (5) supervision and control of foreign exchange. 
(iii) 1979-1984: The Separation of Commercial Banking Operations from the PBOC 
6 The PCBC was first set up on October 1,1954. The bank ceased to function and was transformed into the 
Financial Department for Construction of Infrastructure within the MOF in 1958. See Wan, Timothy Haosen, 
supra note 1, at 171-2. 
Id. That author describes in detail on how the Bank of Communications, the Bank of China, and the 
agricultural banks lost their independence. 
8 The transformation of the private banking industry happened gradually. For example, private banks and 
money shops in Shanghai were first combined into four federal groups in 1950, while those banks with 
Guomingdang government owned capital were converted into state-private jointly operated banks as a result of 
the confiscation of shares previously owned by the Guomingdang government. The four federal groups further 
merged into two General Administration Offices of Federated Groups during July and September 1951. On 30 
November 1952, an agreement was signed among state-private jointly operated banks and two General 
Administration Offices of Federated Groups to form the Unified State-Private Jointly Operated Bank. Those 
private banking institutions that did not join the process of transformation were ordered to cease business by the 
end of 1952. The 14 branches of the "Unified Bank" were combined into the savings department of the local 
branches of the PBOC as of February 1,1955. The head office of the bank was also combined into the Private 
Business Administration Bureau of the PBOC in July 1956. Id., at 172-3. 
9 The PBOC started issuing RMB as the sole legal tender of the PRC on December 1,1948. 
10 In 1954, the PBOC issued Regulations on Internal Monitoring and Supervision, establishing the 
administrative supervisory system. The administrative supervisory system was combined with the Party 
supervisory system in 1958. See Wang, Baoqing, supra note 5. 
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The economic reform initiated in 1978 created needs for financial intermediaries to transfer 
savings into investment. As a result, the ABC, " the CCB'2, and the BOC13 were granted 
independent status one after another from 1979 to 1983. In 1983, the State Council decided 
to establish the PBOC as the country's central bank and establish a new bank named the 
ICBC to take over the commercial banking operations from the PBOC. 14 The ICBC was 
formally established on January 1,1984; 15 and the PBOC has served exclusively as the 
country's central bank since then on. 
2. The PBOC After 1984 
The PBOC's development after 1984 as a financial regulator and supervisor can be divided 
into three stages. 16 
(i) 1984-July 1993 
A number of new commercial banks were set up during that period in addition to the "big 
four". '7 Non-bank financial institutions emerged at that period as well. 18 The prosperous 
financial intermediaries created the necessity for financial regulation and supervision. The 
11 The ABC, which focuses on deposit and lending activities in rural areas, was the first bank to be reestablished 
as separate bank. It was reestablished in February 1979. This move reflected the priority assigned to agriculture 
in the initial stage of economic reform. The bank was initially designated to take deposit and grant loans in rural 
areas. See Lardy, Nicholas R., China's Unfinished Economic Revolution, 62 (1998). 
12 In October 1979, the CCB was removed from the administrative control of the MOF and elevated to an 
organization subordinate directly to the State Council, placing it on the same administrative level as China's 
other banks. See the PBOC, Almanac of China's Finance and Banking 1986, II-13. In 1980, for the first time, 
the CCB began to accept deposits and to engage in lending to support investment projects, rather than simply 
acting as a pass-through for government budgetary funds. Id., at II- 14. 
13 In March 1979 the State Council elevated the administrative status of the BOC by separating it from the 
PBOC and making it an economic entity directly subordinated to the State Council. Id., at II-10. 
14 See Decisions of the State Council on the PBOC's Exclusive Role as Central Bank, issued by the State 
Council on September 17,1983. 
15 The ICBC was established on the basis of the vase branch network of the PBOC. Upon its formal creation, 
the bank immediately became China's largest financial institution. See the PBOC, supra note 12, at 111-28 and 
11-46. 
16 The discussion in the section draws heavily from Liu, Zhangjun & Liu, Xiaoyong, 'Enhance Risk-Prevention, 
Promote the Off-site Surveillance System in China [jiagiang fengxian fangfang, jiji tuijing woguo yinhangye 
feixianchang jianguan tixi jianshe]' in Handbook of Off-site Surveillance for Commercial Banks [shangye 
yinhang feixianchang jianguan gongzhuo shuoche] 1, at 2-3 (China Finance Press, 1999). 
17 For details of the development of these new commercial banks, see Wan, Timothy Haosen, supra note 1, at 
186-189. 
'S Id., at 182-186. 
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financial regulation and supervision during this period was mainly administrative controls 
over financial institutions and bore the following three characteristics: 19 
First, the PBOC played the role of an all-embracing financial regulator and 
supervisor, executing administrative controls over all financial institutions and the whole 
financial market. In May 1985, the PBOC established its department of bank supervision and 
examination. 20 On January 7,1986, the State Council issued Interim Regulations on Bank 
Administration, granting the PBOC supervisory powers over banks and non-bank financial 
institutions. On April 26,1986, the PBOC promulgated the Interim Regulations on 
Administration of Financial Trust and Investment Institutions pursuant to the authority 
delegated by the Interim Regulations on Bank Administration. 2' All financial institutions that 
engage in trust and investment business are required to comply with the Interim Regulations 
on Administration of Financial Trust and Investment Institutions. 22 On August 11,1988, the 
PBOC promulgated the Regulations on the Administration of Urban Credit Cooperatives. 
The above-mentioned regulations made the PBOC an all-around financial regulator 
responsible for supervising, regulating, and inspecting financial institutions, including 
approving the establishment, merger, or dismantling of specialized banks and other financial 
organizations, subject in many case to the State Council approval. 23 
Second, the PBOC focused itself on the market-entry regulation of financial 
institutions and the approval of their business scope, rather than on their risk-management 
capacity and asset quality. 24 The PBOC's supervision over specialized banks, for example, 
were limited to their business activities, aiming at their compliance with the State economic 
19 See Wang Zhaoxing, `Financial Supervision: Opportunities and Challenge (jingrong jiaguan: fazhan yu 
tiaozhan]', China Finance No. 12,16, at 16 (1999). 
20 This department, known as the Examination and Supervision Department, had more than 4,700 personnel at 
the end of 1988. Among them only about 200 were at the level of senior economist or senior accountant with 
slightly more than 1,200 in the middle grades. See the World Bank, China: Financial Sector Policies and 
Institutional Development, 33, a World Bank Country Study (1990). ' 
2' Article 1, Interim Regulations on Administration of Trust and Investment Institutions, issued by the PBOC on 
April 26,1986. 
22 Id. art. 2. On January 19,2001, the PBOC issued new Regulations on Administration of Trust and Investment 
Companies, revealing the Interim Regulations. 
23 Articles 5,6 & 7, Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Bank Administration, issued by 
the State Council on January 7,1986 (hereinafter referred to as "Interim Regulations on Bank Administration"). 
24 For example, instead of setting limitations to restrict over-risk-taking by banks, from 1986 to 1994, an 
interest-sharing scheme was run by the PBOC, allowing state bank headquarters and their local lending 
branches to share the interest repayment as part of their own operational revenue. This gave banks a strong 
incentive to increase lending. See Pu Yonghao, `Why China Won't Be Asia's Next Basket Case Economy', 




and financial policies; laws and regulations; and the credit, cash, foreign currency, and 
financial plans. 25 
Third, the PBOC was vulnerable to interventions from other government agencies in 
its financial regulation and supervision. Many financial institutions were set up during this 
period. Those financial institutions engaged themselves in all kinds of financial businesses, 
some even without the approval of the PBOC, resulting in the distortion of financial 
market. 26 
(ii) July 1993-June 1996: Administrating and Policing the Financial Market 
The Focus of financial regulation and supervision for this period was investigating and 
punishing against financial irregularities so as to restore orders in China's financial markets. 
Besides, a legal framework for banking regulation and supervision started to emerge in the 
country. 27 
The State Council and the PBOC issued a series of documents to restore the financial 
order and regulate the business scope of financial institution. 28 A lot of illegally established 
financial institutions were closed. Many financial institutions and their managers were 
punished for their illegal operations. 29 In 1995, the Central Banking Law3° and the 
Commercial Banking Law31 were adopted and came into effect, providing a legal basis for 
China's financial regulation and supervision. 32 These efforts, however, did not touch the 
accumulated risks within China's financial system. 
25 Interim Regulations on Bank Administration, supra note 23, arts. 12-21. See also Wang, Baoqing, supra note 
5. 
26 See Wang Zhaoxing, supra note 19. 
27 Id. 
28 See, e. g., Opinions of the PBOC on Enhancing Regulation and Supervision over Financial Institutions 
[zhongguo renmin yinhang guanyu jiaqiang jinrong jiaguan gongzhuo yijian de yijian], approved by the State 
Council on September 29,1994. According to these Opinions, the establishment, alteration and termination of 
financial institutions must be examined and approved by the PBOC or its branches. Those financial institutions 
established without the approval of the PBOC or its branches must be closed or apply to the PBOC for approval. 
29 See Wang Zhaoxing, supra note 19. 
30 The Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China [Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Zhong Guo Renmin Yinghang fa], adopted at the 3rd Session of the 8`s NPC on March 18,1995 and came into 
effect as of the same date (hereinafter referred to "the Central Banking Law"). 
31 The Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks, adopted at the 13th Session of the 
Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress on May 10,1995, and effective as of July 1,1995. 
32 For a long period before the adoption of the Central Banking Law and Commercial Banking Law, the banking 
regulation and supervision was conducted on the basis of administrative regulations and rules issued by the 
State Council or its subordinated ministries or commissions. The adoption of the Central Banking Law and 
Commercial Banking Law in 1995 marks that banking regulation and supervision in China started to be carried 
out on a statutory basis. In addition to the Central Banking Law and the Commercial Banking Law, there are 
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(iii) June 1995- Present: The Development of Prudential Regulation in China 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis educated authorities in China. On November 17-19,1997, the 
Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council held the National Financial Working 
Conference in Beijing, calling to establish a financial system compatible to the socialist 
market economy and to strengthen the risk management capacity of financial institutions in 
about three years. 33 
After the conference, the focuses of financial regulation and supervision have been 
shifted or are shifting in the following four aspects: 34 (1) from administrative controls to 
ensure that financial institutions comply with laws and regulations towards the prudential 
regulation and supervision against over-risk-taking and irregularities of financial institutions; 
(2) from the market-entry regulation towards a comprehensive supervision covering the 
market entry, operations and market exist of financial institution; (3) from the segregated 
supervision between local currency and foreign currency business, on-balance-sheet and off- 
balance-sheet business, domestic and off-shore business towards a consolidated regulation 
and supervision; and (4) from the sole reliance upon the on-site inspection towards the 
coordination between on-site inspection and off-site examination. 
3. The PBOC Develops into An Exclusive Banking Regulator and Supervisor 
The after-economic reform age has also witnessed the establishment of China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC). As a 
result, the PBOC develops itself from a sole and all-embracing financial regulator to an 
exclusive banking regulator and supervisor. 
The PBOC used to be a comprehensive regulator over the national financial sector, 
where financial institutions operated in one of the following four sectors: banking, securities, 
other legislation efforts as well. For details of the financial lawmaking practices, see Chen, Xiaoyun, 
`Summarize Experiences and Strengthening Financial Lawmaking [zongjie lifa jingyan, jiaqiang jinrong lifa]', 
China Finance, No. 4,7 (2000); and also Chen, Xiaoyun, 'History and Prospectus of China's Financial 
Legislative Activities [woguo jinrong fazhi jianshe de lichen yu zhanwang]', China Finance No. 12,34-36,64 
(December 1998). 
33 Historical Research Unit of the Central Committee of the CCP, 'Major Events after the Third Session of the 
Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (III) (zhonggong shiyyie sanzhongquanhui yilei 
dashiji-xia)', People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 3 (December 16,1999). 
34 See Wang Zhaoxing, supra note 19; and Wang, Baoqing, supra note 5, at 2. 
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insurance, and trust and investment. 35 The 1995 Central Banking Law authorized the PBOC 
to "exercise supervision over financial institutions and their business operations to maintain 
the legitimate, stable and sound operation of the financial industry , 36 and "approve the 
establishment, changes, termination and the business scope of a financial institution. "37 
The PBOC's role of regulating and supervising the financial industry was later 
redefined by the State Council. The regulation and supervision of the securities business and 
the insurance industry was taken from the PBOC in 1998 with State Council's decision to 
make the CSRC the sole organization to supervise the country's securities industry, 38 and the 
establishment of the CIRC to supervise the country's insurance industry. 39 As a result, the 
PBOC, 40 the CSRC, and the CIRC carry out their respective regulatory and supervisory 
responsibilities in the banking, securities and insurance industries. 
The tripartite financial regulatory structure is consistent with China's separation 
among commercial banking, securities and insurance, simplifies the tasks of each supervisor, 
and facilitates more efficient supervision on each financial sector. This structure, however, 
also allows for regulatory arbitrage and makes consolidated supervision difficult 41 
35 The 1986 Interim Regulations on Banking Administration, arts. 5,6. 
36 The Central Banking Law, supra note 30, art. 30. 
" Id. art. 31. 
38 The CSRC began in 1992 as the executive branch of the State Council Securities Commission, which 
supervised the securities market. In 1997, the CSRC was charged with supervising the Shanghai and Sehnzhen 
stock exchanges. In 1998, as part of the government's effort to streamline the bureaucracy, the SCSC and the 
CSRC were merged as CSRC. According to a decision of the State Council in October 1998, the new CSRC 
enjoys ministerial rank and performs as the sole regulatory agency for the securities industry in China, 
responsible for overseeing securities brokerages, which were formerly supervised by the PBOC, directly 
administering all local securities supervisory bodies, which used to be under local governments, and 
undertaking the responsibilities of the SCSC. The new commission also regulates all international participation 
in China's burgeoning securities sector. See Chinaonline, 'China Approves Regulatory Body for Securities 
Sector' (October 20,1998), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. conz/industry/fina///hive/Secure/1998/October/fn_c8102006. asp'. 
39 On November 18,1998, China formally established an insurance regulatory body, the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission. The insurance industry was previously supervised by the PBOC. The newly 
established CIRC is subject directly to the State Council and fully authorized to regulate and supervise China's 
insurance industry. Its responsibility includes the drafting and adoption of policies, regulations and rules about 
commercial insurance; supervising insurance enterprises to ensure that they operate in compliance with the law 
and regulation; fostering fair competition between insurance enterprises; and promoting insurance risk assessing 
and early warning systems, etc. See Tian Li, `The CIRC Was Established in Beijing Today (Zhongguo Baoxian 
Jiandu Weiyuanhui Zai Jing Chengli)', People's Daily (Overseas Edition) 1 (November 19,1999); and 
Chinaonline, `China to Establish Insurance Regulatory Body' (November 19,1998), available at 
'http: //wwºv. chinaonline. com/industry/fina... ive/Secure/1998/November/fn_b8111903. asp'. 
ao In October 1999, what under the PBOC supervision are three policy banks, the big four, 9 joint stock 
commercial banks, 88 city commercial banks, more than 50,000 rural credit cooperatives, about 3100 urban 
credit cooperatives, and non bank-financial institutions and foreign-invested financial institutions not under the 
supervision of CSRC or CIRC. See Wang, Baoqing, supra note 5. 
41 In South Korea, for example, before the Financial Supervisory Commission was put in place, commercial 
banks were under the direct authority of the Monetary Board (the governing body of the BOK) and the OBS. 
Specialized banks and NBFIs were under the authority of the MOFE, although the MOFE delegated on-site 
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Fortunately, this problem has already been recognized by financial regulators in China, Xia, 
Bin, the director of the Non-banking Financial Institutions Regulatory Department of the 
PBOC, was reported said that under China's current principle of maintaining segregated 
financial operations, supervisory departments for banking, securities and insurance should 
still establish frameworks for coordination and dialogue as soon as possible. 42 In Shanghai, a 
joint meeting system and information sharing system of the three regulatory institutions was 
initiated in August 2000.43 In September 2000, a nationwide joint meeting system of the 
PBOC, the CSRC and the CIRC was initiated. 4 
examination of some NBFIs to the OBS. This lack of a unified system of supervision and regulation, together 
with the weak supervision performed by MOFE on NBFIs, created conditions favorable to regulatory arbitrage 
and high risk practices, especially among commercial banks' trust business and merchant banks. See Balino, 
Tomas J. T., Enoch Charles et al., Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring Lessons from Asia, 115 (IMF, 
September 1999). ' 
42 See Chinaonline, 'Cross-Sector Finance Still Banned in China' (April 6,2000), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/000406/2/b200040304. asp'. The PBOC Monetary Policy Commission 
made the same suggestion. See Sun, Jie, 'The PBOC Monetary Policy Commission Held Its Second Quarterly 
Meeting for 2000 to Determine Future Monetary Policy [yanghang huobi zhengche weiyuanhui zhaokai dier 
jidu lihui que ding jinhou yiduan shijian houbi zhengche zhongdian]', People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 1 
(April 25,2000). 
43 See, e. g., 'Cooperation Among the Three Financial Regulators Established in Shanghai [shanghai jianli 
jinrongye jianguan hezhuo zhidu]', Peoples Daily (overseas edition), 3 (August 26,2000). 
as See ̀ The Three Financial Regulators Are Cooperating in Their Regulation over Financial Industries [sanda 
jinrong jianguan bumeng zhengqiang jianguan heli]', People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 5 (September 9, 
2000). 
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ANNEX XI: THE PBOC'S INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY, THE PBOC'S 
ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURING, AND THE DIVISION OF 
FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY DUTIES BETWEEN THE PBOC 
HEADQUARTERS AND ITS BRANCHES 
1. Enhancing the PBOC's Independence and Autonomy 
(i) Why a More Independent PBOC? 
Despite extensive debates on pros and cons of the central bank independence (CBI), ' the 
tendency worldwide is that more and more independence and autonomy is granted to central 
banks. 2 Although the CBI is advocated mainly in the conduct of monetary policy, it is also 
essential for effective banking supervision, 3 as stated by the Basle Committee in its Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision - "An effective system of banking supervision 
will have clear responsibilities and objectives for each agency involved in the supervision of 
banking organization. Each such agency should possess operational independence and 
"4 adequate resources. 
The 1995 Central Banking Law mandates two tasks to the PBOC: to decide and 
implement monetary policies so as to stabilize the value of the currency and to promote the 
growth of the economy, and to regulate and supervise financial institutions. 5 In order to 
perform these two tasks properly, the PBOC must have operational independence so as to be 
free of political interruption and interference. With regard to its role as banking regulator and 
supervisor, the PBOC needs to have considerable autonomy vis-ä-vis other ministerial level 
units under the State Council in Beijing, as well as vis-ä-vis the provincial party and 
1 For an excellent summary of arguments for and against the CBI, see Lastra, R. M., Central Banking and 
Banking Regulation, 13-24 (1996). 
2 Id., at 9. 
' Id., at 10. 
° Basle Committee, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (September 1997), principle 1. 
5 The Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China, adopted at the 3rd Session of the 
Eighth National People's Congress on March 18,1995, effective as of the same day (hereinafter referred to as 
"the Central Banking Law"), arts. 2&3. The powers and functions of the PBOC are provided as follows: (1) to 
formulate and implement monetary policies; (2) to issue RMB and control its circulation; (3) to approve, 
supervise, and to administer financial institutions; (4) to supervise and control the financial market; (5) to 
promulgate ordinances and rules concerning financial administration and businesses; (6) to hold, administer, 
and to manage the state foreign exchange reserve and bullion reserve; (7) to act as fiscal agent for the State; (8) 
to maintain the normal operation of payment, clearing and settlement systems; (9) to conduct financial 
investigations and make forecasts; and (10) to engage in relevant international financial activities. Id. art. 4. 
289 
government leaders so that it can exercise effective prudential supervision over banks and 
other financial institutions. In particular, the central bank must have sufficient independence 
and political power to achieve two objectives. First, it must be able to insulate banks from 
demands from political leaders to extend loans to projects that do not meet commercial 
lending standards. Second, it must ensure that any subsidies for policy lending are financed 
by the budget rather than by the banking system. 
(ii) A Historic Review of the PBOC's Independence and Autonomy before the 
Implementation of the 1995 Central Banking Law 
Although the PBOC assumed the responsibility of a central bank as early as January 1, 
1984,6 it remained a weak central bank in terms of relationships with ministries in Beijing 
and local government quite a long time afterwards. 
The PBOC's lack of independence and autonomy has its historic root. After its 
establishment in 1949, the PBOC only remained its administrative independence through the 
period of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57). From the beginning of the Great Leap Forward 
in 1958 through the mid-1970s, the PBOC was subordinated to the MOF, reflecting the fact 
that there was very little separation of banking and fiscal operations of the government 
during those years. 7 
It was not until 1979 that the PBOC was separated from the MOF. It remained a weak 
institution, however. The provincial branches of the PBOC were subordinated to local 
government and party officials. Provincial authorities had the power of appointment, 
dismissal, transfer, and promotion of personnel of banks operating within their geographic 
jurisdictions. This had greatly weakened the ability of the PBOC headquarters to effectively 
monitor its local branches. 8 In 1988, the PBOC headquarters was formally vested with the 
power to appoint and remove provincial and lower-level PBOC managers. 9 The PBOC 
6 The State Council in September 1983 approved in principle the separation of the commercial operations from 
the PBOC so as to make the PBOC an exclusive central bank. See Decisions of the State Council On the 
PBOC's Exclusive Role as Central Bank, issued by the State Council on September 17,1983 (hereinafter 
referred to as "the Decisions on the PBOC's Exclusive Role as Central Bank". The Decisions ordered the PBOC 
to be restructured to perform exclusively the functions of a central bank. The PBOC was authorized to supervise 
and to examine the overall banking activities of specialized banks and other financial institutions. 
7 See Lardy, Nicholas R., China's Unfinished Economic Revolution, 173 (1998). 
See Byrd, William A., China's Financial System: The Changing Role of Banks, 12 (1983). 
See the World Bank, China: Financial Sector Policies and Institutional Development, 5, A World Bank 
Country Study (1990). 
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headquarters, however, was still required to consult with the localities, which appear to have 
retained veto power over appointment. 10 
The situation improved in 1990s. In July 1993, Zhu Rongji was appointed as the 
PBOC governor. Zhu's position of vice premier and his forceful style gained the PBOC some 
autonomy that could not have been gained before. The first thing Zhu achieved immediately 
after his appointment was the full authority to appoint and remove the heads of the PBOC's 
provincial branches. " Second, in an unprecedented move, beginning in 1994 the PBOC 
refused to lend money to the MOF to cover the state budget deficit. Third, under Zhu's 
governing, the PBOC headquarters in Beijing gained full control of PBOC credit extended to 
financial institutions. 12 
(iii) An Independent Central Bank Under the Central Banking Law? 
Although the PBOC obtained some de facto independence, it was not until the adoption of 
the 1995 Central Banking Law that a binding legal and institutional framework was put in 
place as a source for the PBOC's political legitimacy and credibility. China's Central 
Banking Law was "formulated for the purpose of defining the status and functions of the 
People's Bank of China, ensuring the correct formulation and implementation of the state 
monetary policy, establishing and perfecting macro control under a central bank, and 
strengthening the supervision and control of the financial industry. 9913 But has the Central 
Banking Law granted the PBOC sufficient CBI to carry out its duties? 
There are two indicators to measure legal articulation of the CBI: one is organic 
safeguards of independence, including appointment process, terms of office, dismissal, 
suitability and salary, prohibitions applicable to central bank officials while in office, 
restrictions on central bank officials after they leave office, and liaisons with Treasury; the 
other is functional safeguards of independence, including limitations on lending to the public 
sector, conduct of monetary policy, other central bank functions, regulatory powers, financial 
10 See Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 7. 
11 Id., at 174. 
12 Id., 174-5. Previously, provincial and lower-level branch offices of the PBOC had discretionary power over 
30% of the central bank lending to the financial system. They were thus vulnerable to importuning by local 
authorities to extend credit to local branches of state banks that, in turn, would be funneled to support projects 
sponsored by the officials. After Zhu's take-over, the headquarters of the People's Bank was able to re- 
centralize authorities for all PBOC lending and the allocation of credit quotas. Id. 
13 The Central Banking Law, supra note 5, art. 1. 
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autonomy, decisional autonomy. 14 In the rest of this section, the CBI of the PBOC is to be 
assessed on the basis of these two indicators. 
a. Organic Safeguards of the CBI under China's Central Banking Law 
The Appointment, Terms of Office, Dismissal, Suitability and Salary, Prohibitions Applicable 
to Central Bank Officials while in Office, and Restrictions on Central Bank Officials after 
They Leave Office When the central bank was established in 1983 the principal decision- 
making body was the bank's board of directors. 15 The chair of the board was the governor of 
the bank. 16 But its members included the presidents of the "big four" as well as a vice 
minister of the MOF. 17 To the extent that the board was a policymaking body, the presence of 
representatives of these institutions appears to have been a conflict of interests and made the 
PBOC vulnerable to interferences from the MOF. 18 
The 1995 Central Banking Law abolished the board of directors. Instead, the Law 
provides that the PBOC governor should assume the overall responsibility and take full 
control of the bank, with the assistance of the deputy governors. 19 With regard to the 
appointment, dismissal of the governor and deputy governors of the PBOC, paragraph 2, 
article 9 of the law reads as follows: 
The person for the Governor of the PBOC shall, on the basis of nomination by the Premier of the State 
Council, be decided by the National People's Congress; and when the NPC is not in session, 
determined by the NPC Standing Committee and appointed or removed by the President of the 
People's Republic of China. The deputy governors of the People's Bank of China shall be appointed 
and removed by the Premier of the State Council. 
The provision that the governor candidate nominated by the State Council must be approved 
by the NPC or its Standing Committee at least makes the PBOC Governor to some extent 
14 See Lastra, R. M., supra note 1, at 27-48. 
15 Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Bank Administration, issued by the State Council 
on January 7,1986, art. 7. 
16 See the Decisions on the PBOC's Exclusive Role as Central Bank, supra note 6. 
" The other members of the board of directors included experts, the deputy governor of the PBOC, a vice 
minister of the State Planning Commission, a vice minister of the State Economic Commission, and the head of 
the People's Insurance Company of China. Id. By the late 1980s, the composition of the board was little 
changed except that a vice minister of the State Economic Reform Commission has replaced the vice minister 
of the State Economic Commission. See the World Bank, supra note 9. 
18 See Lardy, Nicholas, R., supra note 7, at 175. 
19 The Central Banking Law, supra note 5, art. 10. 
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responsible to the NPC and not just to the State Counci1.20 The provisions contained in the 
Central Banking Law regarding the governor and deputy governors of the PBOC, however, 
are not sufficient to guarantee the CBI of the PBOC. First, the Central Banking Law contains 
no provisions on how many deputy governors the PBOC should have and the term of the 
PBOC governor and deputy governors. Because the Premier of the State Council has the final 
say on the appointment and removal of the deputy governors of the PBOC, the State Council 
may appoint those persons "loyal" to the government the PBOC deputy governors and 
dismiss those "troublemakers" whenever it thinks necessary. These appointed deputy 
governors, afraid of losing their positions and powers, might give in under the government 
pressures. Second, except the provisions that the governor, deputy governors and other staff 
should be diligent in carrying out their functions, refrain from abuse of power or malpractice 
for private interests or holding posts concurrently in any other financial institutions, 
enterprises, or foundations, there is no qualification requirements for the PBOC governor and 
deputy governors. That makes it easy for the State Council to nominate or appoint any person 
they like to be the governor or deputy governors of the PBOC. Last but not least, because 
there is no explicit restriction on central bank officials after they leave office, central bank 
officials in China are susceptible to "private" incentives21 and political influence22 during 
their tenure with the central bank. 
Another problem with the PBOC's institutional structure under the 1995 Central 
Banking Law is the provisions concerning the Monetary Policy Committee. The Central 
Banking Law only provides in principle that the Monetary Policy Committee should be 
established within the PBOC, leaving its functions, organization, and working procedure at 
the discretion of the State Council. 23 Because the Monetary Policy Committee is only a 
consulting but not a policy-making body, 24 however, the State Council's absolute right in 
20 There is another article designed for this purpose. Article 6 of the Central Banking Law provides that the 
PBOC shall submit work reports to the Standing Committee of the NPC on matters concerning over the 
financial industry. Id. art. 6. 
2'Central bank officials should be limited in their ability to pursue private employment in credit and financial 
institutions for a reasonable period following their term of office. These restrictions are designed to preclude 
their susceptibility to "private" incentives while in office. Such provisions are particularly necessary for central 
banks responsible for regulating the banking industry, so as to avoid the "capture" of the regulator by the 
regulated institutions. See Lastra, R. M., supra note 1, at 35. 
22 Central bankers should also be temporarily ineligible to become government officials after their term in 
office. This limitation is aimed at avoiding or mitigating political influence during their tenure with the central 
bank. Id. 
2' The Central Banking Law, supra note 5, art. 11. 
24 Regulations on the PBOC Monetary Policy Committee [zhongguo renmin yinhang houbi zhengce weiyuanhui 
tiaoli], issued by the State Council on April 15,1997. 
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deciding the functions, organization, and working procedure of the Monetary Committee 
may not have very large negative impact on the PBOC's independence in terms of banking 
supervision. 
Liaisons with Other Government Agencies at Central or Local Levels The Central 
Banking Law guarantees the independence of the PBOC in relationship with the State 
Council and other government agencies by provisions in three aspects. 
First, the Law provides that the PBOC should report to the Standing Committee of the 
NPC on matters concerning the monetary policies and financial regulation and supervision. 25 
This to some extent refrains the State Council from interrupting into the PBOC's business. 
Second, the Central Banking Law grants the PBOC equal status at the administrative 
hierarchy to the MOF and other government ministries and commissions. Accordingly, the 
PBOC should, "under the leadership of the State Council, independently implement 
monetary policies, exercise its functions and carry on its operation according to the law and 
be free from intervention by local governments, other administrative organs at all levels, 
public organizations, or individuals. v, 26 The status of the PBOC is further clarified by the 
Circular of the State Council General Office on the Functions, the Internal Structure, and 
Manning Quotas of the PBOC, 27 which provides that the PBOC is "a component of the State 
Council' and "a macro-economic controller under the leadership of the State Council to 
decide and implement monetary policies and to regulate and supervise the financial 
industry. " 
Third, the Law grants the PBOC overall controls over its branches and sub-branches. 
According to article 12 of the Central Banking Law, the PBOC should, as necessitated by the 
performance of its functions, establish its branches as its representative organs and exercise 
centralized and unified leadership and control over its branches. 28 
Despite the progress, the PBOC is still subordinated to the State Council. Its governor 
and deputy governors are still nominated or appointed by the State Council. Thus, it might be 
safe to conclude here that the PBOC is still organically dependent on the State Council, 
although it has gained more dependence from other ministries at the central government level 
and local governments. 
25 The Central Banking Law, supra note 5, art. 6. 
26 Id. art. 7. 
27 The Circular on the Functions, the Internal Structure, and Manning Quotas of the PBOC [guowuyuan 
bangongting guanyu yingfa zhongguo renminyinghang zhineng peizhi neishejigou he renyuan bianzhi guiding 
the tongzhi], issued by the General Office of the State Council in June 1993. 
28 The Central Banking Law, supra note 5, art. 12. 
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b. Functional Safeguards of the CBI under China's Central Banking Law 
Limitations on Lending to the Public Sector A prohibition or limitation on financing the 
public sector's deficits or monetizing public debt is a classic indication of central bank 
economic independence. 29 The Central Banking Law establishes the PBOC economic 
independence by prohibiting the Bank from providing the State with overdraft facilities, or 
directly subscribing or underwriting State bonds or other government bonds. 30 Article 29 of 
the Law further provides that the PBOC may not provide loans to local governments at all 
levels, or to financial institutions other than banks, or other organizations or individuals; and 
that the PBOC may not act as financial guarantor for any organization or individual . 
31 
The PBOC, however, is obliged to provide loans to specific non-bank financial 
institutions if the State Council determined so. 32 This creates leeway for the State Council to 
instruct the PBOC to lend to public or quasi-public sector. 
Conduct of Monetary Policy An independent central bank should be responsible for 
implementing monetary policy, as well as for determining or formulating its content. This 
requires the freedom to use a sufficient array of market instruments, whose application is not 
restricted by administrative regulations or political interference. 33 The PBOC is by no means 
independent in conducting monetary policy, because it can only formulate and implement 
monetary policies under the leadership of the State Council. 34 Although art. 22 of the law 
provides a sufficient collection of market instruments that the PBOC can use to implement 
monetary policy, 35 the PBOC is required to report its decision concerning the annual supply 
of bank-notes, interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and other major issues specified by the 
State Council to the State Council for approval before implementation. 36 
Regulatory Powers Although the PBOC can promulgate ordinances and rules 
concerning financial administration and business, 37 the PBOC is not independent in its 
29 See Lastra, R. M., supra note 1, at 38. 
30 The Central Banking Law, supra note 5, art. 28. 
31 Id. art. 29. 
32 Id. 
"See Lastra, R. M., supra note 1, at 40. 
34 The Central Banking Law, supra note 5, arts. 2&3. 
35 Id. art. 22, which provides that the PBOC may apply monetary policy instruments such as deposit reserve 
requirements, the base interest rates, rediscounting windows, lending to commercial banks, and open market 
operation. 
3 Id. art. 5. The PBOC must report other monetary policy decisions to the State Council for record. Id. 
37 Id. art. 4. 
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regulatory powers. Article 2 of the Central Banking Law provides that the PBOC should 
excise supervision and control over the financial industry under the leadership of the State 
38 Council. 
Other Central Bank Functions In addition to its regulatory powers and powers 
concerning monetary policy, the PBOC also acts as a fiscal agent for the State. 39 The PBOC, 
however, "shall act as the fiscal agent for the State in accordance with the law and 
administrative decrees and regulations. "4° 
Financial Autonomy The powers of the governing bodies of a central bank 
independent from the Treasury may be extended through the provision of financial and 
budgetary autonomy to the bank . 
41 The PBOC enjoys full financial autonomy: The PBOC is 
owned solely by the State with its entire paid-up capital allocated by the State. 42 The sole 
state ownership cuts off the influences by other interest groups on the PBOC. Moreover, the 
PBOC is authorized by the Law to exercise independent control over its financial budget. 43 
c. Conclusion: Limited Independence of the PBOC 
The 1995 Central Banking Law grants some independence to the PBOC. Organically, the 
PBOC becomes equal to other ministries in administrative hierarchy. The PBOC local 
branches are no longer vulnerable to intervention from local government. Functionally, the 
PBOC is authorized to formulate and implement monetary policies and exercise supervision 
and control over the financial industry under the leadership of the State Council, free from 
intervention by local governments, other administrative organs at all levels, or public 
organizations or individuals. The PBOC enjoys full financial autonomy. 
The independence and autonomy of the PBOC is limited, however. The PBOC must 
carry out its functions under the leadership of the State Council. Its governor and deputy 
governors are nominated or appointed by the State Council. Moreover, the State Council 
38 Id. art. 2. 
39 Id. art. 4. 
40 Id. art. 23. 
41 See Lastra, R. M., supra note 1, at 44. In the US, the Fed enjoys full financial and budgetary autonomy. 
Whereas in Germany, the Bundesbank has the power to prepare and approve its own accounts. Id. 
°' The Central Banking Law, supra note 5, art. 8. 
03 Id. art. 37. The budget of the PBOC, however, shall be incorporated into the central budget after it has been 
examined and verified by the financial department of the State Council and be subject to the budgetary control 
and supervision of the financial department of the State Council. Id. That casts some doubts on whether the 
PBOC can really exercise independent control over its financial budget. 
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decides the functions, organization and working procedure of its Monetary Policy 
Committee. 
2. The PBOC Organizational Restructuring 
The importance of the PBOC organizational structure can be understood in two senses. First, 
an efficient internal institutional structure facilitates the PBOC to exercise more efficient 
banking regulation and supervision. Second, the internal institutional structure of the PBOC 
is relevant to its relationships with other government departments, and the relationships 
between the PBOC and financial institutions. 
After various efforts in streamlining its headquarters and restructuring its branches, 
by the end of 1998, a new structural system of the PBOC came into existence, with the 
retrenched headquarters, 9 regional branches (supported by 20 financial supervisory offices), 
328 sub-branches and 1828 sub-sub-branches. 44 
(i) Streamlining the PBOC Headquarters 
The restructuring of the PBOC headquarters was implemented in July-August 1998. In 
addition to transferring its securities and insurance regulatory and supervisory duties to 
CSRC and CIRC respectively, the PBOC transferred its businesses relevant to the Asian 
Development Bank to the MOF, 45 and gave back the State commercial banks and policy 
banks the autonomy in deciding the organizational structure and manning of their 
headquarters. 46 These adjustments make it possible for the PBOC to concentrate its resources 
on prudential banking regulation and supervision. 
To streamline its supervision over commercial banks and non-bank financial 
institutions, the PBOC underwent major reforms in its headquarters' organizational 
structure. 47 Two departments, the Department of Examination and Supervision, and the 
Foreign Financial Institution Department were closed. Instead of having different 
44 See, e. g., Jiao, Jinpu, `New Development of China's Financial Reform [zhongguo jinrong tizhi gaige xin 
fazhang]', China Finance No. 10,18, at 18 (1999). 
45 The PBOC had been the official representative for China in the Asian Development Bank since 1985. 
46 The big four and policy banks are only required to record with the PBOC the organizational structure and 
manning of their headquarters. 
" See Dai, Xianglong, 'Opening Address' in Strengthening the Banking System in China: Issues and 
Experience, 11 at 13, BIS Policy Papers No. 7 (October, 1999). 
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departments in charge of different stages of supervision, the PBOC now has the Cooperative 
Financial Institutions Regulations Dept., Non-Banking Financial Institutions Regulation 
Dept., and the First and Second Depts. of Bank Regulation to supervise and oversee a 
financial institution from market entry, through business operation to market exit. 48 Under 
this structure, consolidated supervision is imposed on financial institution's RMB business 
and foreign currency business, on-site-inspection and off-site-examination are more 
coordinated, and the separation between domestic bank supervision and foreign bank branch 
supervision are abolished. 49 
(ii) Reshuffling the PBOC Branches 
a. Why Restructuring? 
Before the reshuffle, the PBOC had a provincial branch at the capital city of each province, 
autonomous region or municipality directly under the Central Government. That made it easy 
for local governments, especially those at the provincial level to intervene into the PBOC's 
monetary policy operations and its financial regulation and supervision. 50 Moreover, this 
branching structure made the relationship between the PBOC and commercial banks the 
relationship of administrative subordination rather than that between the regulator and 
regulatees. The PBOC provincial branches supervised the financial institutions at the same 
administrative level (including branches of the national commercial banks within their 
jurisdiction), ignoring the overall situation of a financial institution. 51 
The reshuffle of the PBOC branches is a great step towards a more independent 
central bank of China. Wen, Jiabao, one of the four vice premiers of China, when speaking at 
the national meeting of the directors of PBOC branches on November 14,1998, said that the 
reshuffle would enhance the authority of the PBOC in implementing monetary policy, the 
48 The headquarters of the PBOC comprises 16 departments: the Accounting and Finance Dept., the Cooperative 
Financial Institutions Regulation Dept., the Non-Banking Financial Institutions Regulation Dept., the Payment 
Technology Dept., the Statistics Dept., the Treaty and Law Dept., the International Dept., the First and the 
Second Depts. Of Bank Regulation; the Research Bureau; the Currency and Gold Bureau; the State Coffer 
Bureau; the Security Bureau; and the Training Center. See Chinaonline, `PRC Ministry/Commission Profile: 
People's Bank of China (PBOC)', available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/refer/ministry-Profile/pbcb3. asp'. 
49 See Jiao, Jinpu, supra note 44. 
50 See the People's Daily Commentator, `An Significant Reform of the PBOC Organizational System (zhongyan 
'inhang guanli tizhi de zhongda gaige]', People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 1 (November 16,1998). 
See Cai, E-sheng, `Financial Supervision in China: Framework, Methods and Current Issues' in 
Strengthening the Banking System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,169, at 169 
(October 1999). 
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independence of the PBOC in carrying out financial regulation and supervision, and would 
improve the efficiency and integration of financial regulation and supervision. 52 
b. Steps towards the Regional Branch System 
In April 1993, the 3`d Plenary Session of the 14`h Communist Party Congress decided that 
"[t]he PBOC should by all means establish regional branches as its agencies that will 
administer more than one province to improve national currency circulation and unified 
currency adjustment". This was followed by the similar provisions in the State Council 
Resolution for Financial Reform in May 1993. The 1995 Central Banking Law includes in 
the law the idea that the PBOC should establish regional branches. 53 It was not until the burst 
of the Asian financial crisis, however, serious steps were taken to reshuffle the PBOC 
branches. 54 The PBOC started considering the location of its regional branches at the 
beginning of 1998 and finally decided to have nine regional branches. 55 On June 12,1998, 
Zhu Rongji gave the green light to the PBOC's restructuring plan. On September 19,1998, 
the Politburo of the Party's Central Committee approved the PBOC plan. sb 
On November 18,1998, Dai, Xianglong held a ribbon cutting ceremony at the first 
regional branch in Shanghai. 57 The rest eight regional branches opened their office in 
52 See Shui, Ji & Shi, Mingshen, `The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Decide to Reform the 
PBOC Organizational System [zhonggong zhongyan guowuyuan zhuochu jueding, zhongguorenminyinhang 
ýuanli tizhi shixing gaige]', People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 1,4 (November 16,1998). 
3' The Central Banking Law, supra note 5, art. 12. 
54 See Chen, Jianhua, 'The Reform of the PBOC's Organizational Structure [gaige renhang guanli tizhi, 
wangshan jinrong tiaokong jianguan tixi]', China Finance No. 11,22, at 22 (November 1998). Among the 15 
measures proposed to resolve problems still facing the country's financial sector at the November 1997 
National Financial Working Conference in Beijing, the first of these measures was to eliminate PBOC's 
Provincial branches and set up regional branches. Id. 
5 At the 9`h NPC in March 1998, many provinces lobbied strongly to secure a regional PBOC branch. The 
PBOC first ruled out the possibility of establishing regional branches in the six traditional geographic regions of 
China (i. e., northeastern, northwestern, southwestern, northern China, eastern China and south-central 
branches). Three guidelines were proposed to steer the process -A regional branch must already have been 
proved to be efficient in order to qualify as a regional bank, and the aggregate amount of financial supervision 
work in province would be the determining principle rather than the physical size of a branch bank. Also, it was 
decided that no regional branch would be opened in Beijing in order to avoid overlap, as the central bank was 
already located in Beijing. See Chinaonline, 'Evolution of China's Central Bank Regional Branch System' 
cJanuary 27,1999), available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. coniltop_stories/today_b2_99011918. htnil'. 
6 Id. 
57 See Wang, Hongyan, `The First Regional PBOC Branches Opened in Shanghai [shoujia kua xingzhengqv 
yanhang fenghang zai hu gua pai]', People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 1 (November 19,1998). 
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December 1998 (see Table 1: The PBOC's New Regional Branches). The new system started 
running on January 1,1999.58 
The regional branches carry out the following duties within their respective 
jurisdictions: 59 (1) to exercise comprehensive supervision over the business activities of 
financial institutions under the authorization of the PBOC headquarters; (2) to investigate and 
deal with activities violating financial laws and regulations; (3) to be in charge of the 
personnel affairs and budget of financial supervisory offices and central sub-branches; (4) to 
manage the PBOC assets and deposit reserves, and carry out rediscounting, interest rate 
control, and other monetary policy businesses; (5) to analyze the economic and financial 
situation, and regional financial risks; (6) to manage foreign exchange reserves, foreign 
debts, and international payments; and (7) to co-ordinate central sub-branches in their 
businesses of coffer management, payment and settlement, cash issuance, and financial 
statistics. 
c. The Merger of Prefectural Sub-branches and City Sub-sub-branches 
Prior to 1995, the PBOC had a prefectural sub-branch set for each prefecture, overlapping 
with a sub-sub-branch at the capital city of each prefecture. This overlapping structure 
accented the administrative relationships between the PBOC and financial institutions under 
its supervision. Moreover, it caused waste of resources. 
The PBOC started tackling the problem with its sub-branches and sub-sub-branches 
prior to that of the provincial branches. In the first half of 1995, the PBOC Guizhou Province 
Branch organized mergers between the overlapping sub-branches and sub-sub-branches as a 
pilot trial. The nationwide mergers started in June 1998, precluding the restructuring of the 
provincial branches. 60 Altogether 148 city sub-sub-branches were abolished or merged into 
prefecture sub-branches. 61 Mergers were also organized between overlapping setting-ups at 
lower levels. 62 
58 See Xv, Xingtang, `The PBOC New Branch System Will Start on January 1,1999 [zhongguo renmin yanhang 
xin guanli tizhi 1999 nian yi yue yi ri kaishi yunxing]', People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 4 (December 31, 
1998). 
59 Id. 
60 See Chen, Jianhua, supra note 54, at 23. 
61 See Jiao, Jinpu, supra note 44. 
62 See Chen, Jianhua, supra note 54, at 23. 
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Table 1: The PBOC's New Regional Branches 
Regional Branches Directorial Areas* The First Regional Branch Heads and 
Their Previous Post 
Shanghai Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian Wu, Xiangling/Director of the State 
Foreign Exchange Administration 
Tianjin Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Liu, Congming/Director of the PBOC 
Mongolia Bank Supervision Department 
Guangzhou Guangdong, Guangxi, Henan Jiang, Chaoliang/Director of the 
PBOC Shenzhen Branch 
Nanjing Jiangsu, Anhui Liu, Zhaofu/Director of the PBOC 
Tianjin Branch 
Shenyang Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang Tan, Jingshun/Director of the PBOC's 
Gansu Branch 
Wuhan Jiangxi, Hubei, Henan Hu, Pingxi/ Director of the PBOC 
Fujian Branch 
Xi'an Shangxi, Gansu, Qinhai, Ningxia, Ye, Yingnan/Director of the PBOC's 
Xinjiang Heilongjiang Branch 
Jinan Shandong, Henan Bai, Shichun/Director of the PBOC 
Jiangsu Branch 
Chengdu Sichuang, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet Wang, Weigiang/Shanxi the 
Provincial Secretary-General of the 
CPC 
* Beijing and Chongqing are under the direct jurisdiction of the PBOC headquarters. 
Sources: Chinaonline, 'A Siginificant Reform of the PBOC Organizational System [zhongyan yinhang guanli 
tizhi de zhongda gaige]', China Finance No. 11,82 (November 1998); Chinaonline, `Evolution of China's 
Central Bank Regional Branch System' (January 27,1999), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/top_stories/today_b2_990119 /8. html '. 
3. The PBOC Regulations on Financial Supervisory Responsibilities 
The PBOC Regulations on Financial Supervisory Responsibilities63 is a very important 
document on banking regulation and supervision. The Regulations mainly provide for the 
63 Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Jinrong Jianguan Zerenzhi (zhaixing), issued by the PBOC on April 24,1999. 
The PBOC started drafting the Regulations as early as the second half of 1996. In October 1998, the PBOC 
started revising the first draft and eventually issued the Regulation in April 1999. 
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division of supervisory duties between the PBOC headquarters and its branches at various 
levels, the qualification for supervisory personnel, the assessment and monitoring of the 
financial supervisors at various levels, and punishments against illegal financial institutions 
and illegal financial activities. 64 
(i) The Division of Supervisory Duties between the PBOC Headquarters and Its 
Branches at Various Levels 
The Central Banking Law provides for the relationships between the PBOC headquarters and 
its branches that the PBOC headquarters "shall exercise centralized and unified leadership 
and control over its branches. "65 With regard to the division of supervisory duties between 
the PBOC headquarters and its branches, the law provides in principle that branches of the 
PBOC should "as authorized by the People's Bank of China, be responsible for the 
supervision and control over the financial operations and for handling relevant business 
operations in areas under their respective jurisdiction. "66 
The Regulations divide the supervisory duties among the PBOC headquarters and its 
branches according to the principles of "unified supervision" and "locality". The Regulations 
focus on the division of the supervisory duties between the PBOC headquarters and its 
regional branches, and only provide in principle the supervisory duties of its sub-branches, 
central sub-sub-branches, and county branches, leaving detailed provisions to the regional 
branches. 67 
According to the regulations, the PBOC headquarters should formulate national 
financial supervisory policies, supervise national financial institutions and foreign-invested 
financial institutions, and examine and monitor the supervisory works of its branches at 
various levels. Given the fact that the operations of the ten new emerging commercial 
banks68 are not limited within the jurisdiction of any single regional branch, to have a 
64 See generally Ma, Junqi, `The PBOC Will Introduce Financial Supervision Responsibility System [mingque 
jianguan zeren, tigao jianguan xiaoli- jianjie "zhongguo renmin yinhang jingrong jianguan 
zerenzhi"(zhaixiang)]', China Finance No. 7,12 (July 1999). 
65 The Central Banking Law, supra note 5, art. 12. 
661d. 
67 See generally Ma, Junqi, supra note 64, at 13. 
68 They are: BOCOM, China Everbright Bank, CITIC Industrial Bank, China Merchants Bank, Huaxia Bank, 
China Minsheng Banking Corporation, Hainan Development Bank, Fujian Industrial Bank, Guangdong 
Development Bank and Pudong Development Bank, Most of them were established in 1990s. 
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consolidated supervision over these banks, the Regulations provide that the headquarters of 
the PBOC should take the responsibility to supervise these banks. 
The regional branches are authorized grand supervisory powers by the Regulations. In 
addition to supervise financial institutions of the same administrative level within their 
jurisdictions, 69 they are in charge of the day-to-day supervision of the branches of the state 
policy banks and the "big four", including the qualification control of the branch managers. 
Moreover, they are authorized to carry out supervision over urban and rural credit 
cooperatives. 70 
The prefecture-level sub branches are authorized to carry out supervision over 
financial institutions registered within its jurisdiction and the county associations of rural and 
urban credit cooperatives, while the sub-sub-branches at county level are authorized to 
exercise supervision over rural credit cooperatives. 71 
(ii) The Assessment and Monitoring of the Financial Supervisors at various Levels 
The Regulations provide for a strict assessment of the performance of individual supervisors 
at various levels and the system of awards and penalties. The Regulations also provide for the 
qualification for supervisors. Due to the lack of experience, these provisions, however, are 
mainly broad provisions in principle. 72 
4. Summary 
Sufficient CBI is essential for the PBOC to carry out its duties of financial regulation and 
supervisions. China's Central Banking Law has granted the PBOC some independence and 
autonomy to carry out its tasks. What the PBOC enjoys, however, is only limited 
independence. The PBOC must carry out it duties under the leadership of the State Council. 
Whether this kind of limited independence is sufficient for the PBOC to exercise properly, its 
duties to regulate and supervise financial industry remains a question. 
69 E. g., the regional branches take full responsibility to supervise city commercial banks, although they have to 
get approval from the PBOC headquarters about the entrance and exit of city commercial banks. See Ma, Junqi, 
supra note 64, at 13. 
70 Id. 
'1 Id. 
72 Id. With regard to penalties, for example, the Regulations only provide penalties against those who "don't 
carry out their supervisory duties according to relevant laws and regulations, or don't report the identified 
problems, or don't deal with the problem according to the instruction from higher-level officials. " Id. 
303 
The recent restructuring of the PBOC organizational structure is a great step forward. 
First, an efficient internal institutional structure of the PBOC facilitates the PBOC to exercise 
more efficient banking regulation and supervision. Second, the internal institutional structure 
of the PBOC is relevant to the relationships between the PBOC and government departments, 
and that between the PBOC and financial institutions. 
To clarify the supervisory duties between the PBOC headquarters and its branches at 
various levels, the PBOC issued Regulations on Financial Supervisory Responsibilities in 
April 1999. The regulations divide the supervisory duties of the PBOC headquarters and 
branches according to the principles of "unified supervision" and "locality". The Regulations 
also provide for the performance assessing of individual banking supervisors at various 
levels, including the award and penalty system. These Regulations will certainly help the 
PBOC to develop a more efficient banking regulatory and supervisory system. 
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ANNEX XII: THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANK LOAN CLASSIFICATION AND 
PROVISIONING SYSTEM IN CHINA 
Loan classification and provisioning practices are essential to the bank credit risk 
management - "Such practices can significantly affect the accuracy of public financial 
reporting and the potential for market discipline. In addition, loan accounting treatments have 
a bearing on the effectiveness of supervisory approaches, including capital requirements.... 
Weak or inadequate loan loss provisioning practices and poor transparency are major sources 
of risk to individual banks and the banking system as a whole"' Experiences indicate that the 
most common cause of bank failures, by far, is poor credit quality and credit risk 
management. 2 
The Basle Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision require that "banks 
establish and adhere to adequate policies, practices and procedures for evaluating the quality 
of assets and the adequacy of loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves". 3 In July 1999, the 
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision issued Sound Practices for Loan Accounting and 
Disclosure, 4 in an attempt to achieve further harmonization in this critical area. In particular, 
the Sound Practices elaborates on certain provisions of the Core Principles, namely, principle 
8, and the first two clauses of principle 21. 
The Basel Committee lists out 26 rules in its Sound Practices for Loan Accounting 
and Disclosure, including rules on foundations for sound accountings (rules 1-3), rules on 
accountings for loans (loan recognition, de-recognition and measurement, rules 4-6; loan 
impairment recognition and measurement, rules 7-8; adequacy of the overall allowance, rule 
9; income recognition, rules 10-11), rules on public disclosure (general, rule 12; public 
disclosure of accounting policies and practices, rules 13-14; public disclosure of credit risk 
1 Points made by Mr. William J. McDonough, Chairman of the Basle Committee and President of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, cited in BIS Press Release, 'Basle Committee Issues Consultative Paper on Loan 
Valuation, Loan Loss Provisioning and Credit Risk Disclosure', available at 
'http: //www. bis. org/press/p981014. htm'. ' 
2 See Beattie, Vivien A., et al., Banks and Bad Debts: Accounting for Loan Losses in International Banking, 1-2 
(1995), where that authors show "the very close connection between bank failures and levels of provisioning 
against loan losses" by a brief survey of the Continental Illinois case, Bank of New England case in the US, the 
Johnson Matthey Bankers case in the UK, the Canadian Commercial Bank case in Canada, the Banco Espanol 
de Credito case in Spain and the Credit Lyonnais case in France. 
3 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (September 
1997), available at 'http: //www. bis. org/ptibl/bdbs3Oa. htm', principle 8. 
4 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Sound Practices for Loan Accounting and Disclosure (July 1999) 
(hereinafter referred to as "Sound Practices"). The document does not intend to cover all issues related to loan 
classification and provisioning. The focus of this document is on accounting and disclosure practices relating to 
the credit risk in loans held in the banking book. 
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management, rule 15; public disclosure of credit exposure, rules 16-19; public disclosure of 
credit quality, rules 20-24), rules on the role of supervisors (rules 25-6). It is far beyond the 
scope of this annex to go through all these rules, rules related to loan classification and 
provisioning, however, will be referred to here and there in the rest of this annex. 
1. China's Former Loan Classification Systems and Their Problems 
Before the economic reform, banks in China were not banks in the sense of modem 
economy. Because the loans were not really commercial loans, there was no need for loan 
classification. 5 The situation continued in early 1980s when there appeared to have been little 
or no effort to classify bank loans by their quality. This was perhaps not surprising when 
enterprise bankruptcy was unheard of, loans routinely were rolled over, and the financial 
soundness of borrowers was largely unknown to lenders. It was from the late 1980s onwards 
that some specialized state banks began to explore approaches to classify their loans. 6 
The 1988 MOF Rules In 1988, the MOF issued Accounting Rules for Financial and 
Insurance Enterprises, which divide loans into "normal" (zhengchang), "overdue" (yuqi), 
"dead" (daizhi), and "irrecoverable" (daizhang), with the last three categories classified as 
NPLs. Under the Rules, irrecoverable loans are defined as any outstanding loans with more 
than 3-year-overdue (including 3 years) against the prescribed period (including the 
extension period); outstanding loans with more than 2-year-overdue (including 2 years) 
against the prescribed period (including the extension period) are defined as dead loans; and 
outstanding loans with more than 6-month-overdue (including the 6 months) against the 
prescribed period (including the extension period) are defined as overdue loans. Accruals on 
loan will continue for overdue and dead loans, but will be recorded on a separate book. 
In its Interim Provisions on State Specialized Banks' Irrecoverable Loan Reserves7 
issued in the same year, the MOF classifies further the following loans/overdue loans as 
irrecoverable loans: (1) any outstanding loan (overdue or not) of which both the borrower 
and its guarantees are bankrupt; (2) any outstanding loan of which the borrower is dead or 
declared missing or dead according to the General Principles of Civil Law; (3) any 
s See Dai, Xianglong, To Accomplish a Solid Base for a Modem Banking System, We must Ameliorate Loan 
Classification and Improve Asset Quality', China Finance (Beijing) No. 7,4 (1998). 
6 fd 
Interim Provisions on State Specialized Banks' Irrecoverable Loan Reserves, issued by the Ministry of 
Finance and effective as of January 1,1988 (As amended in 1992) (hereinafter referred to as "the Interim 
Provisions on Loan Reserves"). 
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outstanding loan of which the borrower has suffered huge losses from uninsured natural 
disasters, or, if the borrower is insured, the loan balance after the borrower repay part of the 
loan with the insurance compensation; and (4) overdue loans specifically authorized by the 
State Council to be written off. 8 
The 1995 PBOC Rules The PBOC promulgated General Lending Rules in 1995,9 in 
an attempt to unifying loan classification norms among Chinese banks. The PBOC follows 
the MOF rules in loan classification, only with minor amendments. Under the General 
Lending Rules, 1° NPLs include overdue loans, dead loans and irrecoverable loans. The PBOC 
rules define irrecoverable loan exactly the same as that of the MOF rules, while stricter 
definition is given to overdue loans and dead loans. Loans are classified as overdue loans 
immediately as it is overdue. " Dead loans are defined as any outstanding loan with more 
than two-years' overdue (including two years) against the prescribed period (including the 
extension of period), or any loan and/or overdue loan with less than two-years' overdue 
against the prescribed period but the borrower has ceased its operations or the project 
construction has stopped (for project loans). '2 Moreover, to curb the pervasive practices of 
loan rollovers, the General Lending Rules put limitations on extending the original maturity 
of any loan: Short-term loans, i. e., loans of one year or less than one-year duration, are not 
supposed to be extended for a period longer than the original duration. Medium-term loans, 
i. e., those of one to five years duration, can be extended for a period of no more than one-half 
of their initial length. Long-term loans, those of more than five-year duration, cannot be 
extended by more than three years. 13 
Problems with the Above-mentioned Loan Classification Systems The MOF system 
and the PBOC system have certain symmetry with the three-tier classification systems used 
in some countries. It is worth noting, however that the MOF and PBOC schemes in general 
are far more lenient than the minimum requirements set by the Basle Committee Sound 
Practices. 
First, they are not in conformity with the recommendation of the Basle Committee 
that "[a] bank should identify and recognize impairment in a loan or a collectively assessed 
8 Id. art. 3. 
9 General Lending Rules [Daikun Tongzhe], issued by the PBOC on July 28,1996 and effective on August 1, 
1996 (hereinafter referred to as the "General Lending Rules"). 
10 Id. art. 34. 
Id. 
1` Id. 
13 Id. arts. 11 & 12. 
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group of loans when it is probable that the bank will not be able to collect, or there is no 
longer reasonable assurance that the bank will collect, all amounts due according to the 
contractual terms of the loan agreement. "14 Both the MOF and the PBOC rules classify loans 
primarily on the basis of payment status rather than risk assessment - instead of classifying 
loans mainly according to borrowers' financial condition and paying capacity, both rules 
classify loans mainly on whether they are overdue, and how long they are overdue. In other 
words, they focus on ex post management rather than on ex ante prevention, ignoring the fact 
that some loans could become subnormal before they are due for repayment. 15 Moreover, 
unlike in developed countries, where when a bank classified any loan, it simultaneously 
classified the entire amount of all loans outstanding to that particular borrower, 16 Chinese 
banks consider each loan separately. If a borrower falls behind in repayments on one loan, 
any other loans to the borrower would not automatically be classified until such time as they 
become past due. Worse, Chinese banks classify only the portion of the loan of payment that 
is past due. For example, if a loan requires annual repayments of principal in equal amounts 
over a five-year period and the borrower misses the first repayment, only the amount of the 
specific required repayment would be classified past due. '7 If the borrower misses 
subsequent repayments, they would be added to the quantity of past due loans over the next 
four years, as the payments were missed. 18 
Second, the Basel Committee Sound Practices requires that "when a loan is identified 
as impaired, a bank should cease accruing interest in accordance with the terms of the 
contract. s19 In China, however, interests continued to accrue on overdue loans for two years. 
It was until January 1,1998 that this accrual period was shortened to one year after the loan 
14 Sound Practices, supra note 4. 
15 See, e. g., Wang, Jun, 'The Implication, Principle and Implementation of Loan Risk Classification', China 
Finance (Beijing) No. 4,11 (1998). 
16 See, e. g., the World Bank, China: Financial Sector Policies and Institutional Development, 72, a World Bank 
Country Study (1990). The presumption, based on the principle of risk assessment, is that if a borrower is out of 
compliance with the repayment terms of one loan, the borrower likely soon will be out of compliance od all 
other loans as well. 
1' Standard practices elsewhere, since it is based on risk assessment, would be to classify the entire loan once 
the first payment was overdue. 
18 See Lardy, Nicholas R., China's Unfinished Economic Revolution, 116-124 (1998). 
19 This principle is implemented in various ways. In most countries, banks will cease reflecting in net income 
the accrual of interest in accordance with the original terms of the contract for impaired loans. In some 
countries, banks as a result of laws or regulations must accrue interest on impaired loans in accordance with the 
original terms of the contract in their financial statements to protect their right of repayment or comply with a 
prohibition against dual accounting. To eliminate the income effect of this accrual, a corresponding specific 
provision generally will be established with an offsetting charge to interest income. See Sound Practices, supra 
note 4, paragraph 29. 
308 
became overdue. 20 This resulted in the untrue high profits of banks and consequently high 
taxes and dividends paid by banks. 
Last but not least, loan provisioning requirements were not set corresponding to asset 
quality of banks in China. The Basel Committee Sound Practices requires that a bank 
establish adequate specific and general allowances to absorb estimated credit losses 
associated with the loan portfolio. 21 In China, there were no requirements for specific 
provision under the above-mentioned systems. Banks were only required to set general 
provisions. 
2. The Introduction of the Five-level Loan Classification System into China 
With the deepening of the financial reform, the above-mentioned systems became more and 
more out-of-date22 and were finally replaced by a five-level loan classification system. In 
1993, the Price Waterhouse began to provide technical support to the PBOC on the five-level 
classification system under the financial aid of the World Bank. 23 The pilot trial was first 
carried out in the BOCOM. From 1996 on, the Department of Examination and Supervision24 
of the PBOC started to apply this five-level system in their inspection of foreign bank 
branches in China, four BOC branches, and one ICBC branch to prepare for the nationwide 
application of the system. 25 
In early 1998, the PBOC issued its Guidelines for Loan Classification 26. In April 
1998, the PBOC held a meeting of the PBOC provincial branch heads and decided to apply 
the five-level loan classification system nationwide. After the trial in Guangdong province, 
the PBOC started applying the five-level classification system in inspecting the asset quality 
27 of domestic commercial banks and rural credit cooperatives at the end of 1998. 
20 See Chen, Yiyuan, Loan Risk Classification Management [Daikuan Fengxianfenglei guanliJ, 9-10 (1999). 
21 See Sound Practices, supra note 4. 
22 See Dai Xianglong, supra note 5. 
23 See, e. g., Wu, Changming & Gao, Jiefa, 'Issues Relating to the Five-level Loan Classification System', China 
Finance (Being) No. 8,18 (1998); and Wonacott, Peter, 'China Terms for Bad Loans', Wall Street Journal, 
interactive edition (February 25,1998). 
24 The Department of Examination and Supervision was established in 1985 and stopped its existence in 1998. 
25 See, e. g., Jiang Chaoliang, et al., Handbook for Five-level Loan Classification [daikuan u ji fenglei shucheng 
duben], 5-6 (1999). 
26 Guidelines for Loan Classification (for trial implementation) [daikuan fengxian fenglei zhidao yuanze 
(shixing)], the PBOC Document No. 151 (1998) (hereinafter referred to as "the PBOC Guidelines for Loan 
Classification"). The Guidelines are accompanied by an Implementing Explanation (hereinafter referred to as 
"the Implementing Explanation"). 
27 See Jiang Chaoliang, et al., supra note 25, at 1. 
309 
The new loan classification system is justified on all the shortcomings of China's 
former loan classification system. Second, The new loan classification system is based on 
borrowers' creditworthiness so that the loan quality can be identified on time. Third, the new 
loan classification system, because of its conformity with the international customers'28 will 
help promote the modernization of China's banking system. Last but not least, the new 
system puts emphasis on the borrower's main business and cash flow so that creditor banks 
will pay more attention to the management of their enterprise borrowers. This will certainly 
help improve SOE's operation and management. 29 
3. The New Loan Classification System -Guidelines for Loan Classification 
The new loan classification system is established by the PBOC Guidelines for Loan 
Classification. The Guidelines apply to all loans governed by the PBOC General Lending 
Rules, 30 i. e., loans held in the banking book. The Guidelines also apply directly to credit 
substitutes, such as stand-by L/Cs and guarantees, etc. Beside, the principles established by 
the Guidelines apply to the classification of other off-balance-sheet items. 31 
Mainly designed for commercial banks, the Guidelines can be used as minimum 
standards by policy banks and other financial institutions to establish their own loan 
classification system. 32 
(i) The Definition and Objectives of Loan Classification 
The loan classification provided by the guidelines denotes a process to classify loans on the 
basis of their respective risks. The objectives underlying the classification process includes: 
(1) to identify the true value and the risks of a loan and to find out the quality of the loan 
portfolio; (2) to identify problems in the process of loan issuance, management, monitoring, 
28 The five-level loan classification system is widely applied by authorities worldwide, including the US, the 
Southeast Asian countries and most of the Eastern European transitional economies. More and more countries 
are taking this model. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority, for example, applied the five-level classification 
s'stem in 1994. See Chen, Yiyuan, supra note 20, at 4-5. 
2 See Xue, Fei & Yang, Bin, 'Press Conference on China's Financial Situation Held by the First Session of the 
Ninth National People's Congress (Shidang zhengjia huobi gongyingliang, baochi guoji shoe ji pingheng)', 
People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 2 (March 9,1998). The PBOC governor Dai Xainglong boosted the new 
loan classification system in all those three aspects at the press conference. 
30 The PBOC Guidelines for Loan Classification, supra note 26, art. 27. 31 Id. art. 27. 
32 ! d. art. 29. 
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and collecting, so as to enhance the credit management; and (3) to help decide whether a 
bank has provisioned adequately to absorb estimated credit losses associated with the loan 
portfolio. 33 
(ii) Criteria for Loan Classification 
Chapter two of the Guidelines sets criteria for loan classification. 34 Loans are classified into 
five categories that refer to varying credit risks - namely - pass, specially mentioned, 
substandard, doubtful and loss, with the last three categories classified as NPLs. 35 The 
Guidelines and its accompanying Implementing Explanation define the five categories of 
loans and lists out their characteristics (see Table 1: Characteristics of Loans in Different 
Categories). 
Banks are allowed to divide one loan into different categories. For example, loan to a 
borrower under liquidation can be divided into different categories. If the bank estimates that 
the bank will receive 40%-65% of its loan principal and interests from the liquidated 
borrower, then 35% of loan could be classified as loss assets, 25% as doubtful assets and the 
rest 40% as substandard assets. 36 
The Guidelines include specific rules for the classification of restructured loans37 and 
loans that are issued in violation of law or regulations. Accordingly, a loan that requires 
restructuring must at least be classified as substandard assets; and if the borrower defaults 
after the loan is restructured or shows difficulties in repaying the loan, the loan should at 
least be classified as doubtful assets. 38 A loan that is issued in violation of the law or 
regulation must at least be classified as specially mentioned assets. 39 
33 Id. art. 2. 
34 Id. art. 8. 
3s Id. art. 3. 
36 Id. sect. 2.2. 
37 A loan is a "restructured loan" when the loan contract has been adjusted for the borrower's financial 
difficulties. The PBOC Guidelines for Loan Classification, supra note 26, art. 6. 
38 Id art. 6. 








(iii) Basic Requirements Regarding Loan Classification upon Commercial Banks 
A commercial banks is required by the Guidelines either to adopt directly the loan 
classification criteria set by the Guidelines, or to establish a loan classification system itself. 
The system developed by a bank must have clear corresponding relationships and be 
interchangeable with the PBOC system. Moreover, the commercial bank must file its system 
with the PBOC for record. 46 
Loan classification system must be complemented by effective internal controls 
commensurate with the size, nature, and the complexity of a bank's lending operations. That 
include: (1) a complete set of internal rules for lending operations, (2) an efficient credit 
management system; (3) the separation between loan examination and loan issuance; (4) a 
consecutive and complete record for each loan, and (5) an efficient information system to 
ensure that the bank have access to the borrower's financial condition and that the high-level 
bank management knows about loans issued by the bank. 47 
In addition, commercial banks are required to enhance the management of overdue 
loans, and to keep record and monitor individual loans. 48 Banks are also required to establish 
policies and procedures for loan restructuring, 49 collateral management and valuation, 50 and 
the management of guaranteed loans. 51 
(iv) The Organization and Implementation of Loan Classification 
Commercial banks are required at least to carry out an overall classification of their loan 
portfolio every half-year. And, whenever there are uncertainties about a borrower's financial 
461d. art. 10. 
47 Id. art. 9. This is the requirement of Basel Committee as well, which requires that the board of directors has 
ultimate oversight responsibility for establishing and maintaining a system of effective internal controls that, 
among other things, should ensure that lending transactions are promptly recorded, loan documentation is 
complete, internal loan review procedures are effective and an appropriate management information system is 
in place. See Sound Practices, supra note 4, paragraph 24. 
sa The PBOC Guidelines for Loan Classification, supra note 26, art. 12. 
09 Id. A commercial bank must provide clearly the pre-conditions and procedures for loan restructuring, and the 
management of restructured loan. Id. 
50 Id. art. 13. The collateral must be marked to market. Id. 
51 Id. art. 14. 
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condition or the borrower's ability to repay loans, including the changes in loan collateral or 
guarantor, loans to that borrower should be reclassified correspondingly. 52 
Commercial banks should ensure the independence, consistency and reliability of 
loan classification. 53 To achieve this, the bank management should take responsibilities for 
the implementation of loan classification; 54 and trainings must be carried out to make sure 
that the lending personnel has sufficient knowledge to conduct the classification. 55 Besides, 
an internal reporting system must be established so that lending personnel can report the 
situation about loans and relevant borrowers to the department in charge of loan 
classification, 56 and that bank management knows about the loan quality and its changes. 57 
The internal auditors of a bank should examine and analyze the policies and 
procedures for loan classification and their implementation periodically and report in writing 
to bank management or the board of directors. 58 
(v) Banking Supervisor's Evaluation of a Bank's Loan Classification Policies and 
Practices 
The PBOC guidelines provide that the PBOC should monitor the loan quality of a 
commercial bank in the light of the information collected through regular supervisory 
reporting59 or on-site inspection. 60 According to the Guidelines, on-site inspections should be 
carried out once a year in principle; while stricter supervision may be imposed on those 
problematic banks. 6' The PBOC's supervision is not limited to carrying out independently 
loan classification when examining the loan quality of a bank, but also includes evaluating 
the bank's credit policies, credit management system, criteria and procedures for loan 
classification, and loan classification results. 62 
52 Id. art. 16. 
531d. art. 17. 
54 Id 
ss Id art. 18. 
36 Id. art. 20. 
57 Id. art. 19. 
"Id. art. 21. 
59 Commercial banks are obliged to report information concerning loan classification to the PBOC upon request. 
Id. art. 25. 
60 Id. art. 22. 
61 Id. art. 23. 
62 Id. art. 24. 
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The Implementing Explanation provides for the procedures and methodologies the 
PBOC should employ in its supervision of a commercial bank's loan quality. 63 Accordingly, 
the PBOC should evaluate the loan classification system of a bank and analyze the reliability 
and objectivity of the bank's loan classification procedures. The PBOC should make sure that 
the bank's loan classification system complies with the minimum requirements set by the 
PBOC Guidelines and corresponds to the system provided by the PBOC Guidelines. 64 In 
deciding whether a bank has classified an individual loan appropriately, the PBOC shall give 
consideration to: 65 (1) the borrower's paying capacity, 66 (2) the borrower's repayment 
record, 67 (3) the borrower's willingness to repay the loan, (4) the collateral or guarantee for 
the loan, 68 (5) the legal documentation of the loan, 69 and (6) the credit management of the 
bank. 7° 
(vi) NPL Provisioning 
With regard to NPL provisioning, the PBOC Guidelines has not gone any further than the 
Commercial Banking Law, which provides that "commercial banks shall retain a provision 
against NPLs and write off loan losses in pursuance of relevant state regulations . 
%t7 1 The 
PBOC Guidelines only provide in principle for NPL provisioning as well. According to the 
PBOC Guidelines, commercial banks should establish NPL provisioning system according to 
63 The Implementing Explanation, supra note 26, sect. 2.1. The procedures and methodologies discussed below 
should be followed by bank internal auditors in auditing the loan classification of their banks, as well. Id. 
64 Id sect. 2.11. 
65 The PBOC Guidelines for Loan Classification, supra note 26, art. 5. 
66 The borrower's paying capacity is the core factor for loan classification. The borrower's paying capacity must 
be judged on various factors, including the borrower's cash flow, financial condition, and other non-financial 
factors that affect the borrower's paying capacity. Id. art. 5; and the Implementing Explanation, supra note 26, 
sect. 2.13. 
67 The repayment record is usually the starting point to classify an individual loan. The repayment record, 
however, cannot substitute other analyses. For example, usually a loan can be classified as normal loan if it not 
overdue or less than 30 days overdue. If the borrower's financial condition deteriorates, however, the loan 
should be classified at least as specially mentioned assets. The Implementing Explanation to the Loan 
Classification Guidelines, supra note 26, sect. 2.12. 
68 The collateral or the guarantee of a loan is the secondary debt service resources. When there is problem with 
the borrower's paying capacity, the marketability of the collateral and the guarantee's paying capacity and 
willingness is essential to the bank's ability to collect loan principal and interests. Id. sect 2.21. 
69 The legal documentation of the loan affects the bank's ability to collect loan as well. For example, an 
incomplete contract, or a contract that it not properly signed will jeopardize the bank's ability to collect loan. Id. 
sect. 2.13. 
70 Banks with poor credit management should be paid special attention to. Id. 
71 Article 57, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks, adopted at the 13th Session of 
the Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress on May 10,1995, and effective as of July 1, 
1995. 
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prudent accounting principles. 72 In addition to general provisions, commercial banks are 
required to set up special provisions on the basis of loan classification. 73 So far, however, no 
specific rules have been established. 
4. The PBOC Guidelines Vs. Basel Committee Sound Practices 
Compared to China's formal loan classification system, the PBOC Guidelines mark a great 
step closer to international standards. Although the Guidelines were issued before the Basel 
Committee Sound Practices for Loan Accounting and Disclosure, the Guidelines are in 
conformity with the Sound Practices in principle. 74 The Guidelines, however, are far behind 
the Sound Practices in disclosure requirements. Besides, the Guidelines have not set out 
detailed rules for loan provisioning. 
(i) The Guidelines Comply with the Foundations for Sound Accounting Set out by the 
Basel Committee 
The Basel Committee Sound Practices set out three foundations for sound accounting, i. e. - 
(1) a bank should adopt a sound system for managing credit risk; 75 (2) Judgments by 
management relating to the recognition and measurement of impairment should be made in 
accordance with documented policies and procedures that reflect such principles as 
consistency and prudence; 76 and (3) The selection and application of accounting policies and 
procedures should conform to fundamental accounting concepts. 77 
The PBOC Guidelines complies with these foundations for sound accounting by 
requiring - (1) that commercial banks in China either adopt the Guidelines directly, or 
establish a system fitting their special needs on the basis of the minimum requirements set by 
the Guidelines; (2) that the loan classification system be complemented by effective internal 
controls commensurate with the size, nature, and the complexity of a bank's lending 
72 The PBOC Guidelines for Loan Classification, supra note 26, art. 28. 
" Id. 
74 Since a consultative paper of the Sound Practices was issued as early as in 1998. The author assumes that the 
PBOC drafted the Guidelines on the basis on the Basel Committee Consultative paper. 
75 Sound Practices, supra note 4, principle 1. 
76 Id. principle 2. 
77 Id. principle 3. 
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operations; and (3) that commercial banks ensure the independence, consistency, and the 
reliability of loan classification. 
(ii) The Loan Classification Criteria and Loan Classification Procedures Set Out by 
the Guidelines Are in Conformity with the Basel Committee Recommendation 
The new loan classification system established by the Guidelines focuses on borrowers' 
paying capacity, rather than whether the loan is past due or not. This is in conformity with 
the recommendation of the Basel Committee that "[t]he evaluation of each loan or group of 
related loans should be based upon the creditworthiness of the particular borrower and the 
creditworthiness of the group to which the borrower belongs. The focus of the assessment of 
impairment is the ability of the borrower to repay all amounts due according to the 
contractual terms of the loan agreement. s78 
Other factors relevant to the assessment of the bank's ability to collect loans 
recommended by the Basel Committee, such as "the debtor's payment record, overall 
financial condition and resources, debt service capacity, financial performance, net worth and 
future prospects; the prospects for support from any financially responsible guarantors; the 
nature and degree of protection provided by the current and stabilized cash flow and value of 
any underlying collateral, etc. '9979 are also included in the PBOC Guidelines. 
80 
To ensure that the impairment in loans is identified in a timely manner, the Basel 
Committee requires that "loans be reviewed for impairment in credit quality on a regular 
basis"81 and that "[r]ecognition of impairment should be considered whenever circumstances 
cause uncertainty about a borrower's ability to repay all amounts due according to the 
contractual terms of the loan agreement. 9,82 These have been included in the Guidelines as 
well. 83 
78 Id. paragraph 44. 
79 Id. 
80 The PBOC Guidelines for Loan Classification, supra note 26, art. 5. 
81 Sound Practices, supra note 4, paragraph 43. 
82 Id. paragraph 46. 
83 The PBOC Guidelines for Loan Classification, supra note 16, art. 16. This article requires that Commercial 
banks should at least carry out an overall classification of their loan portfolio every six months; and whenever 
circumstances cause uncertainty about a borrower's financial condition or the borrower's ability to repay loans, 
impairment should be recognized timely. 
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In addition, the Guidelines require that commercial banks pay special attention to 
overdue loans, 84 establish policies and procedures for loan restructuring, 85 and monitor and 
analyze collateral86 and guaranteed loans periodically. 87 All these are in conformity with the 
Basel Committee recommendation. 88 
(iii) The Guidelines Are Far behind the Sound Practices in Disclosure Requirement 
Transparency has been a key concept for the new international financial architecture. The 
Basel Committee has issued general recommendations about disclosures by banks in the 
paper titled Enhancing Bank Transparency. 89 As a minimum requirement, the Committee has 
identified the following four broad areas in which all banks in their annual financial reports 
should provide clear and concise information with respect to the credit risk in their loan 
portfolio: accounting policies and practices; credit risk management; credit exposures 
(including information about types of loans, domestic versus international loans, loans 
secured by collateral, and unsecured loans); and credit quality. 90 
Accordingly, A bank should provide information on its accounting policies and 
practices in the accounting for loans and loan impairment, the methods employed to apply 
those polices, 91 and information on the accounting policies and methods it uses to determine 
specific and general allowances. 92 Disclosures on credit risk management should include 
information on its risk management and control policies, and practices to mitigate credit risk, 
such as the policies and practices for requiring collateral and guarantees, periodic review of 
loans and collateral, credit risk classification systems (loan grading systems), internal credit 
84 Id. art. 12. 
85 Id. A commercial bank must provide clearly the pre-conditions and procedures for loan restructuring, and the 
management of restructured loan. Id. 
86 Id. art. 13. The collateral must be marked to market. Id. 
87 Id. art. 14. 
88 Sound Practices, supra note 4, paragraphs 45,47,48 and 49. 
89 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Enhancing Bank Transparency (September 1998). 
90 Sound Practices, supra note 4, paragraph 77. 
91 Id. principle 13. A bank should disclose information about the accounting policies, practices and methods its 
uses to account for loans. With regard to accounting policies and practices for loan impairment, it should 
disclose information about its policies for: determining how and when to recognize impairment in a loan and the 
basis of measurement for impaired loans: determining when loans are considered past-due for accounting and 
disclosure purposes (number of days in arrears where appropriate); the basis for charging off loans; accounting 
for recoveries; determining when to cease accruing interest on a loan; and how it recognizes income from 
impaired loans, including interest recognition. Id. paragraph 81. 
92 Id. principle 14, which requires that a bank should disclose information on the accounting policies and 
methods it uses to determine specific and general allowance, and it should explain the key assumptions it uses. 
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quality reviews, and monitoring overdue credits. 93 With regard the disclosure on credit 
quality, the Basel Committee Sound Practices require that a bank disclose information about 
past due and impaired loans, 94 changes in credit quality during the period, 95 changes in 
allowance, 96 and the ceasing of interest accrual because of deterioration in credit quality. 97 
In this aspect, the PBOC Guidelines are far behind the Basel Committee 
recommendation. The Guidelines only provide that commercial banks should disclose their 
loan losses and writing-off in accordance with relevant laws and regulations, 98 without 
setting out any detailed rules. 
5. Loan Provisioning 
Loan provisioning has always been an Achilles' heel with China's loan classification and 
provisioning system. As mentioned before, the PBOC Guidelines only provide in principle 
that commercial banks should set up general and special provisions. In this section, this 
author will first analyze the insufficient provisioning in Chinese commercial banks, 
especially the "big four". Afterwards, recommendation for how to establish a sound 
provisioning system will be made on the basis of international practices. 
(i) The Insufficient Loan Provisioning of China 's Commercial Banks 
The big four began to provision for irrecoverable loan in 1988 at fixed percentages to their 
outstanding loans at the beginning of the year and the percentages ceil the reserves. 99 It was 
93 Id. paragraph 84. 
94 Id. principle 20, which requires that a bank should disclose impaired and past due loans by major categories 
of borrowers and the amounts of specific and general allowances established against each category. Principle 21 
requires that a bank should disclose geographic information about impaired and past due loans including, if 
T5actical, the related amounts of specific and general allowances. 
Id. principle 24, which requires that a bank should disclose summary information about troubled loans that 
have been restructured during the year. 
96 Id. principle 22, which requires that a bank should disclose a reconciliation of changes in the allowance for 
loan impairment. 
9' Id. principle 23, which requires that a bank should disclose balances of loans on which the accrual of interest- 
in accordance with the terms of the original loan agreement- has ceased because of deterioration in credit 
9' 
uality. 
The PBOC Guidelines on Loan Accounting and Disclosure, supra note 26, art. 26. 
99 The percentages required were quite low then: 0.1% for working capital loans to industrial production 
enterprises, commercial enterprises, and construction enterprises; 0.2% for loans to agricultural sector and urban 
& township collective enterprises, and loans to private enterprises and individual proprietor; 0.15% for export & 
import loans; 0.2% for foreign exchange loans and loans for fixed assets and loans for technology updating. No 
reserves were allowed to provide for loans substituting budgetary grants, special-purpose loans trusted by local 
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from 1992 on that the ceiling was increased to 1% of the total outstanding loans at the 
beginning of the year. 1°° It has been further increased to 1% of the year-end outstanding 
loans from 1998 on. 101 The 1% provisions for irrecoverable loans are tax deductible. Banks 
with irrecoverable loans more than 1% of their year-end outstanding loans can set aside extra 
provisions. The extra provisions, however, are not tax deductible. 102 
Information on the actual amounts set aside against NPLs by China's big four has 
increased somewhat in recent years but still is sparse. All available data, however, support 
the view that provisions for NPLs are very inadequate. The ICBC, for example reported 
provisions for NPLs of RMB6.173bn in 1994, an amount just under 0.5% of its loan portfolio 
and only 0.2% of its total assets. 103 This ratio rose to 0.70% in 1996, but decreased to 0.39% 
in 1997.104 The situation is no better for CCB105 and the ABC, 106 the other two of the big 
fours. 
The conclusion is obvious. The big four must increase their loan provisions to an 
adequate level so as to facilitate the writing-off of bad loans and avoid the shock of NPLs. 
This cannot be accomplished without updating China's NPL provisioning requirements to 
international standards. 
(ii) General Provisions Vs. Special Provisions 
There are two types of loan provision. First there are provisions against loans that already 
have been classified as non-performing. In most countries regulators require banks to set 
aside provisions for NPLs within a very short period of time to facilitate, if eventually 
necessary, the complete write-off of the loans without endangering the bank's capital. 
governments and authorities in charge of the enterprise, loans secured with collateral, or inter-financial- 
institution loans. See the Interim Provisions on Loan Reserves, supra note 7, arts. 5,6 and 7. 
100 The ceiling for the year 1993 was set at 0.5%. Banks were required to increase their reserves 0.1% annually 
from the next year on until their reserves reached 1% of their total outstanding loans at the beginning of the 
year. See article 2, Circular Revising Interim Provisions on State Specialized Banks' Irrecoverable Loan 
Reserves, issued by the Ministry of Finance and effective as of January 1,1992. 
101 See Circular of the Ministry of Finance on the Non-Accrual Loans and Loan Loss Provisions, Chengshi 
Jinrong Bao ( July 21 1998). 
102 See Gu, Yu, `On Improving China's Irrecoverable Loan Provisioning System [dui gaijing woguo daizhang 
zhunbeijing zhidu de shikao]', Journal of Finance No. 1,66, at 67 (1999). 
103 Almanac of China's Finance and Banking 1995,517. 
104 See, Lardy, Nicholas R., `The Challenge of Bank Restructuring in China' in Strengthening the Banking 
System in China: Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,23 (October 1999). 
s See Table 3-6 in Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 18, at 98; and Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 104. 
106 See Table 3-7 in Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 17, at 99; and Lardy, Nicholas R., supra note 104. 
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Second, there are general loan loss provisions that are not ascribed to particular assets. ' 07 The 
mix between the two varies across countries reflecting national legislation and the nature of 
the loan book. 
In some countries, 108 attention is mainly given to the procedure of determining an 
appropriate size of overall loan loss provisions. The main question is whether the level of 
loan loss provisions is sufficient to cover probable losses associated with the total loan 
portfolio. In these countries, all or the bulk of a bank's provisions are general provisions and 
identifiable losses are charged off at an early stage. 109 In other countries, the focus is 
primarily on the procedure to arrive at the net book value of individual loans with the 
principal question being one of whether specific provisions are sufficient to cover all 
ascertained and expected losses inherent in those loans on an item-by-item basis. In these 
countries, identified but not yet finally determined losses are often recognized through 
specific provisions while these losses would have been written off in the first set of countries. 
As a second step, banks in some of these latter countries establish additional general 
provisions to cover latent losses which are not yet identified but which are known to exist. ' 10 
The Basel Committee Sound Practices have no bias in favor of either of the two 
models. According to the Sound Practices, when latent losses are known to exist, but they 
cannot yet be ascribed to individual loans, general allowances should be established. 
General allowances are not a substitute for the establishment of adequate specific allowances 
or the recording of appropriate charge-offs, however. 112 Instead, general allowances should 
be considered to represent an interim step pending the identification of losses on individual 
loans that are impaired. As soon as adequate information is available to identify losses on 
107 The Basel Committee uses the terms "general allowances" and "specific allowances" in its Sound Practices 
for Loan Accounting and Disclosure. The Committee defines a "special allowance" as an allowance that is 
established against a loss that is identified in an individual loan; and defines a "general allowance" as an 
allowance that is established for latent losses that are known to exist, but cannot yet be ascribed to individual 
loans. See Sound Practices, supra note 4. 
108 The US is a typical representative. Under SFAS 5 Accounting for Contingencies (FASB, 1975) a loss accrual 
(writing off) should be made when it is probable that an asset has been impaired or a liability has been incurred 
and that the amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated. While the US Banking Circular 201 (US 
Comptroller of the Currency, 1992) clarifies that the provision need only cover inherent losses - that is, 
unconfirmed losses that probably exist in the loan portfolio based upon currently available information. See 
Beattie, Vivien A., et al., supra note 2, at 20-1. 
'09 Sound Practices, supra note 4, paragraph 40. 
110 Id. paragraph 41. 
1" General allowances include allowances against impairment that has been determined to be present in a group 
or pool or loans that share common identifiable characteristics. In some countries, general allowances are also 
established against the portfolio based on an analysis of its various components, including a review of all 
siFnificant loans on an individual basis. Id. paragraph 55. 
"- Id. 
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individual impaired loans, the general allowances should be replaced by specific allowances 
(or charge-off). ' 13 
The PBOC Guidelines seems to choose the model applied by the second set of 
countries. Under the Guidelines, commercial banks must set up special provisions on the 
basis of loan classification result, in addition to general provisions. "' Compared to China's 
former system, the distinction between general and special provisions is a great step forward. 
(iii) Banks' Discretion to Provision for and to Write of Loan Loss 
The Basle Committee Sound Practices require that (1) the loan impairment should be 
recognized by reducing the carrying amount of the loan(s) through an allowance' 15 or charge- 
off! 6 and charging the income statement in the period in which the impairment occurs; '" 
and (2) the aggregate amount of specific and general allowances' 8 should be adequate to 
absorb estimated credit losses associated with the loan portfolio. ' 19 
Under China's former classification system, banks did not have the discretion to 
decide how many provisions they should set aside. Nor did they have the discretion to write 
off loan losses. The MOF set a uniform percentage for the big four. The restriction on loan 
loss writing-off has been even stricter. Before 1988 the big four were not allowed to write off 
any bad loans without specific approval from the State Council. 120 Since 1988, the big four 
are allowed to write off NPLs only with the approval of the PBOC or the State Council - 
provincial PBOC branches had the authority to approve write-offs of up to RMB50000; 
writing-off over RMB100,000 would need the specific approval of the State Council. '2' 
113 Id. paragraph 56. 
14 The PBOC Guidelines for Loan Classification, supra note 26, art. 28. 
The term allowance used by Basel Committee here denotes the amount that reduces the recorded investment 
in a loan or a group of loans to the carrying amount on the balance sheet. Allowances are sometimes referred to 
as provisions or valuation reserves. It should be noted that some accountants consider the use of the terms 
"provision" and "reserve" inappropriate when referring to accumulate value adjustments of loan assets. In this 
thesis, the three concepts are exchangeable, though the author will mainly use the term "provision", while use 
the term allowance only when refers to Basel Committee document. 
116 A "charge-off' (or write-off) reduces the recorded investment in the loan and, if allowances previously have 
been established, the amount of allowances. A charge-off is made when all or part of a loan is deemed un- 
collectible or there is otherwise no realistic prospect of recovery. 
117 Sound Practices, supra note 4, principle 7. 
118 A "specific allowance" is an allowance that is established against a loss that is identified in an individual 
loan. A "general allowance" is an allowance that is established for latent losses that are known to exist, but 
cannot yet be ascribed to individual loans. 
119 Sound Practices, supra note 4, principle 9. 
120 See, Lardy, Nicholas R., China's Unfinished Economic Reform, 118 (1998). 
121 See the World Bank, supra note 16, at 4-95. 
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Since 1992, the PBOC's authority to approve loan writing-off have been raised to half billion 
yuan. But larger amounts still require approval of the State Council. 122 These restrictions on 
loan provisioning and writing off resulted in inadequate loan provisioning and delay in NPL 
writing off. 
The PBOC Guidelines and the MOF 1998 rules grant banks discretion to set aside 
provisions. 123 But the restriction on NPL writing-off has not been changed. To bring Chinese 
practices closer to international standards, banks should be granted discretion to write off 
NPLs as well. 
(iv) Taxation and Loan Loss Provisioning 
The way in which a bank provision for or write off loan loss is, at least partly, determined by 
the tax system of the country where the bank operates and/or is resident. Tax potentially 
affects the cash flows of a bank, its earnings and hence its capital. For example, if an increase 
in a provision is tax deductible, then there is a reduction in the amount of tax payable by a 
bank; while under a tax system where write-offs are tax-deductible but increases in 
provisions are not deductible, managers may write off debts in preference to making a 
provision against them. 124 It is therefore important that tax treatments do not discourage 
timely and adequate loan loss provisioning or writing-off. '25 
Unlike in industrialized countries, 126 tax incentives have not been provided in China 
to encourage banks to set aside provisions or write off loan losses. Under the MOF 1998 
rules, banks are allowed to set aside extra provisions if irrecoverable loans exceed 1% of 
their year-end outstanding loans. The extra provisions, however, are not tax deductible. That 
actually discourages banks from fully provisioning for their irrecoverable loans. 
6. Summary 
122 For the detailed provisions about the writing-off application and approval procedures, see arts. 8 and 9 in the 
Interim Provisions on Loan Reserves, supra note 7. 
123 The PBOC Guidelines for Loan Classification, supra note 26, art. 28. That article provides in principle that 
commercial banks should establish NPL provisioning system according to prudent accounting principles. 
124 See Beattie, Vivien A, et al., supra note 2, at 27. 
12 Sound Practices, supra note 4, paragraph 9. 
126 For example, most countries that are members of the Basle Committee grant tax deductibility to specific 
allowances or charge-offs in the year they occur. See Sound Practices, supra note 4, paragraph 9; and `Table 
7.2 Comparative Table of National Accounting, Taxation and Capital Adequacy Regulations' in Beattie, Vivien 
A, et al., supra note 2, at 74. 
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The importance of loan classification and provisioning system has been evidenced fully by 
both Chinese and foreign experience. The Basel Committee published Sound Practices for 
Loan Accounting and Disclosure in July 1999 to provides guidance to banks and supervisory 
agencies on sound loan accounting and disclosure practices. 
China's former loan classification and provisioning system was by no means in 
consistency with international practices. Efforts were made as early as 1993 to introduce the 
five-level loan classification system into China. It was not until the burst of Asian financial 
crisis that the authorities in China made up their mind to replace the former system with the 
risk-based five-level classification system, however. The PBOC issued Guidelines for Loan 
Classification in 1998, introducing the new system to Chinese banks. The new system started 
to apply nationwide at the end of 1998. 
The new system under the PBOC Guidelines complies with the Basel Committee 
Sound Practices in the requirements for loan classification. The Guidelines, however, is far 
behind the Sound Practices in requirements for public disclosure. Besides, no detailed rules 
have been set by the PBOC Guidelines on loan provisioning. Moreover, the Guidelines keep 
silent on the problem of the income recognition. Banking regulators in China will have to 








ANNEX XIV: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS IN STATE 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
The board of supervisors for Sate commercial banks is first provided by article 18 of the 
1995 Commercial Banking Law. ' The law also provides in principle the constituents of a 
board of supervisors and its duties. 2 On November 12,1997, the PBOC, under the approval 
of the State Council, issued Interim Provisions on the Board of Supervisors for Solely State- 
Owned Commercial Banks. 3 The 1997 interim provisions gave the PBOC almost unlimited 
powers in appointing members of the board of supervisors. 4 Under the provisions, the board 
of supervisors was responsible to the PBOC and should report periodically to the PBOC 
about its works. 5 Moreover, the PBOC paid for the running of the board of supervisor. 
6 All 
these blurred the nature of the board of supervisors. 7 
On March 15,2000, the State Council promulgated the Interim Regulations on the 
Board of Supervisors for State-owned Key Financial Institutions, which repealed the 1997 
Interim Provisions on the Board of Supervisors. 8 The Interim Regulations set out new 
regulations for the board of supervisors in state-owned policy banks, commercial banks, 
financial asset management companies, securities firms, and insurance companies. 9 
According to the Interim Regulations, members of a board of supervisors should be 
appointed by the State Council and be responsible to the State Council, and to exercise 
I The Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks, adopted at the 13th Session of the 
Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress on May 10,1995, and effective as of July 1,1995, 
art. 18. 
2 Id. 
3 Interim Provisions on the Board of Supervisors for Solely State-owned Commercial Banks [guoyou duzi 
shangye yinhang jianshihui zhanxing guiding], approved by the State Council on October 20,1997 and issued 
by the PBOC on November 12,1997 [hereinafter referred to as the Interim Provisions on the Board of 
Supervisors]. 
° Under the interim provisions on the board of supervisors, the PBOC had one representative in the board of 
supervisor (art. 5), detailed qualifications for supervisor were provided by the PBOC (art. 6), representatives 
named by other government agencies and expert supervisors were subject to the qualification examination of 
the PBOC (art. 7). Moreover, the PBOC could recommended the chairperson for the board of supervisor, 
subject to the approval of the State Council (art. 8). 
5 The Interim Provisions on the Board of Supervisors, art. 4. 
6Id. art. 20. 
The board of supervisors should represent the benefits of the state as the owner of the banks, rather than being 
an agent of the PBOC as banking regulator and supervisor. 
8 Xinhua News Agency, `The Promulgation of the Interim Regulations on the Board of Supervisors for State- 
Owned Enterprises, and the Interim Regulations on the Board of Supervisors for State-Owned Key Financial 
Institutions [guoyou qiye jianshihui zhanxing tiaoli, guoyou zhongdian jinrong jigou jianshihui zhanxing tiaoli 
fabu]', People's Daily [Overseas Edition], 1 (March 22,2000). 
9 See Chinaonline, `New Rules Released for China's State-Owned Financial Firms' (March 23,2000), available 
at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstoriesI00032312/B200032201. asp'. 
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control of key state-owned financial institutions over their asset quality and the hedging and 
appreciation of the state-owned assets. 1° The duties of the board of supervisors of a state- 
owned financial institution (SOFI) include: " (1) ensuring that the SOFI operate in 
compliance with laws, administrative regulations and rules; (2) overseeing the SOFI's 
financial affairs, auditing accounting books and other records relating to its business 
activities, and verifying the authenticity and legality of its financial reports and main activity 
records; (3) inspecting the SOFI's economic efficiency, profit distribution, retained and 
added value of state-owned assets, and capital arrangement; and (4) examining and 
evaluating the performance of the SOFI's chief executives, including directors, governors, or 
managers; and proposing for rewards and punishment, and for appointment or removals. 
4 
1° Supra note S. 
Supra note 9. 
327 
ANNEX XV: EFFORTS OF THE PBOC TO HELP COMMERCIAL BANKS OBTAIN 
EXTERNAL INFORMATION 
1. Borrowing License and the National Credit Registration and Information Management 
System 
To encourage banks to lend prudently, the PBOC instituted a system of borrowing license in 
April 1996. An enterprise must hold a borrowing license before they can open account with 
or borrow from major state banks. ' The license carried information on an enterprise's credit 
record and current financial condition. Because the license was restricted to use only in the 
region in which the enterprise was located. Delinquent borrowers often took this loophole by 
going to banks in other regions. 2 
In 1997, the PBOC started to computerize the management of borrowing license. 
Under the new scheme, an enterprise must produce a plastic loan card when applying loan 
from a bank. The plastic card could be fed into a computer that would then retrieve the credit 
data of the borrower and thus allowed banks to assess whether the potential client is reliable 
and creditworthy. 3 Great progress had been made in the construction of this new information 
system for credit and loan registration by the end of 1999: at least preliminary versions of 
this system were established in 301 cities available to Chinese and foreign financial 
institutions, covering more than Im borrowers including many companies, work units and 
other financial organizations that do credit and loan business with banks. 
In early 2000, the PBOC promulgated the Measures on Bank Credit Registration and 
Information Management (Trial), to implement a national bank credit registration and 
information management system. The system intends to reveal borrowers' credit status 
quickly and comprehensively, and to prevent debtors from dodging their debts by borrowing 
repeatedly based on mortgaged assets. Moreover, the system intends to collect information 
on an enterprise's loans, bank drafts, letter of credits, guarantees, letters of guarantee, credit 
lines, corporations' interest defaults, debt non-payments, economic disputes, stock issues and 
1 See Lardy, Nicholas R., China's Unfinished Economic Revolution, 270 & note 3 of Chapter 4 (1998). 2 See Liang, Minggao, 'Accelerate Loan Registration System Construction [jiakui yinhang xingdai dengji 
zhixun xitong jianshe, gouzhu zhongguo shehui xingyong tixi]', China Finance No. 4,36-37,49, at 36 (April 
2000). 
3 Id 
° See Tian, Li, `Measures to Prevent Credit Risks [fangfan xindai fengxian you baozhang]', People's Daily 
(Overseas Edition), 3 (January 29,2000). 
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corporate bonds. The PBOC Measures request that all financially institutions in China - 
including banks, co-operatives, trust and investment companies, finance companies and 
financial leasing companies - to participate in the system. 5 
2. Efforts to Establish China's Individual Creditworthiness System 
Efforts have also been made to monitor the creditworthiness of individual borrowers as well. 
The first step was the introduction of a real-name identification system for household savings 
on April 1,2000,6 creating conditions for banks to monitor the creditworthiness of 
individuals through their accounts with the banks. 7 
Besides, it was reported that China's first consumer credit bureau, the Shanghai 
Personal Credit Data Center, obtained the approval from the PBOC in April 2000. The credit 
company would investigate individuals' consumer credit, to help banks decide to whom they 
should make consumer loans. The credit bureau is connected with the computer networks of 
15 commercial banks and their 300 branches across China. 8 
S See Chinaonline, 'China to Introduce Credit Information Mgmt System' (February 29,2000), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/000229/21CO0022407. asp '. 6 See Chinaonline, 'Real-Name Ids Required for Personal Bank Accounts in China' (April 3,2000), available at 
'http: //www. chinaon lin e. com/topstories/000403/2/C00033111. asp '. 
See Li, Shoujun, `Studies on Establishing China's Individual Creditworthiness System [guanyu jianli woguo 
eren xinyong zhidu de tuantao]', China Finance No. 12,28, at 28 (December 1999). 
See Chinaonline, `China Gains First Consumer Credit Bureau' (April 6,2000), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstories/000406/2/C00040508. asp '. 
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ANNEX XVI: THE GITIC BANKRUPTCY CASE 
1. Fact 
The Guangdong International Trust and Investment Company' is the first state-owned 
financial institution to go bankruptcy. 2 The GITIC case involves the largest-ever amount of 
assets in a Chinese bankruptcy case. 
On October 6,1998, the PBOC issued a notice [the "PBOC Notice"] stating that 
GITIC was unable to pay its matured debts and that in order to protect the lawful rights of its 
creditors, the PBOC had closed GITIC and revoked the financial licenses of GITIC and its 
branches. 3 
According to the Notice, the PBOC set up a liquidation group to carry out GITIC's 
closure liquidation. During the liquidation process, all outstanding debts owed to and by 
GITIC would be placed under the custody of the BOC and the management of GITIC's 
securities businesses be entrusted to Guangfa Securities Company, one of the leading 
securities firms in China. 4 On the same date, the BOC issued a notice [the "BOC Notice"], 
which among other things, stated that the period for registration5 of rights and liabilities of 
GITIC would be from October 6,1998 to January 6,1999.6 
The three-month liquidation, however, found GITIC was insolvent. GITIC's board of 
directors decided that GITIC and three of its over 200 subsidiaries - GITIC Shenzhen 
Company, Guangdong International Leasing Company and Guangxin Development 
1 GITIC was established in July 1980 as a wholly owned entity of the Guangdong Provincial People's 
Government. It obtained approval as a non-bank financial institution from the PBOC with authority to deal in 
foreign exchange in 1983. Shortly after its establishment, GITIC became an important fund-raising vehicle for 
Guangdong. In 1994, GITIC's assets were valued at tens of billions of RMB. It became a financial consortium 
with an exceptional degree of autonomy, with some 300 subsidiaries at home and abroad. In addition to its 
investments in finance, bonds, trade, hotels, tourism and investment consulting, it had over the years also 
become involved in several dozen industrial production fields. Unfortunately, GITIC has also put a huge 
amount of money into high-risk real estate development. In October 1998, GITIC was judged incapable of 
keeping up with debt service on domestic and overseas debts and was shut down by the central government. 
See, e. g., Chinaonline, 'The Spectacular Rise and Fall of GITIC' (May 18,1999), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/top_stories/breakingnews_b2_99051423. html '. 
2 See, e. g., Chinaonline, `Q&A: Guangdong Deputy Governor Speaks on Gitic and Guangdong Enterprise', 
available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/top_stories/breakingnews_b2-99031516. html'. 
3 See Kynge, James & Harding, James, 'China Suffers Biggest Financial Failure', Fin. Times (October 7,1998). 
See Lam, Joseph, `The Closure of GITIC', J. I. B. L. No. 4,127, at 127 (1999); and Chang, TK, 'The Easter Is 
in the Red', International Financial Law Review, 43, at 44 (March, 1999). 
S The actual debt registration form is a one-page printed form with various blanks to be filled in concerning the 
debt in question, and contemplates that the creditor would attach any necessary attachments to the form. See 
Chang, TK, supra note 4. 
6 See Chang, TK, supra note 4; and Lam, Joseph, supra note 4. 
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Enterprise - would apply for bankruptcy. ' On January 11,1999, GITIC filed a petition for 
bankruptcy with the Guangdong Provincial High People's Court. On the same date, the Court 
issued a notice to the creditors of GITIC inviting them to attend the Court on January 16, 
1999. On January 15,1999, the Court issued a public notice of accepting the bankruptcy 
petition. 8 On January 16,1999, the Court issued a separate public notice of bankruptcy, 
stating that the Court declared GITIC bankrupt on January 16,1999 in accordance with the 
first paragraph of Article 3, Article 8 and Article 23 (1) of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law on 
the grounds that (1) the management of GITIC is disorganized, (2) GITIC's liabilities 
substantially exceed its assets, and (3) GITIC is unable to pay its huge debts on time. 9 KPMG 
Huazhen Accounting and two law firms were appointed to handle the cleanup of the bankrupt 
trust - to clear the debts and to oversee investment projects of GITIC and its subsidiaries, 
and to collect money from GITIC's debtors. The notice further provided that as from January 
16,1999 on, GITIC would lose its right to dispose of its assets and that the liquidation 
committee appointed by the Court would take over GITIC. 10 
In April 1999, the first creditors' meeting after the initiation of the bankruptcy 
procedure was held in Guangdong. A creditors' committee was set up at the meeting to 
oversee the disposal of the failed company's assets. " On October 22, the second creditors' 
meeting was held. At the meeting, the liquidating committee informed creditors that GITIC's 
liquidators recognized creditors' claims of RMB24.33bn from a total of RMB38.9bn. 12 The 
7 See Zhu, Jun, 'Closure of Financial Institutions in China' in Strengthening the Banking System in China: 
Issues and Experience, BIS Policy Papers No. 7,304, at 313 (October 1999). GITIC's liquidation proceedings 
were handled in four parts: GITIC headquarters (heard by the High People's Court of Guangdong Province), 
Guangxing Enterprise Co. (heard by Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court), GITIC ShenzhenCo. Ltd. (heard 
by the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court) and Guangdong International Leasing Co. Ltd. (heard by 
Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court). See China Business Information Network, 'China: Court Hearing 
Begins on Bankruptcy of GITIC in Shenzhen' (April 22,1999), available at '/999 WL 5618970'. For the 
purpose of this annex, we will only discuss the bankruptcy of GITIC headquarters. 
For details of this acceptance notice, see Lam, Joseph, 'The Insolvency of GITIC', J. I. B. L No. 6,193, at. 193 
(1999). 
9 Id., at 194. 
1 °See Chinaonline, 'Chinese Court Declares Gitic Bankrupt', available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/top_stories/today_b2 99011803. html '. 
11 See, e. g., Jacob, Rahul & Lucas, Louise, 'China: Government Details Gitic Assets', Fin. Times (April 23, 
1999). 
12 See Lin, Ho Swee, 'GITIC: Payout Blow for Creditors', Fin. Times (October 23,1999). The reduction was 
mainly attributed to unregistered overseas debts. GITIC refused to acknowledge claims for RMB14.464bn 
($1.75bn) of debt that were not formally registered with the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. The 
Guangdong Provincial Court confirmed the refusal at the second creditor's meeting on October 22, and gave 
creditors 15 days to object to the decision. See Chinaonline, 'Creditors of China's Gitic Object to Plan' 
(November 9,1999), available at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstoriesIC9]10807. asp'. 
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third creditors' meeting was held in Guangdong on October 31,2000. Each creditor was 
allowed to claim 3.38% of the confirmed creditor's rights amount. 13 
2. The Consequences of GITIC Case 
Via the bankruptcy of GITIC, China has established clearly that it will not fall into the moral 
hazard trap of rescuing badly run companies just because they are too big to fail. 
Consequently, Chinese companies will no longer be able to obtain easy credit on the basis of 
opaque financial statements, personal connections and vague comfort letter from their parent 
government authorities. Foreign banks and investors will increasingly become the enforcer of 
the market discipline that China's lenders had been unable to impose by administrative fiat, 
thereby helping to impose hard budget constraints on SOEs. 14 
There are negative effects, however. In the wake of GITIC bankruptcy, foreign 
lenders severely contracted credit to the PRC companies. In some cases, they even pulled 
credit lines and demanded early repayment. International capital market financing virtually 
came to a standstill, with several abortive listing of the PRC companies on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange. 15 
Being scared by the impacts of the GITIC bankruptcy, the Monetary Policy 
Committee of the PBOC issued a statement after a policy conference recommending that 
restructuring should be the first priority when addressing problems at china's small and 
medium-sized financial institutions. The committee also said that eliminating all outstanding 
financial risks should be a priority during restructuring. 16 Zhu Rongji, the Premier of China 
suggested that Beijing was working to restructure its debt-laden non-banking financial 
institutions rather than allowing them to go bankrupt, as it had in the case of GITIC. '7 Dai, 
13 See, e. g., Chinaonline, `GITIC Distributes US$84.5 Million to Creditors' (November 7,2000), available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/topstoriesIO01107/0001031 10. asp'. 
14 See Chang, TK, supra note 4, at 43. 
is Id. 
16 See, e. g., Chinaonline, `China to Restructure, Not Bankrupt, Troubled Banks and Trusts', available at 
'http: //www. chinaonline. com/top_stories/breakingnews_b9032514. html '. 
17 See Miller, Matthew & Wong, Lana, 'Official Back Gzitic Revamp, Seek Reprieve Debt Officials Back 
Gzitic Rejig, Seek Standstill on Debts', South China Morning Post 1 (March 18,1999). According to the 
spokesman of the PBOC, Zhu's comments "sent two messages to the outside world. One is that the central 
government will not be responsible for debts owed by local banks and financial institutions. The second is that 
the government hopes that no more financial institutions will become bankrupt. But this does not mean that 
banks will not be allowed to go bankrupt. If there is no other option, bankruptcy is the only solution. " Quoted 
in AFX News, 'China Financial Institutions Must Receive PBOC Approval for Bankruptcy', available at '1999 
rVL 14935612'. 
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Xianglong, speaking on March 1 at the joint BIS/PBOC conference on strengthening the 
banking system in China, said that for financial institutions with payment difficulties, 
rehabilitation and rescue should take priority over closure and restructuring over 
bankruptcy. '8 It seems that there will not be many bankruptcies of financial institutions in the 
near future. 
0 
18 See Dai, Xianglong, `Opening Address' in Strengthening the Banking System in China: Issues and 
Experience, 11, at 14, BIS Policy Papers No. 7 (October, 1999). 
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ANNEX XVII: CHINA EVERBRIGHT BANK'S ACQUISITION OF CHINA 
INVESTMENT BANK'S COMMERCIAL BANKING ASSETS 
China Everbright Bank's acquisition of the commercial banking assets of China's Investment 
Bank (CIB) is a typical purchase and assumption (P & A) case in China. ' 
The CIB was a medium-sized financial institution in China. 2 The institution was set 
up in 1981 to reallocate funds from the World Bank, 3 Asian Development Bank4 and foreign 
governments for small- and medium-sized industrial projects. It was converted into a 
commercial bank in 1994. The bank had trouble in reducing swelling NPLs and adjusting to 
increasing market competition in China's banking sector. Prior to its take-over by the State 
Development Bank (SDB), almost half of its assets were non-performing. 
As part of the rescue plan, in December 1998, the CIB was merged into the State 
Development Bank (SDB). The SDB, being a government policy bank, would have to hive 
off the CIB's commercial banking operations because of government restrictions. Nine 
mainland banks were asked by the PBOC to bid for the CIB's assets before Everbright's 
restructuring plan was accepted. 
The acquisition included the transfer of employees, loan portfolios and other assets. 
Everbright received the 137 banking offices of CIB, without payment, in return for taking 
over most of its assets and liabilities. 
After the acquisition, China Everbright Bank almost doubled its asset to RMB 150 
billion and greatly expanded its presence (the move increased its number of banking offices 
across the mainland to more than 240). The acquisition was supported by the government - 
all the foreign currency assets of CIB, some 80% of which were non-performing, were taken 
over by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). 
1 See, e. g., Macmahon, William J., `Everbright and CIB Merge in a Strong Bank-Weak Bank Rescue', availäble 
at 'http: //www. chinaonline. com/top_stories/breakingnews_b903191S. html ; Kynge, James, 'China: Everbright 
Acquires State Bank', Fin. Times (March 19,1999); Wang Xiaowei, `Huge Credit Risks Seen in CIB 
Acquisition Everbright Takes Over Bad Loans', South China Morning Post (March 19,1999); and Wang, 
Xiaowei, `Everbright to Double Assets CIB Branches Changing Hands', South China Morning Post (March 18, 
1999). 
2 According to the CIB's 1997 report, it had total assets of RMB 74.69 by the end of the year, with 29 regional 
branches and more than 130 sub-branches across the country. The bank's outstanding loans were RMB 35.82 
billion at the end of 1997, of which foreign currency loans amounted to US$1.51 billion. 
3 China entered into the World Bank in 1980. The World Bank approved its first loans to China in June 1981. 
Significant disbursements of these funds occurred after June 1982. 
China became a member of the Asian Development Bank in 1986. 
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